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ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the Islamic resurgence movement, the call for the
abolition of interest and the introduction of profit and loss sharing
schemes gained momentum. Islamic writers have concentrated on
describing the operations of an Islamic bank in an interest based
economy and others have outlined the principles and functions of the
Islamic economy. However there has not yet been a comprehensive
study dealing with the implications of abolishing interest in a
specific country.
Therefore the major objective of this thesis is to examine the
possible introduction of interest free banking in Kuwait, its
implications, operations, advantages and diyantages.
	
It also
-::	 -
focuses upon the transformation process necessary to bring about
these required changes.
The first chapter presents an overview of the Islamic economic system
and its underlying principles; these are the cornerstone for any
transformation from the conventional economic system to a new Islamic
system. The second chapter focuses on Islamic banking, its
methodology, objectives and main operations in theory and practice.
The third chapter deals with the main features of the Kuwait economy.
An emphasis is put upon the existing banking system and the role o1
the central bank in conducting its interest-based monetary policy.
The thesis then describes the changes required in the current
financing instruments employed by Kuwaiti banks in order to adapt to
a new Islamic system. In this respect it is assumed that the current
banking structure will remain intact. Stress is placed upon the
changes required in the short, medium and long-term financing
instruments used domestically.
The central bank's changing role and the monetary policy implications
of a new Islamic system are also analysed.
The final chapter summarises the findings and recommendations of the
thesis and the advantag an4 ay n es of interest free banking
with reference to Kuwait.
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INTRODUCTION
A few years ago the Islamic banking experiment was filled with doubt
and its objectives were misunderstood by the international financial
community. It was looked at in some financial circles as a backward
movement aimed at instigating the bazaar (market) philosophy of
ancient Arabia into our modern and sophisticated environment. Other
commentators have sounded warnings trying to alarm the West about the
dangers of the petro-dollar money that aims at competing with the
Western banking system through the promotion of Islamic banking.
Fortunately these misunderstandings have faded away and a new spirit
of co-operation and understanding has prevailed instead.
The Islamic banking concept is based on two distinct features:
i) the prohibition of nba (usury) including simple interest 1 , and
ii) the combination between capital and labour as an alternative to
t Western conventional system of interest-based economy. 	
j
The fact is that interest on money lent is due ex-ante regardless of
the use to which this money is put, nor does it relate to the outcome
of the business whether profitable or not, whilst the financier in a
profit and loss sharing system earns an ex-post reward very much
related to the outcome of the business. 2
 However, the prohibition of
interest on money lending does not necessarily mean that profit and
system.
The abolition of nba is not meant to circumvent business or put an
end tthriving trade and financial activities in the Moslem world.
"God has permitted trade" (surat al-Baqarat) and the Sharia (Islamic
law) has laid down the respective code of economic activities.
1 Usury and interest are used interchangeably throughout this
thesis, though the Quran has only mentioned nba which
literally means increase or excess and is more synonymous with
usury than interest.
2	 Rafjc al-Masri,	 raf al-Tanmieh aljlami, Beirut: Muassaset
al-Resaleh, 1967, pp 13-21.
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Methodology
In exploring the possibility of the abolition of interest, the
interface between Islam and economics is analysed in order to
understand the theory behind Islamic banking.
An analytical and pragmatic approach is adopted in this thesis as it
is found to be more in line with the purpose of this study. A
mathematical economic model has been considered and dismissed due to
several factors. The economic factors embodied in my analysis do not
lend themselves to economic modelling because there are too many
variables and there is more than one possible solution to the same
problem. This makes the interpretation of the results more
difficult. In addition it does not give an indication of what would
be the right approach or the exact behaviour of the factors under
study without empirical testing. 	 Since we are assuming a
hypothetical situation (the abolition of interest) such testing is
also impossible for the time being. Besides in econometrics, the
results are only valid if the assumptions were right and we do not
know if they are until they are tested, which is not possible as
mentioned before.
Kuwait was chosen as a case study for several reasons: (a) it is an
Islamic country and its constitution declares that the Islamic Sharia
(law) is a main source of legislation; (b) it is a relatively wealthy
country compared with Pakistan, the first Islamic country to abolish
interest; (c) it follows a liberal economic policy; and finally (d)
no comprehensive analysis of an Islamic economy to study the
implication of abolition of interest with reference to a particular
Islamic country has been made as yet.
For the above reasons it is thought that this thesis would contribute
to the current debate on Islamic economics, particularly Islamic
banking and may be used for other Islamic countries whose economic
conditions are very similar to those of Kuwait.
I wish to point out that firstly my analysis is purely academic and
does not suggest or imply to the Government of Kuwait a certain path
to follow. It simply examines the situation as it is and explains
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how it would appear if interest were abolished, and the Implications
thereof. Secondly, there is no indication that the possibility of
abolition of interest is currently being explored in Kuwait.
Scope of the Thesis
Islamic banking is a branch of Islamic economics, while Islam is the
fulcrum and the centre point. How does Islam's spiritual message
embrace economics and banking? This question is addressed in Chapter
1 where the links between Islam and economics are revealed. In order
to expound the theory of Islamic finance it is necessary to
understand the principles and characteristics of Islamic economics
which will also be dealt with.
Chapter 2 provides a foundation for some of the later material about
what the Islamic banks can or cannot do, especially in the way
financial services are provided and how their respective fees are
priced. To better understand the Islamic injunction against lending
money for money, the concept and role of money and the meaning an4
wisdom of banning nba are discussed.
This chapter focuses also on Islamic banking in theory and practice.
Initially the discussion concentrates on the origins and developments
followed by a survey of the various types of Islamic banks. This
chapter spells out the various sources of Islamic banks' funds. The
various modes of Islamic financing are also discussed showing the
application of each in theory and practice by giving examples from
the existing Islamic banks.
Chapters 1 and 2 prescribe the lawful and prohibited in Islamic
banking and economics, paving the way for building an Islamic banking
model for Kuwait. Chapters 3 to 5 inclusive, deal with the salient
features of the Kuwait economy, the banking system, money and capital
markets and finally banking regulations and monetary policy. Notably
the role of the government and banking sector in the economy are
highlighted. The collapse of the unofficial stock market and its
subsequent ramifications are also analysed.
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The role of the Kuwait Finance House (KFH), the only Islamic banking
in the country, is also examined.
The discussion of (a) Islamic economics and banking principles, (b)
the nature of the Kuwait economy and banking system provide a base
for building an Islamic banking model for Kuwait.
Chapter 6 describes the important issues concerning the operation of
the current system, we will be able to place the significant
regulatory and monetary policy changes which will be phased in if
interest were abolished.
To gain some knowledge about the implications of the new system we
address in Chapter 7: (a) the major changes envisaged in the
institutions and instruments, (b) the macroeconomic and microeconomic
advantages and limitations of an Islamic banking system for Kuwait,
(c) the efficiency of Islamic banking in a broad economic sense with
reference to Kuwait. Recognising the importance of the mechanics by
which the change would be carried out, the working of the
transformation process is discussed in this concluding chapter.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
THE ISLAMIC ECONOHY
Introduction
Islam governsthe moral as well as the socio-economic adpoiticaL
affairs of a society. It follows from this that Islamic economics is
baseartTu the Islamic value system. This link between
Islamic values and economics could be inferred from the rules and
injunctions incorporated in the Sharia (Islamic law). In this
chapter the sources of Islamic law will be discussed and this will be
followed by an outline of the philosophical aspects as well as the
characteristics and principles of the Islamic economic system. Some
issues such as normative and positive economics, ethics and economics
and economic problems will also be examined.
The major points concerning the concepts and elements of Islamic
economics are discussed under six headings: wealth and ownership,
social justice, work and productivity, economic intervention, the
demand for money in the Islamic economy and nba (usury) in Islamic
jurisprudence. Since money and nba are very much related to banking
they will he discussed in Chapter 2 along with Islamic banking.
Origins of the Islamic Economic Thinking
Islam is an ideology comprising a set of principles and doctrines
that guide and regulate a Muslim's relations with God and society.
These doctrines are characterised by the notion that Islam is not
only a divine service (like Judaism and Christianity)
i1 aspects of life.
The Islamic code of conduct regulates and organises the immediate
concerns and activities of mankind in their spiritual and material
life. Thus the code of worldly conduct is the divine law that guides
Muslims in their economic, political, social and cultural affairs.
1
BvcontfbP cpnomics of capitalism is a natural or man-made
law.
-
Principles of Islamic economic theory are found basically in the
legally binding precedents known as the sources of Islamic
jurisprudence, in the following order1:
Qur'an:	 Book of revelations made to Mohammad by Cod.
Hadith:
	
Narrative relating deeds and utterances of the Prophet.
Sunna:	 Habitual practice and behaviour of the Prophet Mohaimiad
during his life.
Ijma:	 Consensus	 reached	 after	 intensive	 deliberations
(consultations) among religious scholars on points or
issues facing the nation and not envisaged in the Qur'an
or Sunna.
Qiyas: Deduction by analogy, ie, to give an opinion on a case
(not referred to in the Qur'an or Sunna) in comparison
with another case referred to in the Qur'an or Sunna;
this is accomplished by virtue of the similarity in the
causes for decree (ordinance) between the two cases.
Ijtihad: Jurists independent reasoning (by deduction) relating to
the applicability of certain Sharia rules on each and
every case which was not mentioned in the Qur'an or
Sunna. Independent reasoning was terminated in the
fourth century of Fiijra (Muslim year which will be
denoted by 'h').
Some judicial theologians consider other norms as emanating from the
original sources and these are called Furu, which include Istihsan
(habitual preference) and Istislah (social utility). Istihsan
relates to new judgements and guidelines reflecting the changes in
customs in non-religious matters; every principle in Sharia which is
based on customs (Urf) can be altered or amended when such a custom
has been changed. Istislah is a flexible device based on opinions
Origins of Islamic principles were summarised from the Arabic
version of the following references: Dr Sobhi Mahniassani, The
hi1osophy of Jurisprudence in Islam, Beirut, Dar El-Elm 5th
Ed, 1980, Passim. Abdulwahab Khalaf, Origins of Islamic
Jurisprudence, Kuwait: Dar Al-Kalam, 1978, Passim.
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drawn from experience, provided that they do not violate the Sharia
principles.
In the subsequent sections reference is made to the Islamic schools
of thought (Mazaheb). There are four schools of thought in Islamic
law: the Hannafi, Shafii, Maliki and Hanbali. These schools
represent the Sunni Muslims. There is also the Ja'afari school which
represent the Shi-ite minority.
To all Islamic schools, the Quran and Sunna are the original sources
of Sharia. These schools however use different methods in Qiyas.
Their interpretation and deduction may vary, for example, with
respect to a word that has been mentioned in the original sources and
has multiple meanings, or when an authentic Hadith was transmitted to
one school of thought and not to the others.'
Sunna, sometimes referred to as Jomhour (majority), accepts all
sayings of the Prophet irrespective of the narrator, provided that he
or she is trustworthy. Of the four schools of the Sunna Sect the
Hanaf is rely more heavily on Quiyas and Istihsan (social utility)
than the other schools. The Shafiis acknowledge the superiority of
Ijma over a hadith transmitted by only one person or not confirmed by
other transmitters. They permit al-Istishab calling it al-Munasebeh
(convenience).
To the Malikis, the authentic Ahadith (plural of hadith) the
Prophet's companions (Sahabas) supersedes Qiyas. To them, a genuine
hadith, which is attributed to one narrator, ranks higher than a
hadith attributed to many, provided that the former is in compliance
with the customs and traditions of the inhabitants of al-Madina or
Hijaz (provinces where the Prophet and his companions were living at
that time). The Hanbalis deduction is very similar to al-.Shafiis
except that the authentic hadith, in their views, is superior to
Qiyas, Ijma or the Sahaba's own interpretations. The Shi'it Muslims
do not accept a hadith unless it has been narrated by tha Prophet's
immediate family (particularly Caliph Ali and his descendants).
1 The following explanation of the Islamic schools is based on: lvi
Shaltout. '.n A g idatin wa Shari&', (Islam, Conviction and
a Law, Beirut, dar al-Shuruk, 1983, pp 506-550).
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Is Islamic Economics Positive or Normative?
Islamic economics has been criticised for being normative (that which
describes what ought to be done) as opposed to positive economics
(that which describes the facts as they are). Undeniably Islamic
economics is bound to remain substantially normative particularly at
its early phases of evolution due to a tendency among Islamic
economists to assume that economic agents behave categorically in
line with Islamic economic precepts. Furthermore, they often make
subjective statements moving between pure economics and political
economy.
Baqr al-Sacir believes that Islamic economics is a political economy.
As long as: "We assume a certain social and economic paradigm based
on certain fourdations, then we explain this assumed paradigm and
explore its general characteristics in the light of these
foundations 2
But these interpretations, according to al-Sadr, do not accurately
represent the comprehensive scientific understanding of economic life
in Islamic society, unless that data is collected from experience of
the real world. Usually there are contradictions between the real
aspect of the system and the explanations given on an assumed basis.
The same happened when capitalist economists built their analytical
theories on an assumed basis. They reached conclusions which were in
contradiction of real life.
Khurshid Ahmed attributes a global objective to Islamic economics by
stating that "Islamic economics aims at the study of human falah
S M Hasanuzzaman, for example, defines Islamic economics as
ttthe knowledge and application of injunctions and rules of the
Shariah that prevent injustice in the acquisition and disposal
of material resources in order to provide satisfaction to human
beings and enable them to perform their obligations to Allah
and the Society". See "Definition of Islamic Economics",
Journal of Research in Islamic Economics, Vol 1, No 2, 1984,
p52.	 Apparently this definition ignores completely human
behaviour and its role in the economic process.
2	 IQtisaduna (Our Economy). Beirut, Dar al-Taaruf, 3 ed, 1980,
p334.
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achieved by organising the resources of the earth on the basis of co-
operation and participation. 1
 Human fa.lah, in fact, is a vague
expression and could mean success or progress. Additionally, falah
in Islam consists of spiritual and material elements which cannot be
easily identified without making subjective judgements.
The fact that Islamic economics is not applied anywhere in modern
history precludes the chances of combining economic prediction with
empirical testing as is possible with positive economics. This has
created a vacuum between prediction and hypothesis, on the one hand,
and the real world on the other. Concurrently, generalisation in
Islamic economics has become quite difficult.
Islamic economics, however, does not ignore the conventional tools of
economic analysis such as elasticity, the multiplier and input/output
analysis. The difference between the Islamic and the conventional
system, is that the first uses untestable date (ie, hypothetical) in
the analysis (up till now) while the second uses actual data in the
majority of cases.
Positive Economics, a Western View
Alfred Marshall was the first among the Neo-Classical school who held
the view that economics could be a science like natural sciences.
His view was shared also by Pigou who claimed that economic policies
must be made without dependence on value judgeinents. Robbins, Pigou
and Marshall held the view that economics should be limited to making
scientific prediction and purely descriptive statements in order to
be positive economics.
Robert Heilbroner, on the other hand, criticised the notion of
scientific economics and stressed that even the so called "economic
laws" are built on certain subjective judgements. He gave as an
example the idea of maximisation which is based on value-judgement
"Islamic Economics, Nature and Need", Journal of Research in
Islamic Economics Vol 1, No 2, Winter 1404/1984, p 55.
For critics of this definition see S R Khan, JRIE, Vol 2, No 2,
Jinter 1405/1985, pp 98-9.
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premises such as the belief that a higher growth rate is better than
a lower growth rate. However he points out that a higher growth rate
is not always better if it leads to greater pollution of the
environment. 1 Even Myrdal said, in order to come to conclusions
about advantages of one system of distribution over another, "we must
introduce value judgements from outside economics".2
Thus we can conclude with Anas Zarqa that Islamic economics consists
of normative as well as positive judgements, and that conventional
economics is not free of value judgement and subjective assessments
particularly in choosing between alternatives, or when interpreting
the results or analysing an economic phenomenon.3
Ethics and Economics
The relation between ethics and Islamic economics is found in the
comprehensive nature of Islam incorporating the economic sphere; this
is usually referred to as Muamalat (transactions), with Ibadat
(worships). This link between Islam and economics imposes certain
ethical values. These values prescribe:-
(a) a way of conduct that reminds the Muslims that they should seek
their reward in this life and the hereafter. 4 The Qur'an says:
"ho has created life and death that he may try you, v'hich of
you is best in conduct, and he is the mighty, the Forgiving"
(67:2).
1 "Economics - How Scientific?" Economic Im pact, No 2, p55,
cited in M Saqr in 1st Conf on al-Igtisad al Islami, CRIE,
1980, pp 38-40.
2 From a review, published in the Economic Journal (1954), of the
Political Element in The Development of Economic Theory by
Gunnar Myrdal, trans, Paul Streeten (London, 1953).
3	 See "Islamic Economics: an Approach to Human Welfare", in Kb
Ahmad, ed, 1980. pp 3-18.
4	 The Bible also prescribes a way of conduct for the believers
and is not concerned with spiritual matters only.
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(b) de . (Fara'yed) ,jinps .d— on all Muslims including, for
example, a tax on wealth and income (Zakat) and the inheritance
law.
(c) halal (lawful) and haram (unlawful) acts. For instance trade
is an economic activity which is halal whereas nba (usury) is
a haram activity. It is contended that all halal activities
lead to justice in the exchange process. All haram activities
are forbidden because they lead to injustice and disputes. Ibn
Taymiyah, an Islamic jurist, argues that Sharia has imposed a
restriction in those fields that are needed by people in their
livelihood (eg, sale, rent, gift, etc), banning what inflicts
harm and permitting what has social utility)
Similarly, theologians and reformers in the West were concerned with
ethics and values.	 For example, the concept of just price was
explicitly tackled by Thomas Aquinas (l225l274).2 Moreover, we
should not forget the deliberations of many Christian scholars like
William of Ockham who in the 14th century considered the will of God
the determining factor of ethics, and that "the divine command or
prohibition [is that which] constitutes the rightness or wrongness of
an action. 3
 Thus Ockham's theoLy is very similar to the Islamic
views about ethics shown above.
On the other hand, Neo-classical economic theory does not concern
itselfwith—what is rightorwrong. It views economic maLl as a.
person who seeks his own benefit, maximising his own utility.
1 See "al Qawa'ed al-. Nourania al-Fiqhiyah", quoted in A Al-
Khateeb, Monetary Policy in Islam, Cairo, Dar al-Nanda, 1961,
p113.
2 Bell, The History of Economic Thought, p346, and R Wilson
Banjing and Finatice in the Arab Middle East, London: Macmillan,
1983, p70.
3	 W L Reese, fljtionary of bjpshy and Re.gion, Eastern ari
Western Thought, New Jersey: Humanities Press mc, 1980, p157.
7
Economic Problems
In the opinion of the majority of Islamic writers or Islamic
eTTThtirr-the--eareity-ofresources as they invariably
believe that God has created a. universe full of resources. Tjiedfl
of all races is to seek the bounties of Allah who has provided them
with natural wealth in a well-balanced measure. Hence:
"Verily, all things have we created in proportion and measure
(54:49)" and
"It is God who has created the heavens and the earth and
sendeth down rain from the skies, and with it bringeth out
fruits wherewith to feed you; it is He who hath made the ships
subject to you, that they may sail through the sea by His
command; and the rivers [also] Hath He made subject to you.
And He has made subject to you the sun and the moon, both
diligently pursuing their courses; and the night and the day
hath He [also] made subject to you. And He giveth you of a.il
that you ask for, but if you count the favours of God, never
will ye be able to number them, verily man is given up to
injustice and ingratitude (14:32, 33,43)"
Undoubtedly the above verses are a revealing indication of Allah's
innumerable gifts. We should not, however, forget that effective
exploitation of natural resources requires planning, knowledge,
capital advanced technology and above all entrepreneurial skills to
help bring about an efficient allocation of scarce resources in order
to achieve growth and progress.1
On the other hand Western economists have cited scarcity and
inefficient allocation of resources as the main causes of economic
It is customary among Islamic writers to attribute the causes
of scarcity to injustice in distribution. See El-Gousi, 1982,
op cit, p 19 and A Haykal, Madkhal ha Igtisad Islaini,
(Introduction to Islamic Economy), Beirut, Dar al-Nanda al-
Arabieh, nd, pp 47-50. This is hardly convincing particularly
in underdeveloped countries which are deprived of natural
resources, skilled manpower and adequate capital.
S
problems. Accordingly their concept of economics reflects this view
as in Robbin's definition: "Economics is the science which studies
human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which
have alternative uses")
Effectively, there should not be too many differences between the
Islamic and Western views with respect to the economic problem since
poverty is caused mainly by scarcity and scarcity leads to poverty.
In the previous section an outline of the Islamic origin of economic
thinking and its characteristics were given. In the rest of this
chapter, and in Chapter 2 that follows, an analysis of he economic
implications of Islam is presented by focusing on six occidental
economic concepts which Islam has substantially dealt with. in the
Quran and all Islamic teachings. These are:
Wealth and Ownership in Islam
Work and Productivity
Social Justice and the Distribution System
The Islamic State and Economic Intervention
The Demand for Money in the Islamic Economy
Riba in the Islamic Jurisprudence
WEALTH AND OWNERSHIP IN ISLAM
The concept of wealth and ownership in Islam gives a revealing
portrait of Islamic philosophy.	 It shows how the interaction of
Islamic ideology is interwoven with economics. In the following
passages, an attempt is made to explain the theory of wealth and
property in Islam, focussing on their foundation and origin, rights
and limitation of ownership, public vs private ownership and types of
property.
1	 See Philip A S Taylor, A New Dictionar y of Economics, London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, pp 78-88.
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Wealth, its Source and Ownership
The theory of wealth in Islam is based on certain principles but
especiTiy the principle thEGod is tie creator and the owner of
wealtir1iIngs (Al-Insan) are merely the vicegerents of
God. 1 Of creation it is said: "We have enabled the Sons of Adam,
carried them on land and sea, nurtured them with lawful enjoyment,
and preferred them to much of our creation" (5:76).
Cod's ownership of creation is also stressed: "To Him belongs what is
in the Heavens and on Earth and all between them, and all beneath the
soil" (20:6).
The Qur'an considers possession of wealth a "trying test". God says:
"It is He who had made you (His) agents, inheritors of the earth; He
has raised you in ranks, some above others; that He may try you in
the gifts He has given you. Verily, your Lord is quick in
punishment, yet He is indeed oft forgiving, Most Merciful" (6:165).
On the other hand, many verses of the Qur'an stress that al-Insan is
an owner of his wealth in the form of a mandate or trusteeship.
Hence: "Believe in God and His Messenger, and spend (in charity) out
of the (substance), whereof He has made you heirs. For those of you
who believe and spend (in charity) for them there is a great reward.
And what cause have you why you should not spend in the cause of God?
For to Cod belongs the heritage of the heavens and the earth"
(57:5,7,10).
It appears that there is contradiction between these verses and the
ones cited earlier. In fact careful analysis and thorough
understanding of Islamic principles lead us to believe that the
second phenomenon (man is the vicegerent) is but a natural sequel
emanating from and interrelated with the first phenomenon (Cod is the
creator and owner). God has simply chosen al-Insan to be his trustee
on earth, and subjected "to him all what is on Heaven and on
1 This is different from viceregent which means: a regent's
deputy whereas vicegerent means "any bishop or priest
considered as the earthly deputy of Cod or Christ".
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Earth...". Thus, God is the donor and man is the beneficiary. This
unique relationship entails certain rights and encompasses certain
obligations and duties that have to be literally adhered to by the
beneficiary.
Ownership Rights
Rights of ownership comprise the right of possession, utilisation and
disposition of one's property. These rights, however, have to be
exercised in a manner acceptable to Cod:-
(a) the rgt of possession entails certain obligations on the part
of the possessor, including the protection and safeguard of
property against loss or damage (that may be caused by
negligence, misappropriation or reckless spending); and more
importantly the enlargement of one's property or wealth. Sound
investment management and continuous endeavours to enlarge
one's property are seen as serving not only the owner, but also
society as well.
(b) the right of utilisation embraces the enjoyment and benefit of
property. 1
 At the same time the owner is required to avoid
extravagance, reckless spending, usury and hoarding. Also it
imposes the obligation to avotd improper utlisation by
indulging in wrongful acts such as gambling, drinking, drugs
and all types of betting.
(c) the right of disposition entitles the owner to transfer his
ownership during his life through selling and buying, donations
and grants, and through inheritance after his death.
The Quran says: "Eat of the good thiiigs which Cod hath provided
for you lawful ad good; but fear God, in whom ye believe
(5:91), see also 5:90, 6:141, also: "Men shall have the benefit
of what they earn, and women shall have the benefit of what
they earn" (4:43).
ii
These duties and obligations forbid the owner from deviating from the
inheritance rules set forth in the Qur'an and Sharia (see Inheritance
Law).
How Property is Acquired
Private property is acquired through several lawful means either as a
result of one's own effort, by contractual relationship through
ordinary business transactions, by inheritance, by donation, grants
(Iqta'h) or by pre-emption right. It is haram to acquire property by
unlawful means, such as by coercion, fraud, stealing, cheating,
gambling or to buy knowingly stolen property. The Prophet says: "who
is killed while trying to save and protect his property is a
martyr".1
Limitations on Property Rights
Essentially, there is no quantitative limitation on the desired or
optimal accepted volume of property or wealth to be owned by the
individual.
The Prophet states: "What an excellent thing is lawfully earned
wealth in the hands of a good man". 2 However, there are certain
exceptions according to well established rules in Islamic
jurisprudence stressing that: "Necessities make forbidden things
allowed". 3 These necessities could be numerous and would include for
example: during famine, Islam urges people to share and sacrifice
their individual belongings for the interest of the whole community.
1 Reported by El-Bukhari in A W Wafi, "Economic Integration in
Islam", see the 6th Conference of the Academy of Islamic
Research (AIR), Cairo, 1971. p768.
2	 Reported by El-Bukhari, ibid, p769, and in al-Sebaii, 1960, p
131.
3	 See M Kakf, "Taxation Policy and Resource Allocation", in Z
Ahmed (ed), 1983, p146.
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Calif Omar is reported as saying after a famine struck the nation:
"if (the famine) lasts one year I would add to every household their
equivalent number, for people will not suffer on half rations"
(literally with a half filled stomach). 1 The same principle holds
should the community suffer from scarcity of essential food and
provisions, as also once happened while the Prophet was travelling
with his companions and they experienced a shortage of food and
provisions; the Prophet said: "Whoever has a surplus of provisions
should give to a person who has nothing, and whoever has a surplus
animal for riding shall give to a person who has no horse".2
Public Versus Private Property
The last hadith, supra, has prompted some Islamic writers to conclude
that private ownership is not recognised in Islam until the minimum
subsistence level necessary for everybody has been attained. 3 Other
writers believe that public property in Islam is pre-eminent and not
subordinate to private property. 4 In fact property rights are
recognised by the Quran and the Prophet's tradition; "Whosoever takes
a piece of wealth by force from another man shall meet his Lord and
he will be angry with him". 5
	Islam recognises three kinds of
property: private, common, state property and joint ownership.
Quoted in M A Al-Jamal, 1980, p182. Expressing this in terms
of marginal utility we can say that the marginal utility of the
first few units of food one consumes is very high, as these
units are essential to sustain life. If an individual who has
ten units is willing to give away five units to the needy his
marginal utility will surely be affected. However, the loss of
the five units for another individual who owns fifty units is
hardly noticeable or causes any harm as explained by Omar.
2	 Reported by Muslim in "al-Iqtisad al-Islami", JRIE, 1980, p141.
3 See M Sh Al-Finjari, 1981, p128. To support his views he cited
a Prophet's saying: "Should a believer sleep hungry, nobody's
money is his alone", reported by Abu Dawoud.
4	 See R al-Awadi, 1974, p313.
5	 Narrated by Ahmed, see A Al-Masri, 1975, p43.
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Common property includes: roads, highways, rivers, Mosques. State's
property may include the Treasury (Beit al-mal), government buildings
and installations. Property may not be restricted to a particular
person's use and denied to the rest. Likewise the ruler is not
allowed to keep it for himself or his closest aide or any other
private owner.1
The second category of non-apparent minerals includes any metal which
requires further work and development in its extraction. If those
resources exist on private property, there are two schools of thought
as to ownership. One school holds that the owner of the land may
extract the minerals and keep four-fifths of the yield and pay 20 per
cent as Rikas. 2 The second school, particularly in the Malikis holds
that the land's ownership should be transferred to public property.
Nevertheless the original owners should be entitled to fair
compensation.
private property in Islam is well protected and maintained. 	 The
owner has a social obligation towards the community and other
-.
obligations towards God, the donor.	 State or public property is
sought to serve society and provide for public utilities and
necessities. Neither form of property should impinge on the other.
In cases of conflict, public interest comes before private interest.
Nationalisation is not an objective and may only be exercised for
public good on condition that the initial owners get fair
compensation and that the individual's motivation or incentives are
not impaired. To safeguard peoples' incentives Islam has protected
1	 See al-Umm, Cairo, Kitab al-Shaab, 1968, Vol 2, p131.
2	 Rikas is a tax on hidden treasures.
3	 See A1-Sadr, op cit, 1980, pp 499-508 for a detailed
discussion.
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private property and urged the Muslims to develop their wealth and
investments without inflicting any harm or injury towards society.1
LABOUR AND PRODUCTIVITY
In this section the meaning and importance of work, the concept of
wages, the rights and duties of employees/workers and work ethics in
Islam are discussed. "Islam stands for social justice based on
productive labour and equal opportunities so that everyone can work
according to his ability and reap the fruits of his work". 2 God says
in this respect: "Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of
you, be he male or female" (5:195).
Work andproductivity in the Islamic .teachings are a divine-.duty. In
Islam worship is not restricted to praying, fasting, paying alms and
performing pilgrimage. It also includes performing one's job to the
best of one's ability. More so "the one who renders a useful service
to people is in fact extending a kind of charity for which he will be
rewarded" .
The fact that work is a divine act implies that it is a duty ordained
on all capable men and women and an honour without which a person is
deemed unproductive. By contrast, work and productivity enhances
1 By following the precepts of Islam, harm and injury could be
eliminated and brotherhood and co-operation would be
established.
2	 See Resolutions of the 3rd Conf of AIR, 1966, p344.
3	 See Sheikh M Abu Zahra, "Human Society Under the Agis of
Islam', 3rd Conference of the Academy of Islamic Research
(AIR), 1966, p433. Also the jurists of Islam have stated that
it is a religious obligation for Muslims to try to provide the
means for a happy life for themselves and society.
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progress and gives life a meaning and makes people valuable. 1 The
Prophet says: "Work is no disgrace, it is idleness which is a
disgrace", and that, "The best labour are gaining from a lawful
livelihood" 2
Wages are to be determined with respect to the type of work performed
in conjunction with a fair market rate and by observing the principle
of equal work for equal pay. 3 Payment of wages should not be unduly
delayed. For piecemeal jobs, wage3 are normally due upon completing
the work.4
The employer-worker relationship is marked with justice and
brotherhood. Incorporating these principles in the marginal utility
function, it could be said that the marginal utility of the employer
(eg a factory owner) is determined by the rentier income and also by
the wages of his worker on the basis of justice and equity. By the
same token, the marginal utility of the labourer is a function of his
wages and the amount of rent he is able to generate for the
employer. 5 Thus the marginal utilities of both the labourer and the
employer/owner in the Islamic economy are interdependent on each
other's welfare as in conventional economics in accordance with
Ibn Khaldoun once wrote: "Earnings [from work] is the value of
human labour", implying that idle labour has no positive value
as it does not contribute to any increase in output. See
Abdul-Hady al-Najjar, Islam and Economics, (Al-Islam and Al-
Iqtisad), Kuwait, Aalam al-Ma'arefet, March 1983, pp 20-40.
2	 Cited in Al-Najjar, ibid, p28.
3 In Cod's words: "And 0 my people! give just measure and weight
nor withhold from the people the things that are their due"
(11:85).
4	 The Prophet says: "Cive the worker his wages before his sweat
dries", cited in El-Cousi, 1983, p35.
5	 See M A Choudury, "Principles of Islamic Economics", Middle
Eastern Studies, pp 96-7.
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Pareto optimality.
The Islamic tradition tries to eliminate moral hazard problems by
emphasising that the workers'/employers' duties are not less
important than their rights. For example, they should abide by work
ethics such as (i) honesty and righteousness, 2 (ii) perfection,3
(iii) fulfilling one's obligations, 4 (iv) an employer should never
request a labourer to work beyond his capacities.5
Favouritism is also strongly condemned by the Prophet: "He who puts a
man in charge of a team though there is better than him, he betrayed
Allah, his messenger and all believers.6
In addition the employer is required to offer equal opportunities to
all workers; Islam advocates perfect competition in the labour
market. Accordingly, monopolistic or monopsonic actions on the
supply side are forbidden. Likewise the labour unions' actions to
restrict entry of labour to particular occupations so as to keep
wages up in the face of declining demand violates the liberty of non-
unionists to work. Furthermore it dampens the principle of equality
Pareto Optimality calls for efficient allocation of resources
and that nobody should be worse off as a result of the
redistribution of wealth than before. Moreover, Paretian
theory assumes that the utility of an individual A depends on
thc utility obtained from his income and also from B's income.
In other words, it is assumed that individuals do care about
each others' welfare.	 See A Mohie-Eldin, "Social Welfare",
University of Kuwait, unpublished papers, 1984, p137.
2	 Allah says: "It is not your wealth nor your sons, that will
bring you nearer to us in degree, but only those who believe
and work righteousness - these are the ones for whom there is a
multiplied reward" (34:37), see also (18:30).
3 The Prophet is reported as saying: "Verily Allah likes you,
when you make something to make it with perfection". Narrated
by Al-Baihaqi, see Y al-Qrdawi, Faith and Life, Jeddah, al-Dar
al-Saudiah, 1969, p303.
4	 "Ye who believe! Fulfil all obligations't
 (5:1).
5	 On no soul doth God place a burden greater than it can bear
(2:286).
6	 See Imam Al-i-Iafez (d656h), Al-Tarhih wa Tarheeb, Cairo,
Ministry of Awkaf, 4th ed, 1980, Vol II, p138.
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and equal opportunities for workers irrespective of age, sex, creed,
race or affiliation.1
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE ISLAMIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Islam stands firmly for justice in all aspects of life. 2 The Islamic
-
concept of	 UI3istice aims to provide equa]TEin ties for all
pezsons wil	 earning a living.
Primarily, ownership, labour and need are the three basic elements in
the Islamic distribution system. Labour and ownership are discussed
elsewhere in this chapter. In this section the principles and
policies of social justice with particular emphasis on the
constituents of need in Islam are discussed, followed by the means of
distribution; here the focus is upon zakat, inheritance law and land
distribution.
Justice and equality in Islam means that people should have a fair
opportunity and does not imply that they should be equal in poverty
or in riches. 3 However, it is incumbent on the Islamic state to
provide the basic needs or primary necessities to its citizens. The
primary purpose is to moderate social variances in Islamic society,
and to enable the poor to lead a normal, spiritual and material life
in dignity and content.
This raises two questions: one concerns the powers and
authorities of unions in the Islamic setting and the second
concerns the effects of dismantling monopolistic practices on
the transfer payments of workers. Both these issues are yet to
be explored by Islamic economists.
2 "God commands justice, the doing of good, and liberality to
kith and kin and He forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice
and rebellion: He instructs you that you may receive
admonition" (16:90).
3	 The Quran says: "God will raise up to (suitable) ranks (and
degrees), those of you who believe and who have been granted
knowledge. And Cod is well acquainted with all you do"
(58:11). Although individuals are not equal in status, wealth
and knowledge they are equal before Cod and the best. among them
are the most pious, see (49:13).
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According to Sayed Qutb, social justice in Islam is a "humane
justice" which aims at instituting fairness in a].l values and not
merely economic ones. 1 For instance it is unfair to give social
benefits to a healthy or young individual who is lazy and unwilling
to work. The Prophet says: "It is better for a person to take his
rope and bind wood than beseech people for charity, immaterial
whether they respond or refuse".2
The minimum subsistence level is actually a minimum guaranteed
income. This income could be totally earned by labour, partially
earned or totally received from Beit al-Mal (the Treasury). Thus in
the latter case the transfer payment should be sufficient to secure a
minimum standard of living for the recipients who have no other
income.	 The minimum standard of living varies from country to
country and depends on the degree of wealth in the community and the
availability of resources in the Treasury. This point is rather
important as it sheds some light on the differences between the
Islamic welfare system and other systems. In the socialist and the
capitalist systems, the state is totally responsible for generating
the revenues necessary to cover this social cost. The revenues may
be generated from direct and indirect taxes or through deficit
financing in accordance with the fiscal policies of the government.
In the Islamic system, the community, represented by those who have
more than the requisite Nisab (threshold), shares the burden of
providing the guaranteed minimum income to the needy under the
supervision of Beit al-Mal. 3 Naturally, the State covers the
shortage should the collection in one year fall below the required
budget.
The majority of jurists define primary necessities as the minimum
subsistence level sufficient for providing food, clothes, shelter,
1	 Social Justice in Islam, Beirut: Dar Shuruk, 1983, p28.
2	 See Mohammed El-Fahham, Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, "Social
Reform Between Two Extremes", Cairo, AIR Conf, 1971, p680.
3	 The major transfer payment in the Islamic syte1n is called
zakac (see distribution system). Nisab is defined as the
residual minimum level of inco1ne sufficient to meet the
necessities of one family for one year ahead.
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medical care and education, and a servant (for the disabled). Al-
Shatibi adds to this list other social services such as
transportation. 1 Ali bin Abi Taleb, the fourth Calif, describes
necessities as that which prevent hunger, nakedness and hardships.2
Tools of Distribution and their Economic Objectives
Distribution of wealth to achieve social justice is a primary issue
in Islamic economics and is manifested in three systems: distribution
of wealth and income, natural resources and the system of social and
economic solidarity. 3 The central theme in these systems is to
prevent the concentration of wealth, to decrease the cost of social
services provided by the State and to foster solidarity and caring in
the society.
There are three vital elements in distribution, namely: zakat,
inheritance law and distribution of land. Some of the other
distributional means have been discussed in previous sections of this
chapter and include:4
(a) The system of distributing wealth and income which mainly
includes: zakat, inheritance, religious endowments (Awkaf),
gifts, zakat al-fit'r (charity enjoined on most Muslims
incl.uding those who are below the poverty line but can afford
to donate a token of their daily income once per year), Fay
1	 See M Kakf, "Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation", in Z
Ahmed, ed, 1983, p148.
2	 Ibid, p148.
3	 See Anas Zarqa, "The System of Distribution in Islam",
Jeddah, Vol 2, No 1, 1984, p9.
4	 The classification by A Zarqa is adopted above, see JRIE, 1984,
ibid.	 See also N Sebaii, op cit, 1960, who mentioned 29
elements of distribution in Islam.
(distribution of land gained by peaceful means, 1	Rikaz
(minerals and metals) and booties;
(b) The system of distributing natural resources which mainly
includes: joint participation in certain categories of wealth
(eg, water, pasture and forestry), providing surplus water or
surplus natural resources by those who have to those who have
not, land cultivation and Iqta (allocating barren land for
cultivation);
(c) Systems of compulsory economic solidarity including shares of
debtors in zakat revenues and shares of the wayfarers.
Compulsory obligations towards one's family, the provision of
the bark minimum for subsistence by the State to every citizen
and the right to obtain the sufficient minimum (defined as
clothes, food, shelter and medical treatment).
In the following section, the economic implications of zakat, land
distribution and inheritance law are discussed.2
Role of Zakat in Distribition
In principle, Zakat is considered the third pillar (rokn) of Islam.3
It is, in a way, an act of worship requiring the believer to
relinquish a portion of his wealth or income for the benefit of the
poor. In this sense it varies from prayer (which is an act of
worship also) in that the latter does not require a sacrifice other
Cod says: "What Cod has bestowed on his Apostle and taken away
from the people of the townships, belongs to God, to his
Apostle and to Kindred and Orphans, the needy and the wayfarer;
In order that it may not (merely) make a circuit between the
wealthy among you" (59:7).
2 For more details on the economic consequences of Islam
particularly divorce, endowments, egalitarian distribution, see
R J A Wilson, "The Economic Consequences of the Islamic
Revival", Contemporary Review, Vol 236, No 1372, (May 1980), pp
240-5.
3	 These pillars are professions of faith, prayer (salat), zakat,
fasting (sawm) and pilgrimage to Makkah (haj).
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than in the time spent in praying. 	 In contrast, Zakat requires
sacrificing part of current income as well as accumulated wealth.
According to the first Calif Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq "Zakat is a claim
against wealth")- Specifically it was levied on apparent and non-
apparent wealth, eg, land and fruit, cattle, mining products, gold
and silver and articles of trade. These items constituted elements
of wealth in the early days of Islam. However, Zakat rates range
from 2.5 per cent on idle cash balances, trade, silver and gold
(except jewellery for ornament and personal use which is subject to
different rates), 5 per cent on the products of irrigated land, 20
per cent on minerals and treasures extracted from the earth and 10
per cent (Ushr) on agricultural land watered by rainfall.2
Zakat Characteristics
1. Zakat is an ordinance levy aimed at purifying both the
individual and the capital wealth as revealed in the Quran
(Tawbeh:103).
2. In addition to being an act of worship, it is an "expression of
gratitude to Allah for having bestowed the bounties on the
individual" 3 , and in God's words: "A token unto them is the
dead earth, we revive it, and we bring forth from it grain so
that they eat thereof. And we have placed therein gardens of
the date-palm and grapes, and we have caused springs of water
to gush forth therein.., will they not then give thanks" (36:
33-55).
1	 Cited in M A Zaki Badawi in The Muslim World and the Future
Economic Order, London, Islamic Council of Europe, 1979, p113.
2	 Mustafa al-Sebai, 	 bterakiyat al . Islam, (Islamic Socialism),
1960, p200.
3	 Yusuf al-Qardawi,	 Zaka Jurisprudence,	 (Arabic), Kuwait:
Muassasat al-Resalah, 1981, Part I, p66
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3. Collection and distribution of Zakat is the duty of the state
within the limits prescribed in the Quran. Its rates are
standard (flat) and this rigidity prevents it from being
utilised as a stabilising factor in fiscal policy.
4. Recipients of Zakat are explicitly mentioned in the Quran, thus
its distribution is not left to the discretion of the fiscal
authority; the Quranic verse cites: "Alms are for the poor and
the needy, and those employed to administer the (fund); for
those whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled (to truth)
for those in bondage and in debt; in the cause of God; and for
the wayfarer; (thus it is) ordained by Cod, and God is full of
knowledge and wisdom" (9:60).
5. The divine law and the tradition of the Prophet and his
companions introduced several principles for Zakat collection
and administration fourteen centuries ago. These principles
were innovative at that time and are essential features of tax
legislation in modern times. These are:
(a) the principle of matching certain types of revenues with
certain types of expenditure, eg, Zakat revenue has to be
distributed among certain categories of recipients.
(Lewis, for instance, recommended the "earmarking" of "a
tax on wages" or the benefit of social security fund))
(b) the principles of minimum exemption limit, the Nisab (the
threshold).
(c) the principle of fairness or ability to pay, eg, those
with wealth or income in excess of 'nisab' are considered
able to pay and those with wealth or income below or
equal to 'nisab' are exempted.
(d) the principle that no tax should be levied twice on the
same basis (ie, the avoidance of double taxation).
(e) the Zakat levy can be in cash or in kind depending upon
the Zakat base. In this respect it represents a flow of
A W Lewis, ent Planning, London: George Alien and
Unwin, 1966, p128, cited in A A Salama "Fiscal Analysis of
Zakat with Special Reference to Saudi Arabia's Experience in
Zakat", in M Ariff, Monetary and Fjscal Economics in Islam,
CRIE, 1982, p343.
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goods and services from the rich to the poor. 	 This
transfer is defined as a "progressive transfer".1
Zakat Implications on Fiscal Policy
Having established that Zakat is almsgiving ordained by God and is
not an ordinary tax, it follows that Zakat is not and was never meant
to be a tool of fiscal policy. Though it is similar to taxes since
both have a rate levied on a certain base (an income, an asset or
likewise), it varies from taxes in many ways (see above). Although
Zakat possesses certain properties that make it a desirable element,
it is beyond the control of the fiscal authority.
Economic Implications of Zakat
In essence, its implications are:
(i) the creation of purchasing power among the recipients, thus
raising their consumption, if distributed in cash. As M Kahf
(1981) noted, the distribution of Zakat increases the
disposable income of the recipients 2
 thus raising demand in the
economy, provided the marginal propensity to consume of the
Zakat receiver exceeds that of the Zakat donor.
(ii) the redistribution of wealth and income through the
mobilisation of idle resources by an amount equivalent to the
tax levy. For instance, when it is levied on unexploited land,
personal belongings of jewellery, or idle cash balances, it may
lead to the transfer of wealth gradually from idle owners to
1
	
	
The term is borrowed from Frederick L Pryor, The Origin of the
Economy , NY: Academic Press, 1977, p34.
2 "A Contribution to the Theory of Islamic Behaviour in an
Islamic Economy", in Khurshid Ahmed, ed, Studies in Islamic
Economi.c, p33.
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more dynamic recipients.'
(iii) encouraging investment since it is a tax on the accumulated net
wealth rather than a tax on income alone. The Prophet said:
"Invest the orphans' capital so that it may not be wiped out by
Zakat" 2
(iv) discouraging hoarding and establishing a society based on
brotherhood, co-operation and solidarity which leads ultimately
to the prevention of class-war in that society.
(v) subsidising the poor, thus decreasing the burden of the fiscal
authority and freeing government revenue for other productive
projects.
Al-Himah and Land Allocation
The Prophet instituted a new system whereby the state may allocate a
piece of government land (called Hima'h land). 3 This land is
protected by the ruler for the benefit of society to be used mainly
in previous centuries for horse grazing. By so doing land became the
property of the masses and consequently private ownership of Hima'h
My argument here differs from that of Volker Nienhaus who tried
to undermine the effect of Zakat on growth and mobilisation on
the grounds that it does not change the amount of wealth, see
"Monetary, Social and International Economics", in Economics,
Institute for Scientific Co-operation, West Germany, Vol 28,
1983, p85. It is true that it might not have an inunediate
direct effect on growth but it surely has on mobilisation (see
i and ii above). However if we consider the case when Zakat is
levied on barren land at 10% (ushr) per year, we can say that,
in a few years, the land would be gradually transferred from
the original idle owner to presumably more dynamic
recipient(s).	 Expected exploitation by the new owner leads
ultimately to an increase in the amount of wealth and output in
the society. This is supported by the fact that the Zakat
revenue was estimated at 3% to 3.6% of GNP in Syria and Sudan
(1971 and 1982) respectively. See A Zarqa, "Role of Zakat in
the Macroeconomy and Monetary Policy", Proceedings of Zakat 1st
Conference, Kuwait, 30 April - 2 May, 1984, pp 273-97.
2	 Narrated by Omar, see M ben Ashur, The Objectives of Islamic
Shariah, Tunis, Tunisian Distribution Company, 1978, p175.
3	 The state may also acquire a private land for the benefit of
the public.
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land is banned. The Prophet also allocated barren land to some
Muslims. Afterwards it became a tradition to give title of ownership
to those who actively cultivated land for three consecutive years.
The Prophet said: "Land belongs to Allah and the human beings too.
Whoever rehabilitates barren land becomes its owner; no holder has a
right after three years".1
On another occasion Califa Omar allocated another piece of land for
grazing the cattle of the poor and banned wealthy landlords from
using the same plot. His argument was that landlords can always fall
back and live on their cultivated land should their cattle die for
lack of grazed land. By contrast the poor cattle owners have no land
of their own. It would seem fair to provide them with the necessary
means to yield food and other provisions •2
The incidents cited above reveal the economic necessity that dictated
them. They also reveal the spirit of co-operation and brotherhood:
(a) Irrigated land was so rare in the Arabian desert and still is.
This fact calls for exceptional measures to induce small
farmers and, in particular, the underprivileged ones to revive
barren land.
(b) The distribution of land for cultivation or Hima'h purposes is
made for the public good. In Tare cases the Government may
acquire private land for distribution, provided that the
initial owners are compensated at the going market price.
However, the general contention favours the distribution of
1	 Narrated by Laith from Tawes, see Abu Yusuf, Al-Khj, IBK,
KuwaJt, Dar al-Shuruk, 1985, pp 179-86.
2	 See M Abuzahra, p cit, 1966, p486.
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government or no-man's land rather than acquiring private
ownership.1
(c) The Shariah principle behind this says: "A private injury is
tolerated to ward off a public injury".2
Evidently, the distribution of barren land has far reaching economic
consequences. Apart from distribution of wealth, it fosters economic
development and creates an opportunity to own land for those willing
and capable of work.
The Inheritance Law
Inheritance law is another aspect of the Islamic distribution system.
By this law, Islam seeks to redistribute wealth and to establish
justice and equality in the distribution of ownership. The
significance of the law lies in the fact that its foundations,
including the method of distribution, are based on well devised
criteria. These foundations have long been established in the Quran
and are still applicable today - a revealing indication of their
Al-Qadi (judge) Abu Yusuf, o p cit, p 180, describes barren land
as that which belongs to no one and it is not near an inhabited
area, or used by the public as grave-yard or for any other
purpose. Accordingly it must be in the outskirts of a town and
its possession or holding should be authorised by the Imam
(ruler).
2	 See Abuzahra, o p cit, p486.
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solid basis. 1 Eligibility for inheritance is based on the following
criteria. Firstly on the relationship of kinship and marriage:
(a) Kinship generating through birth permits children to inherit
from their parents and vice versa,
(b) A marriage permits a husband to inherit from his wife and vice
versa.
Secondly, children have absolute right for inheritance regardless of
their age or sex. Thirdly, brothers and sisters do not inherit a
deceased brother or sister's property while their parents are still
alive. Fourthly, a boy receives double the share of his sister.
The aforementioned principles are not without merit.	 Since
inheritance is a transformation of wealth from the deceased to the
heirs it would be fair and equitable to have the nearest of kin as
the lawful heir rather than an outsider.
By this Islam aims at strengthening family ties and eliminating
family feuds and hatred. However, the benefactor(ess) is allowed to
dispose of up to one-third of his/her property for the poor and
distant relatives who are not eligible for inheritance. The Prophet
"Cod (thus) directs you [in] regards [to] your children's
(inheritance): to the male, a portion equal to that of two
females: if only daughters, two or more, their share is two
thirds of the inheritance; if only one, her share is a half.
For parents, a sixth share of the inheritance to each, if the
deceased left children; if no children and the parents are the
(only) heirs, the mother has a third, if the deceased left
brothers (br sisters) the mother has a sixth. The distribution
in all cases is after the payment of legacies and debts. Ye
know not whether your parents or your children are nearest to
you in benefit. These are settled portions ordained by God,
and God is all knowing. All wise.
In what your wives leave, your share is a half, if they leave
no child; but if they leave a child, Ye get a fourth, after
payment of legacies and debts. In what you leave, their share
is a fourth, if ye leave no child, but if ye leave a child they
get an eighth; after payment of legacies and debts.
If the man or woman whose inheritance is in question has left
neither ascendants nor descendants, but left a brother or a
sister, each one of the two gets a sixth but if more than two
they share in a third after payment of legacies and debts; so
that no loss is caused (to anyone). Thus it is ordained by
Cod; and Cod is all knowing, most forhearing" (4:11,12).
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says in this regard: "You may will away a third, but that is a lot.
To leave your heirs rich is better than to leave them poor and
begging from people. You will not spend anything, seeking thereby to
please God, without being rewarded for it, even the mouthful you give
your wife".1
The allocation of shares takes into consideration both need and
obligation. This is why children have a greater share than their
grandfathers because their needs are greater though their degree of
kinships are similar (to the deceased). Also the male heir receives
double the share of the female because men, according to Sharia, are
responsible for the welfare of their wives, daughters and sisters,
even if women were rich, or financially self-sufficient.2
Narrated by Bukhari and Muslim in Mishkat and Ai-Masabih, p656.
Also by Said ibn Waqas in Imam al-Baghawi (436-516 h), Shar'h
al-Sunna, (Explaining Sunna), Cairo, Al-Magtab al-Islami, 1391
(1971), Vol V, p283.
2 See M Shaltout, Islam Akidaton wa Sharia. (Islam, a Conviction
and a Sharia), Beirut: Dar-a-Shuruk, 1983, pp 244-5. Besides
if a man leaves no heir other than one sister she inherits one
half of the inheritance, and if he leaves two sisters they
inherit two thirds, see Quran (4:176).
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THE ISLAMIC STATE AND ECONOMIC INTERVENTION
This section aims at demonstrating the role of the Islamic state in
the market place as a precondition for shaping the framework of the
economic affairs of the Islamic society. Essentially, the
philosophical implication of this role is significant and inc1ud
moral, political, economic and social guidelines. However it is
imperative to note that the dimension and intensity of intervention
is dependent upon the degree of growth and development and on both
the availability of resources and the equitability of their
distribution in a country. In effect an underdeveloped Islamic
country would experience rather more intensive state intervention
than a more advanced one.
The Scope of Intervention
In essence, the religious teachings emanating from (a) the Quran, (b)
the Sunnah (Ahadith and traditions of the prophet) and (c) the
interpretations of the Islamic scholars (Ulamah) provide the basis
for the scope of economic intervention. In this respect the issue is
more straightforward than is the case in the western or the socialist
systems. In western economies, only "in the century before Adam
Smith [did] political economics set out a considerably wider range of
economic policy objectives to be attained by direct government
regulations, or manipulation of economic processes.. .")
	
In Islam
such rules were established long before.2
1	 T W Hutchinson, Positive Economics and Policy Objectives,
London: Allen and iJnwin, 1964, p129.
2 Smoghi assumed that "Laissez-faire, which in Europe did not
become an economic theory in practice until the eighteenth
century, had been Islamic theory and practice as early as the
seventh century". See Joseph Smoghi, 'State Intervention and
Trade in Classical Arabic Literature', Studies in Islam, 4, No
2, 1967, pp 61-65.	 I do not entirely agree that "laissez-
faire" was the policy of the Islamic economic order (for
reasons outlined in this thesis). Nevertheless Smoghi's
statement supports the argument that the fundamentals of the
Islamic economic theory were established.a long time ago.
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In contrast, at its extreme, economic resources in the socialist
system belong to the state, thus leaving no doubt as to the type and
scope of economic intervention. As for Islam, the scope of economic
intervention is broad and can include state interference in many
aspects of economic activity ranging from their guidance and control
to the securing of all functions that fulfil the needs of the
society)- The following analysis aims at explaining and removing the
ambiguity attached to such a general statement.
The fundamental duties bestowed in an Islamic State may consist of
(a) commanding, (b) counselling, and (c) controlling and protecting.
Commanding and Obedience
The commanding function is found in the Quran; this orders the people
to obey their Lord, Prophet and rulers: "Obey God and obey the
Apostle and those in authority from among you" (4:59).
However, the power of the state or its legislative body is not
unlimited. In this respect, the government is bound to intervene and
command within the boundaries of Shariah principles or injunctions.
For instance, "the government cannot legalise usury, allow cheating,
or disregard the inheritance law". 2 Hence, the government's power of
authority is restricted in substance and not absolute in magnitude.
This is a direct application of the Quranic verse (4:59) which states
(ie, in terms of priority) that God is to be obeyed first, then the
Prophet and finally, the rulers (represented by the government).
This injunction reveals many aspects of the nature of obedience in
Islam. The message is perfectly clear and implies that whatever God
and His Prophet has ordained is to be literally adhered to and
whatever has been ruled by the representative government is to be
See Ibn Taymiah, al-Hisba fi'Islam, al-Madina; al-Maktaba al-
Elmiah, nd, pp 16-19, cited in Mohammed A Sagr, al-Iktisad al-
Islam, 1st International Conference in Islamic Economics
(Jeddah: International Centre for Research in Islamic
Economics, 1980), p59.
2	 Mohanunad Baqir al-Sadr, Iktisaduna, op cit, 13 ed, p301.
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followed if it is in compliance with the teachings of God and His
Prophet. The Prophet said: "No obedience is due to him who does not
obey God".' Abu Bakr, the first Califa said in his inaugural speech:
"... and obey me as long as I observe (obey) Cod and His messenger,
[otherwise] you [the people] are not obliged to follow my command".2
This conclusion stems from the fact that God is the creator, the
Apostle is the vicegerent and the ruler is the Apostle's vicegerent
or Califa. The Prophet's hadith states that: "He who obeys me, obeys
God, and he who disobeys me, disobeys God. And he who obeys the
amir, obeys me, and he who disobeys the amir, disobeys me. Behold
the leader [al-imam] is but a shield from behind which the people
fight and by which they protect themselves".3
In addition, Islam is against totalitarian undemocratic government;
The Islamic view of the democratic process differs in substance and
in structure from the democratic Western system. For instance, in
Western democracies the national assembly (or parliament) is free to
legislate by a majority vote any laws that seem to be consistent with
public opinion, whereas in Islamic law, any legislation must be in
conformity with the Divine law. Thus the freedom of expression,
though sacred in Islamic law, is bound by the guiding principles of
Shari'ah, the reason being simple and logical - the Divine law is
more justified, more merciful and further from injustice than any man
made laws.
1	 Ahmed Ibn }anbal, on the authority of Mu'adh ibn Jabal.
2	 See Mohammad Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari, Cairo,
1953.
3	 Reported by Al-Bukhari wa Muslim on the authority of Abu-
Hurayrah and quoted by M Asad in his authoritative and thought-
provoking book, State and Coverntneitin Islam, 1980, p59.
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Counselling and Consultation
The consulting function is part of the duties of the Califa; this
duty was vested in him by Cod and demanded by the community.
Consultative traditions in political and communal affairs are the
£oLpo mt inany_jiio cra L , In Islamic democracy it is also a
divine duty and a moral obligation ordained upon the ruler and the
ruled. In this respect the Prophet "always consulted his companions
as a duty incumbent upon him in his capacity as a Governor". 1 Thus
the duties of the Head of State and his ministers are not confined to
conducting the political affairs of the State. They include, as
well, guiding the conununity in all worldly and religious affairs.
This practice was carried out by the Prophet and the Califas in
obedience with the words of the Quran: "Take counsel with them in all
communal business [amr] and when you have decided on a course of
action, place your trust in God" (3:159).
Interference in the Market Mechanism
In an Islamic economic system the rules of supply and demand are the
governing factors that determine price in the producer and consumer
markets. Buyers and sellers can act freely in their commerctal
transactions without government intervention except in certain
exceptional cases. These cases are not intended to restrict the
freedom of trade, on the contrary their objectives are mainly to
secure perfect information in the market place and to regulate and
organise economic activities in such a manner as to protect economic
freedom without causing harm or injustice to the buyers and sellers.
For instance it has been revealed by the Prophet that it is unlawful
to go out and meet travellers, sellers or farmers who are approaching
the city and "by persuading them that the demand for their goods is
small, induce them to sell cheaply. If this trick has been practiced
on anyone the seller has an option [to repudiate the sale) after his
1	 Sheikh M Abu Zahra, "Human Society Under the Agis of Islam",
AIR Proceedings, op cit, 1966, pp 470-1.
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arrival in the market" 1
 in spite of any contract that has been made.
Thus due consideration is given to the elimination of market
imperfections in the Islamic economy.
The modern day interpretation of the Prophet's message is that it is
essential to bring about perfect market conditions in which everybody
is informed and aware of prices, as well as the nature of supply and
demand. Another message that can be inferred is related to market
forces. It is not sufficient to assume perfect information, the
authorities must make sure that buyers and sellers are well informed
by excluding those brokers or dealers who take advantage of the
sellers' ignorance and intentionally give false information to induce
poor merchants to sell at lower than prevailing market prices.
Islamic views on government intervention to fix market prices, are
based on the Prophet's Hadith and tradition which has been
unambiguously against price fixing if normal conditions prevail. It
has been reported that the people of Al-Madina once told the Prophet:
"0' Apostle of Allah! Prices of things have risen, price them for
us. The Prophet replied: Allah is the Provider : and [He] who [fix
the] prices, and I hope to meet Allah without being asked by any one
of you for an inequality in blood or mal [literally money] 2
The jurists explanation is that prices had increased at the time of
this Hadith either as a result of scarcity or population growth,
while sellers were pricing their products according to the common
practice and norms without injustice on their part. In this
connection, compelling the people to sell at predetermined prices is
not warranted or justified.3
The forces of supply and demand in the pricing structure in Islam are
important. Ibn Khaldun saw the interrelationship between supply and
See Ibn al-Ukhuwan, The Maalim al-Qurba fi Ahkam al-Hisba,
Reubon Levy, ed, London: Cambridge University Press, 1938, p22.
See also. Ahmed ibn Taymiah, Al-Hisba in Islam, Damascus,
Maktabet Dar al-Bayan, 1387 h.
2	 See Al-Baihaqi, Ahmed b Husein, Al-Sunnan al Kubru, Beirut, Dar
al-Fik'r, n-d, Vol II, p29.
3	 Ibn Taymiah, in M Saqr, o p cit, pp 58-60.
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demand and the cost of goods. According to him and to many Islamic
philosophers, including Gazali and Shatibi, human needs and
commodities in particular are of three kinds 1 : necessities,
conveniences and luxuries. Prices are determined by "cost of labour,
duties, taxes and other expenses and from the demand side by the size
and intensity of desire of the city dwellers. 2
 He goes on to say
that price is affected by scarcity of goods: "when goods are few and
rare their prices go up", and when goods are found in abundance
prices decline. 3
 As Rodinson (1978) rightly points out, the
Prophet's tradition has prohibited price fixing and the Islamic
scholars had "condemned practices that might disturb the free play of
supply and demand".4
Islamic teachings with respect to commercial transactions are
directed towards sellers, as well as buyers. The latter are induced
to give fair prices in bargaining rather than trying to downgrade the
goods that they are about to buy in order to compel the seller to
sell at a bargain price. In the words of the Quran: "Give full
measure and full weight, in justice, and wrong not people in respect
of their goods" (11:85).
On the other hand, the government motivated by its Islamic duties to
protect public interest, may intervene in the market to restore fair
competition, and to prevent monopoly or oligopoly. On monopoly the
Prophet said: "One who provides food is favoured with plentiful
1	 Abdul Rahnian ibn Khaldun, Al-MuQaddimah, Ch 4, "The Prices in
the Cities", Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Lubnani, 1979.
2	 Ibn Khaldun, The Mu gaddiniah, trans F Rosenthal, Vol II, New
York: Pantheon Books, 1958, pp 277-8.
3	 Ibid, p 388. Also see Abdul Rahman Ibn Khaldun, "Kitab al-
Ebar",	 Vol I, pp 499-501.
4	 See Islam and Caita1ism, trans Brian Pearce, Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1928, p51.
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bounties, but he who monopolises is accursed and disobedient.1
However, jurists have differed on whether all commodities are subject
to the same injunction against monopoly or whether the prohibition
applies to foodstuffs only. Though Abu Yusuf held the view that
hoarding of anything or item, the availability of which is considered
of vital importance to the society, is absolutely forbidden including
gold or clothes.2
Economic rationing in Islam should not be taken as a rule but rather
as a guideline to be applied in emergencies and in circumstances that
necessitate such action; for example, during the rule of Califa Omar
rationing took place on some commodities (meat), and a moratorium on
the planting of certain crops in favour of other produce of vital
importance was imposed. The rationale to economise the consumption
of a scarce commodity and to secure the supply of another during
famine or abnormal circumstances.
Thsuperiority of market forces is applied not only to final
produce, but also to the factor markets. The level of wages is
deterniineTTihe laboiftThiarket accordTngtthe rules of supply and
demand. This principle is justified on the basis of freedom of
choice and disposition which are protected in the Islamic dichotomy,
naturally, without neglecting the fundamental boundaries of Sharia
principles and limitations. However, there might be a number of
cases where government interference in the labour market is
considered necessary.
Ibn Taymi'ah held the view that an Islamic ruler may direct citizens
towards working in certain professions, like agriculture,
1 Narrated by Abu Dawud al-Tirmidhi, see M A Al-Jammal, Mawsuat
al-Ip tisad al-Islam, (Enclyclopaedia of Islamic Economics),
Beirut: Dar al-kitab, 1980, p206.
2	 See M Mannan, on cit, 1970, p95. See also H A Al-Jammal, ibid,
p206.
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construction and weaving, if a chronic need arises. 1 In such cases,
Ibn Taymi'ah postulated that the workers must be remunerated
according to the fair market rates at the time. Many other jurists
like Shaf ii, ibn Hanbal, Gazali and Ibn al-Jun share the same views
on the grounds that weaving, construction and cultivation are vital
industries in any society and as such the Government is responsible
for securing the provision of these services for the betterment of
the society.2
Therefore, it is a duty of the Islamic state to supervise the job
market to prevent unfair competition, or exploitation of any kind,
through enacting the necessary legislation to determine the wage
policies or contractual relationships for that matter.
Ibn Khaldun advocated a free enterprise system and he opposed
government intervention in the market. The government's buying of
goods for trading purposes created (a) unfair competition in the
market, (b) State monopoly, and (c) escalation in prices so that the
government realises abnormal profits. This leads, as Ibn Khaldun
explains, to (a) throwing small traders and workers out of business,
and (b) killing peoples' incentive to establish or expand their own
business. The outcome is lower taxes and government revenues until
finally the government discovers that the deterioration in revenues
outweighs the small benefits obtained from trade. Consequently the
diminishing returns and the lack of adequate funds to pay for the
On this subject, the late Rector of Azhar, Sheikh Mahmud
Shaltut said: "This is why the jurists of Islam have stated
that it is a religious obligatory duty for Muslims to try to
provide for anything that is deemed indispensable to a happy
life. . . . . if the whole nation neglects the observance of such
duties, this means that the whole nation has sinned and they
will not be forgiven until these duties are performed by
various groups of people each in his particular field", see
Mohamed A Al-Arabi, "Investment of Capital in Islam" in
Proceedings of the 2nd Conference of the AIR, Cairo, 1985, pp
103-21.
2	 See Mohammad al-Mubarak, "Tadakhul al-Dawleh al-Iktisadi fi' -
Islam", in 1st International Conference on Islamic Economy,
pp 14-16. Also M Saq'r op cit, footnotes 2 and 3, pp 60-
61.
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army, deprive the State of adequate defences and may lead eventually
to its defeat "if attacked by the enemy".1
Though this conclusion might be limited to Ibn Khaldun's own time, as
Rosenthal pointed out, what is more significant in Ibn Khaldun's
analysis is "the causal interdependence of economy, finance and
political power, to the exclusion of chance and personal
initiative"., 2
 Notably the views of Ibn Khaldun are shared by many
western and Islamic scholars who agree that governments mingling in
trade and commerce, with the prospect that prices rise, is but an
indirect tax on consumption.
Having discussed the principles of state intervention in the market,
a question might arise concerning the method by which the Islamic
state supervises or organises economic activities. This task in
olden times was performed by the Calipha in person. As the Muslim
population increased and the boundaries of the Islamic state
expanded, the Calipha entrusted the performance of such duties to
officers of sound reputation and good faith. The office of the 1-lisba
(censorship) was charged with the duties of enforcing laws (ina'ruf)
and preventing illegality (munkar). In Islamic law, a. ma'ruf means
"any act, word or intention which is good according to the Shar'a"
and munkar is "an act, word or intention which is bad according to
Shar'a". 3
 Thus the powers, authorities and duties of the Muhtasib
were so wide and remote that they embodied all worldly and religious
affairs.	 Regarding Muhtasib duties in the market place; they
encompassed supervisory and deterrent powers. Muhtasib had to
observe all commercial activities, and in particular to exert
necessary measures against participants in transactions such as
Rosenthal commented by saying: "Here is a North African thinker
advanced through his own experience in his own land and in
Muslim Spain, a complete theory of human civilisation and
culture progressing in a politically organised society". For
more details see "Ibn Khaldun", Bulletin of the John Reynolds
Library, by E I Rosenthal, Manchester, 1940, XXIV, pp 318-20.
2	 Ibid, p318.
3	 Ibn al-Ukhuwan, op cit, p5, "Shara" means the same as Sharia,
ie, the legally binding precedents.
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invalid sales, usury, hoarding, monopoly, invalid hire, invalid
partnerships, and purchase by payment in advance. Other duties
involved enforcing law in connection with the debarring of
currencies, cheating, fraud, theft and robbery. It embraced workers,
craftsmen, makers and weavers, brokers, criers, dyers, cotton
spinners, tailors, money changers, phlebotomists and cuppers,
physicians, oculists, surgeons and bore-setters and instructors of
boys etc.
Summary and Conclusion
The preceding passages have underlined the limitations and
restrictions surrounding Islamic policy towards market intervention.
It has been established that the need for occasional intervention is
necessary in order to protect public interest and prevent monopoly.
Does this mean that economic freedom, and in particular individual
freedom, are restricted or violated? The answer to this question
might differ from one person to another, simply because economists
differ in their definitions of individual and economic freedom.
However, the crux of the matter hinges upon the motives that lie
behind Islamic government policies. Apparently the motives of an
Islamic government in conducting its economic policy are not aimed at
(a) competing in the market, or cancelling the roles of the sellers
and producers, as separate entities, as is the case in communist
economies, nor does it aim at (b) fixing prices on the grounds that
sellers and producers are "greedy capitalists" and thus should be
punished! On the contrary the motives of the Islamic State is
regulatory and protectionary as one realises from the spirit of the
Prophet's sayings.	 This has been clearly demonstrated in the
incidents of the deceptive brokers who are prevented from exploiting
the ignorance of sellers. Thus the need for regulation and
protection arises. Moreover fair play in the market is protected but
monopoly is prevented. Religion, public interest as well as private
interest are well guarded. 	 However, in the case of conflict the
former is favoured. Imam Shatibi pointed out that: "In Islam the
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interests of religion are absolutely higher than the interest of the
worldly life".'
In Islam, ownership of wealth belongs to God and man is a trustee who
is required to follow the precepts and commandments of Allah, the
ultimate owner. These teachings call for Adi and Ehsan (justice and
benevolence), "God commands justice, the doing of good" (16:90).
Individuals and enterprises are expected to serve the public good
without neglecting their own interest. Absolute equality cannot be
attained as people differ in their qualities and aptitudes. Equal
opportunities for those capable of work and a minimum subsistence
level for the poor and disabled have to be maintained. The driving
force behind these principles is social justice which discourages the
concentration of wealth and tries to minimise the social differences
in the society by applying a system of fair distribution. Among the
most powerful tools of this system are zakat (religious tax on income
and wealth) and the inheritance law.
The role of the Islamic state is to maintain a balance between
private and public interests. There are three criteria for
regulating the economic system and intervening in the market
mechanism. It is incumbent on an Islamic government to exercise
guidance, control and protection in accordance with Islamic precepts.
Private ownership is sacreci and there is no limitation on the scope
of ownership, provided that the owner pays the religious tax and
fulfils his or her obligations to God and the community. Economic
activities in Islam are well guarded, and economic agents are free to
conduct their own businesses. The individual is basically free to
choose his work or profession, although this freedom is restricted in
a few cases (see Islamic State and Economic Intervention, p 35).
The most coitroversial as2ect of..Jslamic economics which sets it
apart from the conventional systems is the prohibition of nba and
--
hoarding, and the imposition of zakat. The abolition of nba has
1	 Imam Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafigat fi Usul al-Sha j , l
Maktaba at Tijaniyah al-Kubra, Cairo, 2nd ed, 1975, Vol 2
p370.
40
eCOnomiC a	 ojal consequences.	 On one hand it aims at
eliminating injustice (zuim) and encouraging brotherhood and co-
operation between capital and 1abo Ln the the ha. it ajwa....at
promoting productive enterprises and curbing personal loans for
speculative purposes (see Chapter 2, Riba section).
1 Zuim occurs when the debt matures while the borrower is
insolvent and the lender multiplies the debt for no other
reason than the postponement.
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CHAPTER 2
HONEY, RIBA AND ISLAHIC BANKING
Introduction
Studying the concepts of money and nba in Islam is a prerequisite
for understanding the nature, methodology and the functions of an
Islamic bank. We begin this chapter by focussing on the origins,
nature, characteristics and the Islamic motives for holding money.
Al-Riba in the Quran and Sunna are discussed and the types of nba
are analysed. The religious and economic considerations for banning
nba are also examined.
In the final section we focus on Islamic banking in theory and
practice giving due consideration to the existing types of Islamic
banks and their operations.
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MONEY IN THE ISLA14IC ECONOMY
In this section the origins, nature and characteristics of currency
in the early days of Islam are examined, the role of money and its
functions are also discussed, with examples drawn from the early
Islamic literature. A brief analysis of the demand for money in the
Western economy follows and Islamic views regarding the motives for
holding money are outlined. This is followed by an examination of Al
Riba in Islamic jurisprudence.
Consideration is given to the factors affecting money demand that
have not yet received due attention in the Islamic literature,
including an elucidation of some of the Prophet's Ahadith about
wealth and money in the context of their impact upon utility and
consumption. Islamic views are outlined on barter and hoarding
including the wisdom of prohibiting certain barter transactions, as
well as hoarding.
The Development of Islamic Currency
The currencies in circulation during the first two decades of Islam
were the Byzantine dinar (gold) and the Persian dirham (silver).
These remained in circulation until the 18th year of I-Iijra (to be
denoted by 'h') when Califa Omar minted a replica of the Persian
dirhams adding on some coins the words "Messenger of God". The metal
money used was square in shape.
It was during the reign of Abdel Malak Ibn Marwan (76h) at the time of
the Omayyad dynasty that the first Islamic dinar was minted1.
Consequently the use of the Byzantine dinar was prohibited except for
being restruck as indigenous tender.
1.	 Ibn Khaldouri cited in Rafic al Masri, "al-Islam Wa' Nuqud"
(Islam & Money), A discussion paper, CRIE, 1981, p76.
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The sayings of the Prophet and the interpretations of the early
Islamic scholars referred to in the following passages relate
directly to gold and silver currencies. Ever since paper currency
was first introduced in the sixteenth century (AC), Islamic
contemporary jurists have concluded that as long as paper currency is
fulfilling the same functions as those of metal currency,
particularly as a medium for pricing goods and services, it must be
subjected to the same rules and injunctions1.
The Meaning and Nature of Islamic Money
In Arabic 'mal' or 'al-mal' means money. Al-mal, says Ibn al-Atheer
(d.606h), used to stand for gold and silver, then it meant all types
of wealth (literally al-Tharwa) 2 . Thus money and wealth is used
interchangeably in Islamic literature. However, Islamic jurists have
classified Al-mal or wealth into monetary (Nuqu'd) and non-monetary
assets (Arud) and capital (Ras'mal). This distinction is rather
important and helps to clarify the meanings of the q'uranic verses
and the Prophet sayings (Ahadith, plural of hadith) whenever the term
money or wealth is used. The second benefit derived from this
distinction lies in the fact that the purpose of this section is to
focus on the demand for money in the Islamic economy. Thus the term
money, unless otherwise indicated, will be represented in the same
manner as it is used in Western economies.
It is widely accepted by Islamic and Western economists and
historians that the evolution from a barter economy to a commodity
economy and then to a monetary economy, was carried out gradually.
Initially several commodities, including precious metals, were used
as a medium of exchange. By elimination, precious metals, gold or
silver, emerged as acceptable means for pricing all other products.
1. See for instance the resolutions of the Council of Islamic
Jurisprudence at a Conference held in Makkah, 8-16 Rabi'II.
1402h.
2. See M.H. Makhlouf, Labyan fi Zakat Al-Athman (Explanation of
zakat on currency), Cairo, 1344h, p.23.
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Abu'l-Fad'l al-Dimashqi (570h) wrote about the invention of money
that was dictated by the need for creating a medium of exchange to
ease the problems associated with barter, in almost the same manner
and precision as writers in contemporary economics. He even
mentioned the need for specialisation of labour and the coincidence
of wants and concluded that the "necessity for a standard of value as
a medium for pricing things" was accentuated by the following
factors1:
i) the need and dependence of people on each other;
ii) the desires of one person do not coincide, at the same time,
with those of another;
iii) the quantities of their needs are not equal;
iv) the determination of the exchange rates between one product and
many others, different or of the same kind, is difficult.
Al-Dimashqi (Supra) attributed society's preference for and
acceptance of gold and silver to their flexibility in cutting and
forming, durability, attractiveness, divisibility, odourlessness and
difficulty of counterfeiting and fraud.
Money in Ouran and Sunna
Al-mal (wealth including money) is mentioned many times in the Quran
and is described as an allurement, a gift, or a bounty of God, as
revealed in the following verses:
Wealth and sons are allurements of the life of this world
(18:46)
Offspring and wealth (including money) are objects of comfort,
delight and pleasure (mata): "Beautiful for mankind is love of joys
(that come) from women and offspring and stored heaps of gold and
silver, and horses branded (with their marks), and cattle and land.
That is comfort of the life of the world. Allah with him is a more
excellent abode (3:14)
1. Al-Ishara ila Mahasen al-Tiiara, (the reference to the
advantages of trade,), ed. M. Ashour, Cairo: Dar al-Itihad al-
Arabi l'Tibaah, 1973, quoted by A.O. Metwali and S.I. Shehatah,
Economics of Money in the Islamic Thinking (Arabic), Cairo
Maktebet Wahbeh 1983, p.39.
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Yet if money is a bounty and a gift it must not be mishandled or used
to inflict injustice or injury upon other people. To circumvent such
incidents the ownership and dispersion of mal is governed by the
Sharia principles which forbid usury, hoarding and extravagances:
"You do not really possess of your wealth but that you eat and use
up, that you dress and wear up, and that you spend on charity and
preserve for the after life''.
In the first part of this hadith the Prophet emphasizes that the
demand for money is a matter of choice among different assets. Real
possession is not the material holding of wealth (including money)
since possession without utility is like a useless mirror that
reflects no object. Hence goods are held or possessed for the real
satisfaction they provide to the holder through the ability to
consume to the point of depletion, exhaustion and wearing out. The
optimal utility is reached according to the Prophet when one gets the
best out of, or uses to the utmost, goods and services.2
In the second part of this hadith satisfaction is not confined to
consumption for immediate needs, or for the enjoyment in this world,
but it extends far beyond. In an Islamic context if an individual
spends on charity he will be rewarded in the after life.
The third major meaning that could be inferred from this hadith is
that the real utility from an Islamic perspective is attained through
(a) consumption in this world and spending for the after life (on
charity), and (b) rational spending. In the case of wasteful
spending and extravagances, full consumption i.e. optimal utility, is
1. Narrated by Imam Muslim, see Imam Al-Nawawi, (d 676h), Riyad
al-Saleheen, Cairo, Isa al-Babi al-Halabi, rid, p22l.
2. According to M. Kahf the relationship between real income,and
consumption was defined by the Prophet to equal the "total of
what is used for the purchase of goods and services that
produce immediate satisfaction in the life plus that which is
given away for causes that enrich one's after life", see "A
Contribution to the Theory of Consumer Behaviour in an Islamic
Society", in Kh. Ahmed, 1981, p.23. Most probably 'true
income' or material income is what Kahf meant by 'real income
and should not be confused with real income that was adjusted
for inflation.
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not reached; satisfaction is constrained by the individual's
absorptive capacity and declining marginal utility: The Prophet
asked his followers: "Who among you the mal of his heir's is dearer
to him than his own mal? They answered: everyone sees his mal
dearer than his heir's, then the Prophet said: your mal is what you
use up and your heir's mal is what you leave1.
The message obtained from this saying reveals that:
1.	 Money is precious among Muslims and the Prophet acknowledges
this fact;
2. The people feel that their own mal is dearer to them than their
heirs, though in the final analysis their money eventually
passes into the hands of their heirs;
3. This paradox is explained by the fact that the enjoyment of
wealth is bound by the individual's absorptive capacity though
it could be argued that mathematically an extra earning of one
pound will lead to more satisfaction than the previous one. It
is also true that the desire for money could be infinite, nd
one's wealth would be countless yet the individual's absorptive
capacity and the law of declining marginal utility dictates
that at a certain level the n+l unit of a good will not provide
any more satisfaction than the nth unit.
Characteristics of Money
Money is thought to be characterised by certain properties in order
to achieve its proper role in the economy. 	 The properties are
scarcity, liquidity, stability, circulation and neutrality. 	 Both
Islamic and Western economists agree on the properties of scarcity,
liquidity and stability;	 although all systems recognise the
importance of money circulation, the Islamic teachings, through moral
1.	 Narrated by al-Bukhari, see Irnarn al Nawawi, iyadh al-Salehee,
op cit, p249.
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persuasion and ordinances, have regulated and organised the use of
money at the individual level. In Western economies, monetary
control has reached an advanced stage of sophistication at the macro
level1.
Scarcity is determined by the fact that if money were in abundance
then it would be worthless and useless as a means of payment, since
nobody would be willing to accept it in exchange for goods and
services. As Imam Cazali (1058-1111 AD) said: "among the bounties of
Allah are the creation of the dirham and dinar ... (they are] scarce
in themselves and they are not objects of desire". 2 The fact that
money is desirable means that it is scarce.
Liquidity is the virtue emanating from accepting money as a means of
payment. Thus liquidity means that money could be exchanged directly
for goods and services, at any time, without resorting to other
mediums. In this connection Gazali states: "Who possesses them
[gold and silver] possesses everything".3
On the other hand, Islamic jurists emphasise stability in the value
of money (see Ibn Khaldun infra). They even regarded this quality on
a priori reasoning for accepting a currency as legal tender. Magrizi
(SOlh) wrote about price stability and inflation and called for the
reservation of gold and silver as a standard of value.4
1. It should be emphasised here that the elements of comparison
between Islamic and Western economies are lacking. For
instance, there is a time barrier between Islamic views on
money and contemporary Western theories. Therefore, our aim is
to expound the Islamic views with respect to money and how it
would affect the demand for money in today's world rather than
to show the differences or similarities between the two
systems.
2. Ihya Alum al-Din, Kitab al-Shukr, cited in R. al-Masri, 1977,
p.177.
3. Ibid.
4. Maqrizi (766/1364-845/1441) cited in Rafic al-Masri, "al-Islam
wa Nuqud", op cit, 1981, p.68. Maqrizi a 15th Century
historian wrote many books (Shazuz al-uqud fi zikr' Nuqud
(Treatise on Money) and "Ighasat al Umah Bikashf al-Ghunia"
about the history and causes of starvation in Egypt and the
impact of inflation on prices.
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In Western economies stability in the value of money has become one
of the main goals of economic policies. Although the purchasing
power of money fluctuates with changes in the general price level,
its value is relatively more stable than many different commodities.
Nevertheless its nominal value has been constant at all times.
The importance of money circulation in the economy could be inferred
from certain deeds, injunctions and reported tradition. These
include (a) the banning of barter in 5 main commodities, (b) the
imposition of zakat (religious tax) on income and wealth including
idle bank balances, (c) the degrading of hoarding and finally (d) the
stress upon growth, development and investment of all types of wealth
including money. All of these topics will be dealt with in the
'demand for money' section. At this juncture it is worth noting that
it was a common practice before and also during the early days of
Islam to rent agricultural land in exchange for food or similar non-
monetary items; however the Prophet banned this practice allowing
only the use of gold and silver as a means of payment. Regardless of
the main causes of this ruling, which might well have been to
preserve justice and to eliminate disputes, our intention here is
focussed on its monetary implications. Undoubtedly, this rule leads
to enhancing the process of monetization and increases the turnover
of money in the economy.1
1. About the ruling by Hanafi jurists on the necessity of using
commercial dirham as capital in commenda (Mudaraba), Udovitch
comments: "This is more than an example of the responsiveness
of Hanafi law to encompass needs and realities; from art
economic point of view it indicated that commerce had at its
disposal the entire reservoir of monetary resources of the
medieval Islamic world. This not only facilitated the financing
of trade, but could also stimulate its velocity by making
available all kinds of currency in an age when the supply of
standard, good quality coins was not always adequate", see
Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam, 1970, p.180.
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Role of Money in Islam
The basic functions of money in today's world, excluding the
implications of interest, are identical in both Western and Islamic
economies. These functions include the use of money as a medium of
exchange or a means of payment, a standard unit of measurement, and a
store of value.
Islamic jurists and economists have emphasised the role of money as a
medium of exchange regarding this correctly as one of the main
reasons for the invention of money. Gazali said:
• . . Allah created dinar and dirhams as judges and
intermediaries among other types of al-Amwal [wealth] which can
be estimated among them ... thus their creation is meant to
circulate among people and serve as intermediary among
al'Amwal.	 The other wisdom is to use them as a means to
acquire other objects..
The role of money as a standard measure of value or a unit of account
has eliminated the problems inherent in determining the exact
exchange rate among different types of products. Money serves as a
common denominator for pricing all types of goods and services.
However, the use of money as a unit of account differs from country
to country and is largely dependent on the degree of bankability in
an economy since current and deposit accounts are widely used as
units of accounts.
Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 AD) rioted that money is not only used as a
medium of exchange but it also acts as a store of value by virtue of
its function as a means for deferred payment and as a saving medium.
In his words: "God created the two mineral 'stones', gold and silver,
as the [measure of] value for all capital accumulations. [Gold and
silver are what] the inhabitants of the world, in most cases, consider
treasure and property. Even if, under certain circumstances, other
things are acquired, it is only for the purpose of ultimately obtaining
1.	 Ihya Alum al-Dir, op. cit, see also El-Gousi, 1982, p167.
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[gold and silver]. All other things are subject to market
fluctuations, from which gold and silver are exempt. They are the
basis of profit, property and treasure".1
Finally, for these functions to be fulfilled, acceptability and
recognition either by law or common practice is a condition necessary
for any currency to act as a legal tender.
The Demand for Money in Western Economies
The analysis of demand for money has passed through three major
phases of development in Western economies. The first phase began
with Ricardo and other economists who argued that in the long run the
stock of money is proportionate to price. This approach was stressed
by Irving Fisher (1867-1947) who emphasised the relationship between
money and economic activity or as Laidler put it "the transactional
velocity of circulation" in an economy. 2 Fisher argued that the
quantity of money times its velocity of circulation will be equal to
the number of transactions undertaken times the average price level.3
Hence by introducing the velocity concept Fisher reached the
conclusion that the price level is proportionate to money supply in
the long run. 4 This relationship was expressed in terms of an
identity equation:
MV - PT
where M is the money in circulation
V is velocity of exchange
P is the average price level
T is volume of transactions.
1. lbn Rhaldun trans. Rosenthal, op. cit, Vol. II, p.313, with
minor modifications by the writer.
2. See D.E.W. Laidler, The Demand for Mone y , London, Intertext
Books, 1969, p.44.
3. Ibid.
4. R.C. Amacher, Principles of Macroeconomics, Cincinnatti, South
Western Pub. Co., 1980, pp.151-4.
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Laidler commented that while Fisher was concerned with the factors
that determine the amount of money in an economy, the Cambridge
School economists approach was concerned with the individual's demand
for money. This brings us to the second phase. Thus, instead of
asking what amount of money is needed to carry out the transactions
in the economy as Fisher did, the Cambridge economists were concerned
with how much money an individual 'wants' to hold. 1 The demand
equation for money as introduced by Marshall and Pigou is as fol].ows:
Md KPY
In the above equation the demand for money is a function of income
for each individual and ultimately for the aggregate economy. This
conclusion implies, as Hosek (1925) argued, that the demand for money
in the short run is insensitive to changes in interest rates, and the
velocity of money is constant. 2 On the other hand, Laidler remarked
that the Cambridge school did not ignore the effect of income, wealth
arid interest rates for holding money, rather it failed to study the
relationship between these variables and their individual impact on
the quantity of money.
The third phase came about with Keynes who emphasised the motives
underlying the demand for money. 3
 He identified three motives:
transactionary, precautionary and speculative.
The transaction motive or liquidity preference, is derived from the
use of money as a medium of exchange. People want to hold money for
acquiring goods and services in the ordinary course of business.
Also the need to meet unexpected obligations and contingencies
dictates the necessity of keeping a certain amount of money in idle
balances. However, there is an opportunity cost associated with
retaining idle balances reflected in the yield or interest rate
foregone by not putting money to use.
1. Laidler, op . cit, pp.48-9.
2. William Hosek, Monetary Theory, Illinois, Richard Irwin, 1975,
p.165.
3. The General Theoy of Emp].oent. Interest and Money,
Macmillan, London, 1936, pp 168-70.
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Keynes also identified the "speculative motive".	 He stressed the
importance of the rate of interest and bond prices in determining the
demand for money.	 In his view the demand for money is largely
dependent upon peoples' expectations of the future trends in interest
rates and bond prices. If, for instance, an individual (or firm)
expects interest rates to rise in the future, he would want to hold
money in interest bearing deposit accounts. He might also liquidate
his bond portfolio, if he has any, to avoid a capital loss. Provided
that all wealth holders behave similarly, this contributes to an
increase in the demand for money balances.
On the other hand, if the interest rate is expected to fall, that
individual, according to Keynes, would want to buy bonds since bond
prices will rise. Through a gradual process of changing expectations
wealth holders' demand for bonds rises thus contributing to a fall in
the demand for money balances. Later on Tobin and his Yale
associates expanded the Keynesian theory by asserting that interest
rates and bonds are not the only determinants of the demand for
money. They developed the portfolio approach which recognises the
availability of a wide range of financial and non-financial assets
for savers (households and institutions). The rates of return are
determined by the possibility of substitution among these assets and
the quantities that people would want to hold of each1.
1. We are not concerned here with the effects of monetary policy
on bank credits or money supply which Tobin has discussed
elsewhere. For more details on the portfolio theory see James
Tobin, "Money, Capital and Other Stores of Value", American
Economic Review Proceedings, LI, No. 2, May 1961, pp 26-37,
cited in H. Johnson, (ed), 1978.
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The Demand for Money in the Islamic Economy
So far the motives for holding money balances per se have not gained
adequate coverage in the Islamic literature. However, many writers
have analysed the role of money in Islam and discussed many subjects
that are directly related to money but without focussing on money
demand motives. The aim of this section is to discuss (a) whether
the traditional motives for holding money are accepted or rejected
from an Islamic point of view, and (b) to explain the religious
factors that have the greatest influence on the demand for money.
The factors influencing the demand for money can be grouped into both
internal and external factors. Internal refers to individual
preferences and tastes such as social status, level of income,
extravagance or greed. External refers to ethical, religious and
governmental influences through legislation and regulations. In this
respect the ethical and religious influences that might have the
major impact on Muslims' behaviour in the holding of money are
discussed here. Fiscal influences such as taxation and government
regulations are not discussed, as they are beyond the scope of this
study.	 -
Generally, the demand for money in Western and Islamic systems arises
from a need to carry out transactions and to meet contingencies. The
transaction and precautionary motives arise from the role of money as
a means of payment. Thus holding of money in the Islamic economy is
justified by the need to settle debts (most frequently by cheques
i.e. money) and to meet day to day expenses.
Any analysis of the demand for money in the Islamic economy has to
take into consideration the banning of interest. Thus speculation
regarding changes in interest rates and their impact on bond prices
in the Keynesian dichotomy, or any interest-motivating behaviour,
have no role to play in the demand for Islamic money.
Profit is seen as the substitute for interest in the Islamic economy
and as such will be the criterion for allocation of resources in the
private sector. In order to install profits as the sole yardstick
for the allocation of resources savers could attach a premium on
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their profit expectations to cover them against business risks (e.g.
competition, product saturation) and inflation. In other words
investment decisions in an Islamic economy have to account for a host
of factors including profit anticipation.
As there are no restrictions against investment in Islam, it follows
that trading in financial and physical assets is permissible. Thus,
in the Islamic system a saver/investor can choose a combination of
investment outlets that range from Islamic Sukouk (bonds) to real
estate. It is imperative to point out, however, that in the absence
of interest the speculative demand for money and financial assets
will be less apparent than in the conventional system. Some Islamic
economists even postulate an increase in the demand for real assets
in a nba-free economy. Their argument is based on the assumption
that these assets are a suitable substitute for money balances.1
However, it is worth mentioning that holding money is not without
cost. In the Islamic economy, as mentioned earlier, the cost of
holding money helps in keeping down the demand for money balances.
This cost is higher in Islamic than conventional economies; This
cost includes zakat payment at 2.5% on money balances plus the
opportunity cost, as well as custodian charges. In addition, the
speculative demand for money is uiinimised by the prohibition of
interest and the imposition of zakat on wealth including idle
balances. This, according to Chapra, reduces "the locking-in effect"
of interest rates and secures greater stability to the total demand
for money2 . However, in an Islamic economy speculation may decrease
but it would not entirely disappear. Moreover, the impact of zakat
will not be so great as it is also imposed on articles of trade at
the same rate as on money balances.
1. See, for example, A. Zarqa "The Demand for Money in an Islamic
Economy",. unpublished paper (Arabic) November 1984. Zarqa
asserts that since there is no apparent evidence in Islam
against using money as a store of value, the demand for money
would be influenced by the rate of 'halal' return and the
degree of risk of other assets (financial or real). This
influence he continues, is compatible with the economic
argument that was clearly defined in the portfolio balance
approach as outlined by Tobin and his Yale associates.
2. Towards a Just Monetary Syst, Leicester ; The Islamic
Foundation, 1985, pp.187-8.
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Now what would happen if profitability declined beyond a sustainable
level? The sensible answer is that savers would hold money balances
to a point at which the current net benefit of holding money is
greater than the net present value of investment. That is, the asset
demand for holding money would decline in the face of rising trends
in idle money balances.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE ISLAMIC DEMAND FOR MONEY
Hoarding
Hoarding of money is bitterlj condemned in Islam. God threatens
those who hold money and abstain from spending in the way of Allah
with severe punishment: "They who hoard up gold and silver and spend
it not in the way of Allah, unto them give tidings (0 Muhammad) of a
painful doom, on the day when it will (all) be heated in the fire of
hell, and their foreheads and their flanks and their backs will be
branded therewith (and it will be said unto them): here is that
which you hoarded for yourselves, now taste of what ye used to hoard"
(9:34)
God does not ignore human nature and the lust for wealth and power;
in many verses in the Quran, man is described as selfish, niggardly
and very possessive: "Say if ye had control of the Treasures of the
mercy of my lord, Behold, ye would keep them back, for fear of
spending them, for man is ever niggardly"	 (17:100).
Thus if hoarding is condemned, and mankind is by nature likely to be
begrudging and stingy, Muslims are urged to develop and invest their
wealth on the one hand and to economise in their spending and pay
generously for charity on the other. The Prophet said: "If anyone
revives dead land, it belongs to him, and the unjust root has no
right". Also: "He who has money should develop it; he who has land
should cultivate it".1
1. Narrated by Anas ibn Malik, op cit, p 346. Malik explains
that: "the unjust root is whatever is taken or planted without
right". Cod says: "Make not thy hand tied (like a niggard's)
to thy neck, nor stretnh it forth to its utmost reach, so that
thou become blameworthy and destitute" (17:29)
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As a result investmentisa_moral and religious4a0oft
means against hoarding. 	 However, Islam does not provide a clear
definition of hoarding; the Fuqaha (Islamic jurists) do not totally
agree on what is hoarding and what is not. Imaxn al-Qurtubi (d.671h)
pointed out that Islamic scholars were uncertain whether hoarding
applies to money and wealth even if they have been reduced by zakat
(alms tax) payment or whether it is confined solely to money or
wealth on which zakat has not been paid. He also said: "Sharia has
approved holding wealth (dhabt al-mal) and paying its dues. If
holding wealth is forbidden then its dues would have meant to donate
it all and nobody in this Ummah [nation] decrees that", and he gave
as an example the wealth of some of the Prophet's companions to
support his views.1
Ibn Omar, an Islamic jurist, was of the opinion that "hoarding
excludes money on which zakat has been paid" 2 , while money is said to
be hoarded if zakat has not been paid on it. This opinion coincides
with a Prophet's hadith that says: "God did not ordain zakai but to
purify what remained [saved] of your money, and ordained inheritance
law to leave it [inherit it] to your descendants"3
This hadith implies that saving is lawful in Islam, and in order to
detach wealth from hoarding it should be 'purified' by zakat.
"Blessed by God he who earned lawfully, spent willingly, and
saved for his poor and needy day"4
According to this hadith, the Prophet defines savings as the
difference between earnings and expenditure and as such it is not
hoarding provided that (a) zakat is paid on savings, and (b) the
intention for saving is precautionary.
1. Al-Jameh 1'Ahkam al-Quran, cited in Metwali and Shehata,
pp.24-5.
2. Ibid, p.22.
3. Narrated by Abu Dawoud on the authority of ibn Abbas, ibid,
p22.
4. Quoted by Metwali and Shehata, op cit. ? p.26.
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However, the level of saving, which is by definition a residue may
differ drastically from one person to another, depending on their
level of earnings and expenditure.
Hence, it is hard to draw a demarcation line, in monetary terms,
between savings and hoarding, simply because individuals are not
alike in their spending habits, and the expectations of their future
needs or incomes differ even if they share the same level of income
stream.
It is prudent to assume that a rational Muslim individual would keep
his money balances to a. minimum to avoid the erosion of its value via
zakat or inflation. Moreover a rational investor would search for
investment channels motivated by a number of factors including
religious and moral obligations that encourage investment and forbid
hoarding arid economic factors that dictate the necessity of
investment as a hedge against inflation and as a means of wealth
accumulation.
The preceding discussion on money and wealth may have given the
impression that hoarding relates only to monetary or financial
assets. In effect hoarding may encompass all kinds of property when
its withholding would harm the public. This view is held by Imam Abu
Yousuf who believed that hoarding applies to any commodity including
gold, silver, clothes, and food. His theory rests on the belief that
"he who hoards such commodities abuses his right of ownership since
hoarding of cloth is just as harmful as hoarding food" and "the
community would suffer from the hoarding and monopoly of food as from
the hoarding and monopoly of clothes") He also stressed that
suppressing any of the various needs of society is wrong and
unjustifiable.
Although the above views have some merits, they may be more
applicable in exceptional circumstances such as famine or war rather
than in periods of normality. Moreover, it is hard to visualise that
hoarding of food is the same as hoarding of clothes! Indeed Abu
1.	 M.A. Mannan, Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice, Lahore:
Ashraf Publishers, 1970, p.95.
58
Yousuf's views are not shared by some jurists like Imam Ahmed and
alShafii who thought that the Islamic prohibition of monopoly relates
to food products only.1
Thus it could be safely assumed that hoarding of money balances may
exist when someone withholds or retains idle money balances for a
prolonged time, over and above his immediate needs (for transactions
and contingencies) and with no intention of investing or giving away
for charity, provided at all times that this sum of money is
considered excessive by any standard. Scholars and economists have
argued that money should not be locked-in or withdrawn from
circulation for fear of the hoarding effects. These effects tend to
reduce the supply of money which, if things remain equal, leads to an
increase in the price of goods and services, resulting in a lower
demand, decline in output, and eventually rising unemployment.
However, it does not appear that the temporary keeping of one's
savings in liquid form to benefit, for example, from expected changes
in relative prices of assets is haram (unlawful). Besides, the
abolition of interest will deprive money of its liquidity premium
leading eventually to the disappearance of the speculative motive for
holding cash (which is, currently, largely dependent on the
fluctuations of interest rates).
Money and Barter in Islam
The Prophet explicitly organised barter deals for six vital
commodities, namely gold, silver, dates, barley, wheat and salt.
According to Sunna bartering in these commodities is mainly subject
to two restrictions: firstly, exchanging or selling homogeneous
commodities against themselves with excess profit is not allowed.
Secondly, the transaction must be on a spot basis. That is
exchanging a bar of gold to be delivered immediately for another bar
to be delivered in future is not permissible. Thus spot deals are
lawful whereas forward deals are not (when the exchange is between
1.	 See Sayid Sabiq Ficih Al Sunna, (Sunna Jurisprudence) Beirut:
Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi n.d. Vol. 3, p.401.
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two similar things).
According to Abu Said al Khudari: "Bilal brought to the Prophet,
peace be upon him, some barni [good quality] dates whereupon the
Prophet asked him where these were from. Bilal replied, 'I had some
inferior dates which I exchanged for these - two sa [a measure] for a
sa'. The Prophet said, "Oh no, this is exactly nba. Do not do so,
but when you wish to buy, sell the inferior dates for [cash] and then
buy the better dates with the price you receive")
Two reasons were cited for this rule: (1) replacing money for barter
has eliminated injustice or injury associated nornia.11y with valuation
and determination of exchange rates among different products, and (2)
a belief that barter might lead to nba al-fad'l (literally excess)
which is prohibited. Riba a.l-fad'l occurs, for example, when someone
exchanges one bushel of wheat for one bushel & half to be delivered
at a future date.
As far as the demand for money is concerned, the regularisation of
barter, as explained earlier, facilitates the exchange of goods and
services and increases the velocity of circulation of money. This is
due to the intermediation process through money which was enhanced by
the Prophet's command.2
1. Narrated by Muslim. See Sahih Muslim bi Sharh al Nawawi, Kitab
al-Musaqat, Bab al-ta'am Mithlan bi mithlin; Cairo, al Matba'ah
al Misriyyah, 1349h, Vol XI, pp 13-16.
2. One would think that these benefits have no modern implication
since monetization is widespread. However, if we take into
consideration the amount of barter trade which has reached
about 25% of all worldwide export trade (in M. Mi, ed. p.149)
we can imagine the effect of the regularization of banks on the
future of this trade with the Muslim world if the Islamic code
were strictly enforced.
60
The introduction of money facilitated exchange transactions and
obliterated the problems of barter. On the other hand, the reverence
for money has created the problems associated with hoarding and its
impact on the welfare of the Islamic society. The second major
problem associated with the money economy is the possibility of
creating a contradiction between money as a medium of exchange and
money as an earning asset or commodity. While the basic functions of
money are accepted and recognised, Islam has regulated and formalised
a set of rules and principles in order to bridge the gap between the
supply of and demand for money through the abolition of interest,
hoarding and, to a lesser extent, speculation.
Through zakat, charity and the inheritance law, wealth, including
money, is meant to circulate and change hands. This injunction came
in recognition of the fact that only through the mechanism of
circulation could the process of economic growth and stability be
achieved.
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AL-RIBA IN ISLA14IC JURISPRUDENCE
Generally financial and commercial transactions, with a few
exceptions, are permissible in Islam providing that certain rules and
obligations are observed. On the other hand, so called nba
(usurious) deals are absolutely void in Islam. In the first part of
this section the literal meaning of nba will be defined. In the
second part the kinds, boundaries and scope of nba are discussed.
Finally an outline of some early and contemporary Islamic thoughts on
the reasons for banning nba are presented. This will serve as a
guide to Islamic finance which is the major focus of this thesis.
The Meaning of Riba (Usury)
The word 'nba' in its ordinary usage before Islam was different from
its meaning in Islamic law. Initially, in Arabic, nba literally
meant an increase and an addition (ziyada'), an excess, an
augmentation, or growth (nama'). The verb raba (increased) signifies
a certain augmentation over an original value or status. In Islamic
law nba signifies an addition obtained in an unlawful manner. This
unlawful addition could be implicit or explicit as in sales, a ioan
1ly any contractual agreement. An illegal contract is said
to have a condition bearing an excess accruing to one party with no
considerationgiveito the other. Ibn Jarir al-Tabani (d.3lOh), a
Quranic commentator, said: "a creditor is called Murbi (one who
augments) because he doubles the amount of the debt") However, not
everything that increases (yarbu) is usury or unlawful. For instance
profits from trade and mark-ups on sales are legitimate and lawful.
Also the verb rabat (growth) is used in the Quran in a positive
manner: "Thou seest the earth barren and lifeless, but when we pour
down rain on it, it is stirred (to life), it swells, and it puts
forth every kind of beautiful growth (in pairs) (22:5)
1.	 In Jameh al-Bayan, quoted in Rashid Rida, 	 Ribawa' Mu'amalat
fi'l Islam, ed. B Bitar, Cairo, Maktabet al Qahira, 1960, p.61.
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Types of Riba
According to Ibn Rushd, scholars have agreed that al-Riba is mainly
found in (a) selling (i.e. selling forward the six basic commodities
for the same genre (e.g. one bushel of wheat in exchange for one
bushel and a half to be delivered at a future date), and (b)
liabilities arising from a sale, a credit (salaf) or any other 1 . He
also mentioned that scholars' opinions varied on whether repaying a
debt before maturity for a discount is nba or not.2
Riba in exchanging the basic six commodities is widely known as nba
al'Fad'l (excess) or nba al biyuh (sale), while nba. in one's
liability is known as nba al-Jahili, or nba in debts (see below).
Debts, Loans and Mortgages
In Islamic law debts originate from various transactions, for example,
deferred sales, rent payments, unpaid dowry (as in marriage) and
loans. In a debt contract the debtor becomes liable to the creditor
for the amount of the debt. The debt must be in writing, payable on
the due date and no excess is allowed over the contracted sum if
payment were rescheduled (see (b): types of nba).3
1. Muhammad Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Bidayet al-Mujtahed Wa Nihayat
al-Mutased, Part 2, 3rd ed., Cairo: Mustafa al Babi Halahi
and Sons Library and Press, 1960, p.128.
2. In the view of Sheikh R. Rida, this is not nba since the
latter implies an increase whereas the discount is a decrease
in liability for early settlement. See R. Rida, o p cit, 1960,
pp 70-1.
3. It is common in contemporary writings to use the word 'debt'
for a loan or vice versa. Consequently: (i) nba in debts
originating from a deferred sale is sometimes confused with
(ii) 'sales nba' that may result from exchanging gold, silver
and vital food items, the sales of which were regularised by
the Prophet. The first is called nba al-Nasia' and the second
is called nba al-fad'l.
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The Quran has laid down the rules and conditions pertaining to the
contractual agreement between the debtor and creditor: "When you deal
with each other in contracting a debt for a fixed time, write it
down.., and the one who owes the debt dictate" (2:282), and: "If you
are upon a journey and you do not find a scribe then a security may be
taken into possession" (2:283).
To acknowledge the wisdom and significance of these verses one should
realise that the majority of the addressees were illiterates at the
time of revelation. The emphasis on writing contracts and calling
witnesses is not only seeking to establish law and order to minimise
disputes and eliminate injustice, but is also to show the importance
of writing and reading and encourage literacy.
A loan (qard) 1 is said to be confined to tangible things (Mithliyyat)
and must be payable in its own genre. Under Islamic law a loan is a
benevolent act and the lender should not stipulate a benefit from the
borrower or seek material reward. God says: "Who is he that will
loan to God a [benevolent) loan, which God will double unto his
credit and multiply many times? It is God that giveth (you) want or
plenty, and to him shall be your return" (2:245). Giving a
benevolent loan is thus commendable (Mandub) by Sharia.2
Mortgages are allowed in debts including loans. The mortgagee is
allowed to use the mortgaged property in compensation for the
expenses incurred in maintaining the mortgaged assets (e.g. houses).
As lending and borrowing is inevitable on mortgages the Prophet says:
"The mortgaged animal may be used for riding, when it is mortgaged,
on account of what is spent on it, and the milk of a milked animal
may be drunk when it is mortgaged, and the expenditure shall be borne
by him who rides [the animal] and drinks [the milk].3
1. For a brief outline on jurists' opinion on loans, see R al-
Masri, "al-Nizam al Masrafi al Islami", in Dirassat Fi al-
Igtisad al-Islami, 2nd International Conference on Islamic
Economics, CRIE, 1985, pp 184-5.
2. The above analysis shows that there is a legal difference
between a debt and a loan which has no economic consequences.
For types of loan in Pagan Arabia see infra.
3. Narrated by Abu Hurairah in Manual of Hadith, p.321, see al-
Shafii in	 op cit, Vol 3, pp 184-6.
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tiThe Prophet once bought food from a Jew on credit and he mortgaged
an iron shield")
The Jurists agree that using the mortgaged asset by the mortgagor is
permissible if the mortgagee gives his prior consent.2
The Quranic Iniunctions Against Riba
Recognising hunian nature and the influence of customs and belief on
one's conduct, nba was prohibited in Islam gradually by revealing at
first fundamental principles of the forthcoming duties of Muslims and
what might involve unlawful deeds. In the beginning, the Quranic
verses compared nba and zakat expressing God's discontent with nba
and His blessing for zakat donors: "That which you give in usury in
order that it may increase on (other) peoples' property hath no
increase with Allah: but that which ye give in charity, seeking
Allah's countenance, hath increase manifold" (3:39).
In the second phase, the intention was to preach and warn by
revealing to Muslims the destiny of those who had disobeyed God's
teachings in the past and how they were liable to severe punishment:
"That they took usury, though they were forbidden; and that they
devoured men's substance wrongfully; we have prepared for those among
them who reject faith a grievous punishment" (4:160).
In the third phase the verses were more specific and decisive and
left no doubt that doubled or multiplied nba was no longer allowed:
"0 ye who believe devour not nba [usury], doubled and multiplied:
but fear Allah; that ye may [really] prosper. Fear the Fire, which
is prepared for those who reject faith" (3:130-1).
1. Narrated by A'ishah in 	 ih al Bukhari, Beirut, Dar Ihya'al
Turath al-Arabi, nd, Vol III, p113.
2. But if the consent was a precondition in the mortgage contract,
the mortgagee is not allowed to use the mortgaged asset in
order to avoid nba. See Ali al-Khafif, Ahkani al-muamalat Al-
Shariah fi al Islam, Cairo, np, 1947, p119.
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It has been acknowledged that the following verses about nba in Surat
al-Baqara were among the last ordinances by God, and that the Prophet
died before he was able to explain them to his companions.
Those who devour nba will not stand except as stands one
whom the Evil one by his touch hath driven to madness. That is
because they say 'sale is like nba' but God has permitted sale
and forbidden nba. Those who after receiving direction from
their Lord, desist, shall be pardoned for the past; their case
is for God (to judge), but those who repeat (the offence) are
companions of the Fire: they will abide therein (for ever).
God will deprive nba of all blessing, but will give increase
for deeds of charity: for He loveth not creatures ungrateful
and wicked... 0 ye who believe fear God, and give up what
remains of your demand for usury, if you are indeed believers.
If ye do it not, take notice of war from God and His Apostle.
But if ye turn back, ye shall have your capital sums: deal not
unjustly, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly (2:275-9)
The apparent meaning of these verses signifies that sale, unlike
nba, is a legitimate act. It follows that profits from sales are
also lawful and acceptable. The profits, if any, are but an increase
over the cost of a sale and this increase is not forbidden on the
premise that trade is lawful. All Muslim scholars agree that sale
was permitted to facilitate the exchange of benefits in the
community. This exchange would not have taken place if profits were
not allowed. Otherwise, there will be no inducement for sellers to
exert some effort in order to cater for the needs of society without
undue hindrances1.
Pagan Arabs did not differentiate between nba where the return is
almost guaranteed and sale where profits are not certain.2
Seemingly, the determination of the scope, including the meaning of
1. Ibn 1-lajar in Rida, p.66, Ibn Jarir said, "The increment
[profit] that	 results from trade differs from that which
results from delaying the due date ... Allah says, I have
forbidden the latter and permitted the former". In I.Z.
Badawi, Nazariet al-Riba Muharam Fl Sharia Islamieh, Cairo,
Council for Art, Literature and Social Sciences, n.d. p.62.
2. From Rouh al-Ma'ni lil-Allussi, (d.1270h).. 	 Cairo, Idaret al-
Matba'h al Munirieh, n.d. Vol. 3, p.43.
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unlawful nba as mentioned in the Quran, might hinge upon identifying
the meanings and kinds of usurious transactions that were common in
Arabia during the Quranic revelation, as most probably these same
usurious practices are those which were condemned and forbidden by
the Quran. Unfortunately the Prophet's companions, Quranic
commentators, and Islamic scholars (Fuqaha') differ not only on this
issue but also on whether the term 'nba' that was mentioned in the
Quran is 'collective' or 'general'.
The jurists confirm that for a term to be collective, its literal
meaning should differ from its juristic meaning (which was unknown
before the revelation). Examples of such terms are zakat and salat)
Basically the Islamic Fuqaha unanimously agree that the 'nba'
mentioned in the Quran relates to nba al-Nasia' (deferred usury).
For this reason the nba in the Quran is commonly referred to in
jurisprudence books as nba al-Nasia or al-Nasa'. It is also widely
accepted that nba al-Nasia' essentially is found in debt
transactions and for this reason the 'nba' mentioned in the Quran is
sometimes referred to as nba in debts (nba al-duyun) and again
nba Jahilly. It should be emphasised, however, that while the
majority of the Islamic schools agree that the Quranic prohibition of
nba is indisputable, they might differ on certain matters (see the
controversy on nba al-Fad'l).
In analysing the nba in debt, we ought to know whether the debt is
initiated from a sale, a loan or other transaction. Secondly, what
sort of 'addition' is haram. Is it the first addition at the time of
the debt contract or the second and subsequent additions at or after
the first and second due dates?
1. Their literal meanings are "growth" and "call upon God",
respectively. For a term to be general it must have one meaning
and no need to be explained by the Sunna. Jurists who believe
that nba is a collective term assume that not every increase
is nba (e.g. profits in a sale). Those who believe that nba
is general assume that only the nba which was familiar during
the revelation is the one which is prohibited by the Quran (see
El-Gousi, op cit, 1982. pp 155-9.
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Thirdly, is the 'amount' of the deferred debt related to the face
value (the initial capital) or other sum(s) involved?
On the first question Imam Malik states: "usury in the Jahilliyah was
that a man would give a loan to a man for a set term. When the term
was due, he would say 'will you pay it off or increase [in the amount
due to] me?' If the man paid he took it, if not, he increased [his
debt] and lengthened the term for him". 1 This is simply saying that
at time to a sum of dm100 was due to creditor C. At time t+l (the
due date), the debtor D failed to pay. Consequently the original
debt (P) was doubled to 200 to be repaid at time t+2 as shown in the
following diagram.
P	 dm100	 dm200	 dm300
pmt	 pmt	 pmt
to	t+1	 t^2	 t^3
The conclusion that could be drawn so far is that the original debt
(P0 ) is unknown for sure, because Malik said that the loan was due,
which means that P 0 must be either equal or less than 100 (P 0 ^ 100).
However what the above example tells us is that the nba area is
located between t+l and t+3 provided that the debt was settled
between points t+l and t+3. Yet this conclusion is by no means
decisive (see al-Jassass and types of loans infra). Describing nba
in pre-Islarn, Qutada states: "Riba al-Jahilly is selling on credit
for a specified period. Should the debtor be insolvent at the due
date, the creditor increases [the debt] and grants him [the debtor]
respite.2
Evidently, the nba described by Qutada consisted of deferred debts.
These debts were obligations initiated in sales transactions.
Another type of sale, which was also common in pre-Islam, involved
credits that were repaid in kind. Imam al-Razi explained this
1. Related by Malik on the authority of Zayd Ibn Aslam, Almuwatta,
1982, p.304.
2. Cited in R. Rida, op cit, 1960. p.62
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transaction by saying that a debtor (a farmer) who presumably owed a
whole year's worth of harvest to a creditor would retain one half of
the crop giving the second half to the creditor, undertaking at the
same time to deliver double the quantity in the year that followed.In
his book A.hkam al-Quran, al Jassas (d.370h) states: Al Riba which was
known and practised by the Arabs, was the lending of al darahim
[plural of dirham] and al dananir [plural of dinar] for a specified
period of time in consideration for an agreeable increase [to the
parties concerned]. This was known and common practice among them in
those days. He continued: It is a well known fact that nba al-
Jahilliyah was a deferred loan with a conditional increase added to
it. And this increase is in exchange for an extension'.
The preceding passages have demonstrated the origins of debts in the
pre-Islamic period which lead us to believe that the nba mentioned
in the Quran most probably includes the nba in sales and in loans.
This is evident in the commentary of al-Jassas who explained that
nba in Jahilliyah was the stipulated increase at the time of the
contract and Ibn Qutada who pointed out that nba in sale happens
when the debt matured and then was increased or deferred.
In the following an attempt is made to determine the scope of the
forbidden nba.
The Scote of Riba
The determination of the forbidden nba in sales and loans is linked
with deciding whether nba arises at the time of the debt contract or
the time of the rescheduling. In this respect we have to
differentiate between two cases, sales contracts and loan contracts.
In a sales contract, it is apparent that the margin on the sale is
lawful and thus the amount of debt in one's obligation includes the
1.	 Cited in R. Rida, op cit, 1960, p.63
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sales price (cost of sales plus profits of the seller) which could be
called capital. Thus when the Quran says "You shall have your
capital sum", (3:279) this means that the seller is eligible to
recover the sales price i.e. his capital. The debtor is obliged to
pay the debt in full as agreed upon. On the other hand the creditor
is not allowed to augment the sales price on the due date in case of
the debtor's default and should not get any compensation for
postponement. Abu Jaafar b. Ah Al-Tabarsi (d.561h) in his book
Mujmah al-Bayan explained the meaning of the Quranic verse in Surat
al-Baqara " ... that is they say sale is like usury" is attributed to
the Pagans who used to say that sale without nba is like sale with
nba. He quoted Ibn Abbas who said: "The man among them used to say
when his debt falls due and his creditor demanded payment: 'grant me
time and I will increase you in al-mal [literally money]', ... when
they were told this is nba, they reply both are the same indicating
that the excess in price at the time of sale, or the excess thereto
at maturity due to the postponement are alike. Cod had threatened
and condemned them because of this, and condemned their acts in
saying And Cod has permitted sale and forbidden nba. That is Cod
has permitted trade that bears no nba and has forbidden that which
bears nba. The difference between the two being that the excess in
one is for deferring the debt and in the other is a lawful profit
attributed to sale. Also sale involves an exchange of something for
another, that is the price is in exchange 'for the priced', whilst
al-nba is an excess without exchange except for delaying the due
date or increasing in genre.1
Given the above evidence, it seems rather puzzling why many Islamic
scholars hold the view that nba al-Nasia' is not confined to the
increments incurred after the first and subsequent due dates but
includes any additions stipulated at the time of the debt contract.
These views will be discussed shortly. Nevertheless, it has been
established that nba al-Nasia or nba al-Jahilli can never be at the
time of sale in a fair trading activity for the reasons mentioned
earlier. (For the same reasoning see Ibn Jarir al-Tabani)2
1. Quoted by Rida,	 p.66.
2. Tafsir al Tabani, (al-Tabani commentary of Quranic verses),
Cairo, Dar al Ma'aref, n.d., Vol. II, pp 29-30.
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Types of Loans
It has been established also that nba al-Nasia' may be originated in
a loan transaction as well as in a sale. By applying the same
methodology, it could be safely assumed that loans in Pagan Arabia
were of different kinds such as benevolent loans (qurud hasana') and
loans with stipulated increases attached to them.
In a benevolent loan there is obviously no addition on the face value
of the loan whether it is in money or in kind. The borrower is
expected to return the borrowed sum or anything borrowed, for that
matter, without an increase or a decrease. This loan could be for a
specified or unspecified time, depending on the will of the parties
concerned, or on customary practices in the absence of a declared
intention as to the time of settlement. However, a benevolent loan
may be regarded as a gift or alms if the donor so declares at or
after the borrowing date. 1 Thus in cases where maturity dates are
not declared, the lender has to wait until the borrower will be able
to repay the debt or revert to customs and traditions in this
connection. However, if the maturity date is known, the debtor will
be inclined to honour his obligation at the due date. If he is
insolvent, the lender has no option other than granting him (the
borrower) respite "If he was insolvent grant him respite' t (2:280),
though it is absolutely unfair and unlawful to increase the debt
after the due date in compliance with the general rule cited earlier
for nba al-Nasia. Moreover a benevolent loan is by definition and
by nature an interest-free loan and God urges Muslims to waive their
rights if the debtor faces extenuating circumstances.
Undoubtedly the majority of loans in Pagan Arabia were usurious loans
as revealed from the historical events that have been transmitted to
us. Ibn Hajar al Haithami (d.974h) states:
1.	 Under Sharia, a benevolent loan is payable on demand, but the
lender is always asked to wait if the borrower is insolvent
(see above). See Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni, Riyadh, Maktabet al-
Riyadh al-1-Iaditheh, nd, Vol IV, pp 350-60.
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"Riba was practised when a man gives his money to someone else on
credit, on condition that he [the creditor] takes from him [the
debtor] every month a specified sum and the capital remaitis intact.
When the due date matures the man claims his capital, if the debtor
defaults he increases in the right and in the duration. This is
called Nasia' [postponement], though it also applies to nba al-fadi
[excess] because the purpose of this is the deferment".1
Interestingly, this description by Ibn Hajar falls within the
boundaries of the nba in the Quran, as if the Quranic ordinances in
Surat al-Baqarat address this particular practice. For instance, when
Cod says, "0 ye who believe fear Allah and give up what remains of
your demand for usury" it might be taken to mean that the creditor in
the aforesaid example is ordered to relinquish his alleged right to
the increments after the due date and may recapture his capital sum
as God says: "But if you repent your capital is yours". However, is
it by chance or by accident that the loaned capital in this example
is the same term (i.e. capital) that is used by the Quran or is it
not? In other words are the monthly payments that were paid
regularly by the debtor, which are almost identical to the interest
payments on a bank loan, forbidden nba or not? Tnere is a consensus
among Islamic scholars that the forbidden nba referred to in the
Quran or Sunna is the nba stipulated in a loan contract and that
initiated from the postponement of debts as mentioned earlier2.
Riba al-Fad'l
Riba al-fad'l is the excess received for selling two commodities of
the same kind. In fact nba al-fad'l is found in three cases: in a
sale, in a barter and in an exchange.
1. Ahmed ben M ben Au, al-Zawajer an Icitiraf al Kaba'ir, Cairo,
al-Matba'ah Azharieh n.d. 1st ed., Vol. II, p.180.
2. The opinions of the majority of the Islamic jurists are adopted
throughout this thesis as regards interest or nba which are
both forbidden.
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Riba in Sales
Buying a comniodity (excluding gold and silver) for cash or on credit
is permissible. Al-Bukhari reported A'ishah (the Prophet's wife) as
saying: "The Apostle of God, peace be on him bought food from a Jew
for a deferred payment and he mortgaged for it a coat of mail made of
iron"1.
The permissibility of buying or selling on credit is approved by the
majority of Islamic jurists. They also allowed profit in cash sales
to differ from credit sale 2 . In other words, the scholars have
allowed an increase in the price of credit sales in lieu of the
postponement.
What is forbidden is to sell one of the basic commodities (wheat,
barley, dates and salt) for either gold or silver for future
delivery. Spot sale of these commodities for gold or silver is
permitted at the spot prices prevailing at the time the deal was
struck.	 The Prophet said "... if these classes differ [the six
classes above], then sell as you wish if hand to hand."4
Riba in Bartering
In principle, bartering a commodity for another class of commodity is
allowed under two conditions:
1. See Sahih Muslim, Ministry of Awkaf & Islamic Affairs, Kuwait,
al-Dar al Kuwaitiah L'l Tibaah wa Nashr, 1969, p15.
2. See N Ott'r, al Muamalat, al-Masrafieh wa Rabawiyeh wa Elaluha
fi Islam, 4th ed. 1980, p.93. Also R. a.l-Misri, Majallet al-
Urnnia, Jumada II, 1406h, pp 54-59
3. Imam al-Shukani, Nay 'l al-Awta]Z, "Shefa' Ghalil fi Hok'm
Ziyadet al-Thaman Lemujarad al-Ajal", (A treaty on the decision
of increasing the price for the sake of delay), Dar al-Jeel,
4. On the authority of tJbadah ibn al-Samit in Sahih Muslim, Kitab
al-Buyuh, Hadith No. 3853, p.834.
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a) if the two commodities are among the four basic items (e.g.
wheat for dates), the exchange is permissible if the quantities
of each are not equal, provided that the delivery takes place
instantaneously;
b) if only one commodity among those exchanged belongs to the four
basic items, or neither is, there is no restriction on quantity
or time of delivery. The Prophet said: "Dates for dates, wheat
for wheat, barley for barley, salt for salt, like for like,
hand to hand, he who increased or delayed [delivery] commftted
Riba except of different classes ". (Narrated by Abu
Hurairah)1.
The Prophet banned the bartering of one Sa (type of measurement) of
certain kinds of dates for 2 Sa of lower grade dates and ordered to
sell and buy for cash. The Prophet once said to a man who used to do
just that:
Do you take one Sa for two? He replied, 'Messenger of Allah!
Why should they sell me good dates for assorted low quality
dates, sa for sa!' The Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless and
grant him peace, said, 'Sell the assorted ones for dirhams, and
then buy the good ones with those dirhams'2.
Riba in bartering and lending occurs also when one of the four basic
commodities is exchanged either spot or forward for different weights
of the same commodity. The reason is that it is difficult to assess
the exact value of the exchanged items without the intermediation of
money. To prevent injustice, the Prophet permitted the spot exchange
of equal quantities of these commodities.
Riba in Exchange (Sarf)
In this section exchanging gold for gold, silver for silver and gold
for silver are discussed. Buying gold for gold is permissible if the
1. Quoted by Jamal Attia, "Banking Operations in an Islamic
Framework", Majallet al Muslim al-Muaser, no. 38, April 1984,
p.95.
2. Related from Malik in al Mui	 p.288. For the implications of
this Hadith, see the Concept of Money in Islam Supra.
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transaction Is concluded instantaneously and the same weight is
exchanged for the same weight. The same rule applies for silver.
Equality in weight is not required in exchanging gold (dinar) for
silver (dirham) since they are not equal in genre. The rate of
exchange must be the spot rate (at the time of the contract) with
immediate delivery (i.e. reciprocal exchanging of the two
currencies). The Prophet's Ahadith pertaining to Riba Al-Sarf says:
Let dinar be exchanged for dinar with no addition on either
side and drham be exchanged for dirham with no addition on
either side
Cold for silver is usury except hand to hand2.
There is no harm in taking them [dinars and dirhams] at the
current rate so long as you do not separate leaving something
to be settled
The Controversy
The controversy surrounding nba al-fad'l is the reconciliation of
two views: one restricting nba al-fad'l to those cases where the
exchange, bartering or sale of the same commodity or currency
involves forward delivery. The proponents of this view depend on
hadith Usania ben zey'd who heard the Prophet saying "there is no nba
except in al Nasi'ah" or "No nba in what is traded hand to hand"4.
Though the majority of jurists do not question the authenticity of
these Ahadith, they give various interpretations. Al-Sarakhsi (483h)
for example commented:
1. Abu Fluraira reporting Allah's Messenger, in Sahih Muslin,
Hadith No. 3858, p.834.
2. Oman ibn al-Khattab reporting Allah's Messenger, Ibn al-Khattab
said commenting on this hadith: "If some one asks you to wait
to be paid, until he has gone back to his house [to bring the
money], do not leave" lest it be considered as a debt or
something deferred. For that reason, Imam Malik said this
transaction is disapproved of and the "exchange collapses" if
settlement is delayed, al Muwatta, p.292.
3. On the authority of Ibn Oman in Sunan Abu Dawud, Vol. II, 1984,
pp. 952-3
4. Reported by Ibn Abbas, quoted by Sami. Homoud, 1982, p.155.
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"Probably the narrator ('Usama) heard the Prophet answering a
question on al-Riba in such types, as gold for silver, and dates for
wheat, saying "Verily al-Riba is found in al Nasi'ah", however he
might not have heard the question.1
The second controversy involves the scope of nba al-fad'l i.e.
whether it is confined to the six commodities or includes other items
as well.
The majority of Islamic jurists of various Islamic law schools hold
the view that nba al-fad'l though applying to the famous six
commodities (gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates and salt),
encompasses all other commodities that participate with the aforesaid
six with the same causation (illat) that leads to nba al-fad'l,
though the jurists differ widely on the causation or attributes that
permit analogy.
The Zahiri School exclude analogy from their juristic reasoning.
According to them nba is only found in gold and silver and does not
apply to other currency, save paper money, nor to other than the
commodities mentioned by the Prophet. The Shafii School asserted
that the nba ordinances govern all edible commodities including such
items that are countable and may be sold as individual items. The
Maliki School ruled that the nba ordinances include every edible
commodity that is sold by way of a scale or could be stocked like
corn and rice. It was transmitted that Said al-Musayyab said:
"There is usury only in gold or silver or what is weighed or measured
of what is eaten or drunk.
1. M.A.	 Sarakhsi, Al-Mabsout, Cairo, Matbaat al-Sadeh, 1324h,
p.112.
2. Al-Muwatta, op cit, p.291
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The 1-lanbali School and a number of independent scholars envisaged
that bartering any two commodities of the same genre and quality
should be governed by the Prophet's injunction. Au example of this
is steel and textiles. The opinion of the Hanafis depends on the
Prophet's hadith narrated by Obada ibn al-Samit: "What is weighed is
like for like if it is of the same genre, if the two kinds differ
there is no harm [i.e. exchanges of different weights are valid]1
It is worthy of note that the six commodities which are subject to
nba al-fad'l are characterised by the following properties:
i) either used as money (gold and silver) or as quasi money
ii) some of them are sold by weight, some by measure
iii) four of them were used as essential food items at the time of
the ban.
It follows that any inclusion of an additional commodity either by
analogy (qiyas) or reasoning (ijtihad) should be subject to the
following conditions:
-	 there should be a genuine need to do so, such as scarcity of
such item(s)	 -
- it should be either used as money or quasi money, taking into
consideration that the paper currency, at present, differs from
gold and silver by chronic fluctuation and erosion in the
purchasing power
-	 any attempt to include new items, at present, should not be made
if the said commodity is not classified as an essential
commodity.	 Reference should be made henceforth to the four
original items at the time of the prohibition of nba al-fad'l.
1.	 Quoted by S. Homoud, 1982, p.161.
-'-7I,
The driving force in deciding whether a new food product falls within
the same category of the famous four items or not should be governed
by the fundamental principle in jurisprudence which says: "Freedom of
'I
action in the field of mundane transactions is the rule
Thus it would be prudent to assume that if the Prophet wanted to
incorporate other commodities in the ban he would have said so. On
the contrary he said that "if the classification differs from the six
commodities you can sell as you wish" (see nba in bartering). On
the other hand, any attempt to include items not listed by the
Prophet should be restrictive not absolute. Any unlisted commodity
which could be listed under the banner of nba al-fad'l should
possess at least all the properties of the four commodities together
and not only one of their properties 2 . These common properties are:
I.)	 the alleged commodity is classified as an essential food item
ii) the alleged commodity is sold by measure or weight
iii) the alleged commodity is used or could be used as quasi-money
especially if it were used in exchanging other food items.
iv) basically the alleged commodity should be nutritious as wheat
and corn, vital as salt, belong to the cereal group and could
be stored without fear of decay.
Fruits and vegetables, for example, would be excluded because they
are not mentioned by the Prophet.3
1. See Attia, 1984, pp 97-8.
2. This is only a proposition prompted by the fact that the
Prophet, according to all authoritative reporters, (e.g. hadith
narrated by Muslim, cited in M. Hamshari, 1971, p.192) has
forbidden the six items in his Ahadith, see also al-Muhalla,
Vol. 8, pp 467-8. No other items were mentioned. The arguments
among the Islamic schools of thought on this issue did not
produce any convincing opinion. For this reason, many Muslims
were inclined to accept the Zahiri views though they do not
accept the Zahiri stand, in general because the Zahiria do not
believe in analogy in Fiqh (jurisprudence).
3. Besides some jurists (eg Malik bin Anas) excludes perishable
food items.	 See A Al-Mawdudi, al-Riba, trans, M A Al-I-iadad,
Cairo, Dar al-Ansa.r. nd, p98.
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The Economic Considerations for Prohibiting Riba
Firstly, the wisdom of prohibiting nba in general is summarised, and
then the wisdom of prohibiting nba al-fad'l is discussed.
In banning nba, Islam seeks to establish a society based on justice
earnings or profits should be
commensurate with work effort. Lending money for interest permits
the lender to augment his capital without effort as money does not
create a surplus value by itself. Only through the marriage between
labour and capital a surplus or a deficit might result. Thus, it is
fairer for a provider of capital to share the profit or loss with the
entrepreneur than to obtain a fixed return (regardless of the outcome
of the borrower's business).
Islam recognises that peoples' need for money is not confined to
productive purposes, as there are other needs such as for consumption
and emergencies. Though some consumption loans may be obtained on
interest-free basis, the Islamic State is responsible for fulfilling
many of these needs through an elaborate system of distribution (see
Chapter 1) and through moral teachings to enhance the spirit of
cooperation, brotherhood and spending in the way of Allah.2
Banning nba also aims at eliminating exploitation of the needy and
to prevent selfishness which is normally associated with lending.
1. Quran says "But if ye turn back, ye shall have your capital
sums: deal not unjustly and ye shall not be dealt with
unjustly" (2:279). Additionally Al-Mawdudi mentioned that
injustice associated with nba leads to moral, social,
spiritual and economic harm, see al-Riba, ibid, pp 40-62.
2. Notably, almost all verses of the Quran that mention usury are
either preceded or followed by. verses urging people to give
charity and zakat as in this verse: "That which you give in
usury in order that it may increase on (others) people's
property has no increase with Allah: but that you give in
charity, seeking Allah's countenance, has increased manifold"
(3:39).
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In promoting the spirit of cooperation and caring, the Islamic state
guarantees the repayment of debts on behalf of debtors. The Proph't
says, "whoever leaves property, it is for his heirs, and whoever
leaves a burden, it shall be our charge")- It is also agreed by old
and modern scholars that the nba system (a) deprives society of
capital needed for productive investment 2 , and (b) it prevents
capital owners from engaging in productive enterprises that requfte
labour and hardships as long as return on capital is easily obtained
through lending.
Islam has therefore forbidden nba in all its forms and types. In
this respect there is no difference between a consumption loan and a
productive one; individual loans, loans from or to the government
are all banned.
Why Riba al-Fad'l is Banned
The first broader justification for banning nba al-fad'l in gold and
silver may be inferred from the initial sayings of the Prophet. When
asked about the wisdom he replied "I fear raina' [ribaJ for you"3.
The second wisdom is to give just measure and full weight, by
eliminating means of deception. Third, in order not to monopolise
scarce food in expectation for future profit.
1. Narrated by Bukhari in Manual of Hadith, ed, Muhammad All,
p.320. Also cited in A S al-Masri, o p cit, p100.
2. By contrast, Claude Henin in a study entitled "Financial
Infrastructure of Saudi Arabia" (Institute of International
Cooperation, University of Ottawa, March, 1980, p.6), points
out that "interest-free loans contribute a good deal to the
economic growth of the country and the dissemination of wealth
by allowing poor and middle class individuals to get funds
under exceedingly favourable conditions".
3. Al-Muwatta, op cit, p.291.
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On the other hand, the banning of selling gold for gold unless for
the same weight, came at a time when various kinds of coins exchanged
hands. Debasing of currency was widely practised; to protect
ignorant people from deception and fraud it was necessary to
establish certain measures to introduce well defined criteria. Thus
there was insistence upon weight more than on numbers in exchanging
gold and silver. Malik states: "According to the way things are done
among us there is no harm in selling gold for gold and silver for
silver by counterpoising weight, even if 11 dinars are taken for 10
dinars hand to hand, when the weight of gold is equal, coin for coin,
even if the number is different. Dirhams in such a situation are
treated the same way as dinars")
Abu Zahra emphasised that the banning of nba al-fad'l was aimed at
establishing a perfect measure of value. 2 This is why the Prophet
ordered the intermediation of money and restricted and regulanised
barter when exchanging two commodities, whether they were of the same
or of different kinds. Thus when a buyer sells his bad quality dates
and buys with the proceeds good quality dates, justice and fair
trading prevails, whilst in a strict barter deal the exact worth of
each grade would not be known and hence one of the parties would be
deceived.
Ibn al-Qayyim, an Islamic jurist, spoke about the wisdom of banning
nba al-fad'l. He cited more than one justification including the
prevention of a monopoly of food, to keep prices down and to close
the door against deferred nba. 3 Preventing the monopoly of food
would be avoided by banning the sale of the main food provisions for
future delivery and by disallowing disparity in bartering for
commodities of the same kind. Thus if no one is allowed to make
profit in deferred trading, he would want to sell the commodity
promptly before it perishes. By so doing, food would not become
scarce and the needy would have two options: either buy at the market
price, or resort to barter trading.
1. Al-Muwatta, op cit, p.292.
2. "Tahnim al-Riba", p.31 quoted by El-Gousi, op cit, 1982, p.166.
3. Ibid, p169.
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The banning of nba al-Fad'l has eliminated injustice and injury
associated with the difficulty in determining a fair measure of value
and more significantly has closed the back door to nba al-Nasia
(deferred nba) in accordance with a Sharia rule stating: anything
that serves as a means to the unlawful is also unlawful.'
1.	 Cited in Mashal D Al-Mashal, "The Kuwait Finance House:
Viability of Growth as an Interest-Free Financial Institution",
unpublished PhD dissertation, San Diego, United States,
International University, 1987, p42.
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ISLAMIC BANKING THEORY AND PRACTICE
Nature and Methodology
Islamic banking has onln developing during the second half of
this century. Banking in the conventional system dates back to the
seventeenth century and is governed by commercial laws that have been
evolving since then. It could never have reached its present form
without many attempts of trial and error. However, the crux of the
Islamic system is governed by the Quran, the law of God, and by other
sources of Islamic legislation and practices discussed earlier.
Other aspects of Islamic banking methodology are cited in the
business dealings that prevailed in the early stages of Islamic rule
and thereafter and were discussed in the preceding section, though it
should be emphasised that the law of God is described as being
inunutable and complete. This nature of immutability and completeness
dictates to a great extent the methodological principles of Islamic
banking and subjects its evolution, alongside the conventional
system, to tremendous constraints. For that matter things like usury
and its ramifications cannot be adjusted or altered to suit certain
transactions or deals. Such actions will be regarded as outright
violations of the code of Sharia.
Therefore the Islamic banking system can only be operational under
two fundamental principles: namely the prohibition of interest, and
the introduction of profit and loss sharing schemes and other types
Tfinance (see forms of financing operations). In Islamic law al-
nba (increase) has two phases: the simple interest and cortipound
interest or usury. Both are banned on the grounds that (i) a loan
must not generate a fixed guaranteed return to the lender; (ii)
financing for an undetermined return is only permissible if the
financier and the entrepreneur share between themselves the risk
(loss) as well as the reward (profit). 	 This simple rule is based on
another known principle that where there is no risk there is no
reward.	 In Islamic jurisprudence this is equivalent to the rules
which say that "the burden is in proportion to the benefit and the
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benefit to the burden", and "the liability is an obligation
accompanying gain"
Thus if interest is ruled out, it does not mean that Islamic banks
are no more than non-profit organisations. On the contrary, and
according to the risk reward trade off, the yield in a profit sharing
arrangement is, naturally, a legally accepted return in the Islamic
economy. Other lawful returns include mark-up in trade, service
charges, commissions and agency fees, and property rent as will be
explained in the succeeding passages.
First of all the types and classifications of Islamic banks will be
presented, then the sources and forms of financing operation and
services rendered will be analysed. This is followed by an outline
of some Islamic certificates as well as a summary of the Islamic
supervisory authorities.
Background
The number of Islamic Banks are increasing and their operations are
constantly subject to revision resulting in structural changes in
dimension and scope.
The InternationJ	 Banks (IAIB) defines an
Islamic bank as follows:
Islamic bank is a banking establishment that solicits funds
and emp o s t eIILJ,.0 accorIance
te purf building solidarity and ensuring justice of
-dtStiibution and empQyment of funds Tcordance with the
IstYnic principles.
1. Quoted by Othman A. Liewellyn, "Islamic Jurisprudence and
Environmental Planning", JRIE, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1984,
p.38.
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This definition reflects the general contention of Islamic banks and
stresses the developmental and social aspects which are the basic
foundations of a social Islamic bank. Thus it appears advisable to
differentiate between Islamic development and social bank or
commercially oriented banks.
Classifying Islamic banks by their objectives four types of banks can
be identified: name1y,social, international devepmentona1
commercial, and finally holding banks (see Table 2.1). However,
Islamic banks arec1ssifieLccording to their ownership_structe .--
three types can be identified: 	 state owned, jointly owned and
privately owned banks. The first classification is more siitábIe to
this analysis and will be adapted.
	
The history, objectives and
functions of these banks are discussed below accordingly.
DIAGRAM 2.1
TYPES OF
ISLAMIC BANKING
SOCIAL BANKS ]
COMMERCIAL BANKS	 INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
BANKS
HOLDING
COMPANIES
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Social Banic
The main feature of a social Islamic bank is its emphasis on social
objectives; this embraces the mobilization of savings in the
communitand is considered more important hanrofitiiiTzation
in commercial banks.
The first Islamic social bank was established in the 1950s in
Pakistan. Deposits consisted mainly of savings by the middle class
for the sole purpose of extending interest free loans to needy
farmers. Borrowers were asked to pay a minimum charge to cover the
bank's administrative expenses. There were no financial incentives
for the depositors who put money in the bank; but depositors had
regarded this as a moral duty. The Bank's employees left for other
lucrative jobs. The experiment dwindled and the landlords took over
the responsibility of collecting the outstanding loans from the
borrowers which were mostly paid back in 1960.1
The second experiment in social banking was pioneered in a remote
rural area of Mit-Chamr, Egypt, and operated from 1963-1967. The
initiative was based on replacing the existing banking system by a
new system based on interest-free principles. The second main
objective of the bank was to promote saving habits among Egyptian
peasants, the majority of whom have never had a bank account before.
Three types of accounts were introduced to achieve these objectives.
The saving and credit accounts entitled the regular savers (who had
maintained an account for at least one year) to obtain interest-free
loans to finance their development projects. These accounts were
similar to accounts held by the Saving Housing Institutions in
Germany which allowed the savers to obtain loans at a rate of zero
percent.
The second set of accounts, the investment accounts, were based on a
pooling system whereby the funds deposited in this account together
1.	 Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Arab Midd1e_ast,
1983, p.75.
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with part of the bank's funds were pooled together to finance
particular projects belonging to the depositors, on a participation
basis. The bank and the client shared together the management, risks
and profits of the business. Again this investment account was
similar to the saving funds in some German banks where savings are
pooled together in a saving fund. The fund is then used to finance
the participants on the basis of participation-finance instead of
interest-based loans.
The third account was the fund for social services which incorporated
the Zakat fund and a portion of the bank's profits, as allocated by
the board of directors. The aim of this fund was to assist the
socially underprivileged and the poor in the community1.
The success of this experiment was very satisfactory in the first few
years of operation as the number of depositors increased from 1000 to
60,000. Loans were made for periods ranging from 1-3 years and in a
few cases were for 5 years. Unlike the Pakistan bank, loans were
diversified and included the financing of the purchase of small tools
and machinery for craftsmen and small manufacturers, repairs and
building of houses, the purchase of farm animals and even sewing
machines.
The Ford Foundation in a report dated 1967, praised this experiment
and observed that the farmers regarded the bank as their own! The
main contribution of Mit-Ghamr social bank was undoubtedly the
reduction of the farmers' dependence on money lenders who used to
charge exorbitant rates of interest 2 . However, the bank did not make
a profit on savings accounts since loans to account holders were
discharged free of interest and consequently the bank was not able to
provide savers with any return. Although administrative charges were
collected, they were barely enough to service the loan. On the
1. Ahmed al-Naggar, "Islamic Banks - a new Approach for Economic
Cooperation", in M. Au (ed), 1982, pp 26-7.
2. See R. Wilson, "Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East",
1983, pp 75-77.
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other hand, it seemed that the bank was not too careful in
scrutinizing the proposals for participation schemes, as Ahmad al-
Naggar, the founder, wrote that it was not necessdry for the bank
"to make sure of the client's capability of discharging the loans
given to him . . In effect, the bank's main concern was the
personal character of the clients and not their securities. He
considered that the bank's involvement with the client as partner and
advisor, provide a sufficient protection against business failures.
In addition to the aforementioned, other problems which contributed
to the bank's difficulties, included low salaries and the bank's
location; then made it difficult to attract experienced staff or even
to keep those who had already been on the payroll. 2
 Finally, this
experiment ended in 1967.
The Mit-Ghamr social bank had paved the way for the establishment of
the Nasser Social Bank (NSB) in 1972. Capitalised at 1,400,020
Egyptian pounds, the NSB commenced operations in Cairo by undertaking
to honour all the debts of its predecessor, the Mit-Ghamr Social
Bank. Although the Bank is widely known as a social charitable
institution, it provides virtually all banking services; it grants
loans, accepts deposits and takes equity participation in certain
projects on a profit and loss sharing basis. So Ear, few losses have
occurred, revealing the seriousness and integrity of the Bank's
chosen partners. The Bank is also involved in managing pension fund
and social security portfolios, offering retirement plans, savings
and endowment schemes for non-beneficiaries of the existing
programmes in the private and public sectors; it also grants
subsidies and Sadaqats (donations) to needy citizens 3 . All interest-
free loans are made for social purposes including housing. The
1. A. al-Naggar, op cit, p.27.
2. R. Wilson, 1983, p.77.
3. See NSB Articles of Association.
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shortage of houses is an acute socio-economic problem in Egypt and
the Bank's housing loans are a good contribution to the society's
development and evolution. It is worth mentioning that the Bank has
no way of controlling the utilization of the borrowed money.
However, the Bank presupposes that devout borrowers would not deposit
the funds obtained from NSB in a conventional bank or to use them for
other than the purposes stipulated in the loan application.
Islaevelopment Banks
The idea of establishing an Islamic development bank was the outcome
of joint efforts among the Islamic states which was strongly
supported by the late King Faisel of Saudi Arabia. In the Second
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Karachi in 1970, a
proposal to establish an Islamic bank for trade and development was
recommended. Another proposal was put forward for the establishment
of an agency to be called later The Association of Islamic Banks to
study and promote the idea of Islamic economics and banking. The
Islamic Development Bank (1DB) was formed in 1974 with an authorized
capital of two billion Islamic dinars (equivalent to two billion
SDRs). 1DB aims to foster economic development, social progress.
economic relations of member countries and Muslim communities in
conformity with the principles of Sharia. 1DB also aims to promote
mutual cooperation among Islamic countries and to contribute towards
finding "an appropriate system inspired by Islamic principles and
capable of facing the serious challenges that confront the
development efforts of the Islamic nations.
According to the Articles of Association the operational activities
of 1DB are classified into three broad categories: ordinary
operations, special fund operations and trust fund operations.
Under ordinary operations, 1DB undertakes the following financing
activities
1.	 See 1DB, "Activities and Performances", 1983, p.5.
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	)	 Equity participation in projects/enterprises in order to
provide some return on its capital;
b) Investment in economic and social infrastructure projects;
c) Loans for public sector projects, enterprises and programmes;
and
d) Loans for private sector projects, enterprises and programmes.
Commercial Banks
An Islamic conuiiercial bank may be defined as a financial institution
thatacceptposits from the public and makes them available to end
users (entrepreneurs) on mark-up or a profit and loss sharing basis.
Apart from clearing cheques and ordinary banking services, the
Islamic bank may indulge in all types of commercial activities and
may invest directly in various sectors in the economy. This
definition is based on the actual operations of these banks and not
on what they ought be doing 1 . For example, the Islamic commercial
banks' main activity is to finance the local and foreign trade sector
on a short-term basis. Their investment activities are mostly
related to employment of funds in direct investments ranging from
equity participation to import/export business. These banks scarcely
engage in long-term financing due mainly to the constraints imposed
by their short-term deposit base.
These banks embrace three kinds of ownership structure:
1. Privately owned banks. These banks are usually incorporated as
public shareholding or limited liability companies. Typical
banks of this type are: Dubai Islamic Bank (1975), the First
Islamic Commercial Bank, and Jordan Islamic Bank (1978).
2. Combined ownership banks (private and government). These banks
are also incorporated as public shareholding companies such as
the Kuwait Finance House (1978).
I. Most of these banks have cited among their main objectives such
themes as economic development and fostering of industrial
activities jfl their countries of domicile and Ummat al-Islam
(Is1anic nation).
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3. State_,wned banks. These are commercial banks that were
nationalized in Pakistan and Iran after the abolition of
interest.
Holding Banks
There are three groups_oLholdjpg banks at present: the Islamic
Banking System International (IBS), Dar al-Mal al Islami Trust (DM1)
and al-Raraka Group.
lBS is a holding company that was established in October 1978 in
Luxembourg. lBS is thus the first international Islamic bank to be
established in Europe and outside the Islamic world the company's
authorized capital was initially US $ one million currently standing
at US $lOOm of which US $34.76m was paid up in May 1984. The
objective of lBS is to assist the Islamic banks in identifying
investment opportunities in the international market, and to
introduce international financial institutions to the Islamic
financial and capital markets particularly for financing potential
projects in the Islamic countries.
As a holding company lBS established in 1983 the Islamic bank
International (IBI) in Denmark. IBI is capitalized at DK 40,000m and
is the first licensed deposit taking institution working on Islamic
financing principles to be established in Europe. Currently IBI
investment involves leasing, murabaha, international trade financing
of imports/exports from and to the Islamic world1.
The sources of IBI funds come basically from deposits solicited from
Islamic institutions as well as individuals living outside Denmark.
lBS is also a major shareholder in Arinco Arab Investors, Sear and
Islamic Finance House (Cayrnan) and Faisal Islamic Bank in Sudan and
Egypt.
1.	 Report of the Board of Directors to the General Assembly,
November 1984.
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Dar al-Mal al-Islami Trust (DM1), a holding company (with an
authorized capital of US one billion), was established In 1401 (1981)
in the Bahamas with a global objective of developing and promoting an
integrated "Islamic financial and economic system" and 'peciflcally
to achieve the following goals1:
i) remove the burden of nba from the financial transactions in
Urnmat al-Islam (Islamic Nation);
ii) promote economic unity among Muslim States to achieve
religious, political and cultural unity activities and may
invest directly in various sectors in the economy abiding in
all dealings with Islamic rules and principles;
iii) assist Muslims in the development of their commercial and
industrial potential; and
iv) provide an indigenous Islamic basis for full economic
cooperation with the 'non-Muslim people'.
The DM1 group consists of Islamic investment division, solidarity
division (Islamic insurance), Islamic banking division and Islamic
business division. The DM1 strategy is to form or acquire these
divisions, mainly in Muslim countries, and it may also operate other
subsidiaries to conduct financial or commercial activities.
The Al-Baraka group is an international holding company engaged in
Islamic banking and investment activities.	 Based in Jeddah, the
group's unconsolidated total assets amount to US $796m 2 .	 The group
consists of the following companies:
- Al-Baraka Company for Investment and Development, Jeddah (ABID)
established in 1982, provides short- and medium-term finance,
project finance, export finance and leasing.
1. See for instance, Faisal Islamic Bank, Egypt, The Chairman's
Report to the Shareholders, 1980, and DM1 Trust, Geneva, 1401
h. pp 6-8.
2. Based on the aggregate balance sheets of the group.
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The Saudi Tunisian Finance House which was founded in 1983 as a
Tunisian joint stock company1 . It undertakes all normal
commercial and investment banking activities including equity
participation in industrial projects.
Al-Baraka Investment Company, London, was formed in early 1984
to identify and undertake short- and medium-term investment
activities in Europe and America. Its activities include
export finance, trade finance, commodity trading and real
estate development.
- Al-Baraka International Ltd, is a licensed deposit taker based
in London which was acquired in 1983 and undertakes all
commercial banking activities.
Other wholly owned subsidiaries include Al-Baraka Bank, Sudan (1984),
Arabian Thai International Co. (1983), Bangkok and Al-Baraka Turkish
Finance House (1985).
Summary
Regardless of the type and objectives of Islamic banks they all share
a common ground. Byhejr veynature theyhe1p in attaining the
owin1s:
a) thrift promotion and solidarity among Muslims. especially among
those who shy away from conventional banking for obvious
rligious reasons
b) providing small businessmen and craftsmen with funds and
sometimes interest-free loans to foster their resources and
increase their productivity;
1
	
The Central Bank of Tunisia is a 20% shareholder.
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c)	 contribu	 ial justice by engaging in extra-banking
activities such as the collectioT	 rom depositors and
to need[flzen
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ISLAMIC BANKING OPERATIONS
In this section, the various types of Islamic bank deposits are
discussed followed by the various types of financing instruments that
are currently practised by Islamic banks. An analysis of banking
services such as overdrafts, benevolent loans, endorsement and
collection of bills, transfer of debts, remittances is also given,
followed by an outline of the Islamic money and capital markets.
Deposit Taking
By and large deposit taking is the major source of funds in the
Islamic banks 1 . Its importance is rather propounded by tEe
it is, virtually, cost free as the Islamic banks do not pay interest
on deposits but depositors share in the profit, if any, of the fund
users.
Islamic banks currently offer, as with conventional banks, the
followigyes of deposit accounts:
1. Deposits payab1e..n demand, such as current accounts, saving
accounts, and ordinary deposits at call or short notice.
2. Investment deposit accounts.
Current Accounts
Islamic current accounts are a service offered mainly to Islamic bank
depositors to process bank transfers and pay cheques drawn on them
through the normal national and international clearing systems.
These accounts are payable on demand, and no interest or profit is
received on such accounts.
The value date system as known in the conventional banks is not
applicable to these accounts. The capital of the Islamic bank "would
1.	 Other sources are. capital, reserves and retained earnings.
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be fully subject to the claims of holders of IslLamiC current
accounts" .
Sharia exegencies consider this account as an inteLest free loan
(qard hasan) from the account holder to the bank, the first being a
lender (when money is deposited) and the second a borrower. When
cheques are drawn on the account, the account holder becomes a
borrower and the bank a lender.2
Current accounts in foreign currency, mainly US dollars, may be
opened in many Islamic banks e.g. FIB-Cairo, FIB-Sudan, Islamic Bank
International (131). This is, of course, in addition to opening
current accounts in the domestic currency where the bank is located.
Recently it has been possible in 131-Denmark to open a current
account in three major foreign currencies, namely, the US dollar,
Deutsch mark, arid pound sterling. The minimum funds accepted for the
opening of these accounts must not be less than US $10,000 or
equivalent.
Bonus and Fees on Current Accounts
Normally most Islamic banks do not charge fees or pay interest on
current account balances. However, in Al Barakat International
Limited (ABIL), a licensed London-based deposit taker, a slightly
different situation arises. When a bonus current account is opened,
in either pound sterling or US dollars, a bonus would be paid on the
average balance in excess of S2500 (the bonus level) or equivalent.
To qualify for the bonus, the balance should be maintained for, at
least, six consecutive months. The debtor is allowed to give a bonus
to the creditor either in the form of an increase on the amount of
the debt or any other sign of gratitude in compliance with the
Prophet's saying:
1. Model Islamic Bank (MIB), IAIB, Islamic Investment Company Ltd
(IIC), n.d., p.4.
2. M.S. Madkour "Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence", n.p.,
ii.d., p.736 quoted by Encyclopaedia of Islamic Banking, 1MB
Cairo, 1977, Vol. 1, Ch. 2.
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"The best from among yu are those who discharge their debts in
the best way possible"
However, Islamic jurists have put two restrictions on this practice:
(i) the amount of compensation should not be stipulated in the loan
contract, and (ii) this act must not become a common practice;
otherwise it will not be more than a remuneration of capital in a
straightforward loan which is forbidden under Islamic law.
Although some banks advocate charging customers for current account
services 2 other banks do not, if a minimum balance is maintained.
Such services may be free of charge since the benefits accrued to the
bank from investing the floating balance more than offset the cost3.
For this reason a free service is considered by some jurists as some
kind of benefit given by the bank to the account holder. As such, it
is regarded as a disguised interest and must not be permitted they
alleged.
Savings Accounts
In a commercial Islamic Bank, ordinary saving accounts (excluding
term deposits) are payable on demand. The procedures and formalities
of depositing and withdrawing are almost identical in both systems.
An exception is noted when a saving account is opened in an lB. The
depositor may (if he wishes) assign to the Bank the right to invest
the deposited sum. Since interest is forbidden, profits (or losses)
are realised upon investing a certain portion of these types of
deposits in short term financing.4
If the depositor chooses not to assign that right, the saving account
would be similar to a current account, although a passbook may still
be issued.
1. Cited in Ibn Qudama, Al-Muqhni, 1367 h, p236.
2. Encyclopaedia of Islamic Banking, op cit, Vol. 1, Ch. 2, p.21.
3. KFH require a minimum balance of KD 500 ($1750) for opening a
current account, but no charge is collected for the services.
4. Cash reserves differ from bank to bank.
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Profits of saving accounts are normally less than profits of term or
fixed investment deposit accounts, the reason being that saving
deposits can be withdrawn on demand as in Kuwait Finance House (KFH)
and in some other institutions within a few days notice)
Investment Deposit Accounts
Investment deposit accounts are called 'Islamic participating
accounts'. In practice, however, there are two main kinds of
investment accounts, specified and unspecified.
In the first category the depositor authorises the bank to invest the
deposited sum in particular projects or sectors. For this reason
these accounts are sometimes called 'conditional' or 'limited
investment accounts' because they are geared to a specific sector(s)
or project(s). The Islamic banks may invest part of their own funds
along with the depositors, and in this case, they would share the
profit/loss with the account holder.
In the second category the depositor gives the Islamic bank an
unconditional authorisation to invest the deposited sum without
limitation as to certain sectors or projects; provided, of course,
that all financing deals are in compliance with Islamic principles
and fall within the Bank's investment criteria.
These accounts are held for short-term periods ranging from 3, 6, 9
or 12 months irrespective of their type. They are also held for
longer-term periods of up to 5 years.
Eligibility for profits differ from one bank to another. In the Faisal
Islamic Bank of Egypt, profits are paid on one month deposits, whereas in
the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan and the Islamic Bank of Dubai profits
are paid on 3 and 12 months deposits respectively.
1 For instance, IIC, a subsidiary of DM1, Geneva, accepts and
releases savings deposit funds within a few days notice, see
Abdeen and Shook, 1985, p.199.
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However, in the Islamic banks of Pakistan profits are calculated on
the points product method.
In Al-Baraka International Limited (ABIL), a fixed term deposit (of
not less than £5000 or equivalent), may be opened in the name of a UK
resident or non-resident.	 The minimum term is one month or a
multiple of one month. To comply with the Bank of England
regulations concerning the depositors right to a secured return on
fixed-term deposits, ABIL undertakes to invest these deposits in "a
manner calculated to give a minimum return" which could be anything
from 0.5-2 per cent of the deposited sum. In cases where the actual
profit exceeds this rate, a bonus would be credited to the account to
cover for the difference between the minimum and the actual return.
A withdrawal notice of not less than 7 days before maturity must be
given; failing this the account is renewed for another term on the
same conditions as before.
Evidently, the method of profit distribution as currently applied in
the Islamic banks, with the exception of Pakistan, is not in favour
of small or short-term savers. The banks argue that the calculation
of profits for short-term deposits (e.g. less than a month) is
tedious and costly. This allegation is not convincing and does not
secure equitable treatment among savers who have the right to profits
whatever their balances may be.
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FORMS OF FINANCING OPERATIONS
In the conventional banking system, personal or corporate loans are
performed through a simple financing mechanism. The banks, acting as
financial intermediaries accept deposits, from the public and lend
them to the borrowers, regardless of whether these borrowers are
individuals or corporate entities. The banks' profits are mainly
attributed to the difference between interest expenii3
depositors, and interest earned (received) from borrowers.
In the Islamic banking system the issue is rather more complicated.
Money does not earn money without the collab Loriletween cáI'Eal
and effort. Therefore depositors do not earn an automatic fixed
return on their deposits as in the conventional system. A link has
to be introduced so that the expected earnings of depositors are
directly related to, and constitute a proportion of, the profits
earned by entrepreneurs.	 Nonetheless financing or participating
instruments vary to suit the financial needs in the market and to
provide short-, medium- and long-term funds.	 These Islamic
instruments take one or more of the following forms:	 Modaraba,
Musharaka, Murabaha, leasing and Ijara Wa'iktina. The definitions
and mechanisms surrounding each type are discussed below:
Muda raba
Mudaraba (capital trust) is a pre-Islamic custom used to finance a
significant portion of the caravan trade in the Arabian land.
Orientalists believe that "cornmenda" as it came to be known in the
medieval West, around the 10th century, was adopted from the Islamic
commercial practice that was in operation as early as the sixth
century1.
1.	 See A.L. lJdovitch, 1970, pp. 171-2.
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Definition of )fudaraba
Mudaraba, in jurisprudence terms, is "a contract in profit sharing,
with one party providing funds and the other his work". In other
words, mudaraba (or qirad) is a contract between two parties: an
Islamic bank as an investor (Rab al mal) who provides a second party,
the entrepreneur (mudareb) with financial resources to finance a
particular project. Profits, if any, are shared between the two
parties according to an agreed upon (in advance) percentage. Losses,
if any, are the liability of the Islamic bank, and the mudareb only
loses his efforts and his expected share in the profits.
Mudaraba Applications
Qirad (mudaraba) is best adopted in project financing, and trade
financing. Some Hanbali jurists (fuqaha) allow its usage in
financing agriculture and in financing small businesses or
craftsmanships.
In pursuing this type of financing an lB may use its own funds, its
depositors' funds or both. The contractual relationship between the
lB and depositors or between the lB and entrepreneurs varies with
respect to the source of funds uilised.
i) if the IS uses its own funds, the bank is said to be an
investor (sahib al-mal) and the entrepreneur a mudareb;
ii) if the IS employs the depositor's funds without committing any
of its own, the bank would be acting as an agent for the
depositors from the time the deposits are accepted to the time
when the money is invested in a mudaraba contract. At this
stage the IS becomes a mudareb with respect to the depositors;
and a sahib al-mal (investor) with respect to the
1. A. Abu Gudda, "Mudaraba (qirad) and Modern Applications", in
the 2nd Islamic Bank Conference, KFH, Kuwait, March 22-25,
1983, p.6.
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entrepreneurs. It is conceivable however that this dual
identity could be eliminated whereby the lB acts in its
fiduciary capacity from the time deposits are accepted to the
time when the mudaraba contract is terminated.
iii) if the lB utilises a mixture of its own funds and that of the
depositors, the bank would act as an agent for the depositors,
whereas between the IS and the entrepreneur the former acts in
its own capacity as an investor.
The application of mudaraba in financing current Islamic banking
operations is very limited owing to the restrictions on mudaraba
transactions. These restrictions inhibit its wider application to
cover many sectors in the economy. For instance, the majority of
Islamic scholars argue that inudaraba should be limited to self-
liquidating transactions 1 . By self-liquidating transactions, the
assets of the mudaraba are easily recognisable and must be realised
and liquidated so that the proceeds can be easily distributed between
the partners at the termination of operations, completion of deal, or
the achievement of the mudaraba objectives. Now if the partners want
to renew the mudaraba, a new contract must be negotiated, but only
after the old one has been terminated and the rights and liabilities
of the parties concerned have been recognised and settled. The
argument for this, rather stringent rule, is based on the terms and
conditions applied in mudaraba contracts. These are:-
a) The majority of jurists limit mudaraba to trading activities,
principally buying and selling;
b) The entrepreneur has no right to mix the mudaraba funds and his
own funds. However the Mudareb can share in the equity of the
Mudaraba venture.2
c) Before liquidation and distribution of profits, the mudareb
possesses an uncontested right not only to his share in the
profits but also to any gains or appreciation in the value of
1. Sami H. Homoud, 1982, 2nd ed., pp. 408-9. For an extensive
coverage of Mudaraba see also pp. 388-417, and Islamic Law
Encyclopaedia, "Mudaraba Company", Vol. 10, Ministry of Awqaf
and Islamic Affairs, Kuwait, n.d.
2. See Resolutions and Recommendation of the Seminar on Mudaraba
and Investment Certificates, Jeddah, The Academy of lslamic
Fiqh, 30 August - 2 September 1987.
102
output or assets of the joint venture that might occur during
the life of the mudaraba contract. Furthermore the
determination of the partner's rights te'luire detailed
calculation which is time consuming, especially if such an
exercise has to be done several times a year. However, this is
not, in itself, an obstacle particularly when coinputerisation
is possible;
d) The mudaraba accounts must be recorded properly and audited
independently, a rather dubious task especially for small
businesses when the cost involved may be significant.
However a broader definition of mudaraba so that it may be applied in
various economic activities needs further research and thorough
analysis. For one thing, the majority of Islamic jurists hold the
view that inudaraba contracts are confined to commercial activities.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that new ideas or modern concepts
have to be shelved. On the contrary, the evolution and continuation
of Islamic banking is largely dependent on innovative and new
approaches to finance. New instruments or alternative financing
modes can be created to conform with Islamic principles. Islamic
banking and finance is a new concept in many respects and it will not
be impaired if new approaches are adopted, provided always that it
serves the needs of modern societies, and concurrently it is in
compliance with Sharia.
Husharaka Financing (Participation Finance)
Musharaka financing is a well established partnership contract in
Islamic law and used to be operative in the early Islamic era. It is
also currently one of the more popular means of financing outside
banking systems among commercial or small industrial sectors.
In the context of Islamic banking, musharaka is described as a joint
venture between an Islamic bank and a customer or business entity
geared for certain operations; it may be terminated within a
specified period of time, or when certain conditions are met.
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Contrary to mudaraba, the two partners in a musharaka participate in
the capital of the venture. Profits are allocated according to an
agreed proportion al].owing for managerial skills to be remunerated.
However, if losses occur these are borne by the partners in
proportion to their contribution to the capital. For example, the
bank may participate in 60 per cent of the capital, though its share
in profits might not exceed 50 per cent. Whilst in the case of
losses the bank's liability must not be less than 60 per cent. The
bank's right to ask for collateral or surety is limited by Sharia for
this type of financing.
The Islamic bank may finance industry, trade, real estate,
contracting and almost all legal enterprises through equity or direct
participation. Musharaka is well suited for financing private or
public companies and particularly in project financing for short,
medium and long term periods. The Faisal Islamic Bank, Sudan, for
example, finances selected projects and assists in the procurement of
production equipment on a musharaka basis for periods up to 3 years.
In all cases projects are evaluated; if they are economically
feasible and expected to be profitable, and if the would be partner
has adequate experience and his references are satisfactory, the
extent of the Bank's participation can then be negotiated.
Musharaka consists of two types mainly (a) musharaka related to
certain projects or deals and terminating with the project's
completion, and (b) redeemable musharaka. In the latter category,
the bank recaptures the committed investment progressively with the
project's ability to generate profits and an adequate cash flow
sufficient enough to pay back the Bank's initial invesLment and the
agreed shares in profits. This type of deal is similar to redeemable
participation in conventional banking systems (CBS).
Musharaka financing is characterised by the following features:
1. First and foremost the Islamic bank is not guaranteed a fixed
return on its participation;
2. Equity participation of venture capital in the conventional
system does not preclude the project from borrowing and
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incurring interest payment. In the Islamic system borrowing at
a fixed interest rate from a commercial bani' is forbidden.
Clearly circumstances may arise when musharaka financing may be
set alongside fixed interest borrowing. Should this happen the
Islamic bank may be prepared to take steps to rescind the
interest borrowing. This is the case for example with the
International Islamic Bank for Investment and Development
(IBID) in Egypt; it is prepared to inject fresh money for
projects to buy out other banks or creditors)- By so doing it
clears the balance sheet from any interest bearing debts.
3. Whether an lB steps in to finance fixed assets, working capital
or both, the bank's benefits lie in the profit sharing scheme
between the bank and the venture.
4. Profits are shared pro-rata with equity (total shareholders'
rights) and are calculated for this purpose after allowing for
management fees and before depreciation and provisions.
5. At the outset it appears that using leverage (mainly overdraft)
with equity participation is not advocated in the Islamic
banking system. However, an Islamic bank may extend free
interest participation to alleviate liquidity shortages on a
short-term basis.
When financing trade on Musharaka basis, the transaction may take the
following. Supposing that a client requesting a musharaka loan for
£40,000 is prepared to put in £10,000 capital of his own. The
Bank's share will be calculated as follows (assuming that total sales
amount to £60,000).
1.	 Statement by M. Heliny Attia, Senior Executive, VP (IBID),
Cairo personal interview, March 1983 and August 1984.
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Amount
£st
60,000
50. 000
10,000
2.000
8,000
3 60
4.400
Descrivtion
Total sales
Cost of sales
Musharaka net profit
Less management fees
Bank's share @ 45%l
Balance accruing to the merchant
Actual percentage share of the
merchant, % 64%
To sum up the differences and similarities between Mudaraba and
Musharaka are shown in Table 2.1.
TABLE 2.1: Traditional Forms of Profit Sharing Techniques
Description	 Mudaraba	 Musharaka
Permanent	 Redeemable
Source of fund
	
Bank
Management	 Entrepreneur
Profits	 Agreed upon
ratio
Losses	 Bank whereas
entrepreneur
loses his
effort
Bank and
entrepreneurs
Bank and
entrepreneurs
or entrepre-
neurs alone
i. in propor-
tion to
capital
ownership1
ii. agree upon
ratio
Bank and
entrepreneur
in proportion
to equity
Bank
Entrepreneur
or bank and
entrepreneurs
S arne
S aine
1. For shareholding companies
2. For sole proprietorships.
1. Rate of profit is a contractual agreement in Islamic law and
nee1 not be in propo-rtion to capital, whereas losses must be
shared pro raca with the partners contribution, see
Encyclopaedia of Islamic Law, Kuwait, Ministry of Awkaf and
Islamic Affairs, p cit.
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Nonetheless, the extent of Musaharaka financing is still limited and
ranges from only 7 to 10 per cent of the total financing package of
Islamic banks.
Murabaha (mark-up on sale)
Murabaha is an Islamic method for financing the purchase or import of
capital goods, onsumab1e goods or raw materials. Under the Murabaha
agreement, the customer provides the bank with the specifications and
quotations of the goods to be purchased. The Islamic bank study the
documents with reference to the price, the specification and
conditions for payment. In many instances the bank would be able to
obtain the same goods from a different supplier at more favourable
conditions than those obtained by the customer. When the bank and
its customer agree on the terms of the deal, the former purchases the
goods or commodities and later on passes the title to the customer.
The profit accrues to the bank is mutually agreed as mark-up on the
cost of purchase. There are certain fundamental principles attached
to Murabaha which are overlooked in the literature and are in need of
emphasis here.
1. The purchase price should be declared to the client especially
when the bank succeeds in obtaining a discount or rebate.
Since the mark-up is calculated on the net purchase price, any
discount or rebate obtained has to be acknowledged and
accounted for to the benefit of the client. This procedure is
a strict adherence to Murabaha rules.
2. Goods must be classified and clearly identified according to
international	 or	 commonly	 accepted	 standards	 or
classifications, otherwise murabaha contracts would be void.
3. The third element relates to whether the original agreement
between the Islamic bank and the customer is bindirLg or not.
There are two methods in dealing with this question. In DM1
the customer requests the bank to purchase the goods and
submits art intent to buy same on arrival; this promise is
binding. In the Kuwait Finance House (KFH) the customer gives
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a non-binding promise to buy the commodities that are purchased
by KFH on his behalf. Some scholars argue that the promise to
buy the goods, before the title is transferred and the goods
are in the bank's custody, must not be binding for two
reasons1:
(a) If the promise is binding, then the transaction would be
similar to an ordinary letter of credit (LC) and the
mark-up would riot be more than a disguised interest.
(b) The occidental principle in Islamic contracts prohibits
binding agreements whereby a party promises to deliver or
sell goods he does not own.
However the problem is resolved within Sharia principles as follows:
a) the promise or intent to buy will not be binding as long as the
goods are not purchased; and
b) custody of the goods is not always necessary since it is widely
accepted that the bill of lading is the document of title in
international trade. Once issued an Islamic bank would be able
to sign the sales agreement with the customer.
The transfer of title would be effected by endorsing the bill upon
arrival of the goods at the port of destination.
Nevertheless, when the shipping documents are received by the bank,
the accounts party is notified and requested to honour his promise to
buy within two weeks at most. The amount to be paid by the accounts
party could be paid by the lB as an interest-free loan from the bank
to the latter until the settlement date2.
1. Sheikh Abdulhamid al-Sayeh, "Sales Contracts in Islamic
Jurisprudence", 2nd Islamic Bank Conference, Kuwait,
p.6.
2. Statement by Ahmad Dousary, Manager, Credit Department. KFH,
personal interview, February 21, 1983.
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In cases where the client has a credit balance in the bank less than
the value of the transaction, the latter may finance the gap to
conclude the deal. When the goods are sold, profits will be
distributed in proportion to the parties' contributions1.
The same basic principles of Murabaha outlined above, particularly
the transfer of title and the physical custody of the goods, apply to
domestic trade and finance by means of an instrument called 'internal
Murabaha'.
Although the client must open an account in the lB prior to opening
the LC, it is not uncommon that the bank require a cash cover from
the client to ensure payment, in addition to endorsing commercial
papers in favour of the bank as in the conventional banking system.
There are some arguments in LB circles that the service fee must not
be proportional to the amount of the LC on the grounds that the paper
work and administrative work are not related to the value of the LC.
It is difficult to quantify exactly the actual expenses related to
each letter of credit. A minimum charge rate of 1/2%, as recommended
by the the KFH Religious Supervisory Board, is considered fair and
common.
As far as repayment terms are concerned, they are flexible and
simple. Once the purchase price plus the bank's margin are agreed
upon, repayment could be stretched over 6 to 24 months period and
sometimes to 36 months depending on the market pattern of the
commodity and the terms of trade. In any case repayment may be
discharged on instalment or on a one lump sum basis.
Sometimes a client may finance the purchase of the goods by using his
own funds. In this case, the bank acts merely as an agent charging a
service fee, but no commission is charged for the extension of the
LC. In Islamic law this operation is called Mutajara.
1.	 See Resolutions of the First Islamic Bank Conference, lATh,
Dubai, 20-22 May 1979.
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In summary, Murabaha financing has gained momentum in Islamic banking
operations. A1-Rajhi Group, London branch, for example, a subsidiary
of Al-Rajhi Islamic bank of Saudi Arabia has so far confined its
operations to Murabaha. In the Islamic banking system, Luxembourg,
Murabaha financing reached around 37 per cent of its total financing
in the year ended on 30 June 19841.
Ijara (Lease Financing)
The exact meaning of the Arabic word ijara is reward or recompense.
The use of ijara started before Islam and was regularised during the
early zenith of Islam and has now been adapted to modern needs. A
business or individual client may request the lB to purchase
machinery or equipment with the intention of renting it to the
client. Ijara financing is based upon valuing the financial position
of the client and the expected direct cash flow of the lease contract
same manne—s..jn ordinary lease financing decisions in a
conventional bank though without taking interest into consideration.
This instrument of financing has gained momentum in the conventional
banking system owing in part to its tax advantages. In many countries
the rental payments are tax deductable. 2 In Islamic finance there are
two forms of leasing: (i) direct leasing finance, whereby the
Islamic bank allows the customer to use capital assets owned by the
bank for a limited period of time ranging from a few days up to a few
months or years depending on the type of asset in question. In
return the customer pays a monthly or annual rental fee, (ii) the
second leasing arrangement is called hire-purchase (Ijara wa'k tina')
whereby the Islamic bank rents the assets to the customer who
promises to purchase the asset within a specified period. The rental
payment could be a certain fixed amount or a percentage directly
1. IBSD, Annual Report, 1984, p.22.
2. Rental payment may also reduce zakat payment for companies
liable for zakat on income. But if the leased asset is
considered an article of trade it is usually subject to zakat
at 2.5%. Here an interesting question emerges regarding whether
leased articles of trade are ex2mpted from zakat or not.
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related to the cash flow generated by the asset. The rental charges
usually permit the lessor to amortize the asset and retain some
profits.
The transfer of title depends on the nature of the deal. If a lump
sum payment is agreed upon, the title will be transferred to the
lessee upon exercising his option and paying the agreed price. While
if the payment was made by tranches and spread over a period of time,
the transfer of title, in this case, will be gradual and the bank's
title to the property decreases proportionally, as well as the rental
fees, with the successive payments of the tranches'.
Table 2.2 shows the type of Islamic leasing and title structure.
TABLE 2.2: Types of Islamic Leasing
Rental Charges	 Appreciation
lB	 CR	 Title	 or
Depreciation
Interest	 Lessor	 Lessor
payment
and rental
fees
i Ditto
ii Fixed or
variable
rate
Pure lease Negotiated
fees or %
of cash
flow
lUre	 i Lump sum,
purchase
ii Decreasing
instalment
iii % of cash
flow
Lessor
until
exercise
of option
Lessor,
but
ownership
decreases
relatively
with pay-
ment in lB
Ditto
Ditto, but
could be
shared with
the
customer in
lB
1
	
C. Attia, 1985, p.11-].2.
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Nonetheless, Islamic leasing has still a long way to go and it is
envisaged to capture a sizeable portion of the financing operations
of the Islamic banks in the not too distant future. This is not to be
compared, however, with the current low volume of Islamic leasing
which does not exceed more than 7 per cent of the overall financing
of many Islamic banks.
Social Services of Islamic Banks
Social services are considered an integral part of Islamic banking
operations. In fact and in many Islamic banks, it is an important
function and not merely a by-product as one would imagine.
These services may be classified into three main areas: benevolent
.------loans (qard hasan) and overdrafts, collection and distribution of
zaka fund, sadaqat (donations), and finally preservation of the
Islamic culture and heritage. Explanation of these services ate in
order.
Benevolent loans
The act of lending money, as outlined in detail in the first chapter,
per se is not prohibited in Islam. On the contrary, Islamic
teachings urge the believers to assist the needy and to try to
alleviate hardships. Consequently, an Islamic bank may lend money on
an interest-free basis to a number of beneficiaries such as: (i)
dosTtors who maintain regular accounts, (Tfl areho1ders in
certain circumstances, (iii) a company or client that has already
been financed by the bank. The purpose of the interest-free loan, in
this case, varIes according to the circumstances, for example to meet
a liquidity crisis or to pay a foreign correspondent in lieu of a
documentary letter of credit. The amount paid by the bank is
considered an interest-free loan from the time of payment until the
settlement date, and finally (iv) for education, marriages and other
so'ial purposes.	 All these loans are payab].e within a specified
period either by instalment or lump sum amount.
]. 12
However, inter-bank loans on mark-up basis as currently practised in
Pakistan, are not permitted. It is evident that the banks are
permitting themselves what they forbid to their customers, which is
in principle unjustifiable.
Overdrafts
The Islamic bank conference decided in its first meeting, which was
held in Dubai in 1979, that it is perfectly acceptable when a
customer overdraws his current account. This is looked at normally
as an overdraft in the conventional system. However the Islamic bank
does not charge interest, or fees on overdrafts which are treated as
interest-free loans. 	 There are, however, two conditions to be
observed:	 first the overdrafts should be for short-term periods,
second it must not exceed an upper limit to be decided upon by each
bank separately.
1DB has laid down the terms and conditions pertaining to benevolent
loans which are given under the following:
1. Adequate legal and economic considerations of the transaction
in question are met;
2. Adequate securities and guarantees and other safeguards are
secured;
3. The requested loan must be for productive and not consumption
purposes;
4. The loan amount is small and falls within the limits set forth
by the Board regarding duration and value.
Guarantees, Transfers and Collections
These services include performance bonds letter of guarantee, letters
of credit, travellers cheques ) morley transfer, foreign exchange
transactions and safe deposits etc. The Islamic bank may collect a
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service fee corresponding to the exact expenses incurred by the bank
on the services rendered. However, when the transaction involves
sale and purchase of gold or precious metals on behalf of a customer,
the Islamic bank may charge a commission in its capacity as an agent
which is perfectly legal under Islamic law.
Following is an explanation of the more pertinent types of services
and the controversies surrounding their proper treatment under
Islamic law.
Letters of Guarantee
Principally, the issuance and acceptance of letters of guarantee (LG)
are not a matter of dispute in Islamic banks. The controversy among
Islamic jurists dwells on the situation when the fees charged on this
service are proportional with the amount of the guarantee. The crux
of the matter rests on the fact that the guarantee according to
traditional Islamic jurisprudence is a non-profit contract which
means that it must be given free of charge as a "human service".
According to the traditional views, Islamic banks are prevented from
taking proportional fees and concurrently they are discouraged from
rendering this service in order to avert risks which are not
remunerated. Contemporary jurists classify the guarantees into
commercial LG and non-commercial LG. An example of commercial LGs
are acceptance guarantees and performance bonds. Islamic banks are
allowed to charge fees and commissions in compensation for the
administrative and paperwork involved in assessing the client's
financial position, recording the transaction and issuing the LC.
Meanwhile the banks are not allowed to charge the client in
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compensation for the risk involved. 1 However, they may require the
customer to cover about 20-30 percent of the guarantee and in return
they may issue the guarantee free of charge.
Non-commercial guarantees are those given, for example, to students
for submission to colleges and universities. While the banks can
recover the administrative charges they are encouraged to offer this
service free of charge.2
Needless to mention the religious boards in all Islamic banks
supervise the authenticity of these services and sanction the rate of
the service charges or fees advising in the meantime on the
conformity of these service charges with Sharia.
Advisory and Financial Banking Services
Advisory and financial services offered by Islamic banks are numerous
and designed to widen the scope of convenient operation for the
customers and to facilitate their businesses. Among these services
are financial planning and consulting, property management,
preparation of feasibility studies and project evaluation, stock
issues and collection of call issues, trustee services and finally
agency operations.
1. See Resolutions and Recommendations of the First Fiqh Seminar,
KFH, Kuwait, 7-11 March 1987, pp 11-12.
2. Ibid, p11.
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Foreign Remittances
Money transfer may be effected by a number of forms and means of
payment. The more widely accepted tools are these: cheques, drafts
and money orders (whether by mail or telex).
A few centuries ago money transfer in the Islamic world was quite
common in financial transactions across the borders. Suftadja,
literally a draft, is a financial instrument used for transmitting
money from one place to another. 	 Suftadja principles are well
established and clearly defined in both Islamic and commercial laws
of many Arab and Islamic countries. It was used on both the
individual and institutional levels, especially for transferring
money from the Central Government to the provinces and vice versa.
Admittedly though, few Islamic jurists were inclined to discourage
its acceptance on the grounds that the transmitter, or the money
changer, guarantees the remittance against the "risks of the road".
They argued that when the sender pays in advance a sum of money to
the money changer who issues the Suftadja, a debtor/creditor
relationship has ensued. Thus the sender who became a creditor, had
made an unlawful benefit represented by the safety of the transferred
money without an apparent corresponding benefit to the transmitter.
Therefore, this transaction ought to be declined to avoid the doubt
of nba, they alleged. However, the Encyclopaedia of Islamic Law
(1970) has pointed out that the transfer of money benefits both
parties and not only the sender and as such it is a lawful service.
Moreover, securing money against the risks of the road is a normal
and legitimate benefit and is not similar to a pure monetary gain
enjoyed by the lender in a loan contract which is said to be usury.
Also, as Mustafa al-Zarga, a contemporary Islamic scholar confirmed,
the money transfer is an absolute necessity for tourists, students
and non-residents who have to remit funds to their families etc.
What has to be observed, however, is that the issue of a draft for
money should be made simultaneously arid the spot exchange rate has to
be used. 1 This is in compliance with the general rule established by
the Prophet in exchanging currencies (see nba section).
1.	 For more details see Al-Masaref, Muamalatuha & Wadaeha,
Fawacduha, CRIE, 1983, pp 2-5.
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Transfer of Debts and Bills Collection
The transfer of debt was not known in the Roman law, it was not
possible to transfer the debt to a new debtor or creditor without
liquidating the old debt and establishing a new debtor/creditor
relationship with a new debt. Although it was possible to appoint a
proxy to collect the debt, it was not an efficient disposition since
the principal had the full power to cancel the proxy before the
effective collection of debt.
Hawala or the transfer of debt dates back to the sixth century and
became the basis for other financial instruments. While the transfer
of credit was not known in the European community until the enactment
of the old French law of 1803 in France, it was first introduced in
the civil law in Germany in 1886, and in England partly in 1875 and
finally in 1925.1
According to the French dictionary 'Larousse' and the French legal
encyclopaedia 'Dalloz', the Arabic word Hawala is the origin of the
word 'Aval'. Other French orientalists have traced the origin of the
Islamic financial instruments such as Hawala. This description of
"the face of the Hawala read from right to left. At the upper left
the sum to be paid was written in numerals. The order then read "May
so and so (the issuing banker) pay to bearer (not mentioned by name)
such and such amount (in words). On the lower left corner the date
was indicated and in the lower edge of the note the name of the
issuer was stated".2
Collection of bills throueh the Islamic bank is a legal act since
collection is but a service rendered by the bank on behalf of the
owner or endorser of the bill. The bank is entitled to obtain a fee
or service charge for such works.
1. C Attia, 1985, p5.
2. C Attia, 1985, p6.
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Bills Discounting
Discounting is an act of endorsing a bill of exchange by the
beneficiary to a bank. In consideration thereof, the bank pays the
beneficiary the amount of the bill, in advance, less the discount
proportion. Normally, the discount rate includes commissions and
endorsement fees plus the interest rate on the value of the bill from
the discount date to maturity. As explained earlier, there is no
question regarding the validity of the service fee. As for the
interest charged by the bank, the Islamic law Encyclopaedia in Kuwait
ruled that discounting of bills by a bank is not valid in Islamic
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
1. The transfer of debt from the endorser to the bank, is not
valid due to the inequality between the transferred debt and
the debt to be collected.
2. By the same token, it is not a loan either, since the amount
paid by the bank is less than that to be collected from the
debtor.
3. It is not also a selling of debt due to the fact that the
selling of pecuniary assets for same is only valid if an equal
value of a currency were exchanged for an equivalent value of
the same or of another currency; otherwise the transaction
would lead to nba al-fadl.
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However there is virtually no harm in requesting the Islamic bank to
collect the bills for certain reasonable fees to be agreed upon. The
absolute banning of these types of transactions by the Islamic
Encyclopaedia is most probably related to the normal discounting
practices applied by conventional banks. Consequently the Islamic
banks have found it proper to extend interest free loans to their
customers by holding the bills as collateral.
Types of Notes and Means of Payment
There are virtually three recognised types of notes or bills in
Islamic financial dealings: the cheque, the bill of exchange and the
promisory note.
A cheque is a note by which a drawer advises the drawee, normally a
bank, to pay a specified sum of money to a third person called the
beneficiary.
A bill of exchange is a commercial paper by which the drawer (the
creditor) orders another person (the debtor) to pay a sum of money at
a certain date to a designated beneficiary or to bearer.
A promisory note is an undertaking by the signatory to pay a
specified sum of money, at a certain date, to a second person called
the beneficiary.
Money and Capital Markets
In principle, an Islamic bank is able to underwrite securities and to
be active in trading and selling. Portfolio selection or equity
participation is governed by certain rules and regulations that
should be strictly adhered to, such as: (a) the company issuing the
shares should not deal or trade in banned operations and should not
be a financial institution whose main activities are directly related
to trading in interest-based securities, or syndication, underwriting
and management of interest-bearing bonds; (b) dividends or yields
must not be guaranteed or stated in advance, and (c) in retrospect,
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dealings in preference shares are not allowed on the grounds that it
entitles the holder to preferential rights as to dividends and they
bear a fixed rate of return.
Money market transactions are confined and restricted in the lBS.
For instance, money market instruments in the CRC such as: banker's
acceptance, interbank loans (except benevolent loans), short sales,
trading on the margins and currency option are entirely forbidden in
its present forms due to the interest factor and fixed yield as well
as to the unwarranted risk inherent in these instruments.
By the same token, trading and issuing of certificate of deposits and
bonds whether yielding fixed or floating rate of interest and whether
convertible to shares or not, are not allowed in Islamic banks.
Zero-coupon bonds which are bought at discount are also banned on the
grounds that the discount is merely the difference between the face
value and the purchase price, and represents the "accumulated
interest on the purchase price"
Islamic Certificates or Sukuks (bonds)
To attract deposits and mobilise savings, the Islamic banks have
issued various types of bonds for different transactions. DM1 Trust
introduced in 1981, the DM1 equity participation certificate (EPC).
The DMI/EPC was launched in order to increase DM1 capital by US
$2lOm. In the first phase of this issue that was closed in January
1981, 2 million units were issued at US $105 each excluding a fee of
US $5. The minimum subscription was set up at 10 equity units
totalling US $1100. Interestingly, DM1 had undertaken to buy back
these certificates from selling participants if the sale fell within
the criteria established by DM1 to control risks and costs of market
dealing activities, though the prospectus for this particular issue
was vague regarding the overall limits and sub-limits for such
repurchase. Nonethiess, DM1 has committed itself to act as market
maker pledging at the same time not to support the price, if it was
held within sustainable levels! The Islamic Investment Company of
the Gulf (IIC), a subsidiary of DM1 has issued several Mudataba
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certificates; the 'Islamic Institutional Reserve' Mudaraba (IRM) and
several issues of 'Islamic Mudaraba for Current Investment' (MCI) and
Islamic Mudaraba. for Investment Savings and Solidarity among Muslims.
As the titles imply, these certificates are based on the same
principle of Mudaraba or trust fund where the subscriber is the
'beneficial owner' and IIC is the 'managing trustee'. The objectives
of Islamic institutional reserves Mudaraba (in denomination of US
$100,000) is to create a vehicle through which the Islamic
institutions and businessmen may invest on a short-term and medium-
term basis on Islamic principles. Holders of IRNs are entitled to
two benefits excluding the profits from the certificates. First, IIC
may issue, upon request, letters of credit in values that may equal
up to four times the institution's portfolios, provided that the
institution's credit ratings are satisfactory. Second, IIC may
consider financing the total cost of an acceptable trade transaction.
The profits of the deal would be shared between IIC and the holder of
IRMs.	 In both cases the investor would receive profits on their
investments. Ninety per cent of the declared profits go to the
certificate holder and the rest to the investment company, in
addition to management fees of not less than one dollar per one
thousand dollar invested.
DM1 is also trying to establish an "inter-institutional market' for
Equity Participation Certificates through its subsidiaries and to
list it on the leading stock exchanges.
The Islamic Mudaraba for Current Investment (MCI) works on the same
basis as IRMs except that the minimum subscription is US $500.
Withdrawal from the scheme is permissible either partially or totally
and is effective in the first five days of the month following the
investor's instructions. As the Mudaraba is managed monthly by using
computer financial systems, profits may be calculated and recorded on
a monthly basis.
The Islamic Mudaraba for Investment Savings and Solidarity among
Muslims (MIS) is the Islamic counterpart to life insurance. The
instalment paid by each participant in addition to the profit, if
any, will be accumulated until the insured reaches the age of 60.
Insurance compensation will be paid in case of death out of the
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profits of each participant (as a gratuitous contribution to Islamic
solidarity) to the hiers of the deceased before the age of 60. For
each certificate issued, the hiers receive:
1	 an amount equivalent to the total instalments paid prior to the
date of death;
2	 any profit earned on these investments, and
3. a solidarity benefit in the form of a contribution out of the
profits of surviving participants equal to the outstanding
balances less any arrears.
For example if a 40 year old participant applies for 4 certificates
of $10,000 each, and dies after paying 5 annual instalments, the
total compensation will amount to:
-	 5 annual instalments paid
	
US $10,000
-	 Profits earned, say	 $ 2,000
-	 15 unpaid instalments	 $36,000
TOTAL:
	 $48,000
The Saudi based Islamic Development Bank (1DB) issues certificate of
deposits to individuals and institutions in a minimum denomination of
US $250,000. The proceeds of these certificates are employed in
financing foreign trade activities among member countries or their
institutions.
The Islamic Jordanian Bank is authorised by its charter to issue two
types of Muqarada (trust) bonds. The joint Muqarada bonds are fixed-
terni bonds ranging normally from one to 10 years. The participants
in the joint Muqarada bonds receive annually a yield equivalent to a
share in the net profits of the bank in the year following the issue
date. The specified Muqarada bonds are linked with specified
investment enterprises managed separately by the bank. The investors
in the specified Muqarada bonds are not entitled to a share in the
net profit of the bank. They share only in the net profits of each
Muqrada bond on a percentage basis.
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The Bahrain Islamic Bank is entitled, according to the articles of
association, to issue a negotiable profit-sharing investment
certificate. However, it does not appear that the bank has utilised
this privilege yet. Pakistan was the first Islamic country that
regularised the issuance of Mudaraba certificates by a special law
called Mudaraba Companies and Mudaraba Flotation and Control
Ordinance, 1980. Four types of Mudaraba certificates are allowed:
1. Multipuporse perpetual Mudaraba
2. Multipurpose fixed period Mudaraba
3. Specified purpose perpetual Mudaraba
4. Specified purpose fixed period Mudaraba.
Commodity Trading
Generally, the lBs are currently involved in spot cash markets.
Future contracts are permissible within the following boundaries:
1. Future sales (Bai Al-Ajal) require the transfer of the goods to
the possession of the buyer, while payment will be due in the
future and would be higher than in cash sales.
2. Al-Salani (forward buying) requires cash payments in
consideration for goods, that will be delivered in the future.
Salam contract stipulates the specific identification and
determination of the commodities in terms of weight,
measurement index, and duration of the contract.
The following types of sale are also allowed:
3. Tawliya (break-even sale) means, to sell at cost.
4. Wadi'a means, to sell at a discount.
It is worth noting that options in commodities and shares are
permissible, in principle, If they are between two parties alone
since the permissibility of selling or transferring the option to a
third party is currently debatable among Islamic jurists.
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Supervisory Authorities
Cenanks Supervision
Usually, the Islamic Banks are established by special decree laws in
the countries of incorporation with the exception of the
International Islamic Bank (IIB) that was established in Denmark in
1983, under the Danish Banking Act. Nevertheless, in 1981, Governors
of Central Banks and representatives of monetary authorities of
member states of the Islamic Conference agreed to put lBs under the
central banks' control. The Central Bank and monetary operations
will be discussed in a relevant section.
Reli gious Supervisory Board
To ensure conformity with the requirements of Shari'a, an lB usually
has a Religious Supervisory Boaard (RSB). This Board supervises and
controls the activities of an lB in different ways:
1. The RSB reviews each type of contratural arrangement with a
depositor, and each type of investment to be undertaken by the
bank.
2. The RSB assists in the interpretation of Shari'a so as to
ensure the appropriateness of the bank's investments.
Conc ins ion
In the first section of this chapter we have seen that there are five
	
major properties inherent in Islamic money.
	
These are: scarcity,
	
and	 neutrality.	 The
characteristics of money in Islam not only provide the basis of its
role in the economy but explain the wisdom of banning nba and should
•1help contemporary Jurists in their I.itihad when one or more of the
abe ch àcter3tjcs are inherently missing in today's paper money.
1.	 Individual or collective reasoning.
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For instance, persistent inflation would check the role of a certain
national currency as a medium of exchange and affect its stability
and scarcity (eg fiat money). These elements if taken into
consideration would help in solving the problem of indexation which
is currently under study in Islamic circles.
The abolition of nba, the condemnation of hoarding, and to a lesser
extent certain speculation help to bridge the gap between the supply
and demand for money and guarantee the availability of resources for
productive investments that otherwise would have been hoarded or used
in interest-bearing instruments.
Islamic banking theory is based, in the main, on the abolition of
interest and the introduction of PLS schemes and other accepted
methods of finance such as Ijara, Murabaha and Salam Sale. Currently
Islamic banks consist of social banks, private banks, development and
international investment banks. The success of Islamic banking
theory is manifested by its adherence to the Sharia prinip1es
concerning financial transactions. First among these principles is
the introduction of a nerontractualrerationshp, a fiduciary
relationship between the depositors as principals and the bank as
manager trustee. Net profits are distributed among the depositors
and shareholders whilei ses are Thared according to each party's
contribution. The relationship between the bank and the borrowers
are no more a creditor/debtor relationship. The bank as provider of
funds may become a partner in the enterprise financed through equity
participation (Musharaka) or trust fund (Mudaraba). Thus the return
on The bank's investment is not guaranteed nor the depositors funds
yield a fixed return anymore.
In Chapters 3 to 5 inclusive the features of a secular economy, the
Kuwait economy, are discussed with some concentration on the
financial system and monetary policy. By then we would have gained a
thorough understanding of the Islamic economic principles that have
been explained in Chapters 1 and 2 as well as the Kuwait economy.
This will help in formulating the changes that are needed in order to
install a riba•free banking system in Kuwait.
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CHAPTER 3
THE KUWAIT ECONOMY
Introduction
The purpose of the following Chapters 3 to 5 is to introduce the
salient features of the Kuwait economy and the evolution of its
banking system. This seems to be a necessary fundamental
prerequisite for the ensuing chapers which deal with Islamic banking
in the context of the Kuwaiti economy.
	 In this respect it was
difficult to draw the line between what constitutes a preliminary
introduction and what ought to be a complete reflection of the
Kuwait economy and its banking system.
The introductory chapters should not be allowed to overshadow the
core issues. There are some sections that are relatively broad
because they are seen to have a direct impact upon the Islamic
banking system; a good example of this is the functions and
operations of the Central Bank and the prudential regulations
imposed on the banking sector.
CeoEraphv. Climate and Topography
Kuwait is a tiny country situated at the North-West tip of the
Arabian Gulf, between Iraq in the North and West, and Saudi Arabia
in the South-West. Not very far to the East across the Gulf stands
Iran (see map).
The total area of the State is 17,818 sq.km. (7000 sq.m) including a
few islands scattered in the Gulf of which Bubian is the largest and
Failaka is the main inhabited island. The small archaeological site.
that has been excavated in Failaka indicates an earlier Greek
presence in Kuwait.
The climate in Kuwait is characterised by a moderately cold winter
(l°-13°C), with brief rain and blistering heat in the summer when
the average daily temperature reaches 45oC in July-August. Humidity
is at its highest in December (80%), and at its lowest in June
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(27%).	 Sand storms (Tauz) predominate in the summer lasting for
several days at a time.
The topography of Kuwait is basically plain with low hills and
ridges.	 The highest land is 30Cm above sea level and is found in
the South-West part of the country. 	 The main ridges are the
Jal'Azzur escarpment 245m above sea level to the North-West of
Kuwait Bay. Wadi (valley) al-Butin and Wadi al-Muthanna are the
main depressions located in the Western and Southern boundaries
respectively1.
Early History and Population
Al-Kut, literally a fort or a small gulf, was the name of a small
resting station for the tired caravans crossing the desert; this
later become known as Kuwait2 .	 Kuwait started its modern history as
a result of an influx of inunigrants from the Northern part of
Saudi Arabia who migrated from their home land due to tribal feuds
coupled with severe drought. The majority of these
immigrants were descendants of al-Utub, a branch of the Anaizah
tribe and in 1756 a member of the al-Sabah family was elected the
first Amir (Prince) of Kuwait.
In 1760, Kuwait was chosen to house the East India Company
Headquarters in the Gulf. This led to a growth in trade and
importance among the surrounding countries. The plague that hit
Basra in the 1770s and its occupation by the Persians in 1776 had
resulted in the demise of Basra as a centre and led eventually to
the development of commercial Kuwait as a regional trade centre.
Another important factor was the increase in population witnessed in
Kuwait following the migration of Basra residents.
1. Fatimah al-Abduirazak, Marine Resources in Kuwait, Kuwait:
The Kuwait Univ., 1984, p.26.
2. "Al-kut" also means a "cluster of peasar1t houses used
for storage or a fort around which a number of small houses
are built" see Samir Shamma, The Oti of Kuwait Present
and Future. Lebanon: Middle East Research Publication
Centre, 1959.
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By 1860, Kuwait's population reached 35,000 following the stability
and relative prosperity enjoyed during the rule of Mubarak al iCabir
(the Great) who was recognised by most historians to be the father
of modern Kuwait. The Protectorate Treaty with Britain was signed
during Mubarak's rule; this gave Britain complete control over
Kuwait's foreign affairs and monetary policy. Kuwait agreed not to
lease or dispose of, or give concessions to any individual power on
its land in the Sheikhdom for any purpose without prior permission
from the British. 	 Furthermore the Sheikhdom was not supposed to
receive agents or representatives of foreign governments without
British consent.	 This agreement served the interests of both
parties. Mubarak was able to secure his borders against tribal
attacks from Saudi Arabia's Banu Khalid and Al-Rashid families and
more importantly he rid the country from Turkish dominance. Britain
on the other hand aimed and eventually succeeded in preventing the
Turks and their German allies from completing the ill-fated
Eastern Railroad which was supposed to connect Germany with the Gulf
via Kuwait1.
In 1918, the total population was estimated by the Indian Office of
Foreign Affairs at 65,800. In 1938 the population had only risen to
70,000-80,000 despite the termination of the commercial blockade
that was enforced by the British Admiralty during the First World
War, and the granting of the oil concessions during 1934. The real
population growth started in 1948 and 1950 reaching 120,000 and
150,000 respectively and increasing by 6% in 1951. According to the
latest census of 1985 the population had reached 1.7 million. Table
3.1 shows the population by sex and nationality from 1957 to 1985.
The highest growth rate in population was recorded at an annual rate
of 11.7% (1957-61) and then declined to 9.8% (1961-1965) and 6.1%
(1970-1975).	 By 1980-5 the annual growth rate declined to 4.56%.
The growth in population consists of two elements: The natural growth
rate emanating from the net annual increase in birth rates (i.e.
natural increase, low death rate) and the growth rate initiated by
the net inflow of immigrants into the country. The decline in
1.	 For more details see M. Khouja and P Sadler, fl._Economy of
Kuwa, 1979, pp 8-12.
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growth rate shown above in 1980-5 is largely due to the decrease in
net inflow of immigrants into the country.
Characteristics of the Kuwait Economy
General Profile:
The emergence of Kuwait as an oil-rich country has undoubtedly
transformed the nation from a state of poverty to one of high per
capita income in a relatively short time. However, the challenge
that is facing Kuwait and many other oil producing countries stems
from the	 fact that oil is a depleting commodity.	 Seeking
alternative sources of income to substitute for oil has proved to
be a dilemma in a small economy like Kuwait. Nonetheless, the
dependence on oil, if everything else remains equal, could be
reduced substantially and gradually as a significant proportion of
the oil revenues could	 be substituted by income from foreign
investment "without impairing the growth of the economy or causing
major structural problems". This is supported by the fact that "a
great proportion of the value added demand for oil is via its
exports't meaning that oil could be regarded generally as "an
income component of GNP and a source of foreign exchange earnings"2.
However, the Kuwait economy in broader terms is characterised by the
following features:
1. Ibid, p.107.
2. Ibid, p.106. This conclusion was supported by their
findings concerning the reduced form coefficient of the GNP
components in relation to "net foreign exchange earnings" which
were found to be small.
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1. Except for oil, gas and fisheries, Kuwait has no local natural
resources and minerals. The unbearable climatic conditions
and the absence of flowing water eliminate the chances for
expanding agricultural production, and raising herds (beef
and lamb) for domestic consumption.
2. The economy is dominated by the oil sector. It has contributed
on average 62% of GDP, 77.5% of public revenue and 90.8%
of expoit earnings between 1974-1983.
3. The economy is very dependent upon foreign trade. The ratio
of exports to GDP averaged 73% in the last decade (1974-
1983). However this ratio has been volatile, declining
in recent years due to the reduction of oil exports.
The ratio ot imports to domestic expenditure averaged 75% in
1980-1983, indicating that the rise in domestic expenditure is
associated with an increase in imports. This phenomenon is
not expected to change drastically as long as the
narrow industrial base prevails. Furthermore, it was found
by Khouja and Sadler that the ratio of incremental imports to
incremental domestic expenditure is estimated to be of the
order of 60%. On the other hand, the ratio of imports to
Gi)P at current prices, averaged 24.1% in 1981. According to
IMF sources, the same ratio was 20.1% for Saudi Arabia, 21.1
for France and 10.1 for the USA.	 This feature has led to
the evolution of a
	 prosperous	 commercial • sector	 whose
market has extended far beyond the national boundaries.
4. Low domestic aggregate demand owing to the small size of
the domestic market.	 This hinders industrial expansion,
eliminates the	 benefits of mass production and creates
absorptive capacity problems.
5. Dependence on the rest of the world in many aspects
but in particular in relation to the:-
a)	 marketing of oil, thus making the country vulnerable
to internaziora1 market forces
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b) Channelling of its surplus funds abroad in view of the
limited local investment opportunities, thus subjecting
the economy to external economic pressures and policies.
6. A high ratio of public expenditure to GDP reflecting the
Government's commitment and inclination to distribute the
oil wealth among the Kuwaiti citizens. This net
government expenditure became the prime determinant of money
supply in the economy (see Chapter 5).
7. A Low native manpower base which means that Kuwait is heavily
dependent on foreign labour. The foreign manpower in Kuwait
comprises skilled and unskilled labour in industry and more so
in commerce and services.	 On top of	 that	 teachers,
engineers, technocrats, physicians and technicians are in
short supply. There are clearly social problems arising from
this, particularly dependency.
8. A high national savings ratio to GNP which is still the
highest in the world. This is not surprising since per
capita income among Kuwaiti citizens averages $20,000; if all
residents of Kuwait are included (Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti) the
per capita income is around $12,000; this is still very high
by international standards.
9. A notable government role which is, in a way, unusual in an
open economy that sets no barriers to trade, movement of
capital or invested funds. This feature has led some writers
to conceive of the existence of some kind of paradox
between extreme economic liberalisation and heavy ownership
by the state1 . In fact this so-called paradox is a state
policy expressed by the declared commitment to redistribute
the oil wealth which has taken three dimensions:
1.	 See Tim Nthlock, "Oil Polit.ical Change and Social Dynamics",
The Arab Gulf Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1977, pp 38-45.
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a) the government initiative in establishing the financial
infrastructure	 and its uncontested role in the
development of the country. 	 This led to the goverrunent
taking the lead in
	
setting	 up	 all	 kinds	 of
corporations,	 industrial, investment, services and
financial.	 By so doing, the private sector was
invited to join forces with the public sector in owning
many of these companies. 	 The majority of these joint
ventures, if not all, are profit oriented.
b) The subsidisation of the State of food, education and
health services. More will be said later but the
relevant point here is that this type of government in
its welfare programmes is very close to the system of
the Islamic States mentioned in Chapter 1
c) The support for economic development through an active
process of development planning.
PLANNING AND GROWTH
History and Inmortance of Planning
Planning in Kuwait began with the establishment in 1967 of the
Planning Board (later to become the Ministry of Planning). So far,
three development plans have been prepared by the Ministry of
Planning.	 Unfortunately, the first plan (1967/68-1971/72) was not
approved and then it was suspended. A second five year plan was
formulated covering the period 1976/77-1980/81. 	 After two years of
deliberations the National Assembly recommended the use of the
first plan as a guideline when preparing the National Budgets 1 . In
mid-1965 the Council of Ministers approved a third plan for 1985/86-
1989/90. The National Assembly was suspended before completing its
deliberation on the new plan.
1.	 See	 corntnents by Rhalid al-Issa,	 Arab Planning Institute
(API) SemirLar Proceedings, Kuwait, 1984.
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However, the importance of development planning in Kuwait stems from
the need to transfer a one-resource economy into a more productive
and diversified one. To achieve this goal, radical changes are
required in the structure of the economy. A task of this
magnitude should not be left to chance. The success of planning in
Kuwait,	 however, requires changing the current passive attitude
towards planning.
In what follows, an overview of the main features of the development
plans in Kuwait is presented, then a discussion of economic growth
is given.
The Development Plans
Objectives of the first five year plan (1967/68-1971/72) are
summarized below1:
1. Achieving an annual growth of 6.5% in CD?; this was to take
GDP from KD 801m to KD 1102m by the end of the plan period.
2. Diversifying the sources of income in order to reduce
the relative importance of oil in the economy. The plan
proposed expanding other sectors (e.g. petrochemical industry,
fisheries and agriculture);
3. Developing Kuwaiti manpower, 	 increasing its skills and
participation in the workforce by expanding technical
and vocational training institutes;
4. Completing the basic infrastructure, particularly 	 socio-
economic projects such as housing, education and hospitals;
5. Ensuring an equitable distribution of wealth through raising
the standard of living.
The second development plan (1976/77-1980/81) included the following
main objectives2:
1. See	 the "First Five Year Plan",	 The Planning	 Board,
December 1968, pp 57-64.
2. See A. Mousa, "The Planning Experience in Kuwait", Arab
Planning Institute, Seminar Proceedings, 1984, pp 351-80.
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1. seeking alternative productive base other than oil;
2. developing manpower resources and efficiency;
3. seeking economic integration among the Gulf countries as
a preliminary step towards achieving economic unity in the
Arab world;
4. ensuring social harmony, more equitable distribution of
wealth, and equal opportunities in order to achieve social
justice.
It is notable that the Islamic objective of social justice was among
the main objectives of the second development plan in Kuwait. More
significantly, Kuwait currently undertakes a generous welfare policy
which	 provides a package of social services including: 	 free
housing, education and medication; guaranteed employment, social
security benefits and good subsidies. The core element of this
policy is found in the Islamic aspirations of a society based on
brotherhood, justice and cooperation (see also the third plan).
The New Plan
The main theme and objectives of the recent development plan
emphasise the following:
1. Changing the current structure of the population to reach
a quantitative balance between Kuwaitis and expatriates by
the year 2000. By 1990, however, it is proposed that Kuwaitis
should represent 44.8% of the total population
2. Raising the Kuwaiti labour force from 22.6% of the total
workforce in the base year (1984/85) to 23.7% in 1989/90.
It is expected that the Kuwaiti labour force will be growing
at 4.2% against 3.2% for non-Kuwaitis. To achieve this,
the plan recommends increasing female participation in the
workforce, improving labour productivity and developing
human resources through vocational and technical training.
Developing an efficient administration capable of attaining
an optimal utilization of existing financial and human
resources is also seen as a necessary requisite to achieve
the plan target;
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3. Diversifying the national income by changing the current
pattern of the economy and eliminating the hurdles hindering
the growth in the non-oil sector;
4. Fostering the private sector contribution in the production
and development process 	 and emphasising its	 social
responsibilities. Some of the proposed policies include
expanding the role of private capital and the privatisation
of some government enterprises.
5. Preserving and supporting the basic values of the
society, fostering the peoples sense of responsibility and
encouraging their commitment and contributions to the
development process. The plan also envisages a reduction
in the current budget deficit by 12.5% annually equivalent
to ND 438.4m (1989/90)	 and KID 854.2m (1984/85). 	 This
reduction is based on an anticipated increase in public
revenue of 5.9% per annum (3.6% in non-oil income and 0.8% in
oil income)1.
Though the plan dismissed the idea of tax levies, it
recommends the reduction of individual subsidies and raising
the price of services and utilities to divert the saved
resources to the productive sector.
The investment cost under the plan is estimated at ND 7.5m
of which the private sector contribution is expected to be ND
1. 2m.
6. Public investment (development expenditure) is expected to
grow at 4% annually.	 Completion of outstanding projects
would represent 51% of total investment. New projects would
capture 34.8% and the rest goes for feasibility studies,
maintenance and complementary projects.
1.	 CBK,	 the Kuwait Economy, (1980-84), p.23.	 Apparently the
recent collapse of oil prices and the reduction of
Kuwait's	 oil production drastically alter the quantitative
assumptions of the plan.
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Growth
The purpose of this section is to outline the basic features of
growth in real estate, oil and non-oil GDP,	 capital formation,
trade,	 CNP per head of population; 	 it also examines the
contribution of the	 financial	 sector to GDP as this relates
directly to our study. It should be noted that GDP statistics at
constant prices are usually two years behind GDP statistics at
current prices. Additionally the method of calculating the COP
deflator creates bias in the figures which merit separate treatment
in this section.
Oil and Non-Oil CDP
The national accounts data (Tables 3.2 and 3.3) show that GDP has
increased from KD 1604.14m to KD 5997.7m from 1973-1982 at current
prices; it rose to KD 6424.83m by 1984. GDP at constant prices
(1972) has risen slightly from KD 1421.79m to KD 1473.72ni between
1973-82. Hence the growth of CDP in money terms of 257% between
1973-84 can be accounted for largely by inflation, rather than by an
increase in real output.
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Table 3.4 shows the wide variation in the growth of oil GDP at
current prices compared with constant prices (1978-82). This wide
fluctuation is due mainly to the effect of oil revenues on CDP and
to the method of calculating constant prices which tend to decrease
oil GDP more than non-oil GDP when both values are converted to
constant prices.
Table 3.4: Variations in CDP Growth: Current vs Constant Prices
Average
1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 annual
% growth
Oil GDP at current 2527
prices
Non-oil CDP at	 1733
current prices
Oil GD? at constant 591
prices
4418	 5059	 4118	 2805	 2.64
2306	 2388	 2620	 3192	 16.50
694	 462	 313	 228	 -21.19
Non-oil GD? at	 1005	 1052	 1116	 1181 1246
	
5.52
constant prices
1. Provisional
Source: QSB, CBK pp.44-3.
The above table shows that oil GDP at current prices of 1(0 2760m
(1982) was deflated to 1(0 228m at constant prices. Meanwhile non-oil
GDP of RD 2967m was deflated to RD 1246 which reveals the bias in
the method of conversion in favour of non-oil GDP (alternatively
the comparison between GD? at current prices and constant prices
is meaningless due to the. different conversion methods used in
each figure).
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Capital Formation
The rate of growth in capital formation generally fluctuates
in Kuwait following the rise or fall in oil revenues. It is normally
directly related to the increase in oil revenues.
Between 1980-84 the annual percentage growth rates in gross
capital formation were 11.4, 21.6, 19.6 falling to 4.7 and
5.1 respeccively in 1983 and 1984. While its percentage shares in
GDP were 11.8, 15.8, 22.3, 21.5 and 20.0 respectively at current
prices1.
Trade and Real Estate
Trade and real estate have been badly hit in the last few years.
Their contribution to GDP declined in the period 1980-84 (Table
3.2). As the current slowdown in the economy was not
anticipated in the early 1980s, overstocking of goods and services
coupled with increased investment in real estate activities were
accelerating in anticipation of a growing demand. The Gulf War and
the crash of the stock market in 1982 caused a decline in the number
of inmiigrant workers.	 This in turn was reflected in a lower demand
for goods and services as well as for new dwellings. 	 Consequently
the	 prices . of
	
domestic commodities and	 real	 estate	 fell
considerably.	 Table	 3.6a	 shows the decline in the number of
building permits to the private sector by 30% and 45% for
residential and commercial properties respectively in 1984,
whereas Table 3.6b shows the average decline in rents.
1.	 For more details see Table 3.5
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GNP per Head of Population
GNP per head of population decreased by 12.3% scaling down from US
$21,349 to US $18,716 (1978-82) at 1980 market prices. Excluding
oil GDP a. completely different picture emerges; non-oil GDP per head
of population decreases by 3.8% at constant prices and an increase
of 32.8% at current prices over the same period. Nonetheless, the
GNP per head of population in Kuwait is among the highest in the
world and exceeded that of Saudi Arabia by US $3528 (1982).
Financial Services Sector
During the second half of the 1970s the growth rate of the financial
services sector was greater than in the period between 1980-
84. Despite that, the banks capital resources increased three fold
over their level in the late 1970s, and the private deposits base
rose by 2.5 times. In addition the banks expanded vertically and
horizontally in the domestic market and abroad1.
In summary, despite
	
the sluggish economic growth cited above,
public domestic expenditure and private final consumption rallied at
an annual	 rate of 9.6% and 11% during 1983-84 respectively.
Furthermore, the value of final consumption outpaced non-oil GDP in
1984 by 27% up from 11% in 1975. This reveals the government
commitment to finalise the development plan and to complete the
infrastructure that had been started before the recession.
1.	 CBK, the Kuwait Economy (1980-84), p.12 (Arabic).
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Table 3. 6 a Number of Building Permits to Private Sector
Residential	 % change	 CaiTnercial	 % Charge
1980	 413	 -13	 104	 -19
1981	 387	 -6	 133	 -14
1982	 404	 +4	 158	 +19
1983	 481	 +19	 109	 -13
1984	 312	 -30	 60	 -45
Source: KREB Annual Report, 1984, p.21.
Table 3. 6 b Average Rents of Residential and Office Buildings
Source: KREB Annual Report, 1984, p.20.
145
Macroeconomic Problems
Almanakh Crash
In the second half of 1982 all indications were pointing towards a
crisis in the parallel stock market known as Souk al Manakh (the
name of the building where trading took place). The background of
the crisis and the underlying causes are analysed below.
In the late 1970s there was a rapid increase in the formation of
closed shareholding companies in Kuwait triggered by the new wealth
after the upsurge in oil prices. A small collapse in share prices
in 1978 prompted the government to impose strict limits on the
formation of new closed shareholding companies as well as their
listing in the official stock market. As a result investors, seeking
an outlet for their savings, were compelled to establish new
companies in the Gulf states and particularly in the Bahrain
offshore market. The shares of these companies were unofficially
trading in the Kuwaiti market where supply far exceeded the
demand. The success of some investment companies and the handsome
profits they were making was a positive sign which made many others
follow their lead. The emergence of these companies came at a time
when interest rates were soaring. For instance, it was sufficient
for a company to be established and to deposit the paid-up capical
in one of the international financial centres to earn 20 cents
on the dollar per year. There was also investment in a booming real
estate market in Kuwait, the Gulf, and in some markets abroad at the
time. Much of this business was based upon overdraft facilities
rather than upon the individual's own resources. Some fortunes were
made literally overnight. The effect was instantaneous in the
'Diwania Society' 1 where rumours of sudden wealth reinforced the
rush to participate. The turnover in the market would have been
kept within limits but for two things, post-dated cheques and the
big eight or Hawameer (a kind of fish in the Gulf water which
survive on eating smaller fish)2
1. A hail or place arranged for meetings by an influential
or wealthy person. It is usually attached to their dwelling.
2. This should have been a warning for the danger of dealing
with them.
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The big eight or the market makers were able to fix prices and buy
shares at that price but were also able to sell at much higher
margins.	 A trading upsurge in prices included the official
listed stocks	 as well as those of banks and insurance
companies. Investment in these shares was naturally less risky but
the	 price (e.g.	 KD 25/share) was out of reach for the small
investor compared with (KD 0.025/share) for some Gulf companies.
Post-dated cheques were the medium of payment in the market. By law
the post-dated cheques were payable upon presentation. The
gentlemens' code of trust among dealers prevented such expediency.
In July 1982 a. post-dated cheque was presented for premature payment
but the drawer had not sufficient funds to honour it. The chain of
delinquencies began and was exacerbated by a deterioration in the
neighbouring Gulf War and invasion of Lebanon which created a
pessimistic mood in the Middle Eastern market generally.
Some Government Measures to Solve the Crisis
The government reacted by suspending trading in the market and
formed a 'clearing company' to separate the entanglement among
traders and to estimate the value of the post-dated cheques. The
result came as a shock when the value was estimated at US $94
billions comprising 28,600 cheques at an average value of lCD 933,000
per cheque.1
Then the government formed a trust to pay off the small investors
defined as those holding US $6.5m each. 	 Then they were scaled down
to those holding US $l.5m each. 	 The government paid in cash and
bonds.	 The bonds could be cashed from the banks at a 7.5 discount
rate.
In dealing with the debtors problems, the government enacted a
decree empowering an arbitration committee to evaluate the debtors
1.	 A.H. Hamdan, The Manakh Crisj, (Arabic), Kuwait, Kora
Bookshop, 1984, p.88
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assets in preparation for liquidation. The bitter findings of the
conuittee were that none of the debtors' assets were sufficient to
pay off the creditors because the premium that was added to the
price of shares when the deal was struck made it impossible for the
defaulters' assets to meet their liabilities.
A resolution was adopted allowing for re-evaluation of the debts by
empowering the committee to re-assess the shares at their market
value at the date of trading plus a premium from zero to 25%
depending on each individual case.
The stock market collapse in the late 1970s and early 1980s gives
rise to important questions concerning the underlying causes. If
analysed in an Islamic context, one could find many aspects against
the Islamic value system (see chapter 1). These are:
1. The post-dated cheques
2. The selling of what you do not have
3. The	 quadrupling of share prices without any economic
justification
4. The premium on deferred payment via post-dated cheques
which reached,	 according to some estimates,	 3OO40O%1
while the maximum official interest rate was only 10%
5. The speculation akin to gambling, as the seller and buyer
know very well that the so-called shares have a much smaller
book value than their market price.
On the social level, the harmony and the spirit of brotherhood,
cooperation and mutual trust that were deeply cherished in Kuwait's
society were deeply shaken.
1.	 Au Hasan Hamdan,	 1984, p.37.
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The epidemic of shares trading spread over all classes of society
causing disputes and hindrance to productivity in all sectors of the
economy1.
The effect of the crash on the banking sector was devastating as
borrowers became insolvent and a significant portion of the banks'
assets were non-performing loans.2
Manpower and Human Resources
Before the discovery of oil, when economic activities in Kuwait were
limited, there was no need for foreign labour. Since the discovery
of oil, the country has grown dependent upon expatriate
workers for the running of oil companies (from drilling wells to
pipeline construction and fitting oil tankers). Moreover, the
acceleration of economic development to absorb part of the oil
wealth necessitated a growing demand for expatriates with various
skills and talents in virtually all fields of economic activities
and the civil service, including the police force. This was
accentuated by a shortage of national manpower, a high illiteracy
rate and a refusal by Kuwaitis to take manual jobs.
The provisional figures of the latest census (1985) reveal that the
population of Kuwait had reached l.7m. Kuwaiti nationals numbered
680,000 (40%) against 1,020,000 non-Kuwaiti (60%). The labour
force is predominantly non-Kuwaiti; the number of non-Kuwaiti
workers has increased from 428,000 to 539,000, equivalent to 78% and
80% of the total labour force between 1980-85 respectively (see
Table 3.7).
1. Students	 and employees (in the public and the private
sectors) deserted their work; taxi drivers and citizens of
limited means mortgaged their homes in order to have a share
in the 'pouring wealth' at the time.
2. For a detailed analysis of the debtors problems and
their repercussions on the banking sector see H.S. Kabbara,
"The Debt Crisis in Kuwait", Arab Banker, Vol. VI, No. 2,
March/April 1986, Pp 22-25.
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Despite the government's declared intention of increasing
Kuwaiti manpower, the participation ratio (i.e. the proportion of
labour force in total population) among Kuwaitis has decreased from
19.9% to 18.1% compared with a slight increase from 55.1 to 55.9%
among non-Kuwaitis.	 Alarmed by these facts, the three consecutive
development plans have called for the reversal of this trend (see
development plans). Ironically, any attempt to raise the
participation ratio among nationals can only be possible by adopting
a policy aiming at:
i) increasing the birth rate among Kuwaiti nationals. This may
prove to be unsuccessful as it would be resisted by young
Kuwaitis considerate of the cost involved in raising big
families. Such a policy in any case would raise the cost of
social provision by the government;
ii) decreasing the number of immigrant workers. This again is
not straightforward. It is, for example, constrained by the
need to avoid any labour shortages in the productive sectors
in the economy. Therefore, the emphasis should be shifted
from quantitative restrictions towards achieving a balance
of supply and demand in the labour market regardless of
nationality and origin. In this respect it does not matter
much whether Kuwaitis are 20% or 24% of the labour force,
provided demand for certain employees can be met from the
total workforce, both national and non-national. The scale of
the problem is indicated by the fact that only 2% of the
total workforce in the manufacturing sector are Kuwaitis
despite the fact that the Industrial Act stipulates that the
ratio of nationals should be no less than 25% of the
workforce.
The Kuwaiti resistance to manual work could be partially tackled by
reviving the Islamic principles that respect manual work and
productive workers. 	 These principles are not known to many and are
neglected by many others (see Chapter 1). They include the moral
and spiritual guidance that make everyone proud of his heritage.
Changing the current employment structure requires a formula that
includes moral motivational efforts combined with proper incentive
policy. Exerting a shift from, for example, civil service jobs to
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factory work depends largely on the success of this formula.
However as employment is guaranteed in Kuwait it might not be
possible to change the current employment structure without changing
the current employment policy which encourages disguised
unemployment.
Kuwait does not grant permanent residency status to foreign
immigrants 1 ,	 Additionally, Kuwaiti citizenship is awarded on a
narrow selective basis. Therefore, unemployment among expatriates
(1.2%) is negligible as no foreign employee is allowed to stay after
the termination of his contract unless he finds another job within a
very short time.
Impediments to Industrial Progress
The problems facing industry in Kuwait may be classified into six
major categories:
1. Low demand due to relatively small domestic market
2. Scarcity of raw mdterials and natural resources (apart from
oil)
3. Dependence on foreign labour
4. High costs of production
5. Technical and managerial deficiencies
6. Lack of coordination among government agencies.
1.	 This creates instability in the work force and may
lower productivity, see Impediments to Industrial Progress.
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Effectively the low demand for local manufactured products is due
mainly to a small population, severe competition from imported
products, and limited opportunities for exports to
neighbouring markets owing to trade barriers or political turmoil
(e.g. the Gulf War). To protect local industry, the government has
recently raised the customs duties on some imported goods from 10 to
40%. However this increase is not expected to be effective; for
example, in the case of imported plastic products and cast iron
heavy subsidisation in the country of origin keeps their import price
very competitive despite import duties. Apart from oil and gas,
Kuwait lacks the natural resources that constitute the necessary
ingredients for a strong industrial base. Importation 	 of raw
materials and intermediate goods, though feasible, is rather
costly and would be vulnerable to a disruption in production if the
flow of imports were stopped for any reason.
In addition to the shortage of natural resources, Kuwait is short of
skilled and unskilled national workers. This has created a non-
cohesive workforce in many factories due to the dependence on
expatriate labour of different nationalities and with different
training skills. The fact that these workers live in Kuwait under
temporary work permits creates instability in the workforce which
adversely affects its productivity.
Several factors have contributed to a relatively high cost of
production in Kuwait. These are:
i) Excessive reliance on immigrant workers entails additional
cost to manufacturers vis-a-vis local labour (if available).
These costs include relocation, travelling and orientation
e.xpenses
ii) Importation of machinery, spare parts and materials involves
freight charges,	 insurance and cost paid	 to	 foreign
technicians for installation. This raises considerably the
cost of pre-operation and start-up expenses in Kuwait compared
with the exporting countries1.
1. According to unpublished figures by IBK the cost of freight
and installation expenses may raise the cost of start-up
expenses by 30-40%, other things remaining equal.
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iii) Though industrial land in Kuwait is rented from the government
at a nominal rate, building costs per square metre are
higher than, for example, in Europe 1 . This is due to the
high cost of building materials and the shortage of
construction workers generally.
iv) Another factor which indirectly contributes to raising the
cost of production is the excessive idle capacity in
some industrial sectors (e.g. building materials) which tends
to increase the cost per unit of output. Moreover, small-
scale industries, generally, cannot benefit from the
advantages of economies of scale.
The lack of industrial experience and managerial skills is
undoubtedly among the main obstacles facing industry in Kuwait. The
absence of industrial talent and managerial capabilities has created
insurmountable difficulties that have worked against progress and in
many cases hampered the implementation of potentially profitable
projects. For example, unlike the industrial nations, Kuwait has not
passed from agriculture first to the steam age, then to small
scale industry and then to medium and heavy industries. In contrast,
the Kuwaiti merchants who reaped the fruits of the oil wealth
were encouraged by a number of government incentives to explore
the avenues of industrialization.	 Many problems arose as a result
of conducting industrial affairs in the same manner of retail
business without giving consideration to the differences between
the two. This state of affairs was detrimental in many instances and
resulted in a number of repercussions2:
-	 Technical faults predominantly in the choice of machinery
and equipment
1. See M.A. Omran, "Industrial Projects in Kuwait, Cost
and Incentives", Kuwait's Chamber of Commerce arid Industry,
1981, pp 245-64.
2. For more details see "Mashakel al-Senaah fi'l
Kuwait" (Industrial Problems in Kuwait), LBK 1984 (prepared
by the author).
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-	 Cost overruns due to underestimation of the projects'
cost including pre-operating and working capital requirements
-	 Overlooking the importance of feasibility studies coupled
with incompetence of some of the financial and technical
consultants
What was needed was a minimum technical knowledge, exposure to
industrial relations and promptness and assertiveness in decision
making.
Other obstacles include the multiplicity of government departments
that	 are	 responsible for granting the
	
necessary	 licences
and the lack of coordination among these departments 1 . The result
is seen in undue delays in granting the required approvals from the
competent authorities.
Inflation
For the first time since the early 1970s, the average increase in
prices in Kuwait rose only mildly (by 1% in 1985) recording the
lowest rate of inflation in the whole world. 2
 Nevertheless it would
be helpful to point out the origins of inflation, its measurement
and control.
The extended period of rapid growth and accelerated expansion of
money supply in the mid-1970s led to increased domestic inflationary
pressures on the economy. The inflation caused by domestic factors
has two dimensions:
1. For example,	 these departments include the following
ministries: Commerce and Industry, Transport and
Communications, Public Works, Health, Interior, Oil and many
government agencies such as municipalities, environment and
pollution.
2. The	 International	 Labour Office,	 Geneva,	 see	 al-
Qabas International, No. 492, 2 Oct 1986, London.
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a) Demand-push inflation initiated by increased liquidity
and affluence. The average per capita share in domestic
government expenditure rose from KID 1608 to KID 2095 or by
34.1% from 1979/80-1983/84. Consequently, domestic consumption
of goods and services accelerated with private consumption
exceeding the dinar value of oil GDP by 109.4% and amounting
to 90.1% of non-oil GDP at current prices'.
b) Cost-push inflation generated by the rise in factor
cost, particularly the rise in wages and salaries, and raw
material costs, particularly in the construction sector.
On the other hand, the extensive dependence of Kuwait on the rest of
the world, mainly the industrialized countries, to supply consumable
and durable goods, generated a supply side inflation. This in fact
was accentuated by the rise in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 and the
double digit inflation that was common in Western countries. It
follows that any change in the suppliers' prices must generally be
reflected in the cost of imports. Thus the worldwide recession of
the l980s, reduced oil prices and the decline in interest rates have
helped in damping the inflationary pressures that were the feature
of the 1970s in the Gulf oil producing countries.
Kuwait measures the changes in prices by monitoring the wholesale
price index (WPI) and consumer price index (CPI). WPI includes 5
main items: foodstuffs, clothing, household appliances, medicine
and stationery. The WPI as prepared by the Ministry of Planning, can
be criticised for (i) exclusion of durable consumable goods, (ii)
the constant weights used in the price index since 1972 (base year),
(iii) non-adjustment to reflect the change in the relative weight
of domestic products which have grown in importance over the past
years. The above adjustment would permit better detection of the
source of inflation (domestic or imported).2
1. CBK, The Kuwait Economy (1980-84), p.115.
2. The wholesale price index represents consumer goods sold
by wholesale dealers and does not include commodities such
as intermediate gcods which constitute 60% of Kuwait imports.
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Table 3.8 shows the trend in WPI. The annual percentage increase in
the	 index fell from 10.5 to merely 0.2 between 1980 and 1983,
largely due to: (a) the stability in price of wholesale foodstuffs
whose relative weight is 70.7% in the index, and (b) the slow down
in economic activity.
The consumer price index (CPI) is a better indication of the cost of
living. It was increasing, though at a decreasing rate between
1980-84, as shown in Table 3.9.
Both the decline in import-oriented inflation and the drop in
domestic prices of Kuwaiti origin has led to the decline in cost of
living. Furthermore, the rationalization of government
expenditure and the regularization of domestic liquidity, especially
after the collapse of Souk al-Manakh, contributed to the decline in
the rate of inflation generally.
The government of Kuwait subsidizes the prices of major foodstuffs
(e.g. rice, sugar, meat, vegetable oil, milk and baby food).
Undeniably, government subsidies are important in keeping prices
down. According to the Ministry of Planning, government subsidies
have caused a drop in the annual rates of increase in domestic prices
by 7% during 1976-80 and 9.2% and 7.8% in 1981-82 respectively1.
It is expected that once the cyclical downturn of the Kuwait
economy comes to an end, prices might go up but inflation will not
reach its previous highest peaks. The excess capacity in many
industries and the completion of the infrastructure projects must
exert an influence upon the demand for factors of production even
when recovery is underway.
OIL POLICY. PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE NATIONAL BUDGET
Kuwait's dependence on one source of income has various economic
1.	 CEK, Economic Report, 1982, p.113.
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implications.	 In recent years, however, the income generated from
investing the accumulated wealth, other than oil, has begun to play
a more significant role.
	
In order to understand the factors
influencing Kuwait's fiscal policy we begin by discussing the
developments in the oil market and its impact on public finance
in Kuwait. Then a brief analysis of the fiscal policy objectives
is given followed by an outline of the main features of the
national budget.
Oil Production. Prices and Reserves
The first price rise of oil in 1973 and the second in 1979/80 caused
an unprecedented increase in the price of crude oil that reached 15
to 16 times its original price in the early 1970s. This rise in oil
prices led automatically to the rise in the State's revenue which
was increased more than 20 times. Since 1982/83 the price of oil
has declined, due to world recession causing oil consumption to
fall and to consumers overstocking oil supplies; additionally more
emphasis has been placed upon alternative energy sources.
The oil glut and world recession have compelled a reduction in OPEC
oil production. Thus Kuwait's oil production plunged in 1979/80 for
the first time, by 28.8%. The continued decline in the world demand
for oil triggered a further drop in Kuwait's production which reached
its lowest level of 825,000 b/d in 1982. An estimate of the drastic
cut in oil production could only be measured if compared with
previous production levels which averaged l.8m b/d (1974-83) and
peaked to 2.55m b/d in 1974.
As a proportion of OPEC production, Kuwait's crude oil production
had averaged 5.5% whereas Kuwait's production percentage of world
oil has averaged 2.0% over 1980-84 (Table 3.10). This meagre
volume means that Kuwait alone cannot influence the direction of the
world's supply, it is rather affected by it.
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	6.2	 2.7
	
5.0	 2.0
	
4.3	 1.5
	
6.2	 1.9
	
6.0	 1.8
Table 3.10: Kuwait Oil Production
(million b/d)
Kuwait	 Kuwait Production
Year	 OPEC World	 in percent of
(OC1AOC2 Total	 OPEC	 World
1980	 1.47
1981	 1.02
1982	 0.73
1983	 o.gi
1984	 0.89
1.66
1.13
0.82
1.05
1.03
0.19
0.11
0.09
0.14
0.14
26.88
22.60
19.00
16.99
17.27
62.00
58.00
55.00
56.00
56.00
Source: Kuwait: Minsitry of Oil for the period ending December 1983
World and OPEC: Oil and Energy Trends, February 1985
1. Includes KOC's (Wafra) Production
2. Kuwait's share amounting to half the Company's
production, the other shares goes to Saudi rabia
3. Estimates
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However, Kuwait, as a founder member of OPEC, has beerL influential
in formulating the OPEC policy and in instigating a moderate
stance amid the turmoil that sometimes threatened the organisation's
unity. On the other hand, Kuwait's production in the early 1970s
and the revenues	 generated	 therefrom,	 far	 exceeded	 the
country's requirements for funds,	 although Kuwait kept on producing
more than it really could absorb (in revenue) in order to meet
the worlds' demand for energy. 	 This was done in complete awareness
of the international obligations which resulted, however, in
spiraling inflation coupled with absorptive capacity problems at the
time.
It was in early 1983 that the growing competition in the oil market,
mainly from the Soviet Union, North Sea Oil and Alaskan Oil brought
the realisation that the then sale price of US $32.3 per barrel
could not be maintained. 	 Thus in February 1983,	 the Kuwait
official price was reduced to US $28.3 b/d. Shortly after, OPEC
decided on 1 March 1983 to set the price of Kuwait crude at US
$27.3. This meant a decline of 15.48% over the original price
quoted in January 1982. The same lump sum decrease was applied to
the oil produced from the neutral zone (Khafji and Al-Hout) between
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Additionally, prices of refined products had fallen from US $34.7
per barrel to $30.7 per barrel (1982-1983) a decline of about 11.5%.
Table 3.11 presents the trend in oil prices from 1980 to 1984 for
various crude oil products.
On the other hand, prices of liquified petroleum gas (LPG) continued
their upward trend from 1981 to the first half of 1983 owing to the
shortage of supplies worldwide; gas prices averaged $253.4 per ton
during that period. Though the situation had changed in the second
half of 1983 due to a shift by Japan (the main user of Kuwait LPG
products) to other suppliers. Accordingly prices of gas fell from
$225 to $206 per ton during August 1984.
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Table 3.11: Price of Crude Oil
US$ per barrel
1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984
Kuwait Crude 311
	
28.933	 35.083	 32.300	 27.800	 27.300
Khafji 28°	 29.535	 34.610	 31.030	 26.530	 26.030
Flout 35°	 30.337	 35.672	 34.014	 29.307	 28.600
Source: CBK Economic Report, 1985.
1. Adjusted to 33 from 1 July 1983.
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At current production levels, Kuwait's oil reserves are about 15% of
OPEC reserves and about 10% of the world's reserves. Table 3.12
shows the importance of oil not for Kuwait but for the world at
large in terms of duration of reserves. It is estimated that
Kuwait's reserves of oil will last for 167 years compared with 66
years for OPEC and 34 years for the world at 1983 production levels.
This of course is subject to variations depending on new discoveries
of wells and the promotion and commercial viability of other sources
of energy.	 However these factors, if they materialise, will help
in maintaining or even increasing the estimated duration of
Kuwait's oil; however even if prices of oil stabilize at $27 per
barrel on average, and provided that the OPEC quota for Kuwait
stands at 1.06m/barrel/day, the odds are that Kuwait will not be
able to sustain 2 to 3% growth, at current prices, without running
into deficit.	 This, in part, would eat up the country's income
from foreign reserves, if not threaten its capital base1.
Public Finance
The public sector in Kuwait consists of the central government,
including various Ministries, and the public enterprises. The
financial accounts incorporate the general budget including the
Amiri Diwan (Office of the I-lead of State), 19 ministries and
administrative bodies and the attached budgets including the National
Assembly, the Municipality of Kuwait, Kuwait University and the
National Housing Authority. The general budget includes also the
extraordinary reserve fund. The public sector includes more than 20
enterprises. These enterprises have separate budgets (e.g. Kuwait
Institute for Scientific Research - KISR, Kuwait Airlines, KPC, the
Credit and Savings Bank - CSB). When any of these enterprises
receive loans from the government, the transfer appears in the
general budget under net domestic lending.
1.	 The above figures were obtained as follows:
Annual quota: 1.06 x 360	 38l.6m b/yr
Annual income: 381.6 x 27
	
$lO,303rn
10,303 x .290	 KD 2987.9
an increase of 2% over 1984/85 oil receipts. This means
a deficit of KD 510m (excluding investment income), if
everything else remained equal.
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40
30
42
39
44
84
66
66
71.2
70.7
70.1
69.4
68.5
67.9
67.7
66.7
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
31
29
29
28
29
31
32
34
90
98
89
75
112
165
223
167
449.9
444.9
439.9
444.9
435.6
434.4
436.5
421.9
658.7
652.3
640.8
641.6
641.6
648.5
670.7
669.3
Table 3.12: Oil Reserves1
(Billion barrels)
End of	 Kuwait	 OPEC	 World
Year Reserves Duration Reserves Duration Reserves Duration
(Years)2	 (Years) 2	 (Years )2
Source: Oil and Gas Journal, Worldwide Report, 1983
1. Prepared by the Central Bank of Kuwait
2. Obtained by dividing reserives at the beginning of the next year
by total production of the current year. The outcome would
represent the oil reserves duration (in years) at that time if
the rates of production remain at the level of the current year.
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Policy Implications
Kuwait's fiscal policy in the 1980s followed a cautious, yet prudent
policy, designed to:
	
1.	 Rationalise public expenditure
	
2.	 Achieve	 optimal	 economic and social returns	 on
public expenditure
	
3.	 Improve efficiency in public administration through
a) the development of existing services;
b) creating new government agencies with independent budgets
to facilitate operations and control; and
c) privatisation of certain government services
	
4.	 Increase and diversify the sources of fiscal revenues
5. Support the private sector and stimulate its growth to
increase this sector's role in developing and balancing the
national economy and government finance.
At the outset it is rather difficult to rationalise government
expenditure without cutting spending which results in reducing
certain services. However, the government is trying to avoid
cutting necessary services by declaring that its intention is not "to
save for the sake of saving".1
On the other hand, the increase in non-oil revenues is possible
only if, for example, the government tries to implement a direct
tax system, reduce subsidies, and charge for certain services which
are currently rendered free of charge. Fortunately, the investment
revenue currently compensates for the lost returns in the oil sector.
1.	 CEK, Economic Report, 1983.
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The National Budget
The Kuwaiti budget is characterised by four distinct features:
firstly, tax revenues are minimal and constitute royalties and
customs duties. Income tax is virtually nil, the only tax payable
by closed and public shareholding companies is a 5% levy on net
profit for the benefit of the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement
of Science (KFAS). Secondly about 10-22% of total annual revenue is
set aside in the general reserve fund under a separate heading
called the "fund for future generations". The purpose of this fund,
as its name implies, is to protect future generations against the
depletion of oil. Thirdly, the investment income generated from the
general reserve is treated as an off budget item. Fourthly the
outcome of the separate budgets (e.g. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
(KPC)) are not included in the general budget. The implications
are that the total State's revenue appears lower than it would
have been had this account been treated as a budget item. Table
3.13	 shows	 the various components of public	 revenues	 and
expenditure from 1979/80-1984/85.
It was estimated that the 1984-85 deficit net would be KD 35lm and
gross RD 704m (including allocations for future generations fund
and the Kuwait fund). However, the actual deficit recorded was RD
425.3m excluding investment income.
	 It is noticeable that for the
third time,	 the	 budget runs into deficit (totalling RD
1228m if accumulated).	 The sagging oil revenues and government
policies, aimed at maintaining reasonable growth rather than
sacrificing growth for a balanced budget, has led to a budget
deficit.
Consequently the State's annual revenues, excluding investment
income, dropped by 58% from RD 5940m to RD 2493m (1979/80-1984/85).
It is worth noting that the ratio of oil revenues in the overall
public revenues (including investment income) fell from 98% to 94%
for the same period.
The income from foreign investment is playing a growing role in the
diversification of the national income. This could be inferred
from its contribution to public revenue which grew at a brisk rate of
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217% rising from KD 521.4m to KD 1657m between 1978/79-1982/83.
However the importance of this source of income has proved to be
rather volatile. In 1983/84, for example, it recorded a 22%
decline. The world recession, and lower interest rates, especially
in the US dollar deposits were the main factors that triggered this
sharp slump, in addition to a draw down of KD 417m to finance
budgetary and extra-budgetary domestic expenditure 1 .	 This weak
performance calls for reassessment of the investment policies in
terms of portfolios allocation, geographic location,	 management
and most of all in the overall strategy. The recent
establishment of the General Investment Authority, which is
entrusted with managing the State's foreign investment, is hoping
to achieve the required results.
Public Expenditure
While government revenues were declining public expenditures were
rising but at a lower rate than in the late l970s. For example,
the growth per year in government spending declined from 26% in
1979-80 to an average annual increase of 7.56% between 1979/80-
1984/85.	 This slow down in growth ws inevitable in order to
curtail a growing budget deficit since 1981/822. The
rationalization policy adopted by the government was not effective
in contracting the dinar value of domestic expenditure as the
reduction was only marginal (see Table 3.13). Since the level of
aggregate demand is mainly influenced by public expenditure the
government is keen not to effect a drastic cut in the development
programmes. Thus in the first half of 1983/84 government expenditure
rose by 33% in such areas as: (i) transfer payments (up l6.l7),
owing to an increase in government subsidies on local consumption of
gas, oil and refined products, cost of living allowances, and also
the rise in the government contribution to the social security fund;
(ii) development expenditure (up 19.7%) mostly caused by a rise in
1. See NBK,	 Economic and Financial Bulletin, No. 9, November
1985.
2. The deficit reached KD 112.2,	 591.4 and 425.3 (1981/82,
1982/83 and	 1984/85) excluding allocations for future
generations and investment income, see Table 3.13.
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the allocations to the National Housing Authority (NHA), additional
allocation of KD 131m for defence and RD 22.lm for the Institute of
Applied Technology1.
On the other hand, the government was obliged to postpone some
recreational and leisure projects which were still in the planning
phase2.
More significantly, salaries and wages have increased by 18%
annually (1978/79-1982/83). In Kuwait, salaries and wages constitute
no less than 20-25% of the current expenditure. Land purchase is
another important item in the transfer payment which has risen
annually by 30.5% on average (1979/80-1981/82) and then declined by
70% between 1981/82 and 1984/85. Its weight in total expenditure
shrank from 12% to 4% (1980-85). The development budget consists of
investments on infrastructure and construction expenditure. Thus the
rise in the allocation on these items leads to an upturn in
employment,	 and	 greater demand on many local industries
particularly building materials.
	
Normally,	 public works,
electricity and water account for three-quarters of the development
budget.	 Development expenditure grew by 10.3% on average from
1979/80-1984/85. Kuwait has almost completed the main motorways and
road projects as well as the bulk of the infrastructure facilities.
However, in an effort to stimulate demand and help revive economic
stagnation, the government in the 1983/84 budget boosted the
allocation of the development expenditure to RD 808m (i.e. 23.4% of
public expenditure)3.
1. See CBK, Economic Report, 1983, p.35.
2. Such as the 4th and 5th phase of the "water front project"
along the coastal road and the postponement of setting up
a new airport.
3. Although the actual amount spent was RD 750m up 13.2% over
the previous year (see Table 3.13).
169
6403.2
4434.2
1743.9
225.1
2629.6
4349.2
2764.1
1364.0
221.1
3097.4
4223.7
2334.6
1657.1
232.0
3158.0
4439 .1
2923.6
1288.6
226.9
3120.0
3884.2
2493.8
1154.0
236.4
3155.5
1745.5 1989.8
	
492.3	 658.4
	
391.8	 449.2
3773.6 1251.8
2231.6
44.6
661.9
219.9
1065.7
2113.4
29.1
750.2
227.3
1319.1
2231.6
31.5
756.4
136.0
728.7
Table 3.13: Public Revenues and Expenditure (Closing Accounts)
(KD million)
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85
Revenues	 6968.3
Oil Revenues	 5940.5
Investnent Incane 880.3
Other receipts	 147.5
penditures	 2192.4
Cuirent expen-
diture	 1465.6
Capita expen-
diture	 -
Deve1onent
eeniit"ure	 462.9
Land purchase	 263.9
Surolus______
Surplus (deficit)
excluding invest- 3895.6
merit inccuie
2029.7	 <112.1> <591.4>	 30.5 <425.
Source: Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, 08K
1. From investing government reserves including reserves for future
generations.
2. Starting the fiscal year beginning July 1982, the general expenditure
item was divided into two sections; (i) commodities and services
related to current expenditure, and (ii) transport equipment related
to capital expenditure.
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Balance of Payments
Kuwait's dependence on imported capital goods and consumables has
had an undesirable impact on the balance of payment. So far, this
has been easily absorbed by surpluses in the trade balance
resulting from export earnings of crude oil and petrochemicals.
Thus the surplus is not entirely an outcome of the country's good
performance in buying and selling of goods and services. It is
rather an outcome of the world's demand for Kuwait's oil. Such
demand has been more volatile in the 1980s. 	 Thus from a peak of KD
4.1 bn surplus	 (1980)	 the current account balance declined
steadily until 1984 when it recorded an 11% rise over the previous
year to stand roughly at KD 1.6 bn. This erosion was commensurate
with a deterioration in oil revenues by almost 40% over the same
period. An analysis of the components of the balance of payments
account shows a deteoriation in the trade balance by 33 and 35%
(1981-1982) respectively.
However,	 the	 results of 1983 and 1984 showed a remarkable
improvement achieving a surplus of KD l275m and 10 14l2m, a rise of
36% and 11% respectively. A number of factors contributed to this
upsurge including mainly the rise in oil exports, and economic
rationing accompanied by a decline in both the value and prices of
imports including non-monetary gold.
The service account balance which showed its highest surplus of KD
1.7m (1981) has dropped gradually reflecting in a large part a
dwindling in the net foreign investment income; after showing a
steady growth in the 1970s from investment income has declir1ed in
recent years due to a draw down in order to finance domestic outlays
and also because of a decrease in interest rates1.
1.	 See Public Revenues.
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FOREIGN TRADE
Foreign trade played a vital role in the development and progress of
Kuwait before the oil era, and more so in the aftermath of the oil
discovery.	 International trade is not only an exchange of a
commodity for hard currency, but also a contribution to the
increase in "mass commodities and therefore, the sum of enjoyment"1.
All consumer and durable goods alike are imported to bridge the
gap between an urgent need for such goods and the narrow industrial
base which renders self-sufficiency in certain intermediate goods and
in local manufactured equipment prohibitive, if not impossible.
Another important aspect of trade in Kuwait is that not all imported
goods are for local consumption. A sizeable part of Kuwait's
imports are intended for re-export to the neighbouring countries.
Hence the dependence on foreign trade in Kuwait is a matter of
survival on one hand, and a means of life on the other.
Trade Policy
No matter how difficult industrialization in Kuwait may be, the
government's policy is to strike a balance between the infant
industry and its imported substitutes. A tariff between 10% and up
to 40% may be imposed on a number of imported commodities depending
on the availability of similar products locally. The normal tariff
barrier is only 5% on virtually all imports, unless otherwise
designated for re-export, while the exchange of certain goods, of
local origin, among the Gulf Cooperation Council (CCC) members are
exempted from tariff duty. There is also a negative tariff on
edible and non-edible raw materials and manufactured equipment for
industrial usage.
1.	 David	 Ricardo,	 "Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation", 1817, p.107 cited in Gerald M. Meier, International
Economics, the Theory and Policy , New York:	 Oxford Univ.
Press, 1980, p.57.
172
As in Saudi Arabia, the subsidised items relate to intermediate as
well as final products and foodstuff. For instance, flour and sugar
are final products for household consumption, and at the same time,
they are intermediate produce for the production of many food and
beverage products. Thus their subsidisation is in fact an
added advantage in the competitiveness between domestic products
and imported ones'.
In spite of these subsidies some infant industries in Kuwait, such as
the biscuit industry, have not been able to withstand foreign
competition. In fact the Kuwaiti protective tariff is not a
deterrent nor a barrier to trade and may never be so, as: the
Kuwaiti consumer is quality conscious and is not willing to sacrifice
quality for lower prices even if local
	 production is price
competitive; secondly local manufacturing capacity, excluding
building materials and food products, are lower than domestic demand.
Additionally, local manufactured products must satisfy 40% of local
demand in order to qualify for a protective tariff.	 Therefore very
few products have qualified since 1965.	 Such products include
asbestos pipes,
	
cement,	 pipes,	 medical and industrial oxygen,
steel pipes (6" - 48") and some foundry products.
Commencing August 1985, a new tariff system was introduced. The
eligibility for protective tariff in the new system is directly
related to the value-added generated locally. Thus, an industry
realising 40% value-added or more will benefit from a maximum of 25%
protective tariff. Industries creating from 30-9% value-added will
benefit from 20% tariff protection whereas an industry with value
added of 15% will enjoy only a 15% tariff.
1. John R Presley, 1984, p.88.
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The Development and Composition of Trade
Average imports per capita fell from $5015 to $3751 between 1982-
1984, the first decline that was recorded since 1979.
Consequently the proportion of imports to exports fell from 79% to
65% for the same period. After hovering around 190 points (1981-
1983) the terms of trade declined to 120 points due to the decline
in oil prices (14%) well above the drop registered in the price of
imports (3.8%)1. The income terms of trade 2 have improved by 22%
and 23% (1983-84) respectively due to a decline in the imports
price index by 12.7% and 15.5% respectively for the same period.
The Kuwait trade balance continued to show a surplus in 1983 and
1984. Furthermore, Kuwait's aggregate foreign trade balance slightly
improved (0.3%) in 1984 over the previous year resulting from the
combined effect of a 4% drop in imports accompanied by a 9% rise in
exports.
Exports
Table 3.15 reveals the trade surplus in Kuwait from 1979 to 1984.
When world demand for oil weakened and prices plunged, the value
of exports fell by 28% cropping from KD 5089m to KD 3657m (1979-
1984). Moreover the volume of crude oil exports also dropped
significantly from 760.lm barrel per year to 242m barrel per year
(1979-1984) due to the decline in world demand and the increase
in non-OPEC oil production.	 The new production level represented
only 32.1% of the 1979 level.
What is significant, however, is the emergence of refined petroleum
products as an important component of oil exports. After suffering a
decline in 1980 and 1981, they realised a speedy recovery and
exports climbed by 38.4% and 5% in 1982 and 1984 respectively (see
Table 3.14). It is pertinent to note that their share in the
1. CBK, Economic Report, 1985.
2. Export value index divided by import value index
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Table 3.14: Kuwait Oil Exçorts
Barrel (mn)
(1) Including Kuwait's full share of Arabian Oil Company's (AOC)
production
(2) Revised figures
Source: Ministry of Oil, and Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Ministry
of Planning
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total volume of oil exports jumped from 14% to 37% (1979-84),
while they comprised 60% of crude oil exports in 1984 1 , signifying
the government's determination and commitment to fully utilise
its comparative advantage, namely oil in downstream industries.
Oil exports comprised the bulk of Kuwait's total exports. However,
non-oil exports, including re-exports, were increasing in value by
over 160% from KD 21Gm to a peak of KD 562m (1976-1982), but
declining to KD 396 in 1984.
In the absence of significant agricultural production, non-oil
exports	 of Kuwaiti origin reflect the growth of the local
manufacturing sector.	 From KD 58m in 1977, non-oil exports of
Kuwait origin more than doubled reaching KD 12Gm in 1984.
The geographic distribution of oil exports continues in the
direction of two major groups: Asia and the Far East absorbed 70%
and Western Europe 16.8% in 1983.	 With reference to specific
countries in these groups,	 Japan ranked first consuming 19% of
Kuwait's exports to Asia.	 However in 1984 oil exports to Japan
declined and this prompted the Kuwaiti Ambassador to Japan to
declare in October 1984 that the drop in Japanese imports from
Kuwait is not "in the interests of Japan or of long range
Kuwaiti-Japanese cooperation" and he warned that "if the drop
continued, Kuwait would be obliged to decrease its purchases from
Japan until the balance of trade between the two countries was
restored"2
Non-oil exports of fertilizers (ammonia and urea) were destined
mainly to India, China, Malaysia, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Other
exports of domestic production e.g. steel structures, prefabricated
houses, metal pipes, shrimp, building materials, chemicals and
paints, were mainly exported to other Arab countries. Exports
to Saudi Arabia accounted for KD 36.2m (86.4%) of Kuwait's exports
to the Gulf Cooperation Council (CCC) countries in 1 .983.	 Exports
to Saudi Arabia include: 	 bodies of automotive equipment,
sheds, prefabricated houses, tiles, insulation materials and wood
1. CBK, Economic Report, 1985, p.126.
2. The Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), October 1984.
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Table 3.15 Kuwait's Balance of Thade
(KD million)
1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984*
Exports	 5088.5 5368.9 4530.8 3187.1 3345.7 3657.0
oil	 4781.0 4960.8 3969.2 2614.5 2874.7 3260.8
Non-Oil	 307.5	 408.1	 561.6	 572.6	 471.0	 396.2
Imports	 1437.0 1764.9 1945.4 2370.0 2180.0 2094.0
Surplus	 3651.5 3604.0 2585.4	 817.1 1165.7 1563.0
Source: CSO (1979-1983), and The Kuwait Econcniy, CBK (1985).
*	 Revised figures
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products, fibreglass, water tanks and ready made garments. Exports to
the rest of the Arab world reached only KD 16.4m, about 45% of
exports to Saudi Arabia alone.	 Iraq absorbs the bulk of Kuwait's
exports to non-GCC countries, accounting for 52.3% and 60.5% of
Kuwaiti exports to the Arab countries in 1981 and 1982 respectively,
though Iraq's share declined sharply in 1983 causing a drop in the
exportation of urea, anunoniuni sulphate, table salt and flour.
Imports
The volume of imports fell by 13% between 1983-84; this caine as no
surprise in the wake of the escalation of the war in the neighbouring
countries, the stock market collapse and the subsequent general
slowdown in the economy.	 Consequently, average per capita
imports fell by 25% between 1982-1984 (Table 3.16). In addition,
the ratio of the value of imports to the value of oil exports
amounted to 76% and 64% (1983-84) down from 91% in 1982.
Table 3.16: Kuwait's Per Capita Imports (1980-1984)
(million US$)
1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984
Monthly average imports 	 544	 581	 654	 594	 558*
Total for year** 	 6529	 6978	 7848	 7123	 6700
Per capita imports, $
	
4748	 4760	 5015	 4260	 3751
*	 Partially estimated according to the 3rd quarter average based
on NBK Economic Bulletin 1985, p.26
**
	
	 Adjusted annual	 figures	 do not	 necessarily match the
monthly average
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Imports are classified into three economic categories:
consumption goods accounted for 37% of total imports, followed
by intermediate goods 34% and then capital goods 28% during 19831.
Intermediate goods for industrial requirements including foodstuffs,
such as wheat flour, frozen fruits, undressed hides, raw wool and
cotton accounted for the second largest value of imports (1976-
1983). Their value in 1983 reached 10 730m compared to capital
goods imports of 10 605m.
During the 4 year period from 1979-1982 the fastest growing imported
items were transport equipment which grew by 109%. Transport
equipment imports witnessed a boom particularly in 1980-1982 as a
result of the interruption in the activities, and later the close
down, of the Iraqi ports following the war.	 Consequently Iraq
stepped up its purchases via Kuwait.	 However by the end of 1982
an excess supply of transport vehicles existed.
Japan accounts for a significant share of Kuwait's imports;
Imports from this country were steadily growing from lCD 247m to
576m between 1978-82, an increase of 133%. Its share of total
imports went up from 19.5% to 24.2% for the same period declining to
20% in 1984. France occupied the second position, whilst the USA
held third position in 1984.
Kuwait's import price index declined from 96.9% to 92.3% (1981-83)
increasing by 2.5% in the first half of 1984. The slight
depreciation of the dinar against the US dollar may be partially
responsible for the increase in the import price index during this
period.
The government	 is currently studying measures to curb the
accelerated rate of car importation. 	 It is doubtful whether an
increase in customs duty would deter car purchases or not. However
the increase in value is partially due to the increase of suppliers
prices and an inexhaustive demand.
1.	 See Annual Statistical Abstracts, 1986, p232.
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The industrial countries supplied around 75% of the value of
Kuwait's imports in 1983. 	 European countries alone provided around
40-42% (1978-1982), (Table 3.17).
	
It is to be noted, 	 however,
that the United Kingdom, who supplied around KD l44m per annum
(1978-1980) and was the first among the European trading partners,
had fallen to sixth place by 1984.
Table 3.17: Kuwait's Imports from top Trading Partners
Country	 % Weight*
	
1982
	
1983
	
1984
Japan	 22.9
	
1788
	
1763
	
1350
USA
	
12.8
	
941
	
740
	
636
W. Germany	 9.9
	
814
	
693
	
629
UK
	
7.8
	
582
	
506
	
402
Italy	 7.2
	
627
	
592
	
494
S. Korea	 4.1
	
299
	
296
	
256
France
	 3.9
	
314
	
444
	
740
India	 2.0
	
178
	
99
Australia	 1.9
	
112
	
98
	
141
China PR	 1.6
	
109
	
99
	
100
Holland
	
1.5
	
120
	
96
	
112
Switzerland	 1.3
	
127
	
95
	
89
Spain	 1.3	 88
	
71
	
95
Hong Kong	 1.2
	
109
	
100
	
87
Denmark
	
1.1
	
72
	
64
	
59
Sweden	 1.0
	
85
	
64
	
66
Singapore	 1.0
	
103
	
67
	
142
Canada	 0.9
	
80
	
55
	
56
Belgium	 0.9
	
66
	
63
Sub -Total
	
843
	
6616
	
6005
	
5454
TOTAL:	 100
	
1848
	
7123
	
6100
*Average weight for the period 1980-1983
Source: NBK Economic Report No. 8, May 1985
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Before and after the discovery of oil, Kuwait relied very heavily on
foreign trade. In the pre-oil era, Kuwait was able to exchange
natural Gulf pearls via sea-borne trade with all sorts of goods
(e.g. wood and spices from India, potable water from Basra). After
the discovery of oil, Kuwait continued to utilise the country's
comparative advantage by selling crude oil,	 and more recently
refined products, to satisfy its needs for consumer,
intermediate and capital goods. Thus, specialization and trade
have helped in improving the living standards and in fostering
the development efforts in the country. Besides Kuwait has been an
entrepot for the neighbouring countries irrespective of the temporary
setback due to the Gulf war. Currently, there is no national
barrier to trade except a 5% customs duty on imports and occasional
tariff to protect an infant industry. Financing of foreign trade
was among the main objectives and was behind the subsequent
evolution of the commercial banking sector in Kuwait (see Chapter 4,
Commercial Banking section).
INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS IN KUWAIT
In this section, an outline of the industrial strategies, policies
and incentives for developing an industrial base in Kuwait is given.
We then focus on the industrial structure by reviewing the progress
achieved in oil and non-oil industries in recent years.
Industrial Strategies. Policies and the Government's Role
The Planning Board had outlined the goals and objectives of
industrialization in the first and second five year plans for
1967/68-1971/72 and 1972/73-1977/78 as follows:
1. Diversifying the sources of income of the national economy
2. Reducing the dependence on oil as a depleting resource
3. Encouraging the	 growth of petrochemicals	 and export-
related industries
4. Encouraging	 Kuwaiti citizens to work in the	 industrial
sector through intensive training programmes.
1 01
5. Provision of medium to long term loans at low interest rates
(see Industrial Bank of Kuwait)
6. Formation of joint ventures between the public and private
sector to foster investment in industry
7. Giving	 preference	 in	 government	 purchases	 to
locally manufactured products of comparable quality to imports
8. Tariff protection including import restrictions in a few cases
9. Tax exemption and exemptions from customs duties on
machinery, spare parts, raw materials and semi-processed
products.
In addition to establishing the industrial bank, the government has
extended two soft loans to IBK amounting to KD 200m for the sole
purpose of fostering industrial development in the country. The
government's programme of industrial encouragements is aimed at
decreasing the cost of establishing new industries, 	 stimulating
private investment,	 and securing the stability and the natural
evolution of the manufacturing sector.
To achieve the above objectives the government's policy seeks to
develop the required infrastructure necessary for establishing a
relatively sound industrial base and to assist in its development
and progress. Effectively the State's leap into industrialization
was made possible by the enactment in 1965 of the law relating to
the regularization of industry in Kuwait. The law provides measures
and incentives to local industrial firms within the framework:
industrial zones via nominal rental fees and electricity and water at
subsidized cost.
Industrial Structure
The manufacturing sector in Kuwait consists of oil-based and non-oil
industries. Petrochemicals, including the domestic refineries,
are currently wholly-owned by the State and are managed by
Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC). KNPC runs three
refineries with a capacity of 645,000 barrels per day. These are
Ahmadi, Mina Abdulla arLd
	
Shuaba	 refineries.	 Around	 50% of
Kuwait's oil exports are refined products. KNPC also owns a
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lubricating plant with a production capacity of 28,000 tons
per annum. KNPC is also responsible for domestic marketing of
refined products (engine oil, kerosene, diesel, lubricating oil and
asphalt).
In February 1979, Kuwait took full control over its natural gas
resources. The Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) set up a new liquified gas
plant with a designed capacity of 1725 cubic feet per day. The
main products of the plant are liquid propane, liquid butane,
natural gasoline and various other products.
In its efforts to achieve self-reliance and to diversify its sources
of income, Kuwait has become a leading producer of fertilizers
(urea) in the Gulf. In 1963, the Petrochemical Industries
Corporation (PlC) was formed as a joint venture between the State
owned KNPC and the private sector.	 Subsequently three plants were
set up: (a) the ammonia plant (1966) with a rated capacity of 400
metric tons per day, (b) urea plant (1967) with a current capacity
of 1700 metric tons per day, and (c) arnmonium sulphate (1966) with a
capacity of 450 tons per day.
In 1980 the petrochemical industries were reorganised under the
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC). KPC currently owns KOC, KNPC,
PlC, Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration Company (KUFPEC), and
Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC). 	 In 1981 KPC acquired the US
engineering and exploration firm Santa Fe International. KPC aims
at integrating its downstream industries with retail outlets in
Europe. Accordingly KPC acquired 4300 stations in Belgium, Italy,
Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden and the UK. It also owns refineries in
Denmark and Rotterdam.
In recent years the non-oil industry has witnessed a structural
change in domestic production (see Table 3.18 for industrial
production). The dominance of chemical products (e.g. sodium
hydrochloride and chlorine) has ceased as its contribution in the
manufacturing sector fell from 47% to 14% paving the way for metal
products (mostly aluminium) to rank first in manufacturing GD?.
During 1974-84,	 the metal and non-metal,
	
food and beverages,
textile and clothing industries have recorded remarkable growth.
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Table 3.19 shows the relative importance of each of the industrial
sub-sectors as well as their contribution to GDP from 1974-1984.
Undoubtedly, the above mentioned measures and incentives have
helped in raising the contribution of non-oil industry from KD 75m
to KD 257ui (1974-84) achieving an annual increase of 13.1% at
current prices. The real growth rate was also remarkable averaging
6.4% up to 1982 at 1972 prices.1
Industrial Loans
The formation of the Industrial Bank of Kuwait in 1974 has
facilitated industrial development in the country2 . By the end of
1984 funds disbursed by IBK to industry amounted to KD 140m. The
total number of projects financed was 326 projects (see Table 3.20).
Construction projects accounted for the highest share obtaining 33%
of total IBK financing and ranked first in number of projects (96).
Metal products and engineering came second followed by food and
beverage products. It is of note that the size of financial support
for projects clustered between KD 100 to 500 thousand indicating that
small to medium size ventures are recapturing the majority of
finance.
The survival of the petrochemical industry in Kuwait is largely
dependent on international demand and price competitiveness. The
decline in 1976 and 1977 of world prices of aininonium sulphate and
sulphuric acid has led to a significant reduction in production.
Additionally, the Kuwaiti and Saudi downstream industries are facing
protection barriers in the EEC countries and the United States.
1. IBK Annual Report, 1984.
2. The objectives and functions of the bank - are discussed
in Chapter 4, Specialized Banks section.
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200.4
35.9
2.6
3.6
6.9
7.9
8.9
2.5
2.15
210.1
39.6
2.9
2.8
6.7
192.7
39.7
3.0
2.4
6.7
235.1
42.1
3.3
2.2
6.6
	
7.7	 7.2	 7.9
	
8.7	 8.2	 8.8
	
0.04	 0.04	 0.04
	
1.18	 1.01	 0.4
0.38	 0.37	 0.43
414.3 353.0 383.0
	
8.9	 7.0	 4.0
	
1.65	 1.6	 1.5
21.6
293.7
1.91
50.6
1,550
294
25
10.2
419.0
1.78
36.1
1,553
419
25
65.9
449.8
1.3
41.1
1,124
450
15
5.5
403.2
1.7
50.5
1,184
403
48
9,916 11,224 12,499 13,894
8,736 9,915 10,812 11,827
Table 3.18: Production of Selected Industries
Industrial Activity	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983 1984
Food Processing (ttusand tons)
Flour	 155.6
Bran	 31.8
Macaroni	 1.7
Biscuits	 2.9
Bread	 6.8
Industrial Clianicals
thiorine (000 tons)	 8.0
Caustic Soda (000 tons), 	 9.1
Hydrogen Gas (million m') 	 2.6
Hydrochloride Socliun
(million gallons)
0.24 0.42(million gallons)
niTonium Hydroxide 331.1 463.7(000 metric tons)
Sulphuric Acid
(000 metric tons)	 N/A	 4.8
Detergents
(000 metric tons)	 1.64	 1.90
Construction Materials
Hydrated Lime (100 tons	 17.7
Sand Lime Bricks (000 m )
	
338.1
Concrete Slabs (million in3 )	 1.91
Cement Blocks nd Cable 51.4Cover (000 in")
Cement (1000 tons) 	 1,308
Sand Lime Bricks (000 m3 )	 338
Metal Pipes (000 tons) 	 37
Others
Electricity Production
(MN kwh)	 9,000
Dcniestic Electricity
Consumption (MN.kwh)	 8,600
Potable Water Production
(million gallons)
	
23,400 25,110 28,637 31,586 35,614
Source: Central Statistics Office
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Table 3. 19: Industrial Sub-Sectors Contribution to G)P
Share in	 Contribution to Annual Rate
	
manufacturing GDP at current	 of Grcrth
Sub-Sector	 ()P	 prices	 (Percent )1
(Percent)	 (KD million)
1974	 1984	 1974	 1984*	 1974-1984
	
8.9	 12.8	 6.7	 33.0	 17.3
	
9.2	 11.3	 6.9	 29.0	 15.4
Food and Beverages
Textiles and Wearing
ppare1
Furniture and Wood
Products
Paper and Printing
Chemical Industries
(excluding petro-
leum refineries)
Non-Metals
Metal Products
TOTAL
	
6.4	 7.8	 4.8	 20.0
	
2.4	 7.8	 1.8	 20.0
	
47.6	 14.8	 35.7	 38.0
	
10.3	 15.9	 7.7	 41.0
	
15.2	 29.6	 11.4	 76.0
	
100.0	 100.0	 75.0 257.0
15.3
27.2
0.6
18.2
20.9
13.1
Source: Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Planning, Kuwait and
IBK Annual Report, 1984.
1. Growth rates were ccinputed on a canpound basis
* Preliminary figures
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The major weakness of the non-oil industry lies in its concentration
on building materials.	 This was justifiable when development plans
were under way. Now that the infrastructure is almost complete and
with the sluggishness in the real estate and construction sector,
some factories have already closed down and many others are facing
severe financial and marketing problems. The government's efforts to
develop non-oil industries has been curtailed by the small size of
the market, the shortage of local skilled labour as well as domestic
resources other than oil.1
Some Government Policies
Confronted with these macroeconomic and microeconomic problems,
Kuwait is currently trying to reduce structural imbalances and to
minimise bottlenecks in the important sectors of the economy (i.e.
construction, real estate, industry, trade and banking). First and
foremost Kuwait wants to close the last chapter on the Souk al-
Manakh saga and rebuild confidence in the stock market. So far,
considerable progress has been achieved in this respect. The
enactment of a new stock market law and the disentanglement and
further settlement of al-Manakh debts are an example.2
Starting mid-1983, the government introduced a series of measures
to reactivate ailing sectors in the economy.	 Examples of these
measures are listed below. 	 Recognising the importance of trade in
the economy, the government has:
a)	 abrogated all regulations restricting the re-exportation of all
kinds of goods except those that are subsidized by the
government
1. For more details on the problems facing industry see
Impediments to Industrial Progress
2. Though	 it will take several years before the 	 al-
Manakh repercussions are completely wiped out.
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176.291
78,474
74,533
16, 655
41,033
90,220
25,987
15,348
15,956
1,160
22,750
4,344
86.197
36. 665
36,294
8,035
23.775
39.695
12,861
6,775
4,935
540
4,750
1,440
32.90
14.00
13.85
3.07
9.08
15.15
4.91
2.59
1.88
0.21
1.81
0.55
96
47
39
20
12
56
25
12
8
1
2
8
Table 3.20 IBK O.miulative Loans and Equity Cunibnent
Industrial	 No. of	 Total Cost	 IEK	 Per
Sub-Sector	 Projects	 of Projects	 Financing	 cent
(KD 000)
Construction
Materials
Metal Products
and Engineering
Food and
Beverages
Fumitore
Marine and
Oilfield Services
Ceitdcal Products
Paper and Paper
Products
Printing
Textiles and
Weaving
Industrial Services
Investnent
Ccipanies
Miscellaneous
'IOTAL:	 326	 562,751	 261,962	 100.0
Source: IBK nnual Report, 1984
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b) allowed the private sector to participate in the formation
of strategic stocking of vital commodities which were
previously restricted to the government owned, Kuwait Supplies
Company
c) planned the setting up of a free trade zone.
The government introduced in mid-1985 a progressive tariff system
based on the value-added criteria that must be generated by local
industries in order to benefit front the protection tariff.
Due to the completion of major construction projects and the slow
down in the activities of this sector, the government tried to
protect domestic companies from unfair foreign competition by:
1. Limiting the execution of Governmental projects and
their affiliated corporations to local contractors, and not
resorting to international contractors, except within the
narrowest limits and	 according	 to certain conditions
(e.g.	 projects	 of specialised	 nature	 requiring
competence and expertise, not available locally).
2. Dividing large and repetitive projects, as far as possible,
into smaller packages which could be executed by a larger
number of medium and small size contractors, with the
purpose of encouraging them and developing their abilities.
3. Encouraging small and medium size local contracting companies
to form consortia among themselves for the execution of
projects, which may be beyond the scope of any one of them
to utilise individually.
4. Utilising	 the capabilities of Kuwaiti bilding 	 factories
e.g. pre-cast concrete and pre-fabricated housing
factories, by requiring contractors to procure their needs
from the local market.
At the outset it appears that these measures have closed the door in
the face of international contracting firms. However it has a
significant impact on the direct bidding by foreign companies in
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the medium to semi-large projects, but it does not have the same
effect in connection with large projects or those requiring
technical expertise and know-how. Another conclusion can be derived
also; the possibility of joint ventures is excluded emanating from
the desire of foreign companies to gain a foothold in the area
and the need of national firms to obtain the required back-up and
to strengthen their position in a highly competitive market.
Concluding Remarks
The Kuwait economy can be viewed as one commodity, financial
surplus economy, with limited absorptive capacity due to a small
population, narrow industrial base and limited market potential.
Oil glut and the subsequent deterioration in the State's revenues
led the government eventually to adopt a series of austerity
measures. These have included a substantial cut in transfer
payments (mainly land purchase), a. rise in the domestic price of
gasoline, fuel oil, and stamp duties and the cancellation of
subsidies on a few food items (mainly imported livestock).
Enhancing industrial development requires an overall revision of the
current strategies and goals of industrialization in Kuwait, with
special attention to broadening the subsidy base to help industry in
its infancy. Some of the issues that should be resolved involve:
a) Determining the roles of private, public and joint sectors
in the industrialization process;
b) Partial privatization of the public industries to
generate alternative sources of revenue in a bid to balance the
budget;
c) Apart from restructuring the current loans to the
manufacturing sector, a more effective measure may be to
restructure the current debts into equity and achieve
industrial integration through mergers and acquisitions
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among similar complementary industries to achieve economies
of scale1;
d) Finance	 export	 industries through IBK	 and standarise
tariff protection with GCC countries;
e) Provide oil and oil-derivatives that are used as feedstocks
in domestic industries at subsidised rates.
In order not to create a false deficiency in the labour market, any
attempts to decrease the dependence on foreign labour has also to
ensure the availability of national skilled manpower. A failure to do
that would cause a shortage of local labour and would cause wages to
escalate.	 This would have a subsequent effect on the cost of
projects and the programmes of their execution.
Confronted by persistent economic stagnation,	 Kuwait has few
options owing to the impact of externalities on the Kuwait
economy. The reasons are evident: (i) the price and demand for the
State's main source of income are determined largely by external
forces, (ii) the dependence on imported goods and services of
immigrant labour, (iii) a sizeable portion of foreign trade is
directed towards neighbouring countries, (iv) the price of oil and
income from foreign investments is largely affected by the
fluctuations in the US dollar.
Reduced growth in the non-oil GDP is manifested by limited domestic
absorptive capacity and the decrease in government domestic
expenditure. Thus the efforts to reactivate the economy are
hindered by the deflationary influence on the current Kuwaiti
economy. This has been further exacerbated by a reduction in the
demand by the public sector (the major purchaser from the private
sector), coupled with a decline in private consumption due to the
general unstable outlook of the economy. Moreover, the reduction in
the number of expatriates has caused a reduction in the demand for
consumer goods generally. 	 Effectively the Kuwait economy is
1.	 Similar recommendations were adopted by the Committee
for Reactivating the Kuwait Economy, 1984, p.42.
Actually structuring debts into equity was proposed by the
author, 1986a, op cit, and was suggested later in the
government's settlement of the debt crisis in August 1986.
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undergoing a period of adjustment to cope with the new variables in
the oil market and the slide in domestic aggregate demand.
The success of the government's measures to reactivate the economy
are largely dependent on alleviating the repercussions of the al-
Manakh collapse, and the debts crisis that ensued, and above all on
the outcome of the Gulf war which has hit Kuwait exports and
transit trade hard.
So far, the salient features of the Kuwait economy have been
discussed. In the following chapters banking and finance and the
monetary policies in Kuwait are analysed by focussing on the role of
the Central Bank, the institutional financial structure and its role
in economic development and trade finance.
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CHAPTER 4
THE KTJWAITI BANKING SYSTEM
Introduction
The Kuwaiti banking system is composed of the Central Bank, six
commercial banks, one branch of a foreign bank, 3 specialized banks,
and one Islamic Bank. Money changers and some 28 investment and
financial companies have recently been put under the umbrella of the
Central Bank.
In this chapter, the development of the banking sector and its
significant role in the economy are emphasized giving particular
attention to the performance of the sector during the last five
years. This period is considered crucial and will affect the
direction of the economy for years to come as it has witnessed the
collapse of the unofficial stock market, the decline in oil revenues,
and the slowdown in growth in the real economy.
This chaptei is concluded by a brief introduction to the operations
of the Kuwait Finance House (KFI-I) the sole Islamic bank in the
country. An evaluation of KFH performance with respect to the
banking industry is also given. This is followed in Chapter 5 by an
examination of the role and functions of the Central Bank of Kuwait
and analysis of monetary and credit policy. In the second section of
Chapter 5, the development of the instruments used in the money and
capital markets is discussed touching briefly on some investment
companies peripheral to the banking system.
Background
The Gulf countries, including Kuwait were using foreign metal
currencies mainly the Maria Theresa taler and the Indian rupee until
the beginning of this century. The first paper currency known in
Kuwait was the Indian rupee which remained in circulation from 1899-
1960. The commercial banks in the Gulf used to obtain the Indian
rupee in exchange for pounds sterling. On 11 May 1959 a special Gulf
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rupee was issued to replace the Indian rupee and was of the same par
value (0.18662 gm of fine gold).
The Kuwait Currency Board (KCB) was the first central monetary agency
in Kuwait. Established on 19 October 1960 under Law No 41, the KGB's
main functions were limited to:
1. the issuing and redemption of the Kuwaiti dinar, and
2. buying and selling foreign currency on behalf of the local
commercial banks.
The Kuwaiti dinar was introduced in 1960 in exchange for pounds
sterling and other convertible currencies and was fixed at 2.48828
grams of fine gold or US $2.80 (currently KD 1 - US $3.50). On 17
May 1961 the dinar was recognised as the legal tender currency upon
the retirement of 341.9m Indian rupees (equivalent to $72m) 1 . The
dinar was originally tied to the US dollar, but is now assessed
against a basket of currencies including the yen, the deutch mark,
the Swiss franc, the pound sterling, and the dollar. The fixed value
of the dinar against gold was cancelled by Law No. 130, 1977 which
authorized the Central Bank to determine the value of the dinar
against other currencies.
The Central Bank of Kuwait (hereby referred to as CBK or the Bank)
was established in 1968 under the Currency and Banking Supervision
and Regulation Law No 32 which was substantially amended by the
decree Law No 130 in 1977. The Bank replaced the currency board,
mentioned earlier, and became the sole authority responsible for the
control and supervision of the banking sector, investment companies
and recently the exchange houses (Diagram 4.1).
1.	 Khouja and Sadler,	 p.163.
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The Commercial Banks
The first private commercial bank to be established in Kuwait was the
National Bank of Kuwait (1952). Between 1960 and 1977, five more
commercial banks were formed (see Table 4.1). Most of these banks
were owned by prominent merchant families in order to finance their
import bills and construction activities. Initially 70% of these
banks' assets were invested in foreign banks; of this 70% were in
short-term deposits1.
Since then banks have enjoyed a remarkable growth and expansion,
particularly in the components of their assets, deposits, equity base
and number of branches. In the following passages an analysis of the
factors contributing to such growth, in addition to a summary of the
developments in the main items of the Bank's Balance Sheets, will be
given. Emphasis has been placed on the last five years (1980-84) as
they portray the peak as well as the slide in the activities of the
financial sectors and virtually all sectors in the economy. This
period coincides with the second oil price hike of 1978-79 and the
subsequent slide in oil output and prices.
Banking Structure
The banking system in Kuwait consists of:
1.	 Seven commercial banks, including a branch of a foreign bank
2. Three specialized banks
3. One Islamic bank.
The names, incorporation date and number of branches of these banks
are shown below:
1.	 Arab Banking Systems, Occasional Paper Series No. 1, Arab
Banking Corporation (ABC), Manama, 1985, p.15.
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Commercial Banks Incorporation Date
1952
1960
1960
1967
1971.
1977
Number of Branches
mci Head Office
45
35
27
12
16
8
1
Kuwaiti Ownership:
National Bank of Kuwait
Commercial Bank
Gulf Bank
Al-Ahli Bank
Bank of Kuwait and
The Middle East
Burgan Bank
Branches (Mixed Ownership):
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait
Table 4.1: Banking Structure and Branches (1984)
Specialized Banks:
Savings and Credit Bank
	
1960
	
3
Real Estate Bank
	
1973
	
1
Industrial Bank
	
1974
	
1
Islamic Banks:
Kuwait Finance House 	 1978
	
10
Definition of Commercial Banks in Kuwait
Kuwaiti commercial banks are institutions that perform all of the
following functions :1
a) accepting deposits to redeploy them by granting loans and
advances;
b) buying, selling and discounting commercial bills;
c) issuing cheques and clearing them;
d) floating debts;
e) trading in foreign currency and precious metals (mainly gold
and silver);
f) opening letters of credit and issuing letters of guarantee; or
1.	 Article 54 of the Banking Act No. 32, 1968.
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g) virtually any other lending operations or any activity
prescribed by the commercial law to be within the functions of
banks1.
Accordingly any institution or company that performs only part of the
above mentioned functions is not considered a bank!
The commercial banks in Kuwait are subject to certain prudential
regulations. For example, banks are not permitted:
a) to undertake commercial or industrial activities or buy real
estate other than for the purpose of housing their operations
or the accommodation of their staff;
b) own merchandise, unless its title has been transferred to them
as a result of liquidation or in settlement of third party
loans. The goods obtained must be liquidated within a year of
acquisition date;2
c) underwrite insurance policies, nor may they act as brokers or
dealers. However they may buy or sell CBK bills, or act as an
agent for their customers in their capacity as trustees or
executors of wills3.
However, the banks may acquire shares and certificates kept with them
as collateral (or for safe custody), provided that these shares are
liquidated within two years from .the date of acquisition.
The minimum allowable capital of a bank and/or the allocated capital
of a branch of a foreign bank must not be less than KD 3m.
Additionally a Kuwaiti bank must be incorporated as a public
shareholding company.
It is noteworthy that the Kuwait Finance House (KFH), the only
Islamic Bank in Kuwait, is not classified under commercial banks for
the purposes of reporting, but under "other banks", owing, seemingly,
1. For more details see the Commercial law, Official Gazette, No.
1338, 19 January 1981 (articles 329-404).
2. Article 66 of Act No. 32, .p cit.
3. Ihid, articles 66-7.
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to its incorporation under a special law which does not fall under
the jurisdiction of the Central Bank.
Asset Growth
Assets of the seven conunercial banks rose ten-fold from KD 1.04 bn
approximately to KD 9.99 bn (1974-1983). The rise in total assets
outperformed the growth in GDP which had only increased 1.63 times
for the same period. The lowest positive rate of growth (9.3%) was
recorded in 1983, and the highest was 41.4% in 1976 as indicated in
Table 4.2. As may be noted from the table, total banks' assets
declined 4.2% in 1984 for the first time in the last ten years.
However the average percentage growth for individual banks ranged
between 24.2% for the Burgan bank and 39.9% for the Gulf Bank in 1984
over the previous year.
Trends in Assets
1. Liquid Assets	 -
Cash reserves of commercial banks consist of currency and bank notes
in vaults plus balances with the Central Bank and the CB1( bills. In
1984 cash reserves (KD 323m) almost reached their lowest level since
1981 (KD 321.6m), while balances with CBK (KD 77m), except for 1982
(KD 72.lm), touched their lowest level since 1975 (KD 61.lm).
The CBK bills in 1984 (KD 226.3 m) showed a dramatic slide and almost
fell to 50% of 1982 levels (KD 469.7 m). However, it must be kept in
mind that liquidity in 1982 was exceptionally high and naturally
banks had to seek alternative outlets to invest their surplus funds
efficiently.
2. Claims on the Private Sector
Loans and advances are the main functions of a conventional bank.
Banks compete for deposits in order to broadeit their lending
facilities and foster credit creation in the economy. On the other
hand the banks revenues are derived from two main sources: (a)
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employment of their deposits in different types of interest earning
assets, and (b) charges and commissions received on services such as
issuing letters of guarantee, discounting bills, letters of credit
and so forth.
Besides being in business to make loans, the return on the latter is
usually higher than other types of investments such as the CBK bills
if everything else is equal. In fact the more liquid the asset the
less is its earning capacity and vice versa. In other words if the
risk is negligible (as in the CEK bills) the return is much less than
the case with more risky investments.
Traditionally, the major portion of domestic credit operations in
Kuwait is short-term, mainly overdrafts of less than one year.
Recently lending policy has been shifting towards medium-term lending
though on a small scale, Simultaneously the slowdown in credit
facilities granted by the banks has altered temporarily the
proportion of loans to total claims on the private sector.
Additionally, banks tend to invest in securities during recession.
The outcome was:
1. an upward shift in favour of placement of surplus funds with
the specialized banks in addition to investing in certificate
of deposits issued by these banks;
2. domestic investments, mainly dealing in shares and bonds, was
stepped up to KD 522m in 1983 compared with KD 54.2m in 1982.
Consequently, the proportion of loans and advances in the total
claims on the private sector fell 10 percentage points from 91% in
1981-82 to 81% in 1983-84. Graph 4.1 reveals the growth in credit
facilities versus claims on specialized banks and local investments.
The banks role as provider of funds to the economic activities in
Kuwait has been substantial. About 50% of their total assets take
the form of claims on the private sector. These claims on the private
sector consist of:
a)	 Credit facilities to the domestic sectors (e.g. trade,
construction and industry);
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b) Claims on specialized banks and investments in CDs;
c) Other local investment.
Domestic loans and advances were expanding more rapidly than the rise
in economic activities as reflected by the GDP. These loans and
advances increased from KD 352m to KD 3844m (1974-1983) increasing by
24% on average annually against 5% average annual growth in GDP at
constant prices for the same period. However, it is observed that
credit facilities in 1983 have contracted by 1.4% to KD 3844m. This
compares to a figure of KD 3897 in 1982, a year which itself had seen
credit facilities expand by 22.9% over the previous year (Table 4.3).
This contraction in 1983 was attributed to the lull in economic
activities caused by the stock market crisis and the culmination of
the Gulf and Lebanese war.
Graph 4.1 depicts the trend in the credit facilities and claims on
specialized banks over the last 5 years (1980-1984). As shown on the
graph and in Table 4.3, credit facilities expanded by about 70%
during the period increasing from KD 24l9m to KB 4109m or at a
compound annual growth of 10%. Claims on specialized banks increased
2.6 times over the same period, i.e. from KB 253m to KD 931m at an
annual compound rate of 26%.
Domestic Lending (Sector Financing)
Domestic lending in Kuwait is classified with respect to various
sectors in the economy. In this section, an analysis of the credit
facilities extended to various sectors in the economy is given as it
portrays the role of the commercial banks in the development and
growth of the economy.
Traditionally trade loans are favoured by the commercial banks in
Kuwait, like many other countries.	 Their short-term duration, rapid
turnover or secured nature make them more attractive than other types
of loans. Trade lending ranked first among other types of domestic
credit facilities from 1978 to 1980 and then Jn 1983 (Table 4.4).
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1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1559.4
2118.2
2671.3
3453.5
4292.4
4752.5
5039.7
184.9
201.7
252.7
280.8
395.1
908.3
930.8
1374.5
1916.5
2418.5
3172.7
3897.2
3844.2
4108.8
Table 4.3: Ccrrunercial Banks - C1ais on the Private Sector
(Million Diners)
End of Period	 Credit Facilities2	Other1	 Total.
	
1983 Qi	 3823.9	 619.2	 4443.1
	
Q2	 3738.4	 801.5	 4539.9
	
Q3	 3752.5	 771.8	 4524.4
	
Q4	 3844.2	 908.3	 4752.5
	
1984 QI.	 3888.5	 932.8	 4821.4
	
Q2	 4054.7	 842.0	 4896.8
	
Q3	 4110.4	 853.7	 4964.2
	
Q4	 4108.8	 930.8	 5039.7
1. The major part consists of claims on specialized banks and the
remaining part of local investments.
2. Figures are slightly different frcm Table 4.4 due to rounding.
Source: CBK Quarterly Bulletin Table 10
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Their relative weight among total advances and discounts fluctuated
between 29% (1978) and 25.3% (1983)1.
The siump in trade loans in 1983 is due mainly to: (a) the decline
in the value of imports by 9.8%2, and (b) the slackening in re-
exports. The outcome was a retreat in the growth of trade loans
(mentioned earlier) by 0.7% (1983) against an increase of 28%, 25%,
13.3% between 1980 and 1982 respectively.
In 1981 before its collapse, the security market had triggered an
upsurge in personal loans by 65% mainly to finance speculative
security trading. The value of traded securities fell by 74% in l983
owing to the alarm caused by a further possible sharp drop in share
prices. This caused a slump in personal loans estimated at 6.8% in
that year.
The increased turnover in the shares of Kuwaiti companies by 95% in
1981 partially caused financial services loans to expand by 18.1% and
to soar by 65.3% (1980-1981) respectively. The financial services
loans are used also to finance part of the trading in real estate or
currency speculation. These loans suffered a drastic decline of
14.4% (1982) to rise only 2 percentage points in 1983. It is of note
that the only sectors that showed a nominal growth in 1983 were the
financial services and the real estate loans. 	 According to the
Central Bank this was partially caused by:	 (a) a rescheduling of
debts, and (b) extensive borrowing to settle outstanding debts.
Loans to the industrial sector were rising but at varying degrees from
a modest KD 66.3m to KD 193.7m (1978-1982) then dropping to KD 148m in
1983, declining by 23.5% from the previous year. The decrease in
lending was affected by the building materials industry (excluding
cement), public utilities and food processing.
1. CBK, Economic Report, 1983, p.163.
2. For more details see Chapter 3, Foreign Trade
3. CBt(, op cit, p.57.
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However it could be said that the decline in commercial bank lending
to industry is partially caused by the industrialists preference for
cheap finance from the Industrial Bank of Kuwait, and partially due
to the slowdown in manufacturing activities.
Loans and advances to the construction sector rose steadily from 1980
to 1982 by 23% and 28.7% respectively falling sharply by 1.4% in 1983
on the eve of the slowdown in the economy, though it recovered
slightly, increasing by 2.9% in 1984.
It is of note that real estate loans were rising steadily since 1978
but at a varying rate. Apparently these types of loans were viewed
as less risky than personal or financial services loans. A mortgage
loan, although less liquid than a loan guaranteed by a share
certificate, is relatively more stable in value under normal
conditions. The upsurge in real estate loans, when everything else
was falling, could be attributed to the record surge in real estate
value pushing the loans upwards rather than the growth in the
activities of this sector.
Summary
The first decline in credit facilities in a decade was recorded in
1983 when it suffered a negative growth of 1.4% to recover in 1984
showing an improvement of about 7%. Nonetheless total claims on the
private sector, including claims on specialized banks and financial
institutions, never declined during 1980-1984 (refer to Chart 4.1).
207
a)
.
UI	 UI	
(1)
4-I	 -I-I	 -I-)	 UI
a)	 UIUI	 UI
a)0	 UI
'-I	 —
a)	 a)
(Ii	 UI
0
I:!:.!1IItUI!II1I
ci,
UI
r1C)
I-i
o o	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00	 CN	 0	 c'i	 '	 ¼0
0	 0i Q	 CO	 r-	 .o	 n
-4
208
3. Foreign Assets and Liabilities
In 1984 foreign assets of commercial banks comprised around 26% of
total assets, a slight increase over 1983 (23%) but a considerable
decline from 1980 (33). The rise in foreign assets is attributed in
monetary terms to the increase in advances and discounts to non-
residents by KD 145.6m and the rise in foreign investment (mostly
bonds and securities) by KD 69.lm. The major component of foreign
assets has been the "balances with foreign banks" which consist of
current accounts, short-term deposits and CDs. However, these
balances have been declining 1 owing to the shift towards investments
in shares and bonds as well as syndicated loans, as shown in Tables
4.5a and 4.5b.
The total gross foreign investments of the CBK, the commercial banks,
the 3 specialized banks and 20 investment companies amount to well
over KD 5.18 bn. If adjusted for foreign liabilities, the net foreign
assets would amount to approximately KD 2.5 bn in 1983, well above
the current government expenditure in that year.
Foreign liabilities fluctuated between 15-16.5% of total banks
resources. Nonetheless their growth pattern was extremely volatile
and tended to rise sharply with the increase in demand for domestic
loanable funds, especially if it is associated with a drop in
domestic liquidity. On the other hand, the drop in domestic demand
for loanable funds, among other factors, led to a significant
contraction in the rate of growth in foreign liabilities. For
example, when economic activities declined in 1983, foreign
liabilities increased only slightly by 1.7% against an increase of
20.8% in 1982. Other factors affecting the level of foreign
liabilities are:
i) The availability of the CBK facilities including swaps,
discounts and rediscounts; and
ii) The increase and/or decrease in the cost of external borrowing
in dollars.
1. By 3.7 and 10% (1982-83).
209
0\
op
c..J
op
I-I
C'
r1
dP
0
U)
U
a)
CC
CC
41
C)
I-1
0
fr..
CC
op
0)
U
ci)
0
C
0
op
0
I-.-
C'
'-I
0
0
0
I-I
'-4
I-1
U.-'
0•
0
0
I-I
U-'
If.'
4
c-I
c-I
0•
0
0
I-)
'-4
cc
cc
,-1
0
I-I
In
I-
0
4
I-I
U)
0
1-4
C)
0
•I-4
C.,
U,
'no
4J.b
1-
0-
c. 'I'
Wa)
6
0
0
Oil)
04-)
U)
a)
I-'
0
tl_J .-1
U)
4)
C)
Cl)
Cl,
41
bO
a)
0
•1-1
a)
4-)
4-)
0
1.4
0
U,
4
C)
-1
•0
0
0
0
I-I
,-1
0
c-I
-.zt
0ç'Jr
0i-1r4
000
,-1
4r-oo
r-o
I-I
N.C)O
F-I-I
U-.' 0'
cu-
N. Cfl
r-4
I-c
c'40r-
0c..1?-I
I-I
U,
C)
b -.4-1
Cl) U)
C) WI-)
OuW
04-)
Cl)
I-)	 a)
U)U
OOb
(a .j 0l41:zi
C'4
C'	 O'D	 c-i
Ic-lu,
c	 r-0,-4	 cn
0I-I	 ic-i'
1-4	 0.-lIn	 4
ccop	-
C'	 ,4r1U,	 C'
i-I	 C'IC'I
o	 %omcc
0' 4
	
c. csJ	 C..,
U)
CCI-)
C)
bO ..-4
•1-1 U) U)
a) a)4)
	
Oil))	 op
	
04-)	 -
.
	
a)	 U
	
4Jc:	 0
	
I-I	 I-i
	
CnUl	 Q
0000
(CGj
r4).l
(0
____ 41
U)
4-)
0
C)
5
C
0
0
4)
0
U,
210
Trends in Commercial Banks' Liabilities
Equity
The equity capital of the Kuwaiti Commercial Banks (KCB) consists of:
1. Paid-up capital
2. Statutory reserves which are also called legal reserves. The
percentage allocated to legal reserves is by legal requirement
equivalent to 10% of net profits annually. It is only
permissible to use this reserve to distribute dividends not
exceeding 5% of capital if the bank's net accumulated profit is
not sufficient in a particular year
3
	
Voluntary reserves: these reserves may vary from bank to bank
and are a management prerogative
4. Retained earnings including the undistributed portion of the
current year's dividends
5. Usually the sources of capital increase of KGB are either (a) a
transfer from internal reserves sometimes called hidden
reserves, (b) new issues, in such cases the shares are issued
at a premium, or (c) by distributing net profits in the form of
bonus shares.
More often than not the increase of capital is obtained from one or
two of the above sources.
The equity capital of all commercial banks has risen 12.3 times from
KD 63.8m to KD 784m (1975-84) or at an annual compound rate of 25%
approximately, as shown in Table 4.6.
Functions of a Bank's Capital
Capital serves many purposes:
1. It assures depositors that their money is protected in case of
liquidation;
2. It assures the monetary authority of the adequacy of the bank's
capital and reserves to meet any sudden withdrawals in the
course of ordinary business; and
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Table 4.6: Camiercia1 Banks - Equity Growth
Total Equity	 % Qiare
(million }(D)
1975	 63.8	 25.1
1976	 89.2	 39.8
1977	 197.4
	 121.3
1978	 218.4	 10.6
1979	 267.7
	 22.6
1980	 336.9	 25.9
1981	 411.0	 22.0
1982	 576.9	 40.4
1983
	 664.4	 15.2
1984	 784.6	 18.1
1. Source: MinLsy of Planning, Central Statistical Office 1975-1978
CBK Quarterly Bulletin (1978-1984)
3.	 It proves that the bank is able to "absorb losses out of future
earnings rather than out of capital funds themselves" 1 . In
fact an adequate capital permits the bank to continue in
operation for a reasonable time during which difficulties could
be overcome.	 Thus the central bank may not be invited to step
in.	 -
Yet in strained circumstances the ability of a bank to absorb losses
in excess of earnings and special reserves is limited to the amount
of the bank's capital. Any excess of this would render the bank
insolvent2 . Hence capital acts as a cushion in case of liquidation
and as a protection against risk assets.
Deposits
Generally banks' deposits are considered an essential part of money
supply in an economy. Deposits in Kuwait are no exception and
constitute a sizeable portion of the commercial banks' liabilities.
They consist of Government deposits and private sector deposits which
comprise: (1) current accounts, (2) savings, and (3) time deposits.
Current accounts or sight deposits enable the banks' customers to
draw cheques and make deposits without resorting to money. Savings
accounts are usually short-term and interest is calculated daily or
monthly depending on the type of account.
Time deposits are either for one month, 3 months, 6 months or a year
or more. The current minimum is KD 1000 or US $3500 for between one
month and one year maturity. Commercial banks deposits are
predominantly time deposits and sight deposits making about 59% and
14% of total deposits respectively (1984).
1. F.L. Carcia, 1979, p.198.
2. Cross and Hempel, 1983, p.69.
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Table 4.7: Deposits in CaTniercial Banks
Million Diners
1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984
DEPOSITS
Private sector
- sight
- savings
-time
KD Deposits
Foreign currency
CDs
Sub-Total - 1:
Government
- sight
-time
Sub-Total - 2:
	
418.4	 930.1	 837.0	 772.9	 588.8
	
272.5	 307.7	 336.8	 406.1	 355.0
	
1311.2	 1725.2	 2298.5	 2217.9	 2473.4
	
2002.1	 2963.0	 3472.3	 3396.4	 3417.2
	
587.9	 595.1	 333.0	 597.5	 717.8
	
16.2	 24.9	 34.7	 32.8	 36.8
2606 .2	 3583.0	 3840.0	 4027.2	 4171.8
	
0.8	 1.7	 5.7	 3.7	 3.1
	
170.5	 209.3	 388.1	 358.7	 384.7
	
171.3	 211.0	 393.8	 362.4	 387.8
TOTAL 1 & 2:	 2777.5	 3794.0	 4233.8	 4389.6	 4559.6
Source: CBK, QB, 1984. p.12.
The table has been rearranged showing deposits in KID; any variation is due
to rounding.
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The global deposits with the commercial banks (including Bank of
Kuwait and Bahrain) increased from KD 7l2.lm to KD 4390m (1974-83)
and then topped KD 4560m at the end of 1984 at an average annual
growth of 16.9%. More details on the components and changes of banks
deposits are presented in Table 4.7.
Deposits are classified by sector or by currency. The private sector
deposits in dinars have grown by 70% (1980-84). Sight deposits more
than doubled in 1981 over the previous year owing to the feverish
trading in the stock exchange. They deteriorated gradually starting
from 1982 onwards reflecting the slide in shares trading (refer to
Table 4.7). Savings deposits were modest but growing 1 . The growth
in time deposits outperformed the rest of other types of deposits in
value 2 , the reason being the depositors' shift from sight deposits
towards interest earning deposits. It is noticeable that government
deposits fell by 8% in 1983 causing the residents' deposits to fall
by 2.3% in that year, although they recovered in 1984 but not enough
to reach their level in 1982.
Foreign currency deposits (FCDs) as a proportion of the private
sector's total deposits had fallen from 27% to 17.2% from 1974 to
1984 (see Tables 4.8 and 4.9). One could assume that the growing
confidence in the Kuwaiti dinar and the volatility of foreign
currency as perceived by depositors, apart from interest rate
differentials, were the main causes of this. Usually FCDs are very
sensitive to interest rates, especially dollar rates, and tend to
grow rapidly in response to the rise in the dollar interest rate and
to fall as dollar interest rates slide. This is true, to some
extent, in normal circumstances. The evidence suggests, however, that
during and after the al-Manakh crash things were different. Thus the
decline in FCDs (by 44%) in 1982 over the previous year was due to
the repatriation of funds for speculating in the al-Manakh, while the
rise in FCDs (by 74.5%) in 1983 reflected a tendency to hedge against
the domestic uncertainties following the collapse of Souk al-Manakh3.
1. Reaching KD 406m and then falling to KID 355m (1983-84).
2. Increasing from RD l3llm to RD 2473m (1980-84).
3. I am indebted to Professor P. Sadler for pointing this out. The
growth in FCD vs dinar deposits is depicted in Graph 4.2.
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Table 4.8: Private Sector Deposits
Million Dinars
1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984
Amount %
	
Amount %
	
Amount %
	
Amount %
	
Amount %
RD Deposits 2018.3 77.4
	 2987.8 83.4	 3507.1 91.3	 3429.7 85.2 3454.0 82.8
FC Deposits 587.9 22.6
	 595.2 16.6	 333.0 8.7	 597.5 14.8	 717.8 17.2
Total PSD: 2606.2 100	 3583.0 100	 3840.1 100	 4027.2 100	 171.8 100
Table 4.9: Private Sector Deposits
Growth Rate (%)
Source: Computed from table 12 QB-CBK, 1984, p.12.
216
>1
0
a)
0
a)
0
U)
(U
(U
U)
.lJ
"-I
U)
0
c4
a)
'-1
0
.4J
0
a)
Cj'i
w
(U
p4
C
"-4
a)
(U
0
0
p4
(U
0
)
)
.1
0
U)
a)
U)
0
o
U
wo	 (U
ow	 -•1
.n	 m	 (N	 -	 0	 -1	 (N	 i-fl
I	 I	 I	 I
217
Financial Ratios
Graph 4.3 shows the five year trend in the private deposit vs credit
facilities granted to the private sector. The loans to deposits
ratio reflects the degree a bank is tying up its resources in
loanable funds. The higher the ratio, the lower the volume of other
interest earning assets in the balance sheet. The lower the ratio,
the higher the volume of interest earning assets available for
purchasing bonds and securities. On the face of it, a higher ratio
suggests low liquidity and vice versa. However, with the advent of
CDs, and the possibility of obtaining funds by discounting bills with
the CBK, banks can obtain the funds needed through borrowing either
from the CBK or, to a lesser extent, from the money and capital
markets. This fact leads to the belief that although the loans to
deposits ratio became a "less accurate measure of banks liquidity",
it is nevertheless an indispensible element in detecting domestic
liquidity in Kuwait1.
The ratio of KD claims on the private sector to KD deposits by the
private sector had improved in 1981 declining from 102.5 to 96.1%.
However from 1981 onwards the ratio changed signalling the decrease
in domestic liquidity as shown in Table 4.10.
Table 4.11 gives the cash dividends, earnings per share (EPS), and the
return on assets (ROA), for 1983-84 for all the banking sector. The
Credit and Savings Bank is not included as its detailed balance sheet is
not normally published. As may be noted from the table, cash dividend
ratios were cut down by 50% for most banks in 1984, except Burgan Bank
and KFH. Burgan and KFH did not distribute dividends in that year.
Return on equity (ROE) ratio measures the ratio of net profit to equity
(defined as share capital plus statutory and voluntary reserves plus
retained earnings). As shown in Table 4.11, ROE for all banks, except
IBK, had deteriorated in 1984. The decline in profits and the rise in
equity (due to the increase in reserves) have caused ROE to drop. For
Burgan Bank the drop was drastic owing to the abnormal increase in share
capital during the year accompanied by a decline in profit rate. It is
1.	 See also KFH section for a comparison of some banking industry
ratios with those of KFH.
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notable that banks in Kuwait are overcapitalised even with the
inclusion of inner reserves in the deposits account. 1
 However, the
rise in non-performing loans had resulted in stepping up provisions
for bad debts which had to be written off completely for non-
performing loans in excess of one year. KFH has the lowest capital
ratio with respect to other banks (see KFH Section). The role of
specialised banks in long-term lending is explored in the next
section then an overview of the operations of KFH, the only Islamic
bank in the country is presented. At the end of this chapter a
summary and conclusions are given with some recent developments in
the banking sector.
SPECIALISED BANKS
Traditionally commercial banks in Kuwait are mainly concerned with
the supply of short-term funds, and to a lesser extent, with the
provision of medium-term loans or revolving credit facilities for no
more than 3 to 5 years duration, on average, to first class
borrowers 2 . Moreover, the provision of equity finance was not among
the range of their activities nor are they encouraged to pursue in
compliance with the current prudential regulations described in the
previous section. Thus the government established in 1960 the Credit
Bank which was later called the Credit and Savings Bank (CSB) whose
main objective was the provision of long term loans for housing and
real estate, industrial or agricultural projects. The Industrial
Bank of Kuwait (IBK) became the State's specialised banking
institution in industrial development loans from 1974. The Kuwait
Real Estate Bank (KREB), unlike the CSB and IBK, is privately owned
with minor government holdings.
In the following passages a summary of the activities of these
specialised banks is given describing in more detail the operations
of IBK in connection with its significant role in developing the
1. See Table 12, Commercial Banks Consolidated Balance Sheet.
2. This expression is normally used for borrowers enjoying sound
financial position with AA or AAA rating by Standard and Poors
(a Wall Street rating firm).
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Table 4.12: Caimercial Banks Consolidated Balance Sheet'
(Million Dinars)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
ASSETS:
Reserves (Cash and
balances with Central
Bank)
Claims	 Private
Sector
Foreign Assets
Other
LIABILITIES:
Capital and Reserves
Private sector
Deposits'
4896.5 6320.3 7392.6 7689.3 8225.7 8034.6
221.7 321.6 626.0 372.5 323.0 329.9
2671.4 3453.6 4292.5 4752.7 5045.4 5067.8
1880.1 2245.5 2251.0 2301.1 2507.6 2229.6
123.3 299.6 223.1 263.0 349.7 407.3
4896.5 6320.3 7392.6 7689.3 8225.7 8034.6
336.9 411.0 576.9 664.4 823.3 833.8
2606.2 3583.0 3835.3 4027.1 4171.8 4115.0
Government Deposits
	
171.3 211.0 393.8 362.5 387.8 385.5
Foreign Liabilities	 1134.3 1264.1 1530.0 1550.4 1560.7 1360.3
Other	 647.8 851.2 1056.6 1084.9 1282.1 1340.0
1. National Bank of Kuwait Comercial Bank, Gulf Bank, A1-Ahli Bank,
Bank of Kuwait and Middle East, Burgan Bank and branch of Babrain
and Kuwait Bank
2. Including CDs
Source: CBK, Ecorxnic Report, 1985
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money and capital markets in Kuwait. IBK's role in developing the
domestic industrial sector is discussed in detail in the
industrialization section in Chapter 3.
finition
Specialised banks are those institutions responsible for financing
and developing certain economic sectors such as real estate,
industrial or agricultural sectors. They differ from the commercial
banks in three main areas:
a) their loans are long-term in nature
b) the rate of interest charged by them, except by KREB, is lower
than the market rates and sometimes negligible, and more
importantly
c) they are allowed (except IEK) to accept or maintain saving
accounts for their clients.
Specialised banks (SB's) Aggregate Balance Sheets, shown in Table
4.13. SB's are subject to the rules and regulations of the banking
profession insofar as these rules and regulations do not contradict
the nature of operations of SB's such as the provision of equity
finance. In particular the CBK Board of Directors is empowered to
set up the rules and scope of supervision pertaining to1:
a) terms for deposit acceptances
b) maximum limit of terms of bonds, that they are allowed to issue
as well as terms of loans and credit facilities offered by them
c) rules relating to participation in the equity of other
companies or the purchase of shares in the open markets.
edit and Savings Bank
The Credit and Savings Bank (CSB) was the first specialised bank to be
established in Kuwait in 1960. The authorised capital of the bank
1.	 Articles 76 and 77 of the Banking Act as amended, p.45.
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increased several times to reach KD lbn in 1981. CSB is wholly owned
by the government and its main objectives are to extend:
1.	 Interest-free long-term loans for real estate and housing
projects;
2. Interest-free social loans, e.g. for marriages;
3. Agricultural loans on soft-term basis.
The total loans approved by CSB up to the end of June 1984 totalled
KD 899..8m. The growth rate of these loans declined to 17.3% (1983)
compared with 59% (1982). The bulk of these are predominantly real
estate loans which averaged 87% of its total loans portfolio1.
Normally these loans are either for new homes or for extensions and
modifications, and are repayable over a 40 year period in small
monthly instalments. Agricultural loans and social loans reached. KD
8.4w and 38.9w since inception respectively.
One of the Bank's main objectives is also to encourage and mobilize
domestic savings, especially among students through a stamps system.
The number of schools adopting the system has increased from 157 to
176 schools (1982/83-1983/84). The bank has opened 76840 savings
accounts between its inception and up to 30 June 1984. The savings
accounts are classified into 3 distinct accounts:
a)	 progressed savings account including school savings (24596
accounts)
b) special savings accounts (2244 accounts)
c) deposit accounts.
The bank invests surplus funds in real estate, securities and
deposits with other banks. In addition the government grants the
bank a 2% subsidy on its annual total loans outstanding.
1.	 Amounting to KD 849.8w in mid-1984 and numbering 81,938 loans.
See Annual Report 1983-84.
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Kuwait Real Estate Bank
KREB is a public shareholding company established with a share
capital of KD 4m which was increased several times reaching KD 24.62m
by the end of 1984. The primary objective is to finance the purchase
or the construction of commercial and residential property in Kuwait.
The bank is also involved in financing local contractors and the
importation of building and construction materials.
Despite the slump in the activities of the real estate and
construction sectors, the bank's portfolio of real estate loans had
increased by 9% in 1984 totalling KD 169.6m against KD 155.8m in
1983. As for total loans, advances or overdrafts, these rose from KD
258.5m to 279.8m (1983-1984) respectively, reflecting an increase of
8% in 1984 and an average growth of 13% for the last five years (see
Table 4.14).
The bank is also active in international syndicated loans by managing
18 loans valued at KD 250m and participating in 9 others totalling KD
200m in 1984 alone. These loans are not confined to real estate and
construction projects internationally, but include financing
international trade e.g. the participation in a loan (KD 30m)
extended to Turkey for the purchase of crude oil. Finally, the bank
manages real estate properties on behalf of individuals anci
institutional clients on a fee basis.
Table 4.14: KREB Financial Highlights (million KD)
1980
Loans and Advances	 185
Total Assets	 310
Deposits and Other
Liabilities	 276
Net Profit	 4.2
Shareholders Equity 	 34.3
	
1981	 1982	 1983
	
1984
	
203	 246	 258
	
280
	
391.	 501	 540
	
548
	
353	 445	 479	 483
	
5.2	 6.5	 6.8	 6.4
	
37.9	 55.9	 61.6	 65.5
* Figures are rounded up
Source: Compiled from KREB Annual Report. 1984, pp 34-36.
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Industrial Bank of Kuwait
The Industrial Bank of Kuwait (IBK) was the third specialised bank to
be established in Kuwait in late 1973 and began operations in 1974.
The subscribed capital was initially KD lOm, increasing to KD 20m
fully paid up in June 1981. The total equity base had reached well
above KD 34.3m at the end of 1984.
IBK is one of the leading institutions promoted by the Kuwaiti
government; it is a joint venture between the Ministry of Finance
(31.39%), the Central Bank (12.55%), the Public Institutions for
Social Security (5.15%), Commercial Banks (31.39%), Insurance
Companies (3.36%), Kuwait Real Estate Bank (2.69%) and some major
industrial firms (13.47%).	 Its main objective is to help in the
process of development and promotion of industrial 	 projects in
Kuwait and in particular to:1
1. Assist in formulating a long-term development strategy and to
identify projects that contribute towards the achievement of
the strategy within the constraints of the local environment.
2. Finance industrial projects either through equity participation
or by extending medium and long-term loans or both, in Kuwait
or abroad provided that there is participation of Kuwaiti
capital in those projects.
3. Identify suitable foreign partners for possible industrial
cooperation especially in the field of technology transfer.
4. Expand the resources available to industry through channelling
private savings from the domestic money and capital markets by
strengthening and developing these markets.
IBK has extended, between 1974-1984, around KD 262m in soft-loans to
326 projects, the total cost of which is KD 563m 2 . The Bank is also
1. Article of Association
2. More details on industrial loans are given in Chapter 2,
Industrialization section.
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active in the syndicated loans market and its total participation
reached US $109m, to first class borrowers, at the end of 19841.
The Bank's contribution to the development of money and capital
markets in Kuwait has been significant and deserves proper attention
since the Bank has gained prominence as a market maker in local
markets. IBK was the first institution in Kuwait to issue negotiable
Certificates of Deposits (CDs) in dinar with a fixed interest rate in
1977 and a floating rate in 1979. Both issues were successful and
attractive. IBK is also involved in bond issues and swap operations
in the money market as lender or borrower by taking advantage of the
interest rate differential.
The Bank has managed, co-managed and participated in 20 issues valued
at KID l45m since 1974. So far, the Bank has launched 6 KD bond
issues. The first issue was in 1975 for a sum of KID 5m for three
years maturity, the last one was in 1984 and consisted of two
tranches of KID 5m each. The first tranche was launched in January
and the second in April of the same year2.
IBK also participated in the Kuwaiti capital market by financing
foreign companies undertaking development projects. The Bank
participated in 183 commercial loans valued at KID 6875m (1975-1983)
out of which the Bank's commitments amounted to KID 254.3m. The Bank
adopts a strategy of geographic diversification in order not to
concentrate its exposure in one country or one region. Accordingly
50 loans of the ones mentioned earlier are located in Kuwait, 30 in
the Gulf countries, 25 in Latin America, 28 in Europe, 15 in Arab
North African countries, and finally 35 in South East Asia, Eastern
Europe and other countries.
Table 4.15 presents IBK exposure to commercial and industrial
entities from 1979-1983 in terms of loans granted at the market
interest rates (loans extended at soft interest rates are discussed
in Chapter 3 - industrialization section). The table demonstrates
the relative importance given by the Bank to industrial enterprises
1. See Annual Report, 1984.
2. IBK in 10 years, p.209.
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as opposed to commercial ones. It is worth noting that not all
industrial companies qualify for low interest rate (supra), only
industrial projects located in Kuwait having 51% or more Kuwaiti
ownership are entitled to such cheap financing.
Table 4.15: Commercial and Industrial Loans1
(KD million)
1979
	
1980
	
1981
	
1982
	
1983
Total Coirunercial Loans 2
 273.1
IBK Participation	 14.1
Percentage of Total, %
	
5.0
Industrial Loans
	 38.8
IBK Participation	 4.8
Percentage of Total	 12.3
6128
26.9
2.3
822.0
18.8
2.2
399.4
49.3
12.3
24.0
3.3
13.7
810.6
50.4
6.2
214.9
24.4
11.3
2450.4
42.5
1.7
148.5
16.4
11.0
Source: IBK in 10 years.
1. Representing loans that the Bank had financed directly or was
invited to finance by other financial institutions.
2. The value of commercial loans mentioned above are not the total
value of commercial banks' lending. The industrial loans, are
not to be confused with the industrial loans financed by the
bank at soft interest rates. The industrial loans in the above
table are loans to industrial enterprises at commercial
interest rates.
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Interbank Operations
Although the Bank is not permitted to accept deposits from the
public, it can accept deposits from banks and other financial
institutions; these deposits with the Bank grew nine-fold from KD
33.6 to KD 337m between 1975-83. However, the deposits and
contingencies declined by 9.4% in 1984 reflecting the institutional
need for cash in a difficult year. This decline in deposits was
partially offset by a 22% rise in loans and discounts and a 20% jump
in unquoted investments (see Balance Sheet and Table 4.16).
Table 4.16: IBK Assets and Deposits (million 1(D)
Deposits
Total Assets*	 Assets	 Liabilities
1980
	
451
	
161
	
251
1981
	
534
	
185
	
267
1982
	
580
	
174
	
304
1983
	
610
	
179
	
337
1984
	
593
	
108
	
308
* Including contra accounts.
Source: a) IBK in 10 years (Arabic version), 1984, p.208 for data
from 1980-1983.
b) 1984 figures were calculated from IBK Balance Sheet.
Note:	 Figures are rounded up.
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Table 4.17: The Industrial Baril of Kuwait Balance Sheet
Assets	 1984	 1983
KD	 KD
Cash and balances with banks
Ivbney at call and sbozt nctice
with banks
Central Bank bills
iararitee fund bonds
Bankers negotiable certificates
of deposit
Quoted investments
Deposits with banks
Loans and discounts:
Industrial	 45,115,310
Other	 115,893,637
Ui-quoted investments
908,469 1,031,154
57,425,757 98,281,470
8,265,695 8,203,202
9,502,176 8,745,384
5,248,415 7,250,888
52,341,983 54,193,396
45, 290, 610 72,222,885
52,407,235
79,534,311
161,008,947 131,941,546
48,497,948 40,991,277
Industrial loans and equity
investments:
Loan caimitnents	 247,170,000	 220,780,000
Equity ccmnitinents 	 14,792,691	 11,020,337
	
261,962,691	 231,800,337
Less: Repayment and
cancellations	 88,959,856	 71,705,657
Artunts rt
disbursed	 33,500,509	 34,163,007
139,502,326 125,931,673
Land and build.ings 	 14,820,597 14,469,054
Other assets	 19,297,177 14,289,416
Total assets	 562,110,100 577,551,345
Liabilities of custaners
for letters of credit, accep-
tances and guarantees
	
	 31,300,696 33,005,796
593,410,796 610,557,141
Deposits arid other accounts
including contingencies	 308,153,612 337,090,398
/Coritinued
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Liabilities and Shaex1ders' 	 1984	 1983
Equity	 KD	 KID
Certificates of deposit
issued	 7,307,040 3,796,520
Bonds	 24,821,500 16,887,500
Long-term loans frcri
Coverrnent of K.r.iait:
Principal anxxint
Less: Repajrrnt
Proposed dividend
Total liabilities
SharelxDlders' equity
Capital:
AuthDrised, issued and
fully paid 2,000,000
shares 10 10 each
200,000,000
14,000,000
20,000,000
200,000,000
14,000,000
186,000,000 186,000,000
1,500,000 2,000,000
527,782,152 545,774,418
20,000,000
Statutory reserve
Voluntary reserve
Undistributed profits
Total liabilities and
sharelxlders' equity
Letters of credit, accep-
tances and guarantees on
behalf of custaners
	
3,966,014	 3,554,912
	
9,670,000	 8,090,000
	
691,934	 132,015
34,327,948 31,776,927
562,110,100 577,551,345
31,300,696 33,005,796
593,410,796 610,557,141
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THE KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE
Currently the Kuwait Finance House (KFH) is the first and only
Islamic Bank operating in the State of Kuwait. Its inception was
essential in a country of predominantly Muslim population which felt
the need for such an institution.
in this section the current operations or real estate investment
practices of Kill are highlighted excluding the types of financial
claims and financial assets which are very similar to those described
in Chapter 2 and need not be repeated here. 1 The development and
growth in deposits and some selected financial ratios are discussed
and compared with the banking industry from the first year of
operation until the end of 1984. First of all the objectives and
ownership of KFH will be outlined.
Objectives and Ownership
KFH's main objectives are the provision of banking and investment
services, contributing to the socio-economic development of Kuwait,
and the promotion of Sharia principles in the financial sphere and
banking operations in particular.2
KFH was incorporated in 1977 as a Kuwaiti shareholding company with
an authorized capital of KD lOm which was increased several times to
reach KU l8.7m in 1984. KFH is owned by the Ministry of Finance
(20%), the Minors Department (20%), the Ministry of Religious
Endowments and Islamic Affairs (9%) and the general public (51%).
1. For more details about the types of financing which are
currently practised and those which are not, see Chapter 6
2. See the Memorandum of Agreement, Article (5).
3. In the aftermath of A1-Manakh collapse and the subsequent drop
in all shares trading in the official stock market, the
government bought a significant amount of shares including KFH
raising thus the government's ownership to 60.22% in April
1984.
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It was formed under a special Amiri Decree to exempt it from any
provisions of the existing legislation that contradict and may
restrict its activities.1
Current Operations
KFH is licensed to perform all non-usurious banking operations and
services on its own account and on behalf of its clients. The bank
accepts deposits for various maturities and pays no interest. The
depositors receive a share of the bank's profits according to a
profit sharing scheme commensurate with the amount and duration of
their deposits.
The bank's main activities include:
1. the opening of letters of credit for financing imports and
local trade on a cost-plus basis2
2. financing international trade particularly tripartite
agreements. For instance, the bank is currently involved wIth
1DB in buyer's finance whereby the exportation of crude oil,
for example, from Kuwait or elsewhere is financed by KFH and
1DB on a Murabaha basis 3 .	 In addition lines of credit are
offered with or without bank guarantee. Normal transactions
range from US $7m to $25m.
Profit margins in 1 and 2 above are normally less than market
interest rates due mainly to the negligible cost of funds and also
because Islamic banking in general does not charge commitment fees as
in conventional banks. The duration of financing is generally short
term (from one week to one year). In rare cases it may be extended
up to 2 or 3 years.
1. See Amiri Degree No. 32, 1977 (3 Rabie II 1397h).
2. See Chapter 2 for details.
3. From an interview with Adnan al-Bah'r, the General Manager, in
May 1984 and with £alah Ateeqi in March 1983.
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Financing of Real Estate
KFH may undertake to set up an apartment building on a piece of land
owned by the client who needs bridge financing or in some other
instances 100% financing to develop the property. The client and the
bank enter into a contractual relationship whereby the first party
provides the land and the latter the required financing. Sale
proceeds would be distributed between the two parties according to a
certain mutually agreed upon ratio.
Alternatively the redemption of the bank's interest in the venture
could be made according to a repayment schedule or by a lump sum
amount. The client has the option of holding the title of the land or
of passing it to the joint venture.
In the case where the land or building is owned by a third party, the
client approaches KFH to help finance the purchase of the property.
Upon careful evaluation of the economics and rentability of the
subject property, the bank buys it upon obtaining from the client a
non-binding promise to re-purchase the subject property at an agreed
price. The client makes a down payment and provides a guarantee or
collateral for the residual. The price agreed upon does not change
when the repayment is paid earlier or later than maturity, providing
that re-scheduling or delay in payment is not an act of fraud or
mismanagement. 1
It is noteworthy that a large number of common real estate financing
techniques in the Islamic banks that were known many years ago have
been recently introduced in the conventional system and are considered
"possible patterns of creative financing techniques that have been
increased mightily by the imagination, versatility and ingenuity of
parties to the transactions". 2 These techniques may
1. KFH Guide, n.d., p.10.
2. William R. Beaton, Real Estate Investment, Prentice-Hall Inc.,
1971, p.116.
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permit the lender to share in the income of the property or to share
in the equity ownership of the project which is very similar to
Islamic real estate financing cited above.
Types of Investments
1.	 Real estate developments and investments:
These investments are provided by KFH for its own portfolio and
may take one or more of the following forms:
a) Direct purchase of buildings and developing plots of land
for commercial rental or resale, and participating with
other investors for the same;
b) Instalment sale (Bai Al-Ajal): the instalment sale
method could be an important investment vehicle in real
estate transactions. By this method, KFH may develop a
plot(s) of land, and may sell on an instalment sale basis
at the fair market value. It is understood that part of
the buildings' cost is recaptured (fully amortized) by
each instalment payment.
To an astute buyer, the cost of capital in Bai Al-Ajal is
relatively cheaper than in the conventional system. The
instalment in the first system is clear from interest payments
and mortgage fees which are imputed in the instalment of the
latter'.	 On the other hand, the Islamic bank's need for
liquidity could be maintained by the down payments and
scheduled repayments.
	
2.	 Trading activities:
KFH is also empowered to conduct commercial activities as any
trading company. These activities are normally kept outside
the banking business. A breakdown of these activities is
given below1:
1. This is perfectly true if the cash price were equal to
instalment sale price. However, since it is widely accepted
that the instalment sale price could be higher than cash, the
price differential between the two systems depends on whether
the profit rate in Bal al-Ajal would be higher or lower than
mortgage rates.
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Percentage of Total
1ypes of Trade	 1985	 1984
Foodstuffs
Used cars
Furniture
Construction materials
Miscellaneous
Clothing
Electrical and electronic equipment
TOTAL:
51.2
45.0
18.4
	
18.0
	
5.1
	
12.6
	
30.5
	
6.0
	
9.7
3.5
100.0	 100.0
Total sales in 1984 amounted to KD 17.7m increasing by 13.5%
over the previous year1.
Market Share. Profitability and Performance
The bank captured 6.5 and 7.1% of the market share in terms of
deposits in 1983 and 1984 respectively (see Table 4.18). Though its
share improved slightly its rank within the banking industry slipped
from sixth to seventh owing to the advancement of Burgan bank. It is
too early to tell whether this reveals little enthusiasm from the
public towards Islamic banking or not. Many factors are involved
here and we cannot guess what are the main reasons for this without
empirical testing. 2
Loans to Deposits
As Table 4.18 indicates, this ratio was very low at the start of the
bank's operation, when compared with the industry average. The gap
was narrowed in 1980 and 1981 then worsened in 1984 to lower than the
1979 average.	 However this ratio should be cautiously analysed
particularly when compared with conventional banks' ratios.
1. KFH, Annual Reports 1985 and 1984.	 These years are not
comparable duc to different classifications.
2. On the other hand, the growth in deposits was significant (see
growth below).
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Owing to the inclusion of trading activities and concentration on
real estate investment, the management of the bank may have thought
that these activities were more rewarding than straight financing.
Even if that is so, the bank's first priority, as the only Islamic
bank in Kuwait, is to meet the growing demand for Islamic finance in
the community. Though it is difficult to prove that this duty has
been neglected1 , we can say that the bank's allocation of resources
has favoured conmiercial and investment activities (including the
promotion of Islamic financial institutions abroad) over some
traditional financing (e.g. Musharaka and Mudaraba). 2 On the other
hand, KFH was very active in some other traditional Islamic short-
term finance (e.g. Murabaha and Salam).
Table 4.18:	 Banks' Market Share
Depos its	 Lending
1984	 1983
	
1984	 1983
1. NBK
	
23.5
	
23.0
	
22.0
	
29.5
2. Gulf
	
16.6
	
17.7
	
17.0
	
16.8
3. CBK
	
16.3
	
16.6
	
17.5
	
18.2
4. Al -Ahli
	
13.6
	
14.3
	
14.2
	
15.9
5. BKME
	
8.0
	
8.9
	
9.3
	
9.6
6. KFH
	
7.1
	
6.5
	
3.5
	
4.1
7. Burgan
	 7.5
	
5.7
	
8.5
	
7.9
8. KREB
	
4.4
	
4.2
	
5.0
	
5.3
9. IBK
	
3.0
	
3.1
	
3.0
	
2.7
Figures are rounded and based on Bank Operational Statistics, 1984
and 1983, excluding Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait.
Undoubtedly the bank's depositors as well as shareholders expect the
bank to be profitable as this secures a continuous stream of halal
income and puts the bank on an equal footing with its competitors.
1. Which is difficult to confirm without evidence.
2. For more details see Chapter 6.
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Profit rates on various investment deposits were distributed as
follows:
	
1983	 1984	 1985
Perpetual deposits, %	 7.5	 Nil	 4.0
Fixed term deposits, %
	
6.7	 Nil	 3.5
Saving accounts, %
	
5.0	 Nil	 2.7
Measuring profitability and performance two ratios are selected,
return on investment (ROl) and return on equity (ROE). Table 4.19
shows these ratios for the bank and the industry from 1978 to 1984
inclusive.
Both ratios have been above the industry average from inception to
1983 when they declined below the average. They were nil in 1984 as
the bank did not declare any profits in that year.
Concluding Remarks and Recent Developments
The form of private banking that emerged in Kuwait before and after
its independence in 1961 was basically commercial. The main emphasis
was put on short-term credit to commercial enterprises, particularly
trade because of its rapid turnover and secured nature. Thus the
Kuwaiti banks have preferred the conventional rule of commercial
banking that calls for avoiding long-term lending for fear of its
squeezing effect on liquidity.
The rapid growth of the Kuwait economy in the late 1970s was
accompanied and facilitated by a rapid expansion of the financial
sector. Domestic loans and advances were expanding more rapidly than
the rise in economic activities as reflected by GDP. The banking
yield to the economy as measured by its net profit has increased by
7.6 times from lCD 9.7m to KD 74.7m (1975-84).
Notably, the expansion of the banking sector before 1983 is largely
attributed to the banning of opening of branches of foreign banks;
the trade boom and the growth in construction and government
expenditure that followed the first and second rise in oil prices in
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1973 and 1979; and finally to the free movement of capital and
transfers.
On the other hand, the rate of growth in net profits declined from
240% (1975-79) to 68% (1980-84). On the micro-level, the dwindling
in net profits was caused by a number of elements. These included the
shift from demand deposits to savings and time deposits. Deposits
constitute the largest source of funds for banks exceeding 50% of
total liabilities at the end of 1984. Other factors include the need
to build up inner reserves, stringent lending regulations, coupled
with a decreasing demand for loans due to the slowdown in economic
activities. The economic recession has caused for the first time in
decades, the banks' consolidated Balance Sheet to shrink by 2.3%,
equivalent to KD 191m in 1985 over the previous year (Table 4.12).
These developments are expected to induce the financial institutions
to consolidate their positions in order to cope with adverse business
conditions locally. For example, the contraction in credit facilities
has altered temporarily the proportion of loans to total claims on
the private sector and stepped up banks' investment in securities.
However the banks have always been able to absorb local shocks (e.g.
low interest) or the hurdles of limited domestic absorptive capacity
by diversification through foreign asset holdings and opening of
foreign branches. However, this external expansion has led to
exposing the local economy to the fluctuations in the international
moneymarkets. Thus the economy of Kuwait became more susceptible to
changes in interest rates in the main financial centres, fluctuations
in foreign currencies, mainly the US dollar, and to country risk and
the international debt problems that ensued. Moreover the excess
reliance on foreign markets for investment purposes has decreased the
overall domestic liquidity and subjected the banks to growing
competition in the international money and capital markets.
Locally, the banks are currently coping with the debt problem that
was a legacy of the al-Manakh episode. The banks have shared the
burden of the al-Manakh crisis through the participation in the
capit.l of the "Emergency Reserve Fund", that was formed to secure
the solvency of small debtors. The banks have also brought the so-
called Relief Bonds or "offsetting bills" that were handed over to
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the creditors in partial settlement of their rights in the shares
market.
The dilemma facing the banking sector was also propounded by the
financial difficulties confronting their customers. These
difficulties can be grouped into three main categories: (a) those
arising from the stock market related lending, (b) those related to
the slowdown in business activities, and (c) those attributed to the
customers' poor managerial qualities and the banks' leniency in
extending loans to such customers because of poor judgemental
decisions. By the end of 1984 the outstanding loans in the banking
sector stood at lCD 4.4 bn, of which only 78.3 were secured. Non-
performing loans reached lCD 2.2 bn which prompted the government in
August 1986 to intervene by allowing banks to reschedule debts for up
to 15 years, to wave interest on non-performing loans and for gradual
write-offs of bad debts. The programme also permitted the
restructuring of debts into equity.1
Despite the current downturn in the economy, trade financing is
expected to dominate bank lending which capture, at present, 25% of
total sector financing. The share of overdrafts and personal loans
in proportion to other instruments is expected to decline (see
Chapter 6). Real estate and shares collaterals are envisaged to be
second in importance in favour of giving more insight into the future
prospects of projects financed by the banks.
The commercial banks role in medium- and long-term industrial
financing will remain fairly small under the current conditions.
However the banks are active in short-term and working capital loans
to industry and other productive sectors. The decline in industrial
loans is largely attributed to availability of long-term soft loans
from IBK.
1. For more details on the debt crisis see the author's article in
op cit. In this article the author proposed a solution to the
debt problem in accordance with the Islamic norms of free-
interest or profit sharing which was adopted by the government
as shown above.
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Housing finance is provided by CSB to first home buyers without
interest. Accordingly KREB and the commercial banks can only provide
loans at commercial rates to construction and real state investment
projects. Nevertheless, banks' freedom to fix interest rates are
limited by the usury law which sets an upper limit on interest rates
in the market (see Chapter 5).
Effectively, KFH combines three distinct functions: trading, real
estate development and commercial banking. The management priority
since inception and until the al-Manakh crash tended to lean towards
real estate investment particularly in the local market.
Initially the bank's involvement in real estate activities on its own
account or on behalf of its own customers was rewarding when the
economy was booming)-	 However, soon after the collapse of the
security market, the Bank faced its first major setback. It was
unable to sell property that it had acquired for the purpose of
resale due to the sharp decline in prices. Accordingly the Bank
suffered a liquidity problem with 61% of its deposits (excluding
demand deposits) tied up in fixed assets.
In 1984, KFH declared zero profits since it was obliged to create a
special extraordinary reserve to partially meet unrealised losses in
real estate. However, as shown in Table 4.20 the bank's Balance
Sheet grew from KD 25m to KD 845m (1978-1984) increasing by 33.84
times or an average annual increase of 58.7% while earnings per share
surged from 0.02 fils (1/1000 KD) to 672 fils (1978-1983).
The bank currently operates a network of branches and was the first
to install drive-in teller facilities in some of its branches in
Kuwait.
1.	 The bank's gross profit in real estate amounted to KD 217m in
1983 and dropped significantly in 1984 to reach lCD 14m.
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CHAPTER 5
THE CENTRAL BANK AND MONETARY POLICY
Introduction
This chapter begins by focussing on the objectives and basic
functions of the Central Bank of Kuwait, as outlined by its charter.
An analysis of the rules and regulations that are currently applied
by CBK in conducting and formulating its monetary policy is also
presented. Among the issues that are discussed which will have some
implications on the role of CBK in an interest-less economy are:
open market operations, the discount window and the measures to
regulate and rationalise credit policy1.
In the second section of this chapter, an outline of the existing
money and capital market in Kuwait is given.
This chapter with the preceding one will help us in assessing the
extent of the changes that are required in the current institutions,
instruments and facilities in order to adapt the current banking
system including money and capital markets to an Islamic one (see
Chapter 6).
The Bank's Main Objectives
The main objectives of the Bank are similar to those of other central
banks and are summarized as follows2:
i) to formulate and implement the State's monetary and credit
policies;
ii) to protect and supervise the banking sector and other financial
institutions;
1. These same issues will be discussed in Chapter 6 by showing the
effects of abolishing interest on monetary policy in Kuwait.
2. State of Kuwait, Law No. 32 of 1968 concerning currency, the
CBK and the Organisation of the Banking Profession (Arabic
text), referred to as the Banking Law.
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iii) to ensure economic stability and sustained national income
growth;
iv) to act as the Government's and local authorities' banker and
fiscal agent, as well as the banker's bank;
v) to issue and manage the currency and secure its stability and
free convertibility.
The Bank and the Coverrimentj
The CBK is a state owned institution which started its operations in
1969 with an initial capital of KD 2m; this increased to KD 5m in
1977.
The Governor of the Bank and all its directors are appointed by an
Antiri decree upon the advice of the Minister of Finance. The
Governor is the legal representative and senior officer of the Bank
and the Chairman of its Board of Directors. Other members of the
Board consist of a deputy and six other directors of which two
represent the Ministry of Finance. The four other directors represent
various private sectors of the economy.
The CBK is an independent institution insofar as day-to-day
operations are concerned, whilst decisions relating to monetary and
credit policy are subject to the prior approval of the Minister of
Finance. The Board's decisions that require the Minister's approval
are as follows:
a) formulating the Bank's monetary and credit policy
b) approving the issue and redemption of currency
c) regulating the system, methods and rate of interest regarding
the discounting and rediscounting of commercial bills, loans,
advances and guarantees
d) setting up the ceiling on loans and advances to domestic banks
e) determining and allocating a budget for buying and selling
public debt certificates or government treasury bills
f) establishing the clearing system.
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Although the Government banks with the CBK, it may directly deposit
funds with the local banks in coordination with the CBK.
It is worthy of note that disbursements of loans to the Government or
semi-Government institutions are strictly prohibited except in cases
of non-recurring or temporary budget deficits. However, Government
borrowing, if any, is subject to three conditions:
1. the amounts borrowed should not exceed 10% of the previous
year's public revenues;
2. there is no debt outstanding from the previous year(s);
3. interest must be paid on the borrowed sum, although the
Government usually does not pay for services rendered by the
CBK.
In addition to its involvement in formulating national economic
policies the Bank is also empowered to finance development projects
through the outright purchase and sale of shares and bonds of Kuwaiti
companies or Government enterprises 1 . The participation of the Bank
in the formation of the Industrial Bank of Kuwait is an example.
Monetary Policy and Credit Control
Monetary policy in Kuwait, as in Western economies, aims at achieving a
broad range of general economic policy objectives, though the Kuwait
economy is different in many respects from Western economies. First
there is no personal or corporate income tax, except for a 5% levy on
net profits of the Kuwaiti shareholding companies; this is allocated to
the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Science (KFAS). Second,
there has been no need for government borrowing, and by 1986 national
debt has been non-existent. Thirdly, most of the government's revenue
from oil
1. In addition the Bank is authorized to lend to the banking,
financial and credit institutions provided that the amounts so
committed for buying shares or for lending do not exceed the
Bank's reserves. In compliance thereof the Bank has increased
its reserves by KD 75m in 1984 to reach KD lOOm.
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investment income and revenue accrued from government ownership is
used to inject money back into the economy to finance government,
current expenditure and development projects. These characteristics
of the economy remove some usual tools of economic policy from the
government, such as tax incentives, alter others such as money market
operations via treasury bills, and make others more important
especially: (1) the budget which is concerned with distribution
rather than redistribution of the national product 1 , and (2) the
banking system and liquidity.
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that:
1. monetary policy in Kuwait works in tandem with fiscal policy;
and
2. the goals of general economic policy stress the importance of
(a) growth through diversification away from oil, (b) low
inflation, (c) distribution of oil wealth, and finally (d)
stability of the currency.
In the short run unemployment and disequilibrium in the balance of
payments are not a problem in a surplus oil country like Kuwait;
additionally a shortage of skilled labour is sometimes a hindrance,
but not a real threat to economic progress.
The main targets of the Bank's monetary policy are to regulate
domestic liquidity, rationalise credit policies 2 and to protect the
national economy against chronic fluctuations in interest rates in
the international money market since these have a direct, undesirable
effect on the supply of money in Kuwait. In conducting its monetary
policy, and in order to achieve the stated targets, the Bank has
implemented the following monetary tools and regulations:
1. The fixing of reserve and liquidity ratios
2. Open market operations
1. Khouja and Sadler, op.cit, p.119.
2. Banking Control and Supervision Conference, Abduiwahab A. Al-
Tammar, former Governor, CBK. "The Banking System in Kuwait:
Developments and Future Prospects", (London:	 7-8 May 1985),
p.6. See also various Central Bank's Economic Reports.
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3. Currency swaps
4. The discount window
5. Interest rate controls
6. A ceiling on lending and investment
7. Moral suasion
8. Other rules and regulations.
Reserve Requirements
In order to ensure liquidity and solvency of the banking system, the
monetary authority requires member banks in Kuwait to retain a
certain portion of their eligible liabilities in liquid assets,
either in their vaults or with the Central Bank.
Initially (in 1974), the level of liquidity (or reserve) ratio in
Kuwait was 25% of the bank's total deposits plus liabilities to CBK.
Liquid assets were defined to include certificates of deposits (CDs)
of up to 30 days maturity, bankers' acceptances of up to 90 days,
cash balances with CBK and deposits up to one month1 , provided that
a ratio of 7.5% of the eligible liquid assets is denominated in
Kuwaiti dinar.
A major amendment to this system was introduced in March 1978 whereby
the commercial and specialized banks were required to maintain a
progressive ratio of liquid assets corresponding to the type and
maturity of their deposits. Thus no reserve is required, under the
new measures, on time deposits held for more than a year, whilst a
mandatory progressive scale of required reserve ratio of up to 35% of
demand deposits and short-term deposits of less than one year
maturity must be maintained in liquid assets. Also a 3% mandatory
liquidity ratio, of the total eligible deposits, has to be held in
the following unspecified allocations:
1. Omar Kassem, "The Monetary Sector of the Kuwait Economy",
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Development
Seminar Paper, No. 43, February 1984, p.17.
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i) current balances with the CBK
ii) CBK bills, and
iii) cash assets.
In fact the Bank prefers the whole 3% to consist of CBK bills and
only exceptionally accepts cash and current accounts with CBK as
components of the ratio 1 . Noticeably inter-bank demand deposits, for
less than a month, are not considered liquid assets unless they are
deposited with local banks. Additionally the regulations stipulate
that one third of the eligible liquid assets must be in Kuwaiti
dinars.
Generally the changes in reserve requirements lead to changes in the
base multiplier and the money supply. In addition the change in
reserve requirements affects the banks' profitability by reducing
their income earning assets. It has been argued by some economists2
that a 20% increase in reserve requirements, for example, could
result in 10 to 20% reduction in bank profits. On the other hand it
would reduce the money supply by 5% only3.
Open Market Operations
The Bank is authorized by its charter (articles 34 and 35) to conduct
open market operations through (a) the outright buying and selling
agreements, as well as the discount and rediscount of treasury bonds,
and (b) the management of public debt certificates if issued and
offered by the Government for sale. By 1986 the Government had not
resorted to this mechanism.	 In fact, the Kuwaiti government, as
mentioned earlier, is a prime supplier of funds and a net creditor to
the financial system. On the other hand, the budget deficits that
were realised intermittently since the fiscal year 1981/1982 were
financed from the income from foreign reserves (an off budget item)4.
1. The Central Bank of Kuwait, Annual Report 1983-84, p.26.
2. Thomas Simpson, Money . Banking and Economic Analysis, Englewood
Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall Inc., 1976, pp 219-220.
3. The effects of these changes were not calculated, to my
knowledge, in Kuwait. However it would be advisable for the
monetary authority to take these results into consideration
whenever a change in the reserve ratio is contemplated.
4. See Chapter 3, The Kuwait Economy.
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Yet in 1979 the Bank started to offer what is called CBK bills.
Though they have been described as the "nucleus of open market
operations" 1 , they differ from treasury bills in that they are not
intended to finance the public sector in the same way as treasury
bills are used. to finance the public sector borrowing requirements
(PSBR), for example, in the United Kingdom. The CBK bills are
nevertheless similar to treasury bills from the point of view of
institutional investors since both are riskless investment vehicles.
Since their introduction in 1979 the CBK bills have been subjected to
two major amendments. Firstly, they were allowed to be used as part
of the eligible liquid asset for the purpose of satisfying the
reserve ratio requirements. Secondly, in 1980 the Bank permitted the
non-bank financial institutions, who are subject to the Bank's
supervision, to deal in these bills. In addition, the banks may:
i) sell back the bills to the CBK under the repurchase agreement,
and
ii) may discount the bills before maturity.
provided that in either (i) or (ii) the cash ratio of the banks with
the CBK shall not fall below the minimum 3%. Accordingly the volume
of these bills grew from KD 13.5m or about 3.6% of the reserve money
(high powered money) to a peak of KD 469.7m or 44% of the reserve
money between 1979 and 1984; though the ratio dropped to 33% in 1984,
the Bank sold KD 2284m worth of bills in the fiscal year l98319842.
In summation, the bills are a powerful tool for checking liquidity.
Furthermore, the Bank was careful in setting the yield on these bills
to be less than the discount rates on commercial bills or the rates
on coinniercial lending.
1. The Banker Research Unit, Banking Structure and Sources of
Finance in the Middle East, Ed. Thom and Mazhar, Chapter 7,
"Kuwait", by Hikmat Nashashibi, p.177.
2. CBK Annual Report, 1983-84 (Arabic text), p.26.
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The discount rates on these bills are as follows:
1. 7 days maturity	 4% interest annually
2. 28 days maturity 	 5% interest annually
3. 91 days maturity	 5.688% interest annually
The Bank will not tolerate the intensive discount of commercial bills
or the unwarranted reductions in credits granted to the private
sector in order to buy more CBK bills'. Despite the fact that the
inclusion of the bills in the reserve ratio component might have
weakened its status as a powerful monetary tool, the Bank was able,
via the manipulation of interest rates, to absorb the excess
liquidity. For instance at the beginning of 1983, the Bank raised
the interest rate on one week to 3 month maturities.
On the other hand the CBK bills have contributed to the evolution of
the financial markets in Kuwait.
Swap Operations
In the absence of exchange control regulations, there are no
restrictions on capital movements and remittances in Kuwait. This has
led usually to a leakage in domestic liquidity especially when the dinar
interest rates are much less than the Euro-dollar rates. To absorb
excess domestic liquidity and to allow minimum supervision of the banks'
foreign operations the CBK started a swap operation in May 1978. By
October of the same year swaps were used to help alleviate a liquidity
crunch. By this facility the Bank swaps foreign currency (dollars) to
obtain dinars from the local banks or vice versa at the prevailing
market rates. At the end of the period, currently from one week to six
months, the transaction is reversed. The rates are normally adjusted to
reflect the difference in interest rates between the two currencies as
an incentive to the Kuwaiti banks.
1.	 See the "Industrial Bank of Kuwait (IBK) in Ten Years (1974-
84)", (Arabic text) p.144.
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Starting mid-1983, there was a drop in the private sectors' deposits
coupled with increased demand for loanable funds pushing up swap
balances from KD 69m in June to KD 340m at the end of the year, and
to KD 5l5m in June 19841. The swap facilities were boosted by the
cancellation in March 1983 of the tranches system. By the new method
the swap operations were divided into two segments:
i) short-term operations ranging from a minimum of one week to a
maximum of 3 weeks
ii) medium-term operations ranging from a minimum of one month to a
maximum of 6 months.
Furthermore the new system established an upper limit on the total
operations permitted for any one bank as opposed to the ceiling
within each tranch in the previous system. It was thought that the
swap facility would stem the outflow of capital that seeks better
opportunities or higher interest rates abroad. However, the Gulf war
and arbitrage operations caused a massive flight of capital in March
1984. Although 1984 data is not available yet, the Governor of the
Bank estimated the 1983 outflow at KD 870m composed of2:
i) non-monetary capital outflow from public and private sectors
including banks of up to KD 408m
ii) residents transfer of KD 264m
iii) unrequited Government transfer of KD l98m
Although it is argued that this tool would only temporarily affect
liquidity and "may alleviate problems in the short-term money markets"3,
it is equally true, as David Liewellyn stated, that by this mechanism
"the central bank engineers ... a wider forward discount on domestic
currency and ... a higher Euro-currency interest rate in the currency
concerned, and through arbitrage, higher domestic interest rates".
1. CBK Annual Report (Arabic text) 1983-84, p.12. and the CBK
Economic Report 1983, p.48.
2. National Bank of Kuwait (NBK), Economic and Financial Bulletin
No. 7, November 1984, p.21.
3. I.J. Kemp, A Guide Towards Mone y and Cap ital Markets, London:
McGraw-Hill Company Ltd, 1981.
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3 months	 5.50	 90 days
6 months	 6.00	 91-180 days
9 months	 6.25	 181-270 days
12 months	 6.50	 271-365 days
Thus it is a useful technique in a country like Kuwait "whose central
bank domestic operations are constrained"1.
The Discount Window
In 1975, when the banking sector suffered a liquidity crunch, the Bank
began to discount and rediscount commercial bills presented by the
domestic banks. This facility captures about 90% of the domestic banks
operations with CBK. Nevertheless, the volume of discount and
rediscount facilities fluctuates with respect to the level of economic
activity and with the contraction or expansion of credit facilities.
For example, in 1978 the commercial paper discounted did not exceeded
KD 30.6m due to (a) the small proportion of these bills in the
portfolio of the commercial banks, and (b) most of the advances to
customers were predominantly in the form of overdraft facilities as
opposed to other types of commercial lending, and (c) the Bank's pre-
condition that the maturity of the bills should not exceed 3 months2.
A major amendment to the Bank's law was introduced in 1977 whereby it
was possible to re-discount commercial bills of up to one year
maturity starting from the effective discount date. In addition the
discount rate was raised from 5.50% per annum at the date of opening
the discount window, to the following rates:
Effective 30.12.77	 Effective 23.11.82
Maturity	 Interest	 Maturity
Rates
Interest
Rates
6.00
6.25
6.50
6.75
For further details see Table 5.1.
1. David Liewellyn, "A Potentially Powerful Policy Mechanism", Ih
Bankers Mgazinc, March 1980, p.14.
2. CBK, Economic Report, p.163.
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3.4.79
12. 12.79
6.00 (3 nonths)	 5.75	 5.25 (1 month)
6.25 (6 " )
	
5.50 (3 months)
6.50 (9 "
	 )	 On issue of
bills by the
Central Bank
6.75 (12 Il	 )
6.25	 5.75 (1 month)
6.00 (3 months)
6.75	 6.25 (1 month)
6.50 (3 months)
4.00 (7 days)
6.25 (28 days)
6.50 (91 days) On issue of new
bills by CBK
23.11.82 6.00 (90 days)
6 25 (91-180 " )
6 50 (181-370" )
6.75 (271-365" )
Table 5.1: Discount, and Interest Rates at Central Bank
(% per annun)
Effective Discount Rates Interest Rates Interest on 	 Remarks
Date	 on Cczmnercial	 on Loans	 CBK Bills
Papers	 Against CBK
Bills
1.2.75	 5.50	 On opening the
discount windcM
30.10.77 5.50 (3 innths)
660(6	 "	 )
625(9	 "	 )
6.50 (12 "
	 )
22.1.80
2.1.82
4. 12. 82
26.12.82
26. 1. 83
On adjusionent
of maturities
of discountable
caminercial
papers
3.75 (7 days)
5.625 (28 days)
5.875 (91 days)
2.75 (7 days)
5.00 (28 days)
5.50 (91 days)
4.000 (7 days)
5.000 (28 days)
5.688 (93. days)
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Hence this amendment has been detrimental in curtailing the liquidity
crisis that faced the banking system in 1979, 1980, 1983, 1984 as is
evident from the volume of discounts or rediscounts that jumped 11
times (1978-1984) reaching RD 195.3m, RD 186.6m, RD 334.6m and RD
359m during that period (refer to CBK Balance Sheet).
Interest Rate Control
Furthermore, rates charged on loans and or commissions are also
restricted by the Bank. Initially the maximum allowable interest
rate was 7%. The authorities felt that this rate was acceptable for
religious reasons, 1 and falls short of the usury rate which is
strictly prohibited in Kuwait. However, there is no economic
justification for this rate. Additionally the commercial law was
amended in November 1976 to authorize the CBK to determine the rate
of interest subject to the prior approval of the Ministry of Finance.
Consequently in February 1977 the maximum rate of interest was raised
to 10% on loans dominated in Kuwait dinars. In addition, the rate of
interest is fixed as follows:
a) 7% per year on secured loans to "productive economic
activities"	 of one year maturity or less
b) 8.5% per year on unsecured loans for one year or less
c) 10% per year on loans given to all sectors of maturity
exceeding one year.
Loans in foreign currency and inter-bank loans are not subject to the
above ceilings and are left to be determined by the contracting
parties and market forces. This selective measure in rates
determination by CBK reflects the State's declared policy in
providing funds to selected productive sectors in the economy at
relatively preferential rates and compared to other sectores.
However, the banks have defused the merits of the interest rate
ceiling by the wide usage of service charges which can create, in
effect, interest differentials by another name.
1. Though the fundamental Islamic teachings absolutely prohibits
the paying or receiving interest on loans, for more details
refer to Chapters 1 and 2.
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The rigidity of this system led eventually to the flight of capital
abroad especially at times when the spread was more than enough to
offset the risk of the dollar devaluation against the dinar. This was
more evident in 1980 when the Euro-dollar rates reached an
unprecedented level of 20%. The outflow of capital was further
accentuated by two elements: (a) the flotation of KD bonds issues to
foreign borrowers amounting to KD lO6m (1979), and (b) the formation
of offshore Gulf companies with majority Kuwaiti capital. This
resulted in a domestic liquidity squeeze coupled with an upsurge in
short-term inter-bank interest rates that reached 14% in 1980.
Ultimately the Bank was forced to impose a moratorium on new issues
in KD bonds from November 1979 until October 1980 as the magnitude of
the CBK contribution to ease the liquidity crisis amounted to 24.8%
of the credit facilities and 30% of the dinar deposits in that year
respectively1.
Measures to Regulate and Rationalize Credit Policy
In addition to the monetary tools that are being used to regulate
liquidity, occasionally, the Bank still uses moral suasion. This
unofficial mechanism has proved to be effective in the past when the
Kuwaiti banking community was small and consisted of a close knit
group. Thus personal relations and face-to-face negotiations between
the Government and various economic figures were effective in
reaching a compromise that served the interest of all parties
concerned. The Bank was keen to establish contacts with the banks
representatives and to relate to them verbally the Bank's opinion
regarding monetary and credit policy. A good example of this was
the situation in 1974 when the Bank requested the commercial banks
to lower the overdrafts in their assets or to lower the ceiling on
credit facilities extended for the purpose of buying company shares
or to invest in new issues. At the same time the banks'
representatives freely expressed their points of view which more
often than not were taken into consideration at the CBK in
formulating its policy.
1.	 Refer to Section 2 of this chapter for more information on KD
bonds issues
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However, as the size and scope of the banking sector developed and
competition developed, the relationship between the CBK and the
banking community was more stressful and the Bank has, over the
years, leaned more towards issuing regulations and instructions
rather than relying solely on moral suasion.
The Bank has set up (1973) (1) minimum cash cover for opening letters
of credit, and (2) a maximum limit on the amount of loans the banks
could extend to any one borrower for the purpose of buying company
shares. This latter measure was aimed at securing widespread
distribution of share ownership among Kuwaiti citizens.
The commercial banks were allowed to receive (1972) a 5% interest on
their balances with the CBK, a measure aimed at stemming excess
liquidity. However this procedure was abolished with the advent of
the CBK negotiable bills mentioned earlier.
The Bank also issued instructions (1976) which set up a ceiling on
the unsecured credit facilities that a bank can extend to any one
borrower (whether an individual or a corporation). This limit should
not exceed 10% of the bank(s) equity capital. However, loans to the
productive sector as well as the financing of documentary credits and
those advances that are covered by a legal collateral are exempted
from the above mentioned rule. The rule and the exemption were
seemingly implemented to safeguard the banks' financial position by
deterring them from a concentration of banks lending with a few
borrowers. Diversification was viewed as a means of spreading risk.
At the same time the exemption was aimed at encouraging the
productive sector, discouraging at the same time, speculative
activities. When the Bank introduced regulations to reduce
overdrafts progressively in favour of secured loans, those unable to
obtain overdrafts for speculation resorted to post-dated cheques.
The Bank, anticipating the stock market crisis, banned (early 1982)
the utilization of post-dated cheques as collateral for banks' loans.
Also the Bank ruled out the extension of credit facilities against
the Gulf shares. Although these measures limited the extent of the
banks' exposure in the stock market crisis, it did not prevent the
involvement of the banks customers in issuing post-dated cheques.
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The outcome was the collapse of the market which triggered the
foreclosure of some companies and individuals and left many others on
the verge of bankruptcy. This subject has been dealt with in more
detail in Chapter 3, it suffices to mention however that banning the
issuance and acceptance of post-dated cheques altogether would have
certainly eliminated the volume of trading and might have trimmed
insolvency cases.
Central Bank Loans
The Bank stands ready to extend loans secured by CBK bills to the
commercial banks to adjust the banks reserve position. While
commercial banks borrowing from the CBK was nil in the 1970s, the
loans extended to the commercial banks which were repaid at maturity
amounted to KD 303m at the end of June 19841.
The Bank may also extend loans to non-bank financial and credit
institutions. In this respect the Bank injected over $25m to Jawad
and Hyder Abuihasan, one of the leading money changers in Kuwait
when it became insolvent in early 1985. At the same time the Bank
stepped in to rescue the Kuwait Finance House (KFH), the only islamic
bank in Kuwait, when it became illiquid (1985) as a result of
excessive investment in real estate, although KFH is not under the
jurisdiction of the Bank. However, the recent episode has prompted
the Bank to seriously consider the possibility of extending the
Bank's supervision and control to KFH. The scope and magnitude of
such a move are not known yet.
Foreign Exchan g e Regulations
The current objectives of foreign exchange regulations in Kuwait are
as follows:
1. to secure the stability of the dinar exchange rate
2. to prevent undue speculations, and
1. CBK Annual Report 1983-84 (Arabic), pp 12-24.
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3.	 to ensure the free convertibility of the dinar into the major
world currencies.
The capital flight episode mentioned earlier was highlighted by the
abuse of the hard currency trading system. It happened that certain
financial institutions took advantage of the loopholes in the system
that allowed them to obtain cheap dollars from CBK to presumably
finance international trade. Instead they offered some of these
dollars to the money changers at a mark-up. The money changers who
were inunune from CBK control at that time, sold the hard currency so
obtained at discount in Bahrain at the market rate and made a
handsome profit. The operation was so successful that the turnover
in the foreign exchange trading amounted to KD 3 bn per week in 1983
while it barely exceeded 600m in 19791.
Playing the dollar market ended through the issuing of a ministerial
decree banning the money changers from conducting all banking
activities except those related to foreign currency transactions.
The foreign exchange houses were compelled to register with the
banking control department. Additionally they were not allowed to
represent foreign banks or act on their behalf any more.
As from June 1984, 79 foreign exchange dealers were reported to have
been registered constituting about one half of the practising money
changers at that time. On the other hand, new money changers are
required to obtain a. licence from the central bank before commencing
operations and to keep proper accounting records. The new
regulations required the money changers to apply verbally to the Bank
before buying dollars from the commercial banks2.
To curb dollar sales, the Bank imposed a ceiling on the daily
purchases of dollars by commercial banks at the preferential rate.
The ceiling is determined by the average weekly purchase of dollars
on behalf of the bankers customers in the previous year. A dual
exchange rate system was introduced in April 1984 whereby a
commercial preferential rate was used in buying dollars for
1. NBK op.cit, No. 6, April 1984, p.19.
2. CBK Annual Report, 1983-84, p.19.
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commercial transactions; the documentary credit vouchers must be
presented to qualify for the preferential rate. The second, an
'official rate' relates to non-commercial transactions.
From July 1984, the swap rates were raised twice within a period of
thirty days. This resulted in equalizing the dual rates1.
Other Rules and Regulations
The Bank (1980) urged the gradual substitution of term loans for
overdrafts. The purpose was to rationalize the banks credit policies,
and to direct it towards the productive sectors in the economy. A
programme was recommended by the CBK in order to decrease the
proportion of overdrafts in the overall credit instrument from 55%
(1980) to 45% (1981) to settle at 40% (l9821983)2.
Given the Kuwait social structure, overdrafts were always secured
against the credit worthiness of most Kuwaiti businessmen, once the
stock market crisis emerged, credit worthiness was no longer good
enough.
The CBK Financial Position
The Bank's financial statements indicate a significant growth during
the 5 year period ending on 31 December 1984; for example, the
Bank's assets have risen by 41% from RD 1424.1ni to 2007m. Two major
elements have contributed to this achievement:
j)	 the two-fold increase in the Bank's domestic assets due to "the
increase in the Bank's role in carrying out the State's
monetary and credit policy" as well as the expansion in the
"Bank's facilities to the banking system", 3 and
1. NBK Annual Report, 1984, p.15.
2. In fact the Bank's aim is to entirely eliminate the use of
overdrafts except for short-term emergency credit (from an
unpublished interview between Peter Sadler and the Head of the
Banking Control Department, Kuwait).
3. Al-Tammar, op.cit, p.6.
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Table 5.2: Assets and Liabilities of the Central Bank
(KD million)
1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983	 1984
ASSETS
Foreign Assets
Gold
Reserve Position
inthe IMF
Balances with
Foreign Banks2
Ccimercia1 Papers
Discounted
Other
LThBILITIES
Currency Issued
Local Banks'
Balances
CBK Bills
Government Deposits3
Capital and
Reserves
Foreign
Liabilities4
Other
1014.3 1424.1 1479.4 2039.6 1923.9 2007.0
812.7 1094.3 1172.7 1738.0 1551.1 1430.1
(31.7) (31.7) (31.7) (31.7) (31.7) (31.7)
(138.9) (144.3) (144.3) (164.7) (227.3) (238.3)
(642.1) (918.3) (996.7)(l541.6)(1292.1)(1l60.0)
195.3 298.6 282.4 276.7 334.6 359.0
6.3	 31.2	 24.3	 25.0	 38.2 217.9
1014.3 1424.1 1479.4 2039.6 1923.9 2007.0
229.5 268.7 303.5 365.5 364.9 344.8
136.2 129.5 208.4 244.2 182.6 152.4
13.5	 108.0 167.4 488.0 293.6 246.8
506.2 768.1	 671.3 796.1 754.6 900.8
27.9	 30.0	 30.0	 30.0	 30.0 184.0
	
1.4	 1.6	 14.3	 23.3	 119.3	 27.4
	
99.6	 118.3	 84.6	 92.6	 178.9	 150.9
Source: CBK Economic Report, 1983.
1. Consists of the portion of Kuwait's quota in the Fund, paid in gold,
the net uti.lisation of KD contribution, the IMF withdrawals under
special arrangements and the Bank's holdings of SDR's
2. Includes hills and other convertible financial papers
3. Includes deposits aqainst documentary credits
4. Corr posed of SDR allocations and international organisations
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ii) the 76% rise in the Bank's foreign assets from KD 812m to KID
1430m during the same period as shown in the Bank's Assets and
Liabilities (Table 5.2).
It is noticeable however, that the Bank's ratio of foreign assets to
total assets decreased, falling to 71% at the end of 1984 well below
the 81% and 85% ratios recorded in 1983 and 1982 respectively. The
decline is largely attributed to the decrease in the Bank's deposits
with foreign banks which fell from KID 1524m to KD lO5Om (1982-1984)
in order to finance the commercial banks' purchases of foreign
currency mentioned earlier.
Discounts and rediscounts of commercial bills have been discussed at
length in the monetary tools section. It suffices to mention that
their rate of growth averaged 20% rising from KID 299m to KID 359m
(1980-1984), while deposits and loans with the Bank exceeded KID 188m
at the end of 1984. The currency issued increased by 28.3% from KID
269m to KD 345m (1980-1984). On the other hand the domestic banks'
reserve money (banks balances and CBK bills) grew by 68% from KID 237m
to KD 399m (1980-1984) owing to an upsurge in the banks' holdings of
bills which grew by 2.3 times their volume in 1980.
CEK bills and local bank balances with the Bank peaked in 1982
reaching lCD 488m and 244m respectively and declined by 49% and 38%
respectively (1982-1984) attributable to the decline in the banks'
operations in the last 3 years.
Additionally, the Government's account with the Bank rose by 17.3%
(1980-1984), constituting around 45% of the Bank's total liabilities
in 1984.
The Bank's profits in the fiscal year ending 30 June 1984 amounted to
KD 79m down by 18% from the previous year. In an apparent effort to
strengthen the Bank's equity position, the Bank's general reserves
were boosted in 1984 by lCD 75m reaching KID lOOm against KID 25m in
1983. Consequently the net profits received by the Treasury declined
to about KID 20m against lCD 1.12m a year before.
Summary and Conclusions
The CBK's aim to control domestic liquidity has in recent years
leaned more and more towards alleviating illiquidity than towards
curtailing monetary expansion. In fact the Bank had no choice other
than injecting money (most of the time) in the banking system through
(a) the discount window, (b) swap operations, (c) repurchase
agreements, (d) loans and advances. Nevertheless had there been
highly developed money and capital markets in Kuwait, CBK would not
have been the only supplier of funds to the system. Alternative
sources would have been the sale of loans, notes issues, and
government bills. However the open economic system has allowed a few
banks and corporations to float note issues in the Euro-dollar
market, notwithstanding that the sale of these instruments
domestically are not effective if the liquidity crisis should hit the
economy in a period of tight money. In this case the financial
institutions would seek the help of the Bank as a. last resort.
Nonetheless, the need for developing the existing money and capital
markets is acknowledged by the Bank which is considering the outright
purchase of shares and bonds issued by Kuwait companies "engaged in
productive economic activities" and who "require support, owing to
consequential macroeconomic benefits"1.
On the other hand, the Bank's endeavour to absorb excess liquidity
was hampered by:
1. the fact that the main source of liquidity in Kuwait is the net
government expenditure. Thus the government via the Ministry of
Finance inject money into the economy to stimulate economic
activity. In this respect the coordination between the monetary
and fiscal policies is a matter of strategic priority rather
than temporary tactics.
2. the free market economy that permits free transfer of capital
and remittances, restricts the Bank's options. Since pegging
the exchange rate and controlling the interest rates lead
1.	 A. Al-Tammar, op.cit, pp 9-10.
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eventually to: (a) a laxity of control over the money supply1;
and (b) an unwarranted deviation of policy.
In theory the Bank's role in controlling domestic liquidity would
have been more efficient had the bank set the target of money supply
rather than seeking to curb monetary expansion resulting from the
changes in the demand for money. Again this is not possible given
the fact that the prime determinant of money supply in Kuwait is net
government expenditure.
As regards the Bank's rules and regulations, it is observed that the
Bank's role was, at large, conciliatory or even passive at the
beginning, then it became more involved in supervising the banking
system. Notably, the Bank was not always prepared to avert a crisis
before it occurred. Rather it used to react, though swiftly, to
curtail a problem after it had happened, e.g. the liquidity crisis in
1979 and the loophole in the exchange system that brought in the
exchange dealers under the supervision of the Bank in 1984.
Currently there are signs of the Bank further tightening its grip on
the financial sector. It would be important to require the banks to
disclose more information to the public. In particular, the current
method of treating hidden reserves should be abolished. The current
practice in Kuwait permits the declaration of net profits after
adjustments to or from inner reserves. Furthermore, the inner
reserves, the provisions for doubtful debts and contingencies are
dumped in the "demand and time deposits account". The danger of this
practice is outlined below2:
1. For more details see David Liewellyn "Money Supply and Bank of
England Operations", Loughborough University Banking Centre,
and Butler Till Seminar, 29-31 October 1984, p.42.
2. Actually, all financial statements of Kuwaiti banks contain the
following note: "In accordance with accepted banking practices
in Kuwait, the results for the year are stated after transfer to
or from inner reserves which are classified as contingency
provisions and appear in the balance sheet under deposits and
other accounts including contingencies". For more details on
the accounting practices in the Kuwaiti banks, see Shuaib A.
Shuaib "Current Accounting Practices in Kuwait's Banking
Industry". Finance and Industry Series, No. 5, 1984, pp 7-28.
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1. this treatment is not an accepted accounting practice
internationally
2. it permits, quite evidently, the underestimating or inflating
of the banks' profits depending on the discretion of
management. Thus the shareholders would know nothing about the
true position
3. the current practice also permits the increase of capital or
the distribution of bonus shares by the transfer from inner
reserves. Unless these reserves are disclosed as well as the
provision for doubtful debts, the shareholders and the
prospective investors would not be able to evaluate the
performance of the banks while this ambivalent restriction
exists.
The Bank's declared policy of fostering the activities of the
productive sectors could be more effective by easing credit policy
since the lower interest rate to this sector is only for short-term
periods and the results are not very encouraging as is evident from
the drop in the banks' lending to industry in proportion to the total
credit facilities from 8% to 4% (1980-1984). Even if the government
has to subsidise the interest rate differential, more care should be
given to the commissions and other charges by the banks which very
easily could reach 14-17% (including the basic interest rate) well
above the maximum fixed rate of 10%.
Though the banks' capital adequacy ratios are satisfactory and range
from 5-16% (1984) it is prudent to require the banks to observe a
minimum ratio of capital adequacy against risk assets especially that
the doubtful debts that had to be written off in the previous years
have reached unprecedented levels (yet not formally disclosed). The
capital adequacy to risk asset ratio should be emphasized in view of
the accounting treatment of inner reserves and the practice of
distributing bonus shares mentioned earlier.
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Money and Cap ital Markets in Kuwait
Kuwait is currently the most advanced financial centre in the Arab
world since the demise of Beirut (Lebanon) as a result of the civil
war. Kuwait possesses unique opportunities arising out of a well
developed financial infrastructure, relative political stability and
the openness of the economy.
In this section, we proceed by examining the non-bank financial
institutions that are engaged in the money and capital markets1.
This is followed by an analysis of the money market as well as the
capital market in Kuwait. Particular attention is focussed on the
existing financial instruments in the market in order to measure
their relative attractiveness in the primary and secondary market.
Investment Companies
Due to the limitations of the local financial market, the main task
of many Kuwaiti investment companies lies in channelling local funds
into foreign markets. Effectively, Kuwait is an exporter of capital
owing to a huge surplus and the small size of the local market.
Accordingly, the government formed the Kuwait Investment Company
(KIC) and Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment Company
(KFTCIC) in 1961 and 1965 respectively to invest part of the state's
financial surplus in the international money and capital markets2.
The Kuwait International Investment Company (KIIC) was the third
company to be established in 1973 though in this case it is privately
owned.
1. The banking sector has been discussed at length in Chapter 4.
2. Actually KFTCIC was not allowed initially to invest locally,
however the ban was lifted in the early 1980
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Investment companies may be classified into three groups:
a) The three Ks (KIC, KFTCIC and KIIC). Traditionally, the first
two manage part of the Government's direct and equity
investments in Kuwait (recently) and abroad. KIC has a wider
clientele of institutions and wealthy families1;
b) Specialised brokerage firms such as Arab Company for Trading in
Securities (ACTS) and the Financial Securities Group (FSG).
Both these companies are active in the primary and secondary
markets;
c) The rest of the investment companies are mostly engaged in real
estate, other investments and security trading domestically and
internationally.
These investment companies have succeeded in linking the local
financial market with foreign financial outlets through acquisitions,
portfolio management, and marketing of local and. foreign bonds.
Further, these companies have been active in mobilizing the private
sector savings and employing them in local, regional and
international investment vehicles. Table 5.3 shows the development in
these companies' assets and liabilities which grew by 2.5 times over
the last five years (to 1984). External assets consist of short-term
money balances with foreign banks, loans and discounts to non-
residents, and direct and equity investments. Over the years,
external assets accounted for 60% of total assets of these companies.
The Money Market2
Generally, money markets provide borrowers with short-term capital
and create an outlet for investors to employ their surplus funds.
Moreover, developed money markets help to channel domestic savings
from investors to the ultimate users efficiently and at the lowest
possible transaction cost. The banking role in the channelling of
funds has been discussed in the preceding sections. The focus in
1. See R. Wilson, 1983, op. cit, for more details.
2. This section and the capital market that follows are based on
(a) I J Kemp (ed), A Guide to World Mone y and Cap ital Markets,
1981; (b) various CBK economic reports, and (c) annual reports
of main investment companies in Kuwait.
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this section is to describe the financial instruments available on
the market and their characteristics.
Apart from call and time deposits, the Kuwaiti money market
encompasses four main categories of financial instrument namely:
certificate of deposits (CDs), central bank bills, floating rate
notes (FRNs) and promissory notes.
Kuwaiti dinar call deposits may be placed with all commercial banks
for overnight call, two or seven days notice. Such deposits may not
be for less than KD 50,000. Time deposits may be placed for between
one week and one year providing that such deposits are normally not
less than KD 10,000 or US $25,000, although exceptionally some banks
may accept time deposits for as low as $10,000. Interest on call
deposits in KD is not subject to the maximum ceiling rate and is
determined by supply and demand, whilst interest on other currency
deposits is compatible with the rates prevailing in the Euro-money
markets less a tiny margin. Call and time deposits may also be
placed with investment companies in domestic and foreign currencies.
Local commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions are
allowed to issue bearer CDs in the amount of KD 50,000. The first
negotiable CDs were issued in October 1977 by the Industrial Bank of
Kuwait (IBK) on a tap basis which was sold to the National Bank of
Kuwait (NBK). The second issue was launched by the Gulf Bank and was
the first tranche issue ever made in Kuwait; this was managed by
Kuwait International Investment Company (KIIC). Both of these issues
were denominated in Kuwaiti dinar. In December of the same year the
Kuwaiti Real Estate Bank placed another issue.
Fixed rate CDs (available since 1978 in bearer and registered form)
have 3 months to 3 years maturities. Floating rate CDs (introduced in
1978, in bearer form only) have 3 year maturities and an interest
rate adjusted every three months to one-quarter percent over Kuwait
interbank offered rate (Kibor) for three month deposits. They are
subjected to a minimum coupon specified at issue. CDs do not have
the same interest rate constraints as time deposits and interest on
both types of CDs is free from withholding tax.
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The secondary market for CDs is not very active mainly due to the
continuous holding of these certificates by the prime lenders for
their yield, negligible risk, and the narrow range of investment
instruments available on the market. However the Arab Company for
Trading Securities (ACTS) is always ready to buy and sell CDs at any
day regardless of their value and may keep them in custody free of
charge. The Central Bank bills are discussed at length in Chapter 5,
Part 1 and need not be re-examined here. It suffices to mention that
the CBK bills were first introduced in 1978 and they are issued in
three maturities, one week, four weeks and thirteen weeks.
Promissory notes were first issued by Kuwaiti companies in 1978.
They are made in bearer form and of maturities ranging from 3 months
to four years and are secured against the assets of the issuer. They
may be endorsed or sold in the secondary market.
Floating rate notes (FRNs) are another instrument issued by the local
banks either in lots of KD 1000 each, or in lots of US $1000 each.
They are in bearer or registered form. The interest is adjusted
every 6 months and is normally fixed at one-quarter percent above
Kibor for six month deposits.
One of the main developments in 1983 was the launching by KFTCIC, for
the first time, of FRNs in two tranches for KD 7m each due in 1988
and 1990 at 10% respectively. In addition the United Bank of Kuwait
which is owned jointly by the Kuwaiti banks and the Three Ks,
launched KD 5m FRNs in 1983. The aim was "to bridge the gap between
the money market ... and the capital market".' This package which
consisted of equal proportions of straight bonds and a five-year
note, was not traded as expected2.
1. Terence Prideaux, "The Capital Market Fades Away", Euronioney,
August 1984, p.174.
2. By mid-1984 there were around KD 50m of FRNs acid KD 30m of
fixed-rate CDs
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The Cap ital Market Instruments
The Kuwaiti capital market is characterised by a relatively unique
feature in that the government is not a primary borrower in the
market. On the contrary the government is a primary supplier of
funds not only indirectly through government expenditure and land
purchases, but also through its direct purchases of public issues by
the banks and financial institutions in Kuwait and overseas. This
characteristic might explain to some extent the government's
initiative to establish a Kuwaiti bond market.
Bond Issues
The Kuwait Investment Company (KIC) was active in underwriting six
private placements in Kuwaiti dinars on behalf of the World Bank
between 1968-1973. The issues denominated in minimum KD 1000 and
carried a maturity of 5 years and paid semi-annual interest. The
Asian Development Bank followed suit with a private placement of RD
5m in 1974. The years 1978-79 marked the largest size of these
issues, reaching RD 154m and RD 112m respectively. Interest rates
for most of the issues were between 8.5-9%. The outflow of capital
witnessed in 1979 and the deteriorating quality of borrowers had
prompted the government to suspend new bond issues. The ban was
lifted in 1982.
1974 marked the birth of internationally quoted public issue; the
first issue was launched by KIIC. The primary borrowers are usually
Arab financial institutions including pension funds. Between 1968-
1983 the number of bonds issued were 86 amounting to RD 669.8m. In
1983 there were only five new issues, three of which amounted to RD
17m and were in favour of non-resident borrowers1.
The launching of Eurobonds in Kuwaiti currency eliminated the
exchange risk for the Kuwaiti investor. Additionally, bonds are a
d	 CBK, Economic Report, 1983, p.195.
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safe investment vehicle since most of the Kuwaiti bond issues are
guaranteed by the borrower's country so the capital loss is
negligible at least in nominal value if the bonds were kept to
maturity1.
On the other hand the Kuwaiti-Eurobond could be an option bond making
it attractive to foreign takers. This is explained by the fact that
the bond allows the subscription and/or the redemption of interest or
principal in either US currency or Kuwaiti dinar either prior to or
at maturity.
From 1978 onward the bond market in Kuwait attracted many first class
borrowers (Treble A) such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan) and
Occidental International Finance (USA), Banque Nationale de Paris,
Credit Lyonnais, City of Oslo (Norway), Industrial Bank of Finland
and many more. Table 5.4 gives the number and value of KD bonds
issued (1968-84).
However the growth of the KD bond market from 1982 onwards was
hampered by the dissatisfaction of the Kuwaiti government coup]ed
with its sentiment against the possibility of drawing liquidity out
of the system which is normally associated with widening dinar/dollar
spread. Such reluctance by the authorities was expressed in mid-1982
during the climax of the al-Manakh stock market crisis, and more
recently in mid-1984 when the Finance Minister explicitly declared
the government's intention of (a) not supporting new issues to
foreign borrowers and (b) encouraging local borrowing.
The decline in local money market rates from 13% for 6 months
duration to 7% at the end of 1982 had resulted in a positive yield
curve such that the "total returns on par-coupon bonds" in 1983
reached 15%, while "lower coupon bonds, less constrained by call
features, showed returns approaching 2O%I,.2
1. R. Wilson, 1983, op.cit, p.107.
2. Terence Prideaux, op.cit, p.174.
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As at the end of 1984 the nominal outstanding Kuwaiti dinar bond
issues were estimated at KID 363m ($ 1.2 bn). The KID bond market in
Kuwait is suffering from the seemingly conflicting interests; whether
to open the doors for foreign borrowers and by so doing depriving
local borrowers of badly needed liquidity in a period of recurring
recession, or to clamp-down on such activities (which it seems the
financial authorities had advocated). As a result, the dinar bond
currency lost its prestigious status as the fourth most popular bond
currency1.
The Secondary Market
The secondary market is relatively small compared with those of
international financial centres such as London, New York and Tokyo.
However, the secondary market in Kuwait was activated by the
establishment of the Arab Company for Trading in Securities (ACTS).
Upon the initiative of KIIC and IBK, ACTS was established with the
main objective of creating a secondary market in Kuwait. Initially
the capital was KID lm and soon after it was raised to KID 3m and
currently reaches KID 6m. Between May 1977 and October 1978 the total
turnover reached KID l6Om. This was the result of low cost of capital
5.5-6% against a yield of 9-10% on medium term (five to seven years)
bonds. Such activities in the secondary market faded away when the
US dollar rates started to shoot up (1979-1980) leading the foreign
investors to dump their holding of KID bonds in the hands of Kuwaiti
institutions and government agencies.
The value of the KID denominated bonds traded on the secondary market
since its inception in 1978 and up to 1983, totalled KID 549m. Table
5.5 shows the size of bonds traded each year and the corresponding
annual growth.
1.	 Ibid, p.l77.
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Table 5.4: Issues of KID Denaninated Debt Bonds
(nnKID)
Dcaiestic Issues	 Issues to Non-	 Total
Resident Borrowers
Year Quantity Value	 Quantity Value	 Quantity Value
1
2
2
6
1	 5
	 8
1	 8
	 13
7
3 32 15
14
2
5
1	 7
	 7
2	 10
	 3
3(1)	 24
1
1
2
2
6
9
14
7
18
14
2
5
8
5
3
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
15.0
30.0
50.0
40.3
47.5
76.0
31.0
122.0
112.0
14.0
34.0
46.0
17.0
15.0
30.0
50.0
40.3
52.5
84.0
31.0
154.0
112.0
14.0
34.0
53.0
27.0
24.0
1. The first issues were in favour of IEK at 9.5% while the third was
in favour of a number of local companies at 10%.
Source: CEK, Economic Report, 1983, p.176, Hillal Mutairi, "Kuwaiti
Bond Market in Dinars", Development of Kuwaiti Capital Market
Conference, pril 1984.
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Table 5.5: KID Bonds Traded in the Secondary Market
1978	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983
Bonds Value, I(Dm	 40	 90	 43	 106	 126	 144
Growth (shrinkage), %	 -	 125	 (52)	 147	 18.9	 14
Although the value of traded bonds increased 3.6 times during the
five year period from 1979 to 1983, trading followed an irregular
pattern. Moreover, while trading was brisk in 1983 increasing by 14%
over the previous year, in contrast the Eurobond market was
relatively sluggish. However the dealers and participants in the
market believe that trading could have been more active had the local
institutions involved been ready to take book losses.
Prospects
The Kuwaiti bond market expanded very rapidly in the late l970s and
through the early 1980s. The market has certain rigidities owing to
the correlation between the coupon rate and the interest rate for
three to six months interbank deposits. Thus whenever the interest
rate in the Euro-dollar market exceeds the KID rate the demand for KID
denominated bonds weakens. The high interest rates, at times,
compared with US dollar rates, tend to raise the cost of borrowing
and deter borrowers from the Kuwaiti market, though in most cases
private placements were priced at rates compatible with dollar paper.
The preference by the institutional investors to hold on to their
bonds to maturity is a further obstacle to the development in the
secondary market. However in 1984 KIIC reversed this trend and
liquidated part of its portfolio, especially convertible bonds by
selling them in the secondary market.
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The Stock Exchange
Currently there is one official stock exchange and one parallel or
unofficial stock market in Kuwait, widely known as Souk al-Manakh.
As at the end of December 1983, there were 48 companies registered in
the official Stock Exchange (KSE). These companies consist of 39
public shareholding companies with total outstanding shares of KD
934m, 7 closed shareholding companies and 2 Gulf shareholding
companies. Initially, the majority of Kuwait shares had a nominal
value of lCD 10 each. 1 The government allowed the breakdown into KD
1.000 per share. This was intended to allow widespread share
ownership and to attempt to prevent ownership of the bulk of company
shares to fall in the hands of a wealthy minority.
It is noticeable that the volume of traded shares of the investment,
industrial, transport and service companies reached its highest level
in 1981. This phenomenon is not based on justified economic grounds
but merely upon speculation.
The market value of the public shareholding companies by the end of
1983 was lCD 7.6 bn dropping by 11% from the previous year, though the
number of shares outstanding rose from 837m to 1009m for the same
period.
Following the crash of the parallel market, the KSE suffered a
dramatic decline in stock prices that drove the stock index to its
lowest level ever. Table 5.6 shows the share prices of the financial
institutions between the first and second quarters of 1984 indicating
a fall ranging from 48% for NBK to 64% for Burgan Bank. The share
prices would have pluinetted further had the government not supported
the prices by acquiring around lCD 750ni worth of outstanding shares.
1.	 Preparations are currently underway to further breakdown the
shares' nominal value to 100 fils.
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ConcludinE Remarks
The present bearish trend is probably going to last for sometime. The
steering forces behind its long awaited recovery, namely the
government through its agencies and the market makers, are not going
to intervene to stimulate the shares market once more unless the
economic indicators show some improvement.
The development of Kuwait as a regional financial centre was hampered
by the result of the Bahraini offshore banking operations and a host
of internal circumstances such as:
1.	 The maximum ceilings imposed on interest rates for religious
considerations;
2. The restrictions on the establishment of non-Kuwaiti financial
institutions;
3. The small size of the domestic corporate borrowers;
4. The absence of government debt;
5. The delay in the development of the money and capital markets
owing largely to the newness of the specialized institution that
need time, expertise and flexibility to work as market makers;
6. The narrow range of financial instruments that were available
in the market particularly before 1974.
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Table 5.6: Share Prices (KD)
1984
1st Qtr.	 2nd Qtr.*
High	 LcM	 High	 Lc
BANKS
NBK
Gulf
Carnercial
Alabli
BKME
Real Estate
Burgan
INVESThET XANIES
KIC
KFTCIC
KIIC
KFC
INSURANCE (flIPANIES -
Kuwait Insurance Co.
Gulf Insurance Co.
Ahlia Insurance Co.
Warba Insurance Co.
13.775
13.333
12.700
15.850
14.320
13.230
12. 175
9.350
5.652
5.820
18.375
11.500
10.500
10.250
12.250
9.00
6.000
6.750
4.250
17.000
9.400
6.400
5.750
6.700
6.500
7.050
4.400
5.200
1.940
3.480
17.000
17.000
7.000
2.900
7.100
4.720
5.300
5.700
6.000
4.000
4.380
1.200
4.783
2.300
2.000
17.000
13.000
3.500
2900
* Up th 15 December 1984
Source: Cciiiled fran NBK ?nnual Report 1984, p.41.
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CHAPTER 6
RUDIMENT OF AN ISLANIC FINANCIAL MODEL, CASE OF KUWAIT
"1 realised that to refute a system before understandin it and
becoming acquainted with its depths is to act blindly".
1.	 M Al-Ghazail, Al-MunQiz Mina Dhalal, trans M Watt, George Allen
& TJnwin, 1953, p29.
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Introduction
A model of an Islamic financial system is developed here to explore
the feasibility of changing the current conventional system in Kuwait
into an Islamic one. First, an examination of the framework of the
existing financial system, including Kuwait Finance House (KFH), is
undertaken. The gaps in the current system are also identified and
the measures that could be taken to fill these gaps are elaborated.
Second, the future financial requirements of Kuwait are presented
showing how the existing system can respond to these requirements and
how Islamic banking can substitute for the present system and offer
new alternatives as well. Third, short, medium and long-term finance
are discussed in order to explain how the needs for finance in the
Islamic system are met. Finally, the objectives of an Islamic
monetary policy are defined. The functions of an Islamic Central
Bank are also outlined followed by a description of the Islamic money
and capital markets.
No attempt is made in this chapter to describe the transformation
process from an interest-based economy into a nba-free economy; this
will be a topic of the next chapter.
BACKGROUND
A questionnaire was sent to the Kuwaiti banks 1 in order to gain a
greater insight into the workings of the existing banking system.
Based on this questionnaire and on the information provided in
Chapters 2, 4 and 5, it was possible to formulate the matrix shown in
Figure 6.1.
1.	 The author would like to thank the management of the Gulf Bank,
Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait and the Industrial Bank of Kuwait for
the information provided in response to a questionnaire on
their lending and financing operations.
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Links and Classification
The matrix sunmiarises the relationship that exists between a
comprehensive set of claims/assets on one hand and each of the
Islamic banks and the conventional banks on the other. To simplify
the comparison, the various claims/assets were divided into four
categories:
A. Financial claims and financing instruments that were introduced
by the Islamic banks (to be termed FCFIs, see Chapter 2).
B. Financial claims and lending facilities that are used by the
conventional Kuwa.iti banks and are not allowed by KFH and most
of the Islamic banks (to be termed FCLFs, see Infra).
C. FCFIs that are practised by both systems but differ in
application (to be termed either FCFIs or FCLFs whichever the
case may be). This category is divided into three subsections:
services, financing instruments and direct investments.
D. FCFIs that are used by the conventional Kuwaiti banks which are
partially accepted by some Islamic banks (to be termed debated
FCFIs).
THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK
Banks in Kuwait are largely dependent on the strength of the Kuwait
economy1 and the flow of the financial and capital assets in and out
of the country. For example, oil exports (an outflow) generate
revenues (an inflow) which are used for buying goods and services
from local and foreign markets.
In the early 1970s, a fast growing economy had created the necessary
impetus for a nationwide progress in financial institutions, markets
1 The same could be said about Gulf banks in general, see J R
Presley, "The Banks Oil and the Arab Gulf Economies", The Arab
Gulf Journal, Vol 5, No 2, Oct/Sept 1985, London, pp 47-56.
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and systems. In particular, development projects and international
trade were booming. Merchant familes had formed the old commercial
banks in order to finance a thriving trade business and to facilitate
the settlement of trade obligations. The oil boom had triggered a
rapid growth in economic activities including the banking sector.
This led gradually to a concentration of power among these families.
Effectively, commercial banks are the main deposit taking
institutions and the only clearing banks in the country. They
captured 84 percent of total deposits of the banking sector in 1985.
Deposits come from individuals, corporations, government and inter-
bank sources as well. Generally, specialised banks are not
authorised to handle deposit accounts for the public. However, two
of the specialised banks, KREB and CSB are authorised to open saving
accounts solely for their borrowers.	 Interestingly, the private
sector deposits in the Kuwaiti commercial banks are predominantly
time (term) deposits. In 1985, for example, they constituted 72
percent of dinar deposits while sight and saving deposits accounted
for 17 percent and 11 percent respectively.1
It has been shown (Chapter 4) that the needs for finance are met by
commercial and specialised banking and non-banking institutions. At
present, Kuwaiti banks offer a certain range of retail and corporate
products. These include consumer finance, and personal and corporate
loans to various economic sectors.
Over the years, personal, financial loans and trade loans have
captured more than 75 percent of the banks' total lending. This
demonstrates the significance of short-term loans in the operations
of commercial banks. On average, 10 percent of banks' loans go to
the construction sector.
Commercial banks are leaders in the industry. In 1985, commercial
banks' total assets exceeded those of the specialised banks by 4.3
times and the non-bank investment companies by 5.7 times. Lending
1 However, time deposits represented 59% of the sum of dinar and
foreign currency deposits in the same year. Data on deposits
is collected from CRK economic report, 1985, pp 158-60.
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has grown from less than 47.7 percent to 52.3 percent of the
commercial banks total resources (1980-85).
In the early 1970s, 80 percent of lending was in the form of
overdrafts. In 1983, overdraft facilities accounted for 67 percent
of total bank lending1 ; evidently greater than the 40 percent ceiling
that has been set up by the Central Bank. The banks use other short-
term lending facilities including discounting of commercial papers,
promissory notes and revolving credit. 2 Virtually all commercial
banks extend term loans domestically on a small scale, and for
periods not exceeding three to five years for large corporations and
first class borrowers (whose credit rating is very good).
In the field of international lending, banks arrange financial and
guarantee facilities to international contractors working in Kuwait
and the Gulf area. Apart from direct lending, banks and non-bank
financial institutions arrange market and sovereign lending and act
as lead managers and co-managers in syndicated loans locally and
abroad. Their clients are government, corporate and financial
institutions. This is not surprising given the fact that commercial
banks' foreign assets comprise 30-38 percent of the banks' total
resources (1980-1984).
Commercial and specialised banks including investment companies buy
and sell securities; these are mainly bonds, floating and fixed rate
notes (FRNs), and negotiable certificates of deposits to financial
institutions and the private sector in Kuwait and abroad. Banks
issue CDs and FRNs to support their capital base and sometimes to
expand their lending capacity.
1	 See Capital Int'l, "Kuwaiti Money Market & Banking Report",
1984, p11.
2	 A commitment by a bank allowing a customer to roll-over credit.
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Among the respondents to our questionnaire, only the Gulf Bank
has acknowledged that certain partnerships on a PLS basis were
conducted. This is the only Islamic financing instrument that has
been used, so far, in this bank. 1 Recently though the bank has
opened an investment window whereby a team manages an investment
portfolio on Islamic principles. None of the respondents to the
questionnaire provided hire-purchase, factoring or leasing finance.
The major characteristics of the Kuwaiti specialised banks'
operations are surmnarized below:
1) long-term lending and equity participation are the main
features of the Kuwaiti specialized banks. For example, IBK
provides industrial loans and may share in the equity of
industrial ventures.	 It is not allowed though to extend
overdrafts on a soft interest basis.
ii) KREB extends construction and real estate loans. Although it is
not permitted to provide equity finance it is allowed to share
in the equity of real estate, and other investment companies
and financial institutions domestically and overseas.
iii) Among the specialized banks only the Credit and Savings Bank
provide housing finance via interest-free loans. However,
deposits with the bank earn interest and the bank is free to
invest its surplus in interest-bearing assets.
KFH CURRENT PRACTICES
An outline of KFH operation is presented in Chapter 4. This section
is confined to suminarising the basic features of KFH practices as
shown in the matrix (Figure 6.1).
Since its inception in 1977, KFH has concentrated its operations on
Murabaha financing, financing of international and internal trade,
and real estate investments. Thus, not all instruments which are
allowed by Sharia are currently practised by KFH.
1.	 Though the bank refused to disclose further information about
the magnitude of such arrangements
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For instance, KFH is not currently very active, if at all, in
Musharaka financing. There have been occasions when KF1-I has resorted
to Mudaraba financing, but the results were not encouraging)
However KFH has recently been involved in real estate investments on
a "restricted Mudaraba" basis.2
Not all FCFIs are currently used by KFH. For example: investment
auctioning (see long-term finance) is not appropriate in Kuwait as
IBK provides the finance needed for industrial projects. Muzaraah
and Musaqa.t 3 are of minor importance in Kuwait as the country is not
a rural area; in any case the Agricultural Authority provides land,
seeds and agricultural tools as grants to the farmers.
As in most Islamic banks Istisnaa (deferred purchase) is not, so far,
widely practised. 4 All loans bearing interest are not applied in
KFH. Also all debatable FRFIs are not practised by KFH.
1. Management gave no details of the outcome. However such
disappointments should not debar the opportunities for Mudaraba
financing with the right partners.
2. Faisal al-Zamel, Beit al-Tamweel (KFH), Al-Qabas No 4882, 14
December 1985.
3. Muzaraah is a leasing contract of an arid land whereby the
landlord shares the produce with the tenants on an agreed upon
ratio. Musaqat is a leasing contract of an orchard whereby the
tenant must pay his share in cash and not in kind.
4. A contract allowing the purchaser (e.g. a bank) to pay the
total price of an industrial product in advance.
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SUMMARY
The existing banking system is characterised by the following
features:
1. Commercial banking activities dominate the banking sector.
2. Time deposits are significantly higher than demand and saving
deposits.
3. Conunercial banks concentrate on personal, financial and trade
credit. This makes the banking business vulnerable; activity
increases in a boom and decreases in recession.
4. Overdrafts dominate the lending facilities of commercial banks.
5. Bonds of various types (CDs, FRNs) are issued by leading
investment companies, specialised and commercial banks. The
banking system is active in sovereign lending and syndicated
loans.
6. KFH is concentrating on Murabaha, trading activities and real
estate development. There are no inàications that this trend
is likely to change in the forseeable future.
Deficiencies in the Existing Banking System
In what follows, the deficiencies in the current banking system are
analysed via an Islamic perspective. Some emphasis is put on
overdraft and personal loans as they represent a sizeable portion of
the banks' lending operations in Kuwait. The repercussions of the
stockniarket crash are also analysed as they unveil major gaps in the
current financial system.
Lower demand for oil and the subsequent collapse in prices in the mid
l9SOs have significantly decreased the government's revenues. This
has caused a slowdown in growth and reflected in weaker public sector
demand for goods and services. Additionally, overambitious projects
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in construction and commercial buildings have led to an oversupply
resulting in lower prices of real estate and a lower occupancy rate
than before the recession.
As far as banks are concerned, there has been a dramatic decline in
industrial loans, a drop in the growth of construction and trade
loans and an upsurge in loan losses, particularly in the aftermath of
the stock market collapse. The banks' inadequate assessment of the
long-range trends 1 in the market have contributed to the upsurge in
loan losses. The banking system currently needs to adjust to this
new business environment and to make a positive contribution to
economic recovery.
Injustice and Inequity
The current banking system is based on a debtor/creditor
relationship. In this system, loans must be paid on maturity
regardless of the outcome of the business to which credit was
initially granted. Even if the borrower incurs a loss and assuming
that the chances for rescheduling or postponement are exhausted, the
debt must be paid. Alternatively, the borrower will have to be
declared bankrupt or will have to liquidate some assets, if
available, to meet his obligations. Lenders increase their wealth
and financial influence in society by seizing the pledged assets
whenever a boirower goes under.2
See J R Presley, op cj, 1985, p50.
2	 A comparable example in Kuwait history is the case of the first
stock market crisis in the late 1970s. Large investment
companies bailed out traders by buying their shares at low
prices. Two years later, the companies realised a hugh capital
gain. Also in the case of the UK, heavy industries have
borrowed heavily and were in default. Old equity was simply
taken from the old shareholders and new papers were issued to
the buyers (the commercial banks and the Bank of England). A
few years later the banks sold the papers at higher prices;
from a discussion with Professor J B Tew.
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Consequently, the borrower's wealth or equity base is eroded. This
is hardly justified particularly if losses were the outcome of
adverse business conditions over which the borrower has no control
(eg, trade barriers that were abruptly imposed by government, or bad
weather that damaged crops, etc).
The current financial system encourages savers to become 'passive
lenders', ie to collect a guaranteed interest by waiting.
Furthermore, lenders, under the current system, are rewarded for
taking little or no risk. By contrast, savers/investors who
establish productive enterprises and are willing to take risk are not
given any guarantee.1
Disenchantment of Profitable Business
Commercial banks in Kuwait, as elsewhere, are generally more
concerned with collateral than with the purpose of the loan or the
type of the borrower's business.
The typical bank's policy of financing borrowers who have sufficient
assets provide those borrowers with the opportunity to increase their
wealth or to spend lavishly if the loan was a personal or a name
loan. In contrast, small businesses, which may have the expertise,
are denied credit owing to a lack of collateral. 	 The promising
business is therefore denied the opportunity to grow and prosper.
The banks have been concerned primarily with expansion and attracting
deposits, but in the process have neglected important financing
tasks. The commercial banks are currently reluctant to provide - on
a considerable scale - small business finance, risk and seed capital
for new ventures or new products. 2 Long-term development finance to
industry, fisheries and agriculture has also been somewhat restricted
by the banks. Furthermore the banks have failed, particularly before
the Al-Manakh era, to spread lending more efficiently between
productive and non-productive sectors.
1	 M Siddiqi, Issues in Islamic Bankin g , 1983, p73.
2 By contrast, some banks and investment companies have
established First Venture Capital - to invest in the USA -
capitalised at US $25ni.
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More signficantly, their tendency to hold low or risk-less assets
undermine their role and means that intermediation through banks is
inefficient (see Chapter 7 - Efficiency of Islamic Banking).1
Gaps in Borrowing/Lending Instruments
Potential borrowes do not have the choice of a wide variety of
instruments for raising funds. Apart from issuing shares, borrowers
have limited kinds of debt instruments; issuing bonds, for example,
is restricted to banks and large investment companies.
Off-balance sheet financing is restricted to issuing bank guarantees,
acceptances, documentary letters of credit and documentary bills for
collection. At present, short term lending by Kuwaiti banks focuses
on overdrafts, revolving credits, and discounting of promissory notes
or other commercial bills. It is widely recognised that banks favour
large corporations and wealthy businessmen in granting overdrafts,
personal and financial loans over smaller entrepreneurs. Such
practices may lead to an inequitable allocation of resources as the
funds do not go to the enterprises or sectors that need them most,2
or to those that are more productive than a credit worthy borrower.
On the other hand, what appears to be a good risk today because of
credit worthiness and good reputation might not be true tomorrow. It
is equally true that terms such as 'credit worthiness' and 'sound
reputation' might conceal ineptness and incompetence if the banks
were to rely on general features and appearances rather than on the
actual financial position of the borrowers. Even when the financial
position is examined, it is usually not scrutinised enough where good
quality borrowers are concerned.3
Same observation was made by Karken, J L & Wallice, N; see
"Deposit Insurance & Bank Regulations: A Partial Equilibrium
Exposition", Journal of Business, Vol 51, 1978, cited in Wagar,
M, 1985, p83.
2	 KhatKhat and Riechel, "Multipurpose Banking", IMF Staff Paper,
Vol 23, 1980, p510.
3 This favourtism in lending is quite evident from the number of
defaulters. Two hundred borrowers (0.34% of total defaulters)
got KD 2.7bn (60%) out of KD 4.4bn of non-performing loans
whereas 75% of borrowers got small loans (not exceeding KD
100,000).	 See the author's "Debt Crisis in Kuwait", o p cit,
1986, p23.
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In the final analysis quite often the lending decision is based on
personal judgments and knowledge of the borrower's family rather than
on financial statements. However, the banks do not lean on thin air,
owing to their responsibilities towards the depositors. Hence they
put a ceiling on the maximum amount of overdraft permitted to one
person or entity. In addition, some Kuwaiti banks may require
partial freezing on the clients' savings accounts if certain
conditions are not met, though an overdraft is defined as an
unsecured loan. Also, the Kuwiait banks are happy with regard to the
duration of the facility which is by definition short-term and may
ask the client to pay back at any time before maturity. Yet the risk
lies in the fact that, more often than not, the banks have been
obliged to roll over the facility rather than call it off. In fact,
this appears to be a sensible approach to follow in order to preserve
a good working relationship with the client by granting him another
chance hoping for the best.
For the borrower, this facility is convenient and flexible as it is
used when money is needed, and the interest will be calculated on the
outstanding balance at each interval. Thus, the borrower obtains
cheaper funds at relatively cheaper rates than direct loans. Another
feature of this facility is that the bank is not concerned with the
purpose for which the money is used as long as the conditions of
security arid repayment are met.
Therefore, it is not surprising to discover that the current lending
operations in the Kuwaiti banks are simple and conventional and that
they need only minor supervision and control. Also, the type of
financing does not require a high degree of managerial capability and
sophistication.
Gaps in the Stock Harket Related Lending
The preoccupation of commercial banks in passive lending particularly
through unsecured personal and financial loans has encouraged an
excessive speculation in real estate and in the stock market. Some
banks have even failed to exercise reasonable diligence in financing
speculators. Purchasers of shares could borrow up to 100 percent of
the value from brokers or finance companies. There were no strict
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regulations for fixing the minimum or maximum margin requirements.
Banks used to lend on unregistered Gulf shares though they were
banned later by the Central Bank. Brokers and traders were free to
lend on such stocks for the purchase of Kuwaiti registered shares or
as collateral. In practice, many other regulations were violated.
For example, some banks have lent to their directors prior to
obtaining shareholders' approval as required by their charters.
Al-Manakh and it's Repercussions
The Al-Manakh saga has caused political, social and economic problems
that could have been more devastating had the government not been
able to offer solutions and commit public funds. The major
repercussions have been:-
1. Land prices have fallen far short of the expectations of
dealers. Consequently, the huge capital gains that were
expected in the peak years have given way to huge capital
losses.
2. The capital base of the banks has deteriorated and abnormal
reserves have been depleted in a bid to compensate for doubtful
debts.
3
	
	
Kuwait's financial reputation in the international money and
capital markets has been badly hurt.
4
	
	
Confidence and trust among dealers and traders, deeply
cherished in Kuwaiti society, have been shaken.
5
	
	
Many factories, commercial and service firms have been forced
to close down and thousands of workers have been made
redundant. In addition, companies that survived the crisis
have often experienced abnormal cash shortages and have not
been able to pay their salaried employees.
6
	
	
Many investors' life savings have been wiped out or diminshed
signficantly.
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The government had to draw on foreign reserves to avert a banking
collapse and to restore confidence in the banking system.
Consequently, the stock market collapse gave rise to a massive debt
default known as the "debt crisis". The number of debtors who failed
to service their debts reached 59,064 owing KD 4.4 billion to the
banking sector at the beginning of 1985. Unserviceable loans
represented 40% of total sector financing.
After two years of volatility and turmoil the government put forward
a programme to solve the debt crisis. Briefly, the rescue package
called for the following:
(a) Rescheduling of secured and unsecured debts over a ten year
period net of interest for firms with negative cash flows.
(b) Defaulters with positive cash flow paying from six to seven
percent interest on non-performing loans over a 15 year period.
(c) The convergence of debt to equity.
(d) Debtors's companies became eligible for working capital or
refinancing facilities, provided the new loan is given upon
careful evaluation of the borrowers' companies.
(e) Commitments by state to support the banks' shareholders and
depositors' rights.
The stock market collapse also revealed many gaps in the current
financial system which are in violation of Sharia code of business
ethics; in particular these are:
-	 indulgence in nba at exorbitant rates that were far beyond the
legal ceiling rates.
-	 Selling what one does not own, or buying what one cannot afford
to buy.	 For example, selling orders were not backed by
possession of the stock. Dealers used to trade from their own
account without any restrictions on volumes, margins or prices.
-	 Committing 'gharar' by artificially creating a rise in prices.
Individual financial investors (the market makers), including
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some top banking officials, were able to make 'monopoly' gains
for themselves. They used to bid prices up by creating
artificial demand or by fixing the price that reflected their
biased desire rather than the expected future return of the
share.
With the traditional emphasis on trade and name loans (personal and
financial), many banks have not been able to react quickly to the
changing pattern of finance, nor to the decline in economic activity.
Weak control by the supervisory authority and lack of strategic
planning and long-range forecasts of markets, sectors and political
trends have further exacerbated the banking problems.
The overall sector financing by conunercial banks tended to decline
rather than increase, reflecting the downturn in the economy. Above
all, this revealed the unwillingness or incapacity of banks to
identify and pursue profitable customers or business. Non-conformity
with current laws and Islamic business ethics among market
practitioners, favouritism in lending, the encouragement of
speculative activities, and inappropriate financing methods show that
the current financial system is inherently inequitable and
inefficient and leads to excessive speculation in financial and real
assets. Under these circumstances, the current system must adapt to
the future financial requirements examined in the following section.
How Banks Can Res pond to Future Financial Requirements
The Kuwaiti banks need to cope with structural changes in the
economy.	 These changes are manifested in the decline in Oi
revenues, growing importance of overseas investments, the
introduction of treasury bills to finance the deficit, near
completion of infrastructure projects coupled with a persistent
slowdown in economic activities. Falling loan demand and the absence
of a government stimulus have further reduced the growth in banking
business. Thanks to the debt settlement programmes, the banks are
presently closing the final chapters on the Souk Al-Manakh debacle
and its ramifications including the debt crisis.
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Faced with these problems, the banks must redefine their strategies
and reorient policies in order to absorb the new changes in the local
and international financial requirements. The banks need to
recognise their social responsibilities and reallocate resources by
increasing their investments and the financing of the productive
sectors in the economy. For example, the setting up of a special
fund to provide medium to long-term loans would be a sensible
approach in order to increase the supply of loanable funds to small
and medium sized manufacturing companies, and the newly emerging
agricultural sector.
Another area that has been neglected to date is export finance. The
banks need to offer this facility in order to help Kuwaiti producers
in selling their products in an extremely competitive Gulf market.
Export credit provides exporters with cash on delivery of their goods
and enables them to grant medium-term credit to Gulf importers. In
order to decrease the long-term commitment of commercial banks, loans
could be syndicated among several banks. Alternatively, commercial
banks can provide short-term export credit while medium-term loans
could be arranged through IBK.
In many countries, specialised banks were established to provide
export credit and export insurance as well (eg, Export-Import Bank
(EXIM) - USA and the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) -UK).
There is no need at present for an export bank in Kuwait as IBK could
provide this facility in co-operation with commercial banks.
The banking industry is a service industry. 	 There are many
possibilities for broadening the banks' advisory and consulting
business. The banks need to expand their advisory role in
sophisticated areas such as fund management, merger and acquisition,
real estate funds and trust management. These services generate fees
for the banks and provide important services for Kuwaiti investors.
The importance of trade to the banks' customers and the increasing
international orientation of the Kuwaiti economy require the banks to
offer advice on commercial, economic and political conditions of
foreign countries. Usually, banks have an economics department
though they seldom provide these services to customers.
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Bank lending in the western hemisphere is transforming gradually into
securitisation and globalisation. Through securitisation, corporate
bonds are replacing loan contracts. Clobalisation means that trading
can take place any time of the day through most of the financial
centres worldwide. The success of these facilities depends on the
development of an active money and capital market in Kuwait.
Banking control has been heading towards deregularisation in the
European and American banking systems. By contrast, banks in Kuwait
are currently subjected to tight monetary and prudential control by
the Central Bank. This might hinder banking expansion and innovation
into new markets or products.
We have discussed in the previous sections the gaps in the existing
banking system and the future financial requirements. In what
follows the capacity of the Islamic banking to fulfill the current
gaps and to meet the future financial requirements are discussed. In
this regard, two questions are dealt with: (a) what Islamic banking
can do to improve the financial system, and (b) how it would do it.
The Islamic Alternative
Objectives of the New System
The new approach is based on the Kuwaiti culture and beliefs that
were deeply cherished in old Islamic societies. Identifying the
objectives of the new system would largely contribute to its
implementation on a solid foundation. These objectives are outlined
below:
1. emphasise the relationship between Islamic norms and the
dadfunctions of the economy including the banking
syiiand
2. fill the gaps in the existing financial system and provide
Islamic finance to all economic sectors based on their needs in
accordance with a new development plan.
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3. establish a banking system based on profit and loss
pEtc ipation ie0r7creait0._xe1at10nshiP.
4. conduct monetary policy and reorganise the control and
supervision of the ceF bank in compliance with a free-
integd-eeommy.
5. attract and promote long-term saving behaviour in the Kuwaiti
society.
6. create public awareness of the Islamic banking system and its
benefits .
SPECIFIC AREAS
Financinz Small Businesses Without Collateral:
The Third Development Plan (1985/86-1989/90) calls amongst other
things for diversifying the sources of income, enhancing
technological advancement and increasing the involvement of young
Kuwaitis in scientific research.
Attaining these objectives must involve changing current attitudes
and policies. These changes are required in order to foster
entrepreneurial spirit and encourage innovation into new ventures and
products. The drive for a balanced and indigenous population is
unlikely to materialise without helping young Kuwaitis to become
self-independent. One way to achieve this goal is by self-employment
and by encouraging young Kuwaitis to establish their own businesses.
Small companies are not qualified for listings in the stock exchange.
Hence, they cannot issue shares and bonds in the capital market.
They do not have access to the money market either, also they cannot
offer collateral in order to be eligible for bank credit.2
1	 Ahmad El-Naggar, from a press conference held in Turkish
Cyprus, 22 September 1987.
2 H C Horst Albach, "Views on the International Symposium on a
New Strategy of Development from Below", Kibrus (Turkish
Cyprus), 23-27, Sept 1987, p2.
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The prohibition of interest paves the way for a new concept in
banking, financing and lending criteria. It would be possible to
finance small ventures and proprietorships which have the expertise
but lack collateral. The emphasis is being put on project evaluation
and expected profitability more than on collateral. Furthermore, in
Mudaraba and Musharaka, for example, the financier is not even
allowed in the ordinary course of business to obtain guarantees of
any sort from the entrepreneur.
Financing Risky Projects
The possibility of financing risky projects would be enhanced as the
Islamic banks are under no obligation to issue fixed financial claims
to their depositors. 1
 More significantly, the Islamic banks, through
equity participation, are not only taking risk but are also providing
long-term finance. Hence, the Islamic banks can assist the
government and quasi government institutions in financing venture
capital and providing development loans. The financial system, at
present, depends on the government for providing development and
industrial loans; the consequence has been that the financial needs
of small business and venture capitalists are not met.
Leasing - A Possible Alternative
There are a great many investments which could be financed by
leasing. Leasing and hire purchase are currently funded outside the
banking system. There is a great opportunity for leasing and hire
purchase to flourish in an Islamic system, even without a tax
advantage. First, leasing is one of the backbones of Islamic
finance. 2 Second, Ijara Waktina is a flexible form of finance and it
can be for short, medium or long-term periods. Third, it can be used
for financing consumer durables or for financing equipment and
machinery.
1	 Wagar, M, 1985, p83.
2	 The advantages of leasing are discussed here, for details on
Islamic leasing see Chapter 2.
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Fourth, leasing in particular provides facilities for long-range
corporate planning as it is not affected by fluctuations in interest
rates or inflation, and can be stretched over longer time periods
than traditional loans.1
Solving an Acute Problem and Offering New Alternatives
Some Kuwaiti. commercial and industrial firms are currently solvent
but temporary illiquid. Some others are capital short and need fresh
capital to restore their equity base. Several factors have
contributed to these problems, but particularly:-
1. Tumbling sales (despite heavy discounts) caused by persistent
depression, fierce competition and loss of regional markets.
2. Difficulty in collecting debts, particularly if the debtor has
been referred to the debt settlement programme or has been hurt
by stock market related activities.
Consequently, many firms have not been able to serve their debts
despite several postponements and rescheduling. Moreover, those
firms with average profits but heavy debt obligation have seen their
earnings fail to cover the debt service. Those firms with adequate
profit and manageable debts are reluctant to service them. Both
categories (those who can and those who cannot service their debts)
are demanding concessions such as lower interest or decreased
installments. Some also demand a waiver of interest as is the case
with defaulters under the debt settlement programme.
A means, therefore, has to be found whereby financial institutions
can give the necessary support of active though illiquid firms, to
enable them to alleviate their liquidity shortages. Waiver of
interest alone, though plausible as it may be from an Islamic point
of view, may not entirely solve the problem if interest were not
1	 See Rosemund Jones, "Sunny Outlook Gives Le&se of Life",
jomoney, January 1987, pp116-126.
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prohibited on a nationwide basis. A fresh approach to solve the
problem is therefore more relevant than at any time before. A new
Islamic approach would alter the lender/debtor relationship by
introducing a partnership based on converting debts into equity.
According to this approach, debtors would sell to the creditors
profit-linked certificates for the value of outstanding loans and of
acceptable denominations. 	 [These certificates would be called
redeemable participation certificates (RPCs).] Essentially, the
banks should not get involved in running the debtors' companies.
Therefore, it is assumed that the existing ownership structure of
these companies should remain unchanged. The RPCs may not have a
voting right except in cases of liquidation or merger of the related
companies. The RPCs would be negotiable-bearer certificates.
Negotability helps in creating a secondary market and provides the
banks with liquidity when needed.
In addition, more than one bank may become a holder of RPCs of the
same conpany. In such cases, banks A and B may exchange their
certificates in companies X and Y respectively. Thus, each bank may
consolidate its holdings in one company, especially if that bank
happens to be a prime lender to a particular company(s). On the
other hand, the legal rights of these banks as creditors will be
protected by the commercial law all the same. The RPCs would yield a
net profit (dividends) prorate with the ordinary shares. (Net profit
is defined as the amount available for the distribution of dividends
and after all operating expenses are deduced in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles.)
The implementation of equity financing should be conditional upon
careful examination of the companies financial performance, and in
particular, on the expected positive cash flow to be generated.
Hence, the decision to go ahead according to this approach will
largely depend upon the projects ability to generate net revenues
rather than the absolute dependence on the social status of the
borrowers or their collateral. The current experience has revealed
that neither of these two features have correlated with the ability
to maintain current liquidity; the banks have been unable to recover
their loan's as the value of collateral has declined considerably.
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It would be plausible if the Central Bank would agree to buy the RPCs
at par or allow their inclusion in the liquidity reserve ratio. The
banks inevitably are also expected to inject more money to the proven
viable debtors to alleviate their liquidity problems. The new
funding by the banks would take either of several forms; First, in
case the funds are needed to finance the purchase of capital goods or
for working capital purposes, it is suggested that the banks could
resort to Murabaha (mark-up on sale) financing. (By Murabaha the
banks procure and then sell the goods or the materials required by
their clients/debtors on a cost-plus basis.) Second, the instrument
of financing could also take the form of the hire purchase method
(Ijara Wa'Ktina). Here the risk is minimal provided that the
borrower signs an irrevocable binding agreement to purchase the hired
asset at a definite future date.
Moreover, there are many good arguments in favour of profit-linked
certificates, as opposed to rescheduling. These include firstly the
argument that the borrower will no longer have to worry about payment
of interest charges at times of financial difficulties and during a
depressed market, as currently is the case. In other words, the
debtors will be relieved from the burden of paying interest which is
chargeable against profits. Secondly, the sharing of banks in the
profit of the ventures may well exceed the interest earned under the
previous system. However, in case of losses, the banks would be
liable to lose a part or the whole of their invested capital. Again
there is always the possibility of profits in subsequent years that
might offset the losses incurred earlier. Thirdly, the scheme is
flexible and allows the banks to recapture their capital whenever the
companies cash flow permits. Thus, the participation may be for
short-term, medium or long-term, depending on the consent of the
parties and the availability of surplus funds in the debtor's vaults.
Summary and Remarks
Commercial banks have recently introduced a wide variety of new
products internationally and to some extent in Kuwait. These include
credit cards, automated teller machines (ATM), travellers cheques,
barter trade, security funds, investment trusts and real estate
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funds. There is also a shift in focus from commercial banking to
private or personal banking. 1
 A bank of the future is one that can
offer a broad range of financial services. These services would
include: the usual credit business, deposits and clearing services,
advice on investment opportunities, country and currency risk,
interest rate trends, investment management and market information.
Most of the above-mentioned activities could be offered by Islamic
banks on PLS, or cost-plus or fee basis.
We have focussed here on the need for providing risk capital, small
business and development finance. Islamic banking can provide the
needs of current and future financial requirements through various
means including: securitisation (eg, RPCs), equity participation and
equity swaps, leasing and murabaha.
More importantly, an Islamic solution has been recommended for
supporting the capital base or liquidity positions of debtors'
companies. An implementation of this proposal would, (a) reactive
the commercial and manufacturing sectors, and (b) tackle the
financial difficulties which are currently engulfing companies that
were subjected to the debt settlement programme. In what follows, we
focus on two issues:
i) 1-low Islamic banking can provide short, medium and long-term
finance and what instruments are currently applied or proposed
for future consideration by Islamic banks.
ii) The workings of monetary policy and the capital market under
Islamic principles.
1	 See Gulf Economies and International Report, Gulf International
Bank, (GIB), May 1986, Vol 1, No 5, p3.
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Islamic Short. Medium and Long-Term Financing
The Kuwaiti banking system with the exception of KFH and CSB is based
on interest. It is to be expected that overdrafts, discounting of
bills and direct loans have no role to play in an Islamic banking
system) Moreover, there are certain modern financing techniques
such as leasing or sale and lease back that could be easily modified
in compliance with Sharia as there are similar counterparts in
Islamic finance (Ijara and Ijara-Waqtina).
The traditional methods of Islamic finance such as Mudaraba,
Musharaka, Murabaha, leasing, Ijara Waqtina, Bai-Salam were discussed
in Chapter 2.
As we have seen, the Islamic financing methods such as Murabaha or
Musharaka are used to finance foreign trade and working capital,
while by Ijara and leasing the needs of the business community for
capital and durable goods can be met. Consumer loans can also be
arranged through Murabaha, Ijara or Bai-Salam.
Some new financing methods which have not been applied, or are not
widely spread are discussed in this section in the following order:
1. Short-term finance: forward purchase, bridging finance,
transaction loans, consumer finance, financial and personal
loans, factoring.
2. Medium- and long-term finance: equity finance, subordinated
capital, project finance, investment auctioning, commercial
real estate financing, instalment finance2.
1. Though discounting of bills is practised in Pakistan and Iran
after the abolition of interest this does not mean that they
are lawful (according to the majority of IJiama (Sharia
jurists)). For an Islamic alternative for discounting of bills
by the Central Bank see Islamic monetary policy.	 -
2. This classification is for exposition, as installment finance and
transaction loans could be short-or medium-term as shown in Tables
6.1 and 6.2.
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Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present the various needs for finance and how
these needs are met according to Sharia. The tables show also the
application of various financing media on the corporate and personal
level respectively as envisaged for Kuwait. Thus, instruments that
are debatable or not suitable for Kuwait are excluded from the tables
(e.g. investment auctioning, factoring). For example, investment
auctioning is impractical for Kuwait. The state provides land (at
nominal rent fees) and IBK finance the cost of the venture. Besides,
investment auctioning, even if it were Islamically acceptable, is
more suitable for developing countries with centrally planned
economies1.
1.	 The reason for excluding factoring from the table is because it
is debatable and only lawful instruments are mentioned.
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Table 6.1: Corporate Finance
Financing Media
SHORT - TERM APPLICATIONS
Working capital
Trade finance
Stock underwriting
Non- recurring
transactions
Trading in conuno-
dities (other than
gold and silver)
Murabaha, forward purchase, interest-free
loans, trade credit
Murabaha, Musharaka, Mudaraba, deferred
payment
Bridging finance
Transaction loans (Murabaha, instalment
sale)
Bai al-Ajal (sales credit)
Liquidity shortages Redeemable participation, sale of assets,
subordinated capital, rescheduling of debts,
interest-free loans
Pre-operating and 	 Equity finance, trade credit
start-up cost
LONG-TERM APPLICATIONS
Venture capital
	
Musharaka, Project finance
Purchase of capital Hire-purchase, leasing, Murabaha
goods
Financing of large Project finance
proj ects
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Table 6.2: Consumer and Personal Finance
SHORT-TERM APPLICATIONS
vii) Emergencies and liquidity
shortages
vi)	 Short-term transactional
demand
ix)	 Consumer products
FINANCING MEDIA
Interest-free loans
cooperative loans
Interest-free loans
cooperative loans
Hire-purchase, Bai al-Ajal
Murabaha
x) Agricultural produce	 Bai- Salam
xi) Cultivation of barren land 	 Muz araah
xii) Cultivation of fertile land 	 Musaqat
SHORT-TERM FINANCE
Forward Purchase
Forward purchase is a fourteenth century old trading contract.
Though it has not found its application in Islamic banking, it is a
convenient method of financing working capital requirements of
industrial, agricultural or commercial enterprises. The Islamic bank
advances the funds needed against a binding promise by the recipient
(debtor) of forward delivery of the merchandise. The price of the
goods would be determined by mutual agreement taking into
consideration the ruling or market wholesale price, if available, of
similar products. The conditions pertaining to this type of contract
stipulate that there be:1
1.	 A Al-Salous, 1983, Fil Be yuh Wal Nugud Wal Bunouk, (Doha: Dar
al-Haramayn, 1983), pp67-69.
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i) advance payment at the time of the deal
ii) deferred delivery of the merchandise
iii) the listing of the exact specification of the product and time
of delivery.
The foregoing reveals that forward purchase is a modern application
of Istisna' (a request for manufacturing).
The Islamic modes of finance have been criticised and its proponents
have admitted shortcomings in providing the working capital needs of
business. However, there is a growing awareness in Islamic financial
circles of the importance of developing new financing instruments.
By forward purchase the bank is actually financing the working
capital needed to procure a commodity or product. By this we mean
that financing could cover, for example, three months worth of
production (i.e. finished goods). Ironically the bank would be
financing three months supply of the following:
1. Raw materials cost
2. Labour wages	 -
3. Overheads and utilities
4. Depreciation
5. General and administrative expenses.
Nevertheless, the successful application of forward purchase depends
to a great extent on: (a) the goodwill of the parties; (b)
compliance with Sharia, e.g. the products cannot be sold by the bank
before delivery; (c) enforcement of a Fair Trading Act that would
lay down standards and practices to eliminate exploitation,
profiteering and disputes.
If applied properly forward purchase may overcome some shortcomings
of Islamic short-term finance for small as well as large
manufacturing companies.
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Bridging Finance
Islamic banks in Pakistan are providing this facility in terms of
firm commitment or underwriting of public issues of shares. The
issuing company would normally issue an allotment letter in the form
of a participation term certificate (PTC). The PTCs may be redeemed
out of the proceeds of the public offering of shares.
Bankers Equity Limited of Pakistan charge the issuing company a fee
that may reach up to 12% per annum commencing from the date of
release of each instalment to the date of start-up of commercial
production. This discount is locally defined as the "pre-commercial
discount" and may be viewed as disguised interest.
Needless to say this method of bridge financing, as employed in
Pakistan, seems to be in violation of Sharia since the advancement by
the banks during construction or the initial stages of share offer
does not justify the payment of a fixed fee unless it is a commission
fee (Joalah). However, the question is whether the company could
offer the shares at discount (below par) as an incentive for the
bankers and institutional investors who are committed to underwrite
the issue1 . If the issue is successful the underwiters may, if they
wish, dispose of the shares at market price and make a capital gain
should the price of the shares go up, notwithstanding that prices may
go down as well as up. The second option would be to retain the
shares until after commercial production, aiming for income.
1. It is difficult to determine what discount could be offered
before agreeing on the permissibility of fixing two prices one
for the pre-launch offer and the second for ordinary investors.
This issue has to be cleared by Islamic scholars.
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Transaction Loans
If a firm needs short-term financing for a non-recurring transaction,
it is advised in the conventional system to obtain an individual
transaction loan. For example, if a landlord wants to buy new
furniture for his furnished condominiums, he might obtain a
transaction loan for that particular purpose. The customer saves the
commitment fees that would otherwise be compulsory in a revolving
credit arrangement.
Transaction loans, as defined above, may be financed by Murabaha,
credit sale or instalment sale in compliance with Sharia.
Consumer Finance
Consumer finance, or consumer credit, is credit extended to
individual customers and may be classified into sale credit and loan
credit1.
Sale credit is an agreement between a person (the debtor) and any
other person or entity (the creditor) by which the creditor (e.g. a
bank) buys an item upon the customer's request and sells it back at
the cost price plus a margin. The amount owed is repaid by one lump
sum or by instalments. Both methods are acceptable in Islamic law on
the basis of Bai al-Ajal (deferred sales) 2 . Loan credit is an
agreement between a person (the debtor) and any other person or
entity by which the debtor obtains cash and promises to repay at a
specified time in the future.
1. Jacobs et al, 1974, p.168.
2. There are some jurists, however, who oppose adding a premium on
sale credit over cash sale. Virtually all Islamic banks with
the approval of their Sharia Boards collect a premium on sale
credit. Rafic al-Masri has pointed out that the increase over
the face value of a loan is nba, whereas the increment in sale
credit (in lieu of the deferred payment) or the discount for
early payment is lawful. See Derasat Fi al-Igtisad al-Islami
(Studies ii Islamic Economics) 2nd International Conference in
Islamic Economics, Jeddah, CRIE, 1985, p.172.
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It is worth mentioning that only the Kuwait Finance House provides
sale credit, whereas all commercial banks in Kuwait provide loan
credit. There is a significant difference between an Islamic bank and
the conventional banks in Kuwait which merits some thought. In
principle, KFH is not allowed by its charter or by Sharia code to
deal in straight loans. On the other hand, the commercial banks are
banned by the banking act and the Kuwait commercial law to buy and
sell consumer products or engage in sale credit.
Financial and Personal Loans
Financial loans in Kuwait include basically loans to brokers and
dealers to finance security trading, o for the purchase of shares on
the margin. Such transactions are not likely to exist in Islamic
finance for two basic reasons: interest and speculation (see Islamic
capital markets).
There is reason to believe that unsecured personal loans (as known in
the current system) will decline after the abolition of interest.
However, there would be a need to extend unsecured benevolent loans
to those who have no security through a special fund. Money could be
raised from the government, voluntary contributions and charitable
organisations, or the public.
Factoring
The major question in relation to factoring is its legality due to
the similarity between factoring and transfer of rights in Islamic
law.
Factoring is the act of selling a company's accounts receivables
(debtors) to a finance company commonly known as a "factor" or a
"factoring company". Factoring may be with or without recourse.
"With recourse" means that the factor can retrieve any bad debts
whereas in "without recourse" the factor takes over the claims and
assumes the responsibility of debt collection and the risk of
debtor's default.
	 Accordingly the fees received by the finance
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company in the second case (without recourse) is naturally higher
than in the first case (with recourse) and includes a sum covering
interest, collection charges and a premium for bad debts1.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Factoring
Factoring solves the cash flow problems of the selling company and
relieves it from the trouble of debt collection and associated costs.
On the other hand, the cost of this type of financing is higher than
for overdrafts or term loans. However, companies that resort to
factoring are normally those which have already exhausted their lines
of credit and expect a lull in trade activities.
In addition, customers are not usually receptive to factoring as they
would be obliged to deal with a finance company wi .th whom they have
never had a business relationship before. Other customers may look
at the situation differently and consider that assigning the
collection of debts to a finance company reflects the creditors'
mistrust in their financial position.
Factoring and Islamic Law
In Kuwait where business is based on personal relationships and
direct contacts, overlooking this delicate matter could result in a
significant loss of business. Probably for this reason none of the
respondents to our questionnaire used factoring at all2.
1. For more details on factoring see Oliver Wood, op cit, also
E.P. Doyle, Practice of Banking, (London, M and E Handbooks
1981, 3rd ed., pp 302-3.
2. The Gulf Bank, however, is contemplating engaging in factoring
sometime in the future as mentioned earlier.
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Factoring is a modern contract. It is not surprising, therefore,
that it was not mentioned specifically in Islamic law. However one
can easily see the similarity between factoring and the selling of
accounts receivable or debtors accounts for a specified sum of money
to be advanced to the seller. Thus the bank or factor is actually
advancing money which is less than the face value of the debts, the
difference being the interest charges plus administrative expenses
and compensating fees for bad debts (providing the contract is non-
recourse). Sharia has no objection, however, to interest-free
advances (by the bank) secured by a mortgage or by accounts
receivable.
If factoring were banned after the abolition of interest in Kuwait it
is not expected that it would have any significant impact on the
supply of loanable funds in the short term at least for the reasons
cited earlier1.
MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM FINANCE
Medium term finances are defined throughout this chapter as finances
with initial term to maturity in excess of one year but not exceeding
seven years, while longer term finances are those in excess of seven
years.
Equity Finance
An equity such as a stock is a claim against variable income 2 . This
definition applies to both the Islamic and the conventional systems.
1. It seems that M. Mohsin, whom I believe was the only writer to
discuss factoring in the literature, has accepted the
purchasing of accounts receivable and notes by Islamic banks.
He proposes some modifications of the terms and conditions
inherent in factoring to eliminate the interest element
although he did not elaborate how! See "A Profile of Riba-free
Banking", in M. Ariff, 1982, p.194. His views are not shared
by Ulaina as mentioned above.
2. Auerbach, 1983, p.17.
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At present the commercial banks lending portfolios consist of
overdrafts, discounts and straight loans. Though equity finance is
not considered a part of these activities, the banks hold equity
ownership primarily in financial institutions and investment
companies in Kuwait and abroad.
y contrast, if interest were abolished, equity finance is expected
to be one of the avenues for channelling funds to corporate
borrowers. Actually equity finance is but a form of Musharaka
between an Islamic bank and a corporation. Since this characteristic
has not been tackled comprehensively in the Islamic literature it
deserves, therefore, some explanation. This development, taken alone
(the transformation from lending to equity) demands radical changes
in the banks' assets and liability structure and provides a new
approach to finance. In this respect we have to differentiate
between holding equity shares to maintain liquidity and holding them
as a means of financing. As equity finance in the Islamic banks is
meant to be a permanent share ownership as opposed to security
trading, it ought to be matched with longer term deposits.
In the absence of an Islamic capital market, direct equity finance
would play a viable role in financing large and small firms in an
Islamic economy. From the banks point of view equities are divided in
terms of their characteristics into development, investment arid
venture capital shares. Thus Islamic banks may provide finance
throigh equity participation to serve various needs. To foster the
development of industry or any productive project, the Islamic banks
may purchase development shares (those issued by existing companies)
to finance new expansion schemes or modernization and rehabilitation.
The banks may also finance venture capital by purchasing new issued
shares in companies involved in high-technology or aiming to launch a
new product or project.
A Different Approach to Finance
Normally a company with a 1ow capital base faces difficulty in
raising funds under the conventional system. This is rather prudent
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given the fact that a company's gearing ratio (total liabilities less
equity capital divided by equity capital) measures the proportion of
equity in the total sources of funds. It is therefore an indication
of the ability to absorb losses.
By contrast, an Islamic bank would finance the same company without
sacrificing prudence, as the financing approach of an Islamic bank
would rather focus on the profitability of the enterprise. After
carrying out the normal banking evaluation techniques such as
assessment of the capital, character and capacity of the client and
if it has proven to be satisfactory along with the bank's criterion
for profitability, the Islamic bank would not only buy out the
existing creditors, but it would inject the additional funds to keep
the company afloat, provided at all times that the product(s) and the
markets are favourable.
The crux of the matter hinges upon the different perceptions accorded
to capital structure by each system, as shown in the following table.
Table 6.3: Capital Structure
At Present
	 After Abolition	 %
of Interest
Note: (a) The above figures are hypothetical and used for
illustration purposes only.
(b)	 Short-term debt need not be the same under the two
systems.
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This table not only reveals the expected changes in the Kuwaiti
companies after the abolition of interest, but gives several
indications as to the expected composition of each of the three main
sources of finance, namely capital, medium-, long- and short-term
finance (see Chapter 7).
The second major aspect of this structure is its impact on the way of
doing business in the money and capital markets, after the abolition
of interest (see summary and recommendations below).
The third aspect is the possibility of having permanent capital and
temporary capital in one company under Islamic finance. Temporary
capital is the same as redeemable participation (Chapter 2) and in
this respect it would be a good substitute for ordinary debt and
overdraft in the conventional system. Redeemable participation may
take the form of participation term certificates (PTCs) or
subordinated capital. PTCs will be discussed in the Islamic money and
capital market so we turn now to subordinated capital.
Subordinated Capital
Subordinated capital, as the name implies is a form of loan capital
subordinated to other creditors, having an initial term to maturity
and incorporating no restrictive covenants1.
In Islamic finance, subordinated capital is basically a form of
financing a venture on PLS basis but only for a specified period. It
goes without saying that subordinated capital, like many forms of
Islamic finance, do not incorporate restrictive covenants. Thus the
immediate difference between the two systems, in this repsect, lies
in the distribution of returns which is interest-based under the
conventional system and profit-related under the Islamic system.
1.	 See Bank of England Bulletin, "The Measurement of Capital",
Sept. 1980.
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As the supply of funds through this mechanism may not necessarily be
in local currency, this type of finance is especially attractive for
a financial surplus economy such as Kuwait. As it permits the supply
and/or repatriation of capital in convertible currencies, it
minimizes the risk of foreign exchange as well as facilitating the
repatriation of capital without being subjected to foreign exchange
control.
In addition, the dividends paid are treated as interest for tax
purposes, while dividends received by non-residents are tax exempt,
another added advantage!
However, subordinated capital is different from equity in that it has
no voting rights and does not share in capital gains. Equally
important, however, is that it is not liable for company losses in
the conventional system whereas it is under PLS formula'.
Suimnary and Recommendations
Equity finance and subordinated capital are expected to be among the
main instri.mients of medium to long-term PLS schemes. Other
instruments that have been discussed earlier are trust finance
(Mudaraba) and participation finance (Musharaka). Equity finance aiid
subordinated capital are means of sharing ownership between the bank
and the client. Since it is provided as a substitute for debt
financing, or even for fixed yield instruments (under Islamic
financing) its implementation should be subject to government
regulations and supervision. Notwithstanding that at all times the
authorities should aim at maintaining freedom of contracting between
the banks and their clients in comformity with the Islamic law.
These regulations might include:
1.	 Whether to give or not give the existing shareholders the right
of first refusal for the new shares
1. See UNIDO Workshop, "Islamic Financing Mechanism Available for
Islamic Banks and the Need for New Mechanism" by Jamal Attia,
June 1986, p.5.
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2. Though the banks' ownership is bound to be of a permanent
nature under adverse circumstances or liquidity shortages the
banks might be compelled at some time in the future to
liquidate some assets. Would they be allowed to sell their
equity shares and under what conditions?
3. How would the banks secure their rights and prevent possible
dilution of outstanding shares?
4. A possible solution to the points raised in 2 and 3 above would
be:
i) to issue, for example, two classes of shares, A and B.
In this case, class A would be owned by the founder
shareholders, while class B would be acquired by the
creditors and would be eligible for redemption at a
future date. In such a case the redemption ought to be
exercised in stages allowing reasonable intervals between
each exercise. This would enable the bank to cash in the
profit share and would allow the company to forecast its
cash outlay in advance.
ii) to issue convertible stocks or securities such as shares
that would be readily convertible into cash, and/or
shares having the right to transfer from one form of
holding to another, e.g. from shares to negotiable
participation term certificates (see Money and Capftal
Markets).
Project Financing
Project financing is defined as the method of "financing an economic
unit capable of generating sufficient cash flow to conservatively
cover operating cost and debt services for financing the project over
a reasonable time period which is less than the economic life of the
asset".
1.	 Peter K. Nevitt, 1979, p.167.
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Project financing has been especially important in the capital
intensive industries such as oil exploration and development, mining,
power plants and transportation. It has helped in the last few years
to provide unconventional and sometimes complex financing packages.
Its complexities stem from the multiplicity of the parties involved
and the necessity to spell out and segregate the rights and
responsibilities of each.
Advantages of Project Financing
In the context of Islamic finance, the advantages of project
financing are as follows:
1. It exemplifies the spirit of Islamic finance through Musharaka
(participation) of more than one party in financing a capital
intensive and an economically vital project
2. It provides the medium for financing large projects without
exhausting the credit rating or the credit ratio of the sponsor
3. It allows the separation of the sponsor's credit risk from that
of the project if the project is based on a non-recourse basis
at least after start-up of commercial production. Thus the
sponsor would have to put up his own collateral during
construction while the assets of the project would be pledged
after start-up'
4. Credit sources, guarantees, and lenient credit terms may be
available for the project but not for the sponsor
5. It is premature to include tax considerations and accounting
treatment as potential benefits, as these matters are yet to be
resolved under Islamic financing. Nevertheless, one cannot
ignore the potential tax benefits for the sponsor when the project
is treated as an off-balance sheet item, provided that
1.	 For more details see Nevitt, op.cit, p.15.
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the sponsor's ownership is below 50%.	 Ownership has to be
disclosed under Kuwaiti laws if it is above 50%
6. Legal requirements, regulatory problems, and even indentures
would be less stringent if applied to the project rather than
the sponsor1.
Various forms of finance may be used for a project. The decisive
factors in choosing the financing medium are:
i) the type and nature of the project in question
ii) the cost of debt and service charges involved
iii) the degree of risk and ultimately the guarantee required
iv) the tax position of the sponsor or the parent company.
Other considerations might include the accounting treatment in the
books of the sponsor or the parent company.
How project financing works in the exploration. develotment and/or
drilling of oil under a joint venture Operating Agreement2
Suppose that a Kuwaiti Oil Company (KOC) is planning to explore and
develop offshore drilling in Bahrain. As a gesture of Gulf
cooperation, KOC invites other interested Gulf Oil corporations to
participate.	 Accordingly an Operating Agreement will be signed
including the following provisions:3
1. The participants designate one party (the operator) to manage
the day to day operations of the venture in compliance with the
provisions of the Operating Agreement.
2. An Executive Committee may be formed to assist in the decision
making process that needs a majority vote or opinion (see
Figure 6.2).
1. Ibid, 1983, 4th ed, p6.
2. This section is based on P. Nevitt, Project Financing, op.cit,
and has been adopted to suit Islamic financing principles.
3. Each of these provisions correspond to the same number in
Figure 6.2.
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3.	 The participants pay their contributions to the joint venture;
the parties hold titles to the property as "tenants in common".
The parties share in the product of the property (in kind) in
proportion to their respective contributions. Failure by one
party to pay the contributions may lead to confiscation of its
shares in the production until full payment is made. Other
remedies are also possible.
4. An Islamic bank or investment company may be invited to finance
the joint venture on a PLS basis.
5. A leasing company may procure certain drilling equipment on the
basis of Islamic leasing.
Instead of sharing the product in kind, the partners may wish to
share in the cash proceeds. In this case, the partners share in the
profit or loss, if any, in proportion to their participation. Sharing
the profit pro-rata with capital may raise a question concerning the
distribution of profits according to Islamic law.	 Generally, the
profit shares, in Musharaka, need not be pro-rata with the partners
contributions according to Islamic law. 	 The circumstances, however,
are different in our examples cited above due to the following
factors 1 .	 -
1. The Hanafi and Maliki Schools of Islamic law divide
partnerships into two main categories: Sharikat al milk
(proprietary partnership), and Sharikat al Aq'd (commercial or
contractual partnership). The first is either voluntary as in
the joint acceptance of a gift, or compulsory as in the case of
inheritance. In this type the profit on capital appreciation
is shared equally. The second is divided into Sharikat Amwal
(partnership based on money, Sharikat Wujuh (partnership based
on reputation) and Sharikat Amal (partnership based on labour).
In this type the profit is based on mutual agreement and need
not be pro-rata with capital. The difference between Sharikat
al Milk and our example above is obvious and needs no further
explanation. The difference between a joint venture agreement
(JVA) and Sharikat al Aq'd lies in the structure and objective
since JVA has established a separate company to manage the
venture and neither of the partners are involved. Therefore,
it is sensible that each partner shares in the profit and loss
pro-rata with capital. However, in the event where a lead
manager or promoter exists it would be plausible to assign
promotion fees or finder fees or a percentage of profit to such
person or entity.
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FIGURE 62: A Joint Venture for Financing Oil Exploration by Project
Financing Techniques
Exp 1anatioofSyrnbo1s
a Dotted lines refer tc the oil company entrusted with oparating the joiPt
venture.
b. Operator; the company in charge of the joint venture.
C. Numbers appearing in the boxes denote the steps involved in the formation
of the joint venture. For more details see provisions of the joint '.'ecIture.
d. Management	 Executive Committee.
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Summary
Project finance has been developing in the West owing to its
convenience and flexibility. There is no reason why it should not be
used in Islamic financing in the same vigour, especially since the
synopsis of Islamic finance may be effectively applied in project
finance. For instance, leasing, joint ventures, trusts,
corporations, covenants and guarantees can all be designed to comply
with Sharia. There are, however, certain methods employed in
conventional finance which are not acceptable by Sharia. These
methods, however, are very few to be reckoned with and they do not
prevent innovation towards the advent of what could be termed
"Islamic Project Financing" which may have its own methods and
building blocks along the same lines that have been shown in the
example given in the text.
Instalment Finance
By instalment sales or instalment credit the Islamic banks in Kuwait
can finance the purchase of raw materials, spare parts, machinery and
a host of many other capital or consumable goods in the industrial or
agricultural sectors. In addition instalment sales are suitable for
financing building contractors or for the purchase of dwelling units
(housing finance).
Commercial Real Estate Financing
Background:
Commercial real estate financing are loans extended to:
i) developers - builders undertaking construction activities;
ii) retail stores and shopping centres;
iii) large apartment complexes and office buildings.
The Kuwait Real Estate Bank is the sole specialised real estate
lender on an interest basis in Kuwait. The Kuwait commercial banks
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are also engaged in short-term real estate financing and to a smaller
scale in medium term lending (see Chapter 4).
A few other non-bank financial institutions such as investment
companies, are engaged in commercial real estate lending within and
outside the country. Their real estate lending is normally a part of
a broader financing package including debt and equity, e.g. the
construction and running of a four star hotel. In recapturing their
invested capital and profits the Islamic banks have different
options 1 . These range from:
i) sharing the rental income; or
ii) setting up the building and then selling it back to the client
either on an instalment or deferred lump sum payment; or
iii) building the property and leasing it back to the client.
Usually financing is secured by first mortgage on the appraised
property.
lrrestment huctioning
This system has been proposed by the Council of Islamic Ideology in
Pakistan (Cli Report on the elimination of interest in Pakistan). The
idea rests on forming a consortium between commercial banks and
investment institutions with an objective to initiate and promote
Industrial projects. The consortium would study the feasibility of a
certain project or projects and choose a potentially feasible one.
Then after completing the relevant studies, a final report would be
prepared. The project would be announced and a bidder would be
invited from competent investors for say purchase of the machinery
from the consortium. The bid will be awarded to the highest bidder,
provided that at all times the bidders are of sound reputation in the
industry. The bid price would reflect the cost of machinery plus a
small margin (called service charge) to the consortium. The tenders
are awarded providing that the successful bidder implements the
project within a specified time. 	 Repayments are effected by
instalments.
1.	 See Chapter 4, KFH section, for more details.
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The investor would rely on the expertise of the professional
appointed by the consortium to appraise the project. On the other
hand, any unexpected technical faults which develop create a problem
in deciding who bears the responsibility.
Summary and Conclusions
The need for short-term loans is as acute in the Islamic economy as
it is in the conventional one.
This section has demonstrated that there is no lack of Islamic short-
tetm instruments to replace overdrafts and other short-term
conventional lending facilities with the exception of straightforward
personal loans 1 . We cannot ignore though the importance of
benevolent loans in relieving hardships at least temporarily. The
banks are not the only source of funding for such loans as there are
voluntary contributions, specified deposits, cooperative banks,
family and relatives. Nevertheless interest-free loans may satisfy
the need of individual borrowers or non-recurring applications from
corporate entities.
	 -
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 in the text have shown the various applications of
funds on the corporate and personal levels and the corresponding
financing media as summarised below.
Short-term finance is needed to meet the following:
on the corporate level:
i) working capital requirements;
ii) trade finance, export/import finance;
iii) bridging finance.
1.	 The desire of the monetary authorities in Kuwait to eliminate
or contract overdraft from the banking system is a step in the
right direction.	 Furthermore it would facilitate the
transformation process towards a nba-free economy.
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on the personal level:
iv) emergencies and liquidity shortages;
v) short-term transactional demands;
vi) consumer durables.
Relatively speaking all of the aforementioned needs could be met by
Islamic financing media as shown in Chapter 2 and Section 3 of this
chapter.1
The different applications and methods of long-term finance have been
discussed. Various aspects of equity finance, subordinated capital
and project finance were analysed. These vehicles are promising and
their application would open a tremendous opportunity for Islamic
finance to spread not only in Kuwait but in the international
financial markets. Much still has to be done in terms of standards
and accompanying regulations that should be amalgamated to
regularise, for example, trading in the stock market and whether to
allow banks to trade or not trade in shares of the companies they are
financing.
It goes without saying that the propositions regarding the Islamic
modes of finance may only be enforceable when the existing Kuwaiti
laws and regulations are modified to cope with the new system.
However, it is assumed throughout this chapter that the necessary
changes in the current legislation would be affected prior to the
implementation of the new system.
1. We have not discussed in this chapter the merits and demerits
of Islamic finance as these topics will be dealt with in
Chapter 7.
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MONETARY POLICY IN AN ISLAMIC FRAMEWORK
Chapters 4 and 5 discussed the various aspects of the current Kuwaiti
financial system including the Central Bank, monetary policy and
banking regulations.
In this chapter an attempt is made to:
i) analyse the various instruments of monetary policy including
prudential regulations that could be applied after the
abolition of interest, with respect to Kuwait; and
ii) show the basic findings and conclusions that could be reached
or induced from such an analysis.
First of all a word on the basic assumptions and constraints of the
study followed by a proposed financial structure of the banking
system after the abolition of interest.
Basic Assumptions and Constraints
It is assumed, for the sake of this analysis, that the monetary
authorities in Kuwait would be working within a set of parameters and
constraints in order to cope with the changes inspired by the new
system. These are:-
1. Interest would be abolished completely from the banking
operations whereas it remains operative in Kuwait's
international financial transactions (with the rest of the
world) to the extent it deems necessary or unavoidable. This
is only permissible during the transformation process.
2. Banks work as financial intermediaries. This entails that they
are only bound to buy and sell commodities or goods upon their
customers request. This means that they can finance the
procurement of goods but they are not authorised to engage
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directly in trade for their own account'. This appears to be a
workable model for Kuwait. It enhances specialization and the
division of labour (i.e. avoid mixing between intermediation
and commercial activities).
3. Reiterating what has been said in previous chapters, the
Islamic financial instruments would be divided into two
categories: i) profit-related instruments, and (ii) fixed yield
or rental based instruments. 	 -
4. Discounting and/or rediscounting of commercial bills is
forbidden (see Chapter 6) whereas buying and selling of
financial claims (authentic bills) for their face value is
permissible, provided the consent of the drawee is obtained in
advance in compliance with the Islamic law.
5. The banking sector will remain basically privately owned with
government participation as currently is the case.
6. No attempt is made to define money supply for the purpose of
monetary indicators or targeting. As Chapra (1985, p.212)
noted it is preferable "to observe all variants of M" at least
in the early phases of an interest-free economy. As it would
be difficult to predict the behaviour of the monetary
aggregates in an Islamic economy before studying the impact of
the monetary policy on the various aggregates.
Monetary Policy Objectives (Goalsi
The main objectives of the monetary policy in each of the Islamic and
Western economies are almost identical. The main difference is in the
emphasis of the policy. 	 The Islamic economists focus on internal
1.	 Interestingly, the law for usury-free banking in Iran has
forbidden the banks to engage in commercial activities other
than for providing their customers needs for goods arid
services.
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Satisfactory balance of
payments
Maximum or stable growth
stability and distributive justice. The Western economists are also
concerned with stability and justice though monetarists are pretty
occupied with controlling the intermediate targets (money supply and
interest rates) in order to curb inflation. In the inonetarist's
view, lower inflation will reduce prices, increase the demand leading
eventually to a reduction in the rate of unemployment.
A comparison between the Islamic and Western monetary poliLies
reveals that both systems have similar objectives with minor
differences as shown below:_
Table 6.4: Monetary Policy Objectives
Islamic Economy1
Stability in the Value of money
Economic well being with full
employment
External stability
Optimum rate of economic
-gowth
Western Economy
Price stability
Minimum unemployment
In terms of the general economic policy objectives, both systems seem
to stress efficient allocation of resources and equality in the
distribution of income. While both systems agree on these principles
they differ in th I arneans to achieve tEesgoT
Fiscal vs Monetary Policy in Kuwait
Islamic economists have cited two ways by which an Islamic state can
finance the government: (a) by issuing Fiat money through the
Central Bank against non-interest bearing IOUs from the Treasury3,
1. For more details see Monetary & Fiscal Economics of Islam, ed.
M. Arrif, 1982.
2. For more details see Douglas Fisher, Money Banking and Monetary
Policy op cit p.243.
3. For example see Al-Jarhi in Z. Ahmed, 1983, p.69.
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and (b) through taxation to finance "normal recurring expenditures"
(those that could not be financed by PLS arrangements)1.
By the end of 1986 neither of these two methods were applicable in
Kuwait due to the fact that the Ministry of Finance and Commerce is a
net creditor to the financial system and the main source of the money
supply in the economy.
The implementation of fiscal policy and the management of the State's
reserves are currently carried out by the Ministry of Finance and
Commerce. In the absence of meaningful income tax, income from oil is
the main source of government spending. Since the early l980s the
government has chosen to finance a persistent budget deficit by using
up the general reserve2 (see Chapter 3).
The importance of the fiscal policy in Kuwait (mainly through
government spending) is worth noting. The interaction between fiscal
and monetary policy explains, to a great extent, the behaviour of the
monetary authority in conducting its policy. For instance, over the
years the increase in government expenditure was unabated policy3.
Confronted with this reality, the Central Bank's main task was the
alleviation of inflation and the curtailment of the expansion in
domestic liquidity by rationalising the banks' credit policies.
1. "Towards a Just Monetary S ystem", op cit, p.192. Chapra also
proposes to divert up to 25% of the banks' demand deposits to
the Central Bank in order to finance socially oriented
projects.
2. For an alternative policy see Deficit Finance, Chapter 7. On
the other hand, in the Western economies there are four methods
of financing: (a) borrowing from the banking sector, (b)
borrowing from the public, (c) taxation, and (d) regressive
taxes (VAT), Alvin H. Hansen, "Monetary Theory and Fiscal
Policy", (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co.Inc. 1949), p.167.
3. See Khouja and Sadler, l979,p.l62. Although it has been
established that the monetary influence was considerably 3
times more effective than the fiscal stimulus, Imad Moosa "A
Study of Kuwait's Monetary Sector", unpublished Doctorate
dissertation, Univ. of Sheffield, Feb. 1986.
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A Framework for Change
If interest were abolished in Kuwait the basic characteristics of the
monetary policy objectives are expected to remain unchanged. These
include growth through diversification of income (other than from
oil), low inflation, distribution of oil wealth, and stability of the
currency (see Chapter 3).
Seemingly the technical objectives of the Bank would not vary
significantly from its current practices (i.e. controlling and
stabilising the monetary and banking systems). However its means and
priorities would vary significantly from those applied in the current
system. The means and tools of the monetary policy after the
abolition of interest are discussed later. As for the priorities to
be instigated by the new system, one could mention the endeavours to
create a banking system capable of allocating the resources to the
benefit of those who needed it most, and to minimise the social cost
of intermediation. The key to success of the new system lies in the
positive implementation of these goals.
On the other hand, few changes are expected to occur in the main
structure of the financial system precipitated by the abolition of
interest and summarized below:
a) The Kuwait Finance House would be brought under the supervision
of the Central Bank. The thrust of this assumption is
justified in light of the expected abolition of interest from
the entire banking system. Therefore, there would be no reason
to exclude a commercial bank from the Bank's supervisory
authority.
b) It is assumed that the existing insurance companies would
continue their operations as before the abolition of interest.
It is expected however, that sometime in the future Islamic
solidarity companies would be established. The solidarity
companies would replace the existing insurance companies and
perform their operations under Islamic principles.
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c) We assume that the Bank may not be willing to authorise member
banks to perform multipurpose functions. This proposition is
comparable with our basic assumption that the banks would
remain as financial intermediaries. The central objective is to
curtail monopoly through the division of labour among various
sectors in the economy. The same policy is adopted by the
monetary authorities in Iran and Pakistan after Islamisation.
Apparently there must be a difference between the functions of
one Islamic bank working in a conventional system and the
functions of Islamic banks in an interest-free system. For
example, the existing Islamic banks outside Iran and Pakistan
are licensed to engage in trading activities for their own
accounts and for their clients (e.g. Murabaha). It is unlikely
that an Islamic system would allow commercial banks to engage
in trade for the reasons cited above.
337
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISLAI1IC MONETARY POLICY
The banning of interest and consequently the absence of the discount
rate mechanism are basic features of the Islamic economic policy.
This however would not cripple the monetary or prudential control.
Besides, as will be explained later, the monetary authority would
have to seek different monetary instruments from those applied in the
conventional system. Whether their importance and impact on the
monetary aggregates would be as equally effective as the conventional
ones is rather difficult to find out in the absence of empirical
evidence. It is worth mentioning, however, that the Islamic monetary
theory and instruments are not yet fully developed. This is to be
expected as the subject has only recently been tackled by a number of
writers.
Monetary and Prudential Controls
It is essential at this point to distinguish bet'een monetary control
and prudential control (or regulations) as outlined below2:
Monetary Control
-	 Open market operations
-	 Discount window (not applicable in Islamic monetary policy)
-	 Profit sharing ratios (debatable among Islamic economists)
-	 Liquidity ratios
-	 Reserve ratios
1. In addition it is too early to draw conclusions based on the
functions of the Iranian and Pakistani Central Banks as both
are still in the experimental phases
2. It should be emphasized that this classification is based on
the purpose of imposing the tool which differs from country to
country. In addition, the liquidity and reserve ratios may be
used for both purposes i.e. for a monetary as well as
prudential control. Or they may be used solely as a regulatory
tool (e.g. the current mood in the Bank of England in favour of
the reintroduction of the reserve ratio as a regulatory
measure).
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Prudential Control
-	 Statutory regulations (minimum capital requirements, limitation
on lending)
-	 Self-imposed regulations
-	 Selective control measures
In the subsequent section, the above instrument variables are
discussed with reference to Kuwait. Examples, where applicable, are
given from the Iranian and Pakistani experiments in monetary policy
and control, bearing in mind that there are significant differences
in the eccnomies of these countries. In addition the banking sector
is nationalized in both Pakistan and Iran which is not the case in
Kuwait.
Open Market Operations
In the conventional system government securities are a useful device
for financing the government and changing the money supply and banks
reserves through open market operations (selling and buying
government securities to the private sector). Since the security is
an interest-bearing instrument generally, they could not be used in
deficit financing or in open market operations in an Islamic systet?.
It ought to be mentioned that treasury bills that are sold at a
discount are no different than zero-coupon bonds or any other type of
debt instrument. Evidently, the interest factor in treasury bills
represent the difference between the sale price and the nominal price
at the time of issue. kfterards. the market price of the bill
reflects the expected changes in interest rates as well as the life
of the bill (prior to the selling date).
Accordingly, it is to be expected that open market operations, as
currently known, would be ruled out in conjunction with the abolition
of interest in Kuwait, provided of course that an accepted substitute
has been formulated.
1.	 By 'security' we mean treasury bills, notes and bonds.
How then can the Islamic Central Bank manage the money supply?
According to al-Jarhi, the Central Bank can influence the supply of
money by depositing with member banks what he calls "central
deposits" (CDs). The Bank retain the initiative by allocating the
CDs among the banks according to their performance and liquidity
needs. The CDs are negotiable medium-term instruments and could be
redeemed by the Bank whenever necessary 1 . Although the
transferrability of the CDs helps in creating a secondary market, it
is doubtful whether the Bank would be able to retain control of both
the volume of its holdings of the CDs or the level of banks'
reserves.
For example, selling the CDs to the non-banking sector will reduce
the private sector's deposits with the banking system negating thus
the efficacy of this tool. In order for this policy to be effective
therefore, the time of selling the certificates to the public should
be restricted to cases when the monetary authority aims at curtailing
the growth in money supply. In such events there would be no need to
draw down the deposits with member banks as the selling of CDs will
have the same objective though indirectly.
Another solution to these problems would be for the Bank to decide
freely on the volume of its holdings, the amount it wants to withdraw
as well as the timing of each of these transactions. Within these
parameters the Bank can preserve stability in the market and exert
the required control on banks' liquidity by injecting funds in the
banking system at times of liquidity crisis and reverse the
transaction when a contraction in money supply is required 2 . In a
way, this policy is similar to monetary base control which was
adopted by the United States in the l980s for controlling deposits in
the banking system in order to influence the quantity of money in the
economy3.
1. "A Monetary and Financial Structure for an Interest-free
Economy", in Mone y and Banking . Z. Ahmed ed., pp 81-2.
2. This policy seems to be working well in Saudi Arabia through
SAMA, see M. Chapra, 1985, pp. 213-4.
3. See J. Kemp, op.cit, 1981, p.116.
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However, there are two irtherent weaknesses in the proposed CDs which
would hinder their marketability. It is unclear what would be the
incentives for buying these CDs by the public 1 , or what would
determine their market price, in the absence of interest.
Other instruments have also been proposed in the literature to
substitute for open market operations (in the conventional system).
These range from buying and selling equity shares by the central
bank2 , to controlling the lending and the "refinance ratios" 3 . An
explanation of these proposals is in order.
By open market operations (see above) the central bank may buy and
sell government securities whenever it wants to increase or decrease
liquidity in the banking system, or whenever it wants to decrease or
increase interest rates. There are two main differences between this
mechanism and the proposed one in the Islamic system. Firstly, if an
Islamic central bank can decide the quantity it wants to buy and sell,
there is no way it can fix the selling or buying price of shares. By
contrast, the conventional central bank can, to some extent, determine
the price and quantities it sells 4 . Secondly, interest rates usually
move up or down signalling a period of shortage or excess liquidity in
the system, a feature which is non-existent in equity shares. It
could be said, however, that selling or buying shares by the central
bank would decrease or increase liquidity as well. For such a
situation to occur, the quantity to be sold or bought should be
significant. If a huge quantity of shares were traded from time to
time it would cause a panic in the market and would subject share
prices to sharp fluctuations hurting thus small investors and
contributing to instability in the stock market.
The lending ratio was defined by Siddiqi as the ratio of benevolent
loans to demand deposits, whereas the refinance ratio as the ratio of
the central bank's replenishment of funds to commercia' banks'
1. See Naqvi in Z. Ahmed, 1983, pp. 88-90.
2. See Rafi, 1983, p.153.
3. See M. Siddiqi, 1983, pp. 47-50.
4. See J. Kemp, 1981, p.386.
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interest-free loans 1 . Since interest-free loans are intended as
relief loans and must not be used excessively, it can never be used
as an instrument of monetary policy. Besides, an instrument to be
effective it should be directly related with the monetary target or
the intermediate target to say the least. A feature which is not
available in the proposed ratios nor inherent in the purpose for
which they are intended initially namely, for emergency and social
loans. Increasing the compensating ratio may be plausible in chronic
liquidity shortages by firms 2 . However, the impact of this policy is
expected to be minimal as it does not have material influence on
total deposits or credit volume of the banking system3.
Discounting of Bills and the Discount Window
The commercial bill of exchange, its uses, definition and
acceptability from an Islamic angle have been referred to in Chapter
2. The current practice of CBK in conducting its monetary policy
particularly through the discount window, has been discussed in
Chapter 5. In what follows the features of commercial bills and
their role in a conventional and Islamic monetary policy are
explored.
Traditionally, commercial papers are an accepted means of payment in
Kuwait. They are used in domestic and international trade
(documentary bills). The latter is drawn in connection with imported
goods and should be supported by other documents (e.g. bills of
lading and insurance policy).
When a bill is drawn it may be discounted by a bank so that the
seller (drawer) obtains cash when needed rather than waiting until
1. In Kh. Ahmed (ed), 1981, pp. 224-5.
2. We prefer to use the term compensating ratio to mean the
amounts provided by the central bank to compensate commercial
banks for interest-free loans.
3. Chapra (1985, p.205), is also against prescribing a lending or
refinance ratio by the bank as commercial banks should not be
responsible to grant free-loans
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the due date of the bill. On the other hand, a bill may be drawn on
a bank by prior arrangement with the buyer against acceptance credit
(e.g. irrevocable documentary credit). Islamic scholars have
concluded that drawing a bill is legitimate while discounting is not
(see Chapter 2). Effectively the bank discounting the bill profits
from the difference between the amount it pays to the seller of the
bill and the value to be received at maturity. The difference (the
discount) is calculated according to the market interest rate and the
time left to maturity. For example, a bill due in two months ahead
and has been discounted now when the rate of interest is 12% means
that the seller of the bill has to pay 2% (2 x 12/12 x 100) in
interest charges, plus of course commission fees and other charges.
The central bank in Kuwait and elsewhere rediscounts a significant
portion of the commercial bills held by the banking system against a
thin margin. Rediscounting improves the banks' cash position and
allows them to increase credit expansion to various sectors in the
economy.
The above discussion has demonstrated the significance of commercial
bills in the financial system. Briefly: 	 (a) they are used as a
means of payment; (b) permits sellers to obtain funds when badly
needed (through) discounting; (c) facilitates payment for goods at a
subsequent date rather than at the time of the deal, and Cd) enables
the monetary authority to exert some kind of control over short-term
credits by administering the rediscount rate and the timing of sale
or purchase of these instruments.
Perhaps, for the above reasons, the monetary authorities in Pakistan
could not rule out discounting of bills.
The Central Bank in Iran (called Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran)
still buys and sells "commercial papers and certificates of
indebtedness". It is alleged that such mechanisms could "yield the
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same results as the interest rate, insofar as the exertion of
monetary policy is concerned'.
The mechanism of this policy has not been declared. Presumably the
commercial papers will be rediscounted by the central bank when the
monetary authority aims at replenishing the banks' liquidity. It is
doubtful whether this tool will have the same effect as the changes
in interest rates usually have on the quantity of money in the
economy.
The importance of discounting of bills in alleviating short-term
liquidity problems in the economy, unfortunately, does not legitimise
their sale at a discount in view of Sharia. 2 .	 Their use as a
monetary tool though stems from their acceptance, as negotiable
instruments, by banks and traders. Currently, commercial papers are
readily discounted and rediscounted by banks and the central bank in
Kuwait respectively. A process which is likely to be abolished if a
stringent application of Sharia is adopted. However, central bank's
bills in Kuwait have little effect on credit expansion because they
are part of the reserve ratio.
1. See "The Impact of the New Banking System on the Instrument of
Monetary and Credit Policy in Iran", CBI International Seminar,
op cjt, p.13.
2. It should be noted however that few contemporary scholars hold
the view that discounting of bills could be accepted as this
transaction is similar allegedly to selling debts at a discount
which is permissible by the majority of scholars. In effect
selling debts at a discount is subject to two conditions (by
Sharia): (if the buyer cannot collect the full value of a bill
i.e. more than what he paid for it, and (ii) the seller
(beneficiary) remains liable for the debtor's default. See B.
Sad'r, 1981, pp. 153-161. Thus discounting of bills may not be
legalised on these conditions.
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REGULATING THE PROFIT SHARING RATIOS
Definitions and Properties
The profit sharing ratio is a percentage by which the expected profit
is to be divided between a financier and an entrepreneur. According
to Islamic law, the ratio has to be specified in advance by the
contracted parties. Thus the profit ratio has certain properties:
1. it is a percentage and not a flat rate,
2. its realization is uncertain depending upon whether the
enterprise is a profit-maker or a loser, and
3. its rate is determined by the mutual agreement of the parties
concerned.
Kinds of Profit Ratios
As there is more than one interest rate in the conventional system
(the prime rate, lending rate, borrowing rate, mortgage rate), there
are also several profit ratios in the Islamic system. For instance,
there are the depositors' rate of profit (drp) 1
 (the profit ratio
attributed to the depositors on investment accounts), and the bank's
rate of profit (brp) 2 (the portion of the entrepreneur's profit
attributed to the bank).
Enormity of the Problem
There are currently three views among Islamic economists regarding
the profit sharing rates.
Naqvi (1983) opposes any manipulation of the ratio by the
authorities, under normal circumstances. Any intervention, in his
view, is bound to disturb the equitable distribution of profits
1. So called by Siddiqi, 1983, p.101
2. Ibid
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between the depositors, the bank and the entrepreneurs 1 . Siddiqi
however (1983) points out that the forces of supply and demand will
determine the ratios. He nevertheless, favours their utilization as
an instrument of monetary policy. By lowering or increasing the drp
the authorities may increase or decrease the volume of the bank's
deposits leading eventually to expanding or contracting the supply of
money. Siddiqi also advocates the tampering with the brp by raising
it and simultaneously lowering the drp in order to curb inflation.
When an expansionary policy is desirable, the authorities can lower
the brp and at the same time increase the drp leading eventually to
an increase in the money supply 2 . He gave no explanation about the
mechanics of this policy.
Al-Jarhi (1982) opposes such intervention by the authorities as it
leads to disturbing the contractual arrangement among the parties
concerned. However, he suggests instead to influence the supply of
Mudaraba funds indirectly in two ways: (i) the central bank may open
Mudaraba investment accounts with member banks, and (ii) the central
bank can float PLS bonds to be sold to member banks3.
In capitulation, some sort of prudential and not monetary control is
desirable to prevent exploitation, oligopoly (fixing the ratios by
two institutions), or monopoly. Monetary control though aids in
changing the money supply through buying and selling PLS bonds or
through opening or closing the mudaraba investment accounts with the
banks.	 Moreover, this solution avoids the interference by the
monetary authorities in the free will of the depositors, bankers and
1. See Ahmad ed, Fiscal Policy & Resource Allocation in Islam
(Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1983), p.197.
2. M.N. Siddiqi, Central Banking in Islamic Framework, CRIE,
Jeddah, 1986, Memograph, p.31. Similar views were expressed by
Uzair (1978), p.48-49 and A. Khan in Ariff, 1982, p.252.
3. See M. Ariff, ed, p.235. Nevertheless, PLS bonds are
restricted to projects that have a clear cost/benefit
relationship. This property may limit their effective
utilisation as a monetary tool.
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the entrepreneurs. Moreover, fixing the profit ratio is akin to
fixing prices in the market which was contested by the Prophet (see
Islamic Economics, Chapter 1). On the other hand (one) has to study
the implications of changing the ratios on disintermediation which is
likely to occur1 . This could happen according to the Gurley-Shaw
hypothesis when the authorities control the banks' monetary base at
times of tight money, which induces the borrowers to obtain credit
from non-bank financial institutions (unless they are controlled as
well) 2 . Other points that ought to be taken into consideration are
the lag between economic events (recession, inflation) and the
reaction by the authority which could defuse the effect of the
policy.
One also has to bear in mind the behaviour of the savers, the banks
and the entrepreneurs. An increase in the brp for instance, would
signal an increase in prices by the entrepreneurs. This is likely to
happen in order to offset the upward adjustment of the brp (which is,
in the final analysis, a potential cost of fund to the
entrepreneurs). This conclusion agrees with Sargent and Lucas' survey
(1981). They point out that there is a correlation between the
dynamic adjustment of an economy and the national expectation. They
argue that if an adjustment of a monetary variable is expected it
will be reflected in prices. 3 Whether the new prices will be
accepted in the market or not depends on price elasticity of demand
and the degree of competitiveness among different supply outlets.
1. Probably for this reason Siddiqi proposes to extend the control
of the Central Bank to trading companies as well, see Central
Banking in an Islamic framework, o p cit, p31. This proposition
would be impractical and costly in the case of Kuwait.
2. To prevent such events, the Monetary and Control Act of 1980 in
the USA, was introduced to extend the Federal Reserve control
to the transaction accounts with the thrift institutions. See
Johnson and Roberts, 1985, pp 307-8.
3. While if an unexpected change occurs it will be reflected in
output, see Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice,
Allen and Unwin, 1978.
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PRUDENTIAL REGUlATIONS
Prudential regulations are those prudent conditions that the banks
are required to meet in compliance with the Central Bank's
instructions.
There is little written in the Islamic literature about prudential
regulations, so far the ideas expressed on this subject are unsettled
and reflect either (i) the operations of a monetary authority of a
nationalized banking system, or (ii) the writers' perception of a
monetary system based entirely on profit and loss sharing (PLS)
(Mudaraba and Musharaka). No reference is made to the possibility of
having an Islamic financial system based on PLS and fixed yield
instruments as it is assumed in this study.
If interest was abolished, the Kuwaiti monetary authorities will be
confronted with a set of fundamental issues that must be dealt with
before even attempting to impose any regulation. First, among these,
is the determination of a minimum capital base of an Islamic bank.
Second, the classification of member banks and other financial
institutions (commercial, investment or specialised banks). Third,
the powers of the bank vis-a-vis the member banks in connection with
the pricing mechanism of Ci) depositors' profit share; (ii) the
mark-ups in Murabaha instalment sales or forward purchase financing,
and (iii) various services.'
For the sake of this analysis, it is assumed that the capital base
and the current classification of member banks shall remain
unchanged.
1. Pricing mechanism is different from price determination. It is
intended to protect the interests of the depositors and
entrepreneurs and to provide guidelines for the banks in
accordance with the prevailing market conditions at the time.
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RESERVE RATIOS
Statutory Reserves
Currently there are two Balance Sheet asset reserve ratios in Kuwait:
the mandatory progressive reserve ratio and the liquidity ratio (see
Chapter 5). Actually the introduction of the reserve ratio did not
affect the banks' demand for reserves because they always held excess
reserves1.
Self-Imposed Ratio
The self-imposed reserve ratios by KFH require the maintenance of a
10% reserve on unspecified investment deposits, and 20% on specified
investment deposits (Mudaraha deposits). In defending this policy
KFH or other Islamic banks may argue that the account holders have
agreed to merge their funds in a pool and are aware of the 10% rule.
However it seems rather strange to indiscriminately retain
(disinvest) a lump sum of 10% from the total balance of the specified
deposit accounts (to meet withdrawals) regardless of the fact that
some depositors have maintained a steady balance during the
accounting period. By the current method those "disciplined"
deposicors receive lower profits than they should otherwise get in
proportion to their balances (which remained intact).
It is useful to take into consideration when studying the alteration
of any of the above mentioned ratios, the following:
1. The effect of any imposed ratio on the supply of loanable
funds, and on the possibility of holding unnecessary idle
balances, bearing in mind that these funds are geared towards
productive investment. For this reason, the Central Bank of
Jordan (CBJ)
1.	 Imad Moosa, 1986, p.164. This is due mainly to the fact that
some reserves are interest-yielding assets (CBK bills). It
could also be attributed to the undeveloped money market, the
limited investment opportunities domestically, or sometimes for
window dressing, or as an excess precaution by the banks.
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has decided that specified investment deposit accounts should
not be included in the calculation of the cash ratio1.
2. The experiences and relatively recent developments in direct
control measures in other open economies. For example, the
special reserve ratio (the Corset) in the United Kingdom was
abolished since the l980s. It has been found that direct
controls generally cause inefficiencies and leaks in the
financial system and their costs outweigh their benefits2.
The power of the authorities to use the reserve ratio either to
discourage or encourage credit creation by increasing or decreasing
the ratio respectively, was distorted by (i) Euro-sterling leaks, the
growth in the Euro-sterling market (Sterling denominated deposits
held in the Euro-banks by UK residents), and (ii) "commercial bills
leak", the act of endorsing a commercial bill drawn by the bank's
customer 3 which was not directly controlled by the Bank of England.
1. The CBJ decision is based on: (a) the nature of these deposits
as the deposit holder has the right to determine the investment
method and (b) the bank's role as a pure intermediary.
2. The author has benefited from lectures on the UK. monetary
theory and policy delivered by D.T. Liewellyn, J.H.B. Tew, M.J.
Hall and C. Kearney during the academic year 1984/85 at LUT,
Dept. of Economics.
3. For more details see M.J.B. Hall, Monetari Policy since 1971:
Conduct and Performance (London, Macmillan, 1983).
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Selective and Economic Controls
Economic controls and Balance Sheet controls are other tools that
could be employed by an Islamic central bank without violating the
Sharia principles. Special directive measures may be used in Kuwait
as a substitute for subsidized interest in the present system. These
might involve directing banks' advances towards certain sectors in
the economy by allowing higher credit limits than normally required,
lower margin requirements or secured loans. Securing these advances
by the Bank against credit risk is another commonly used measure in
the conventional but not in the Islamic system (e.g. small business
loans).
Other instruments such as "selective control instruments" consisting
of consumer credit control and "real estate or industrial credit
control" aims at either (i) curtailing the banks freedom in lending
to consumers, or (ii) granting incentives to expand real estate and
industrial loans in order to activate the housing and industrial
sectors.
However credit ceilings, which aim at curtailing credit expansion,
have been found to be counter-productive. They could be avoided by
resorting to paper acceptances and commercial bills 1 in the interest-
based system.
The effects of a contractionary policy by resorting to selective
credit control in Kuwait after the abolition of interest, will depend
largely on the activities of non-bank financial institutions in
providing loanable funds. For example, if the current Situation
prevails, it could be said that the selective controls would
partially influence credit expansion as most businesses are run by
1.	 From various lectures by M. Hall at LUT, Economics Dept, Oct.
1985. For disintermediation initiating from monetary base
control, see D. Liewellyn in Framework for UK Monetary Policy,
External Transactions and Money Supp, 1982, p.136.
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individuals or general trading companies 1 who favour cheap money
through trade credit and family savings.
In view of the above discussion, it seems plausible to apply capital
adequacy ratios (the ratio of capital to total assets). The
importance of this ratio is manifested as follows:
1. Capital is normally looked at as a cushion of safety and as a
measure of confidence in the bank's ability to absorb losses.
2. In a free enterprise system, such as in Kuwait, the shareholders
and not the government, should be prepared through adequate
capital to protect the depositors against business risks or bad
management. This is important particularly in an Islamic
framework since deposit insurance schemes are not so far
applicable2.
3. Prudential regulations usually raise the social cost of
intermediation while capital adequacy reduces such cost. As
Gardner point out that there is an inverse relationship between
capital adequacy , and liquidity. In other words where risk
protective capital is sufficient there would be no need for
excess liquidity and vice versa3.
4. Capital adequacy can easily be identified and measured by the
supervisory authorities and could be adjusted periodically4.
1. Omar Qasim, "Indigenous Money Supply", London, SOAS Seminar
1981, p.3.
2. Only on investment deposits on the ground that the investor
(the depositor) is liable for losses, though demand deposits
are fully guaranteed by the shareholders.
3. Op. cit, p.32.
4. There is a growing demand by the USA and UK to raise capital
adequacy ratio from 6% to 9%. Also there is a trend in Europe
to include off-balance sheet items in order to reduce the
composite of primary capital. Primary capital consists of
equity, perpetual preferred stock, loan loss reserve and some
minor items.
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It should be mentioned, however, that "risk-protective" capital and
ultimately the capital adequacy ratio will inversely depend on the
level of cash deposits held in the Islamic banks. The level of demand
deposits in turn depends on whether the 100% or fractional reserve
system is adopted. In the case of 100% reserve, for example, risk-
protective capital would have to be less than in the fractional
reserve system.
Credit Creation
So far, it has been assumed that the proposed Islamic banking system
in Kuwait would permit credit creation by commercial banks. Actually
this hypothesis is rather controversial among Islamic economists. M.
al-Jarhi, Anas Zarqa, M. Kah'f and others oppose credit creation and
call for a one hundred percent reserve ratio on demand deposits.
Their argument is based on the following premises2:
1. The commercial banks should not be allowed to benefit (without
effort) from any increase in the supply of money whenever an
expansion in the high powered money occurs. Any such increase
should benefit the whole society leading to economic
stability3.
2. Credit creation should be left to the central bank alone which
would change the money supply through deposits with member
banks.
1. Used by E.P.M. Cardner, Bangor Occasional paper No. 14.
2. M. Ariff ed. op cit and Ahmed ed. (1983), p.99.
3. This notion is debatable. As long as we believe in the role of
the banking sector in the development of an economy, any
increase in deposits will be reflected in credit expansion by
the banks. A desirable and an important impetus to economic
growth (see below).
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On the other hand, Chapra, Siddiqi, Uzair and others are proponents
of fractional reserve. Their argument is based on the premises that
instability and inequality in the fractional reserve system could be
avoided by suitable checks and balances and equitable allocation and
distribution of directive deposits. Z. Abmed believes that credit
creation and deficit financing are necessary in the transition period
in order to handle external shocks that might require exparsionary
policy1.
In principle, the 100% reserve system is based on ethical and
economical factors but it is feared that it might cause hoarding.
To eliminate instability, Milton Freidman and Henry Simon (1945)
proposed two separate banking institutions, one for deposit taking and
clearing functions with 100% reserve ratio. The second is for
investment banking and commercial lending. The 100% reserve system
they correctly argued will stop banking failures, reduce government
intervention in credit policies and stabilize the banking system2.
Generally, an increase in demand deposits allow the banks to increase
their lending capacity many tinies more than the increase in deposits
as a result of the money multiplier. In an Islamic system any
increase in credit expansion should go to financing the real sectors
in the economy. In the absence of speculations and overdrafts, there
is no reason to believe that the fractional reserve system is
inequitable or it will not benefit all those eligible for financing,
particularly the productive sectors 3 . The depositors will also
benefit from any increase in lending through enhanced banking
profits. An advantage that would not have been possible under 100%
reserve.
1. In M. Ariff (ed), op.cit, 1982, p.227.
2. See M. Khan, 1986, pp. 8-9.
3. Unless borrowers borrow to hold funds which is not possible in
an Islamic system (e.g. due to the effects of zakat and the
ordinances against hoarding.
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ISLAMIC FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS
Money Markets
Money market transactions are confined and restricted in the Islamic
financial system. Call money or overnight money is not available
unless it is obtained free of interest. The inaccessibility of short
term money to alleviate chronic liquidity shortages in the Islamic
banks could be partially resolved through inter-banking operations
within the Islamic banking structure as follows:
A cash surplus bank would furnish the cash-deficit bank with fresh
money in the form of sight or short-term deposits. Several deposits
or withdrawals might occur during the year. At the end of the year,
the donor bank could share in the profits of the recipient bank on
the basis of daily points products along with the banks' saving or
term deposits account 1 . A second method would be through the central
bank's deposits as mentioned earlier. A short-term money instrument
is lacking though some research is being conducted at IDE training
institute; no conclusive results, so far, have been reached.
Money market instruments in the conventional banking system such as
banker's acceptances and letters of guarantee are issued in the
Islamic system, basically, gratis, except for a service charge,
regardless of the amount of the guarantee, and against an adequate
surety.
CAPITAL MARKETS
Background
In principle, an Islamic bank is able to underwrite securities and
1. The daily point product is a commonly used method whereby the
amounts of deposits are multiplied by the number of days to
arrive at a weighted average for the duration and amount of
every deposit
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to be active in trading and selling. Portfolio selection or equity
participation is governed by certain rules and regulations that
should be strictly adhered to e.g. (a) the company issuing the shares
should not deal or trade in banned operations and should not be a
financial institution whose main activities are directly related to
trading in interest-based securities, or syndication, underwriting
and management of interest-bearing bonds; (b) dividends or yields
must not be guaranteed or stated in advance, and (c) dealings in
preference shares are not allowed on the grounds that they entitle
the holder to preferential rights as to dividends and they bear a
fixed rate of return'.
On the other hand while trading on the margin is not allowed due to
the involvement of interest, purchase of securities could be
fulfilled on the basis of bai al-Ajal, i.e. buying on credit,
provided that it is permissible by Islamic scholars.
Development of the Capital Market1
The evolution of an orderly Islamic financial market is dependent
upon the development of Islamic financial structure in a certain
country or region. Fortunately, a number of features for such
development in Kuwait are currently available.
Firstly,	 there are surplus units looking for investment
opportunities. Conversely, there are deficit units looking for
funds. Secondly, the Islamic banks issue financial claims, i.e.
deposits to surplus units. These deposits become available to
corporate or individual entities through the process of
intermediation. Thirdly, the corporations issue shares that could be
sold to the public or to the Islamic financial institutions.
Nevertheless the process of equity participation through shares is
very popular in Kuwait. Fourthly, there are virtually no
I. This section has to be read in conjunction with the Islamic
Sukuk mentioned in Chapter 2, Islamic Banking, and Chapter 6,
Solving an Acute Prcblem and Offering New Alternatives.
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restrictions on buying or selling company shares in the open market
except of course shares of closed shareholding companies or limited
liability companies.
What are missing, however, are two important segments of the market,
namely trading in government securities and trading in corporate debt
certificates 1 . It is worthy of note that the Islamization of the
banking system in Pakistan has permitted the floatation of some PLS
certificates. This development was aided by the already existing
financial infrastructure including market makers and investment
funds, and a set of rules and pertaining laws and regulations such as
the Mudaraba ordinances2.
Participation Term Certificates
Participation Term Certificates (PTC) were first introduced in
Pakistan by the Panel of Economists and Bankers. The PTC may be issued
by companies seeking medium- to long-terni finance directly to the
public by prime borrowers or may be underwritten by an Islamic
merchant bank. As the PTCs are not interest bearing certificates,
their floatation would not be possible unless the Kuwaiti company
law were amended to this effect.
1. As the development of these two instruments is the cornerstone
towards the evolution of the financial markets. For more
details, see Jack Revel, The British Financial System, (London:
Macmillan Press 1973), pp.20-71.
2. For more details see D.M. Quereshi, "The Role of Sharia Based
Financial Instruments in a Muslim Country", Seminar on
development of a system of Islamic financial instruments, Kuala
Lumpur, 1986.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Economic development, diversification of income and efficient
allocation of resources and distribution of wealth are the broad
economic policy objectives for Kuwait. Monetary or fiscal policies
for that matter are means to an end namely to achieve the stated
objectives. The monetary authorities were unable to effectively
control the base money because two components of the base (i) the
government deposits with the Bank are determined by the Ministry of
Finance, and (ii) net foreign assets of the Bank depend on the
position of the balance of payment.' Therefore the supply of money as
a target variable may be difficult to control (unlike advanced
economies), due to the interaction and sometimes contradiction
between the fiscal and monetary policies. Accordingly economic
activities in Kuwait cannot be controlled by monetary policies alone.
Both the fiscal and monetary policies have to work in tandem in order
to achieve the long-term stabilization and progress. This conclusion
may apply to the period succeeding the abolition of interest insofar
as the conditions prescribed above remain unchanged.
The Ministry of Finance is expected to continue its political
supervision over the central bank and to administer the bulk of the
general reserve partly through the Kuwait Investment Authority. Among
the Bank's main responsibilities during the transition period would
be the preparation of new non-usury banking law and regulations. The
law would be expected to authorise the Bank to perform the following
functions:
i) enhance its supervisory powers over the commercial and
specialised banks and the money changers; and tighten its grip
on the financial sector in general to ensure a smooth
transformation into the new system. Specifically, the Bank's
main task would be (i) the prevention of banking failures and
the establishment of a sound Islamic banking system;
1.	 Mocsa, 1986, p.395.
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ii) act as lender of last resort for the banking sector. Its re-
financing 'or recurrent deposits with member banks would be on
PLS basis. The profit ratio awarded to the Bank would be lower
than that given to savings accounts, thus leaving a slight
margin to the bank(s):
iii) act as fiscal agent to the government, and maintain stability
of the currency;
iv) promote and develop interest-free banking systems in Kuwait and
the Muslim countries;
v) establish new banking rules in compliance with Islamic
principles including (a) a new accounting procedure and
guidelines to monitor their application; (b) identify risk
capital and determine the capital adequacy ratios and develop a
new balance sheet format; (c) examination and inspection of
the banks' books to detect violations or problems in loans or
deposits; (d) determination of the structure of assets and
liabilities and the optimal allocation of the banks' resources
among different asset categories (e.g. reserve, and liquid
assets, PLS finance, fixed yield finance).
vi) establish guidelines for developing Islamic money and capital
markets in Kuwait and control their activities;
vii) establish guidelines as to the maximum allowable exposure to
one customer or closely related group, and also allowable
exposure to one country or region.
Open market operations would only be feasible, provided that a market
for CDs or other types of PLS certificates are introduced including
government debt certificates. Additionally, as mentioned in (ii)
above, the central bank's deposits with member banks could be used to
control credit expansion and ultimately the money supply.
Altering the profit sharing ratio is counterproductive as it might
lead to disintermediation, interferes with the free will of the
parties concerned and it is inefficient due to the lag effect.
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However fixing the ratio by monopolistic or ogopolistic practices
must be stopped. Close supervision to prevent exploitation or
profiteering is more in line with the Islamic teachings (see Chapter
1, Economic Intervention). Intermediation should not increase the
social cost to the users. The prudential regulatory systems should
have this goal in mind "but not to the extent of using prudential
regulation as a weapon of monetary policy"1.
The Bank's discount rate as well as the CBK bills were rarely used
effectively in controlling liquidity in Kuwait. This is due to the
rigidity of the interest rate which did not keep pace with the dollar
interest rate to prevent capital outflow. This should not mean
however, that the abolition of the discount window would not have an
impact on the implementation of the monetary policy after the
abolition of interest. Eliminating the discount window will have an
undesirable effect on the implementation of the monetary policy
particularly in the transition period; and in the absence of a
powerful substitute.
The Central Bank's efforts to achieve its objective is largely
dependent upon:
	 -
1) well-established financial infrastructure as the monetary
policy could be highly effective in a developed financial
market2;
ii) well-established administrative infrastructure in both the
Central Bank and the financial institutions;
iii) a commitment from the government officials and the public to
the success and evolution of the new system.
1. Gardner, o1.cit, p.13.
2. Y. Jamshidipsur, "Central Banking and Islamic Banking, a
preliminary Study", 2nd Banking Workshop, Vienna 11-17 May
1982, p.12.
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The Central Bank would retain the current practices of regulating the
exchange rate of the dinar vis-a-vis the foreign currencies to
maintain its stability.
Until an acceptable Islamic device is found, the international
financial transactions of the Bank with the rest of the world will
remain generally unchanged1.
1.	 The same policy is adopted by the State Bank of Pakistan, see
CII Report, p.198.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLTJS ION
Knowledge comprises (a) the concept (tasawur) which is
apprehended by definition, and (b) the assertion or judgement
(tasdiq), which is apprehended by proof.1
Intro duct ion
Any task, especially if it were of the magnitude of transforming an
interest based economy into an Islamic one, must have a strategy, and
any strategy should aim at a set of goals. However, neither the
strategy nor the goal(s) have any chance of being implemented without
the aid of a set of ways and means that are capable of achieving the
required objective (the abolition of interest) at the lowest possible
cost.
The abolition of interest is a major deviation from the current and
long-established economic policies world-wide. Changing the
financial structure of the economy requires changing the financial
assets and obligations. These changes affect attitudes, concepts and
regulations. Thus, we begin this concluding chapter by answering
these questions:
(a) Is it possible to structure an Islamic banking system in
Kuwait? If yes, then:
(b) What are the major changes and implications for financial
institutions and financial instruments?
(c) What are the expected measures during the transformation
period?
1	 Al-Chazali, M, The Faith and Practice of H Al-Ghazall by
Montgomery Watt, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953, p35.
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(d) What are the impediments (limitations) at the micro- and macro-
levels?
(e) Is the Islamic banking system efficient?
(f) What are the likely benefits?
The Possibility of Structuring an Islamic tanking System in Kuwait
Kuwait is an Islamic country and the Islamic Sharia is a source of
legislation in the country. The civil code prohibits the paying of
interest in all non-commercial transactions. The commercial code,
though permitting interest, has a maximum allowable rate ranging
between seven (7) percent and ten (10) percent. This ceiling is
imposed on moral grounds. 1
 There are thus moral and religious bases
for abolishing interest in Kuwait or any other Islamic country given
the strict injunction against nba in the Quran, the main source of
legislation in Islam (see Chapter One).
Currently there are two potent Islamic states, Pakistan and Iran, who
have introduced Islamic economic principles and abolished interest.
Moreover, there are currently more than 56 Islamic banks working on
several continents in uneasy environments (ie, in countries where
nba is not unlawful). These Islamic banks are viable institutions
despite the competition they are facing from the conventional banks.
The above factors lead us to believe that introducing Islamic banking
in Kuwait is possible. 	 However, this experiment requires drastic
changes in conducting banking operations. 2	These changes are
discussed below. First, a word about two possible approaches to
instigate a change. The abrogation of nba in Kuwait could take one
or two paths, a revolutionary or evolutionary one. In what follows,
1 The Kuwaiti legislation adopts two contradictory stands, one
confesses that interest is unlawful (Civil Code) while the
other legalises low-interest levels (The Commercial Code). In
fairness, one may say that in the absence of a workable
interest-free system, the Kuwaiti legislation has adopted a
moderate rather than fundamental stand.
2	 It has also some cost and limitations (see infra).
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we will discuss these two options in order to pin-point the
advantages and disadvantages of each.
The Revolutionary Approach
By revolutionary we mean a set of actions, alterations and changes
that are politically motivated and which aim at achieving political
goals through abrupt changes in the economic system with little or ro
consideration of the ramifications that might ensue. An example of
such action is seen in the decisions to abolish interest in the
Iranian and Sudanese economies.
The Iranian experiment seems to be working though there is little
information available which might shed some light on the intricacies
of this revolutionary act. A panel of bankers, economists, TJlama and
businessmen drafted the banking non-usury law which was approved by
the parliament in 1983. The law called for a transformation of
banks' deposits in accordance with Sharia within one year and for the
whole banking system within three years. On the other hand, the
Sudanese experiment soon faded away with the recent coup that
overthrew the regime of the former president, who initiated a hasty
transformation into a nba-free economy. The Pakistani experiment
has been more cautious than that of Iran and Sudan and passed through
lengthy discussions and well planned phases that took almost five
years before it became fully operational in August 1985.
Nonetheless, the Pakistani economists and theologians were very much
occupied by the setting up stages for the structural changes,
procedures and policies of the existing banks and financial
institutions. Consequently, the macroeconomic effects of the
transformation in the economy have not been fully examined, if at
all.
The Evolutionary pproach
The evolutionary path, though religiously motivated, takes into
consideration a number of factors:
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(i) First and foremost, it requires certain precepts and calls for
the establishment of a strong fundamental framework as a
prerequisite for building a new economic paradigm. This
paradigm should be capable of overcoming the inherent
deficiencies of the existing system and of providing a subtle
and workable solution for the current economic problems, if
possible.
(ii) Naturally, the above considerations presuppose certain needs to
be met and certain options to be evaluated before endorsing the
changes by the authorities. These are discussed below.
Changes and Implications for Financial Institutions and Instruments
In this section, the changes in the institutional framework, banking
operations, asset and liability management and the nature and legal
aspects of the relationship that will govern the banks, depositors
and borrowers after the abolition of interest are discussed.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
As we recall, financial institutions in Kuwait consist of commercial
banks, specialised banks, investment companies and money changers.
The current ownership structure and the division of labour in the
current institutional framework of the Kuwaiti banking system is
assumed to remain basically the same after the abolition of interest.
In the main there is no need to upset the banking system by
introducing dramatic changes and yet retaining the banks'
independence as viable private units. The flexibility of the Islamic
economic order is largely manifested in its ability to absorb several
concepts such as joint stock companies, or public shareholding
companies without risking a divergence from Islamic common laws. As
it is widely recognised, the western forms of companies ur
partnerships could be adopted (apart from nba) to Islamic banking
with minor alteration.
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Therefore the existing ownership structure of all Kuwait's commercial
and specialised banks could be left unchanged. The only immediate
requirement would involve the banning of preference shares and
subordinated loans which must take place simultaneously with the
banning of interest.
However, it is hardly likely that the abolition of preference shares
from commercial transactions in Kuwait would raise any problem. As
far as subordinated loans are concerned, (a) they could be converted
into straight equity, or (b) redeemed before maturity, or (c) left to
maturity to avoid an undesirable strain on liquidity.
Operational Changes
As explained earlier the Islamic methods of finance are either profit
related or fixed yield instruments. Based on maturity transformation
the main methods of finance that have to be introduced by Islamic
banks in Kuwait are grouped as follows (see Chapters Two and Six).
(i) Short term: trade financing, bridging finance (that carry no
interest),	 consumer loan, musharaka, mudaraba, forward
purchase, salam;
(ii) Medium term: leasing, hire purchase, business development
finance on musharaka, project finance;
(iii)Long term: equity finance, redeemable participation, building
and construction finance, and project finance.
Basically, an extensive use of trade-related instruments (that are
risk free, eg, murabaha, leasing etc) to the point of entirely
neglecting PLS methods is not acceptable.
The monetary authority is responsible for setting up the guidelines
pertaining to the asset structure of Kuwaiti banks. A commercial
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bank, for instance, may be allowed to engage, for example, 50 percent
of its assets in short-term trade-related instruments', 25 percent in
PLS instruments and the rest in cash and near cash items. A
commercial bank, however, is by definition a provider of short-term
loans. An import-orientated economy such as Kuwait depends very
heavily on trade. To finance trade efficiently, murabaha and other
short-term self liquidating media have proved to be suitable arid
legitimate devices. It would not seem economically proper to curtail
their use.
On the other hand, this does not mean that economists should not
search for methods that would increase involvement of commercial
banks in development finances (eg, equity finances) through maturity
transformation and devising certain packages for increasing
investment deposits in their portfolios (see liquidity
transformation, infra).
Asset Management
The asset side of an Islamic bank would consist of cash items
including currency and coins, deposits with the central bank, and
deposits with other commercial and specialised institutions.
Deposits maintained with the central bank serve two purposes, to
facilitate the clearance of cheques, and to satisfy reserve
requirements. Two fundamental changes will emerge in an interest-
free system. First, deposits with the central bank for the above
mentioned purposes will be interest-free. Second, the reserve ratio
would be mainly for demand deposits with a much lower reserve (than
on demand deposits) for savings accounts to serve as a precaution
against sudden withdrawals. The idea of low-level reserves on
savings accounts is to permit the optimal investment of these
1 Though proponents of strictly PLS systems would like to
eliminate other instruments, these other instruments are legal
and their benefits outweigh their shortcomings.
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accounts without sacrificing prudence. Owing to the expected rise in
investment deposits (time deposits) over demand and savings deposits1
and to ensure the optimal utilisation of the former, it is not
envisaged that the reserves on investment type deposits would be
significant. This stand has also been endorsed by the Covernois of
Islamic Central Banks.2
On the other hand, the Islamic banks must hold secondary reserves to
meet cyclical and normal fluctuation as well as unpredictable demands
for finance. The components and volume of the secondary reserves
have to be declared by the monetary authorities upon previous
consultations with the banks, particularly during transition.3
The third, most important item is that the asset structure of the
Kuwaiti banks, after the abolition of interest, would consist mainly
of PLS and trade-related loans to various economic sectors and
individuals. The new financing methods demand a shift in the
financing policies and monitoring of projects by Kuwaiti banks.
They would still look for credit worthiness, character, and capacity
of the borrower/entrepreneur. More emphasis would be put however on
the profitability of the ventures for which finance is needed and on
the character of the sponsor particularly if equity participations
were contemplated. Effectively, the provision of long-term funds,
including equity participation, is largely dependent on the type of
Islamic bank. For instance, Islamic investment banks or specialised
banks (eg, IBK) and investment companies will be more active in long-
term finance than Islamic commercial banks. The Central Bank might
decree, for example, that 60 percent or more of their assets must be
used on a PLS basis, 15 percent or less on other types of finance and
the rest in cash or near cash.
1	 As currently is the case with KFH and we do not anticipate this
trend to change if interest were abolished.
2	 See Central Banks' Governors Report, Khartoum, 1981.
3 The Governors of the Islamic Central Banks proposed to keep
these reserves on the same level as in conventional banks, see
Governors' Report, op cit, 1981.'
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This is due generally to the maturity structure of their deposits
which basically are long-term in nature. Unless the commercial banks
succeed in attracting long-term deposits, their involvement in equity
finance would remain modest particularly if they were not using
advanced techniques in maturity transformation. 1 However, the banks'
involvement in medium-to long-term finance could be enlarged knowing
that their deposits are predominantly term deposits and their
balances are relatively stable and growing (see Chapter Six).
Inter-bank money market provides banks with immediate access to
liquidity when needed. In the absence of a developed money market,
Islamic banks in Kuwait have to rely on the central bank to provide
them with central deposits and call money on an interest-free basis
(see Islamic monetary policy).
Liability Management2
The capital of an Islamic bank serves two functions; (a) it is a
cushion protecting the current account holders against insolvency of
the bank, and (b) it is the primary permanent source of operating
funds. The capital may be increased by selling new stocks, though
the banks' power to increase their capital is limited by their
charter, and requires prior approval of the shareholders, the
monetary authorities and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Retained earnings (undistributed profits) are also another source of
funds which are frequently used by Kuwaiti banks to increase capital.
However, such increases will not inject new money into equity.
Unlike deposits created by conventional banks, Islamic banks'
deposits are not a claim to a fixed nominal value. They are instead
a claim to a variable value consisting of the nominal value of
deposits plus or minus a share in the profits or losses sustained by
Based on statistical observation and probability analysis, the
banks may establish that a considerable portion of short-term
deposits remain with the banks longer than anticipated. This
allows the banks to engage in an increased proportion of long-
term finance, other things are equal.
2	 Liquidity management is discussed under inter-bank operations
(see impediments to Islamic banks).
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the bank as the case may be.	 It follows that depositors in an
Islamic bank do not own a share in the equity of the bank.
In view of the fact that PLS deposits are not secured by the bank,
capital accounts (capital plus reserves and retained earnings) are
then a cushion protecting the shareholders and holders of demand
deposits accounts only. This does not suggest that capital in
general or the capital adequacy ratio should be less in an Islamic
bank than in a conventional bank. At any rate, and in the absence of
deposit insurance, the bank's capital must provide confidence and
safeguards to the public due to the fact that part of the bank's own
resources may be tied up in relatively risky PLS enterprises.
The transformation into the new system entails certain changes in the
nature and legal aspects of assets and liabilities of an Islamic
bank. Other modifications that merit our attention encompass the
functioning of central banking and monetary policy in an interest-
free economy. These changes are discussed in Chapter Six and
summarised below. First a word on the nature and legal aspects of an
Islamic bank's assets and liabilities.
In an Islamic bank there are three separate bodies: the depositors,
the bank and the entrepreneurs. In order to explain the legal status
of each we have to distinguish between two types of deposits. Demand
deposits give rise to a creditor/debtor relationship between the
depositor and the bank respectively. These deposits do not yield a
profit, could be withdrawn on demand and are fully guaranteed by the
bank. Under Islamic law such deposits are legally considered as
amanah (trust) funds with an implicit authorisation to utilise the
fund by the bank.
In the investment type deposits, the creditor/debtor relationship is
replaced by a principal/agent contract called the mudaraba contract.
Thus, in our Islamic banking model for Kuwait we assume that the
banking system is based on a two-tier mudaraba contract. The
depositor acting as rabalmal and the bank as a mudareb (trustee). As
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between the bank and the borrower, the bank acts as a rab-almal
whereas the entrepreneur as a mudareb (see Chapter 2).1
Central Banking and Monetar y Policy
The abolition of interest is not expected to change the objectives of
monetary pQlicy in Kuwait. These include growth through
diversification of income (other than from oil), efficient allocation
of resources and distribution of wealth, low inflation and stability
of the currency.
Among the Bank's main objectives during the transition period is to
devise non-usury banking law and regulations. The main function of
the bank would have to be modified to cope with the requirements of
the new system. For example, its refinancing or recurrent deposits
with member banks would be on a PLS basis. The profit ratio awarded
to the Bank would be lower than that given to saving accounts for
banks' profits rates on specified mudaraba contracts.
In the absence of the discount window and conventional open market
operations in an interest free economy, monetary policy tools would
be limited. The authorities must seek other tools that are
acceptable by Sharia. Some of the tools that have been suggested and
seem to offer a powerful mechanism for controlling money supply are
through central bank's deposits with member banks, and floating PLS
bonds (see Chapter Six, Monetary Policy). By changing the level of
the bank's deposits and by increasing or decreasing the PLS bonds,
the Islamic monetary authority may change the level of the money
supply and exert the desired effect on the financing operations of
member banks.	 Islamic monetary and prudential control would be
I	 This new contractual relationship entails the enactment of new
laws or modifying the existing ones to spei.l out the rights and
obligations of each party.	 -
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confined to liquidity and reserve ratios, 3- capital adequacy and self
imposed regulations, and selective control measures. Changing banks'
rate of profit (brp) or depositors 1 rate of profit (drp) to exert
monetary control was ruled out in our analysis. In effect, the drp
and brp must be determined by the supply and demand in the market in
compliance with Islamic law.
On the other hand, the advocates of using these ratios as a monetary
tool do not specify a workable mechanism for such policy except to
point out that it could be used to control the money supply and
credit expansion.2
Working of the Transformation Process - One Possible Solution
For all practical purposes a transition period is imperative whereby
all necessary preparations are made to implement the changes. Thus
it has to be emphasised that the transition period is going to be the
most critical aspect of the transformation process. Recognising that
prior to transition planning and preparatory work must be done it
would be realistic to assume that infrastructure should be the
fulcrum of the transition period. As most of the basic framework
would be laid down to ensure a smooth transformation of the system
the basic elements may encompass the establishment of legal and
administrative infrastructure, and economic and religious advisory
boards as will be explained in this section.
Bashir (1984) has studied the minimal ratios desirable for FIB,
Sudan, so that it does not decrease the availability of
loanable funds or affect the objective of optimising the return
to deposits and shareholders.
2	 See, for instance, Siddiqi, 1986, p31, and Uzair in Ariff,
1982, p252. Further research is needed for devising a
framework for observing rather than manipulating the ratio by
the Bank.
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Legal Aspects of the Elimination of Interest in Kuwait
The interest-based economy is a well developed discipline and a legal
system comprising well organised institutions, organisations and
related entities that are established by laws and protected by the
constitutions of virtually all Muslim countries. Furthermore,
generations of civil servants, bankers, businessmen and savers have
been taught, practiced and believed (though reluctantly for some of
them) in the existing system.
Given these circumstances, the conversion from an interest-based to
an Islamic system in any Islamic country and especially in Kuwait has
to be gradual and systematic)
A formal policy for the implementation of a legislative agenda must
be adopted so that the steps for abolishing interest will be preceded
by the enactment of new laws and amendments of the existing ones.
First among these laws is the enactment of a new financial services
act. This act would amalgamate Islamic services by codifying Sharia
rulings with respect to: mudaraba contracts, leasing, project
finance, forward purchase, salam, musharaka and redeemable
participation, the issuance and trading in stocks and PLS bonds,
murabaha and trade finance, bai al-ajal, ijara waktina and virtually
all Islamic financing media. Other issues in this cQntext relate to
new regulations for mortgages and collaterals, the rights and
limitations of share ownership, and the bases for pricing of profit-
related certificates.
The civil code in Kuwait disallows interest-based transactions of a
civil nature (ie, among non-commercial entities or ordinary persons).
By contrast, the commercial code permits the payment or the receival
Chapra, (1985, p222) has emphasised the need for a gradual
approach as it would be, in his words, "a mistake to try to
achieve the transition in one stroke or over a short period of
time. Such an attempt could suffocate the whole system and do
(a great) damage to the economy and ultimately to Islam".
The gradual approach has also been advocated by the Pakstan
Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), see CRIE Series No 7, 1984,
pp 37-41.
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of interest in commercial transactions or commercial loans (Articles
102 and 115). Accordingly, an amendment of Articles 102 and 115 of
the law forbidding the charging or the collection of interest would
be required. Apart from these articles, the commercial code complies
with Islamic law.
The legislature's first priorities with respect to the banking law
would be to choose between two options:
(a) enact a new interest-free banking law, as was the case in Iran,
or
(b) effect the necessary amendments to the existing banking law, to
be followed by respective regulations and instructions from the
Central Bank, as was the case in Pakistan. Assuming that
during transition, the monetary authority would adopt the
second option, we summarise below major issues that must be
considered and suggested amendments to the banking law number
32 (1968).
At present, currency in circulation and demand deposits must be
covered by: gold coins or bullions, demand deposits in local and
foreign currency, foreign securities and bills, commercial papers in
convertible foreign currencies, treasury bills and bonds issued by
the Government of Kuwait, and commercial papers discounted by the
banks (Article 12).
It is envisaged that locally discounted commercial papers would not
be considered in the currency coverage. However, discounted papers
would be included in the coverage if the bills were endorsed at face
value (ie, without interest), provided that the authorities would not
allow discounting after the abolition of interest.
Under Article 26, the Central Bank's Board of Directors is authorised
to formulate and fix the discount and rediscount rates, as well as to
fix the level of interest rates on loans and discounts of commercial
bills by the Bank. Articles 32, 37 and 41 permit the Bank to earn
interest on loans extended to member banks and government
organisations and to pay interest on deposits aswell. Provided that
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discounts and rediscounts of bills on interest would be forbidden, an
amendment of Articles 26, 32, 37 and 41 must be carried out after the
abolition of interest. Likewise, if the Government of Kuwait would
not allow the selling of interest-bearing treasury bills, an
amendment of Article 35 becomes essential.
Measures for Elimination of Interest
The measures that are contemplated for the elimination of interest
are listed below:
No interest should be charged on government loans or advances
to state-owned institutions or government owned independent
organisations, municipalities and autonomous entities.
Likewise,	 interest	 on	 inter-government	 transactions,
transactions with the public and any form of deal which
stipulates interest charges should be eliminated.
Alternatively and where it is deemed applicable, a service
charge would be imposed to cover actual expenses incurred in
processing the loan or the advance payment.
Interest on CK balances with the commercial banks should
remain the same during the transition period. However, such
interest must be eliminated and substituted by a profit sharing
scheme as outlined elsewhere (see Monetary Policy and CBK
Operation).
Government deposits with non-bank financial institutions and
investment companies should cease to earn interest. Profit and
loss sharing contracts would be implemented with the share of
the government in profits agreed upon.
Interest on overdue payments to the government by corporations
and individuals regardless of the origins of these payments
should be abolished. Appropriate disciplinary measures would
be enforced in such cases in compatibility with Sharia.
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- Establishment of an administrative and financial infrastructure
including an efficient judicial arbitration system to effect
speedy settlement of disputes, advisory and business
development board and central auditing office.
- Amendments of the banking law, commercial code, and social
security law to comply with Islamic Sharia)
- Elimination of the interest penalty from all government
transactions and outstanding obligations domestically.
- Amendments of the banking transactions and the introduction of
new monetary regulations and policies in compliance with
Islamic Law (see Chapter Six, Islamic Central Banking).
- The waiving of interest on government loans to IRK and other
Kuwaiti institutions.
IBK Board agreement to reduce the rate of interest charged to
local industry by the same rate that has been waived by the
government. For example, if the rate of interest on government
loans to IRK were 2%, then IBK would reduce the rate on
industrial loans by the same percentage pending entire
abolition of interest.
The Central Bank to issue instructions to member banks
permitting the opening of PLS deposits while existing deposits
will be allowed to continue until the termination of interest
is carried out.
The Central Bank to issue instructions organising the
procedures for opening LCs on a murabaha basis to coincide with
the implementation of the above mentioned step. The
application of murabaha at the early stages of Islamic finance
stems from its simplicity and clarity. Moreover, it requires
minimal alterations of the existing system of trade finance and
1 The amendment of social security law would be limited to
waiving the charging of interest on outstanding (unpaid)
contributions by the employers.
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minimal training of bank employees. More significantly, the
introduction of murabaha facilitates the provision of Islamic
short-term finance in an economy which is predominantly trade
orientated. Thus it seems logical to start the first phase of
Islamic finance by murabaha and other trade related
instruments.
- The pertinent laws and regulations for murabaha certificates,
PTCs and PLS bonds would be promulgated paving the way for the
issuance and trading in these instruments.
-	 Islamic banks to announce the launching of Islamic investment
portfolios on PLS basis.
- The Central Bank to announce the banning of interest-based
deposits and the beginning of Islamic finance particularly on
PLS basis.
Infrastructure
It is hard to believe that a successful transition could ever have
any chance of successful implementation without the help of a number
of institutions and organisations to support and back up the new
system.
Advisory and Business Develo pment Board
Apart from providing Islamic finance the primary objectives of the
new system is to provide a wide range of financial services that are
good substitutions for the conventional ones and also fill the gaps
in the present range of services. Recognising that the newness and
somewhat complex nature of certain branches of Islamic finance will
not be applicable immediately after transformation it is logical to
have an advisory and business development board (ABDB). The tasks
maintained by the ABDB would be to:
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(i) provide technical assistance and advice concerning the types of
Islamic finance.
(ii) develop new instruments consistent with Sharia.
(iii)promote, educate and advise the public on all aspects of
Islamic finance and answer their queries.
(iv) co-operate and consult and hold seminars, conferences and
meetings with the International Association of Islamic Banks,
other Islamic financial institutions in Kuwait and abroad,
Islamic Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, and any other
interested academic or professional institution. Members of
the ABDB may include:
- representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the
Central Bank
- economists and bankers
- one or two representatives from the Chamber of Commerce
and Industry
- prominent Islamic scholars
When the government adopts the recommendation of the ABDB to abolish
interest the preliminary phase ends and the transformation process
begins.
Regulation of Auditors and the Auditing Profession
Among the criticisms raised against Islamic forms of financing is the
possibility of excessive cost which is expected to be incurred in
supervising and controlling the borrower/entrepreneurs accounts. To
overcome this, Chapra proposed the formation of an Investment Audit
Corporation (IAC) whose function would be to audit the accounts of
those customers applying for PLS finance (Mudaraba, Musharaka etc))
At present, auditing in Kuwait is carried out by small and large
firms of independent auditors. The problem is that usually small
1	 1985, pl8O,'op cit.
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auditing firms, though not expensive compared with large firms, are
not professionally competent. On the other hand, large auditing
firms though competent are relatively expensive. The IAC, if it were
established in Kuwait, must not put small auditing firms out of
business. Likewise it would not cancel out the functions of internal
auditors as its task would be limited to examining the accounts of
small businesses who apply for PLS financing. Therefore, the main
objective of the IAC would be, for example, to:
(a) safeguard	 the	 depositors	 and	 shareholders	 against
misrepresentation of facts or manipulation of accounts
(b) minimise the cost of auditing for each individual institution,
provided that it is sponsored by these institutions, and
(c) act as a database through the compilation of information about
customers.
The services rendered by the IAC could be extended to individual
investors who want to enter into Mudaraba, Musharaka or any kind of
partnership with other merchants or firms.
Evidently, the auditing techniques of small firms in Kuwait need
upgrading1 and the reorganisation of the auditing profession is
advisable. The auditors must bear some responsibility for their
actions and therefore the possibility of reprimanding, fining or
suspending their licence by the respective authority seems
appropriate. One of the central issues that awaits a decision from
the regulators is whether to allow diversification within the
auditing profession into management consultancy and feasibility
analysis of potential projects. As a rule it is important to
eliminate any conflict of interest in order to cope with a new
financial system and to safeguard auditors' independence so that they
may carry out their work with professional integrity.
1	 From the experience of the author while working with IEK.
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Judicial Arbitration System
During transition and pending the entire elimination of interest from
the economy, interest penalty in case of rescheduling or overdue
balances should be abolished, as this is the absolute nba which was
banned by the Quran (see nba section). Meanwhile, the establishment
of a judicial Arbitration Court is suggested in order to secure a
speedy settlement of debts and financial disputes.
Specialised Control Department
Before the completion of the transformation process the formation of
a special control department at the Central Bank is suggested. Its
duties may include the control and supervision of Islamic banks
during and after transition.
Timetable
No attempt has been made to set up a time schedule for the
implementation of the new system. The individual, competent
authorities are more qualified in forecasting the chronological
factor than this academic work is. However, it could be said that
the transformation to the new system may be carried, out when the
legal framework has been set up and the supporting institutions and
organisations have been established.
Remarks
The main thrust of the transformation process would be to:
(a) Revive Islamic values and business ethics (eg, brotherhood, co-
operation, integrity and honesty, justice and equity);
(b) Establish a code of business conduct and emphasise honesty in
book-keeping, moderation in pricing and profit earnings;
380
(c) Set up the necessary administrative and institutional
infrastructure to ensure effective implementation so that
deficiencies would be discovered and discrepancies would be
amended. An example of the proposed organisations include the
Advisory and Business Development Board, Religious Advisory
Board for each bank (see Chapter Two), Investment Auditing
Office, Judicial Arbitration System, and the creation of a
specialised control department at the CBK to supervise Islamic
banking operations;
(d) Amend and enact the necessary legal framework including
amendments of the civil code, commercial law and banking act to
comply with Sharia;
(e) The complete abolition of interest is expected to take effect
after the results of the transition period have proved to be
satisfactory. Also prior to this stage the infrastructure
necessary to establish Islamic finance on a sound basis should
be completed;
Equally important also is the field assessment of the
transition period to detect any problems or loopholes in order
for the necessary actions to be taken without undue delay;
(f) The transition period should lead to consolidation of diverse
views on Islamic banking operations and concepts among
practitioners and decision makers to ensure a smooth
transformation process. Furthermore, existing contracts must
run their course. Ample time must be given before starting
each step;
(g) During transition, interest bearing loans should be eliminated
systematically to reach, for example, lower than 15 percent of
total lending. The retaining of interest bearing loans during
this stage is to accommodate the need for personal loans and
short-term needs for liquidity. This measure will be totally
abolished in the final phase or when suitable Islamic
alternatives to personal loans and short-term borrowing are
implemented, whichever is earlier.
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In the preceding passages we have discussed three major issues: the
possibility of structuring an Islamic banking system for Kuwait, the
changes and implications for financial institutions and instruments,
if interest were abolished and the working of the transformation
process. It is concluded that it would be possible to change the
current system into an interest-free one given the fact that the
operations and legal nature and asset/liability management could be
modified to accommodate the new system.
In what follows, the impediments, ie, the cost and limitations of the
new system are discussed. Solutions or suggestions are proposed
where applicable in order to bridge the gap between what ought to be
done and what could be done in accordance with the prevailing
situation.
MAJOR IMPEDIMENTS TO ISLAMIC BANKING
The major impediments that are expected to face the application of
Islamic banking in Kuwait are analysed. The impediments are
classified into those relating to: (i) the micro- and macro-levels,
(ii) borrowers and depositors' behaviour, and (iii) miscellaneous.1
Construction and Real Estate Financing
If interest is abolished in Kuwait, technical and structural problems
will emerge in commercial real estate financing. As we have seen,
KFH is not only licensed to provide construction loans but is also a
construction company in its own right. If all remained the same
after interest were banned, KFH would be a developer and builder as
It should be emphasised, however, that these obstacles could be
resolved once will and expertise are put together to provide a
solution. On the micro-level the following issues are
discussed: 1 - construction and real estate financing, 2 -
consumer loans, 3 - financing ailing companies on PLS, 4 -
working capital finance, 5 - cost of processing the loan and
service charges, 6 - information and running costs, 7 -
provision of investment risk, 8 - liquidity management, 9 -
liquidity transEormatiori, 10 - fixing the rate of return, 11 -
bonus on demand deposits, 12 - criterion for investment
decisions.
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currently is the case. In addition, it would have to compete with
KREB in financing construction and real estate, not with different
financing methods as before but with 'interest-free' finance.
Needless to say short-term financing is provided by all commercial
banks.1
As KREB is an intermediate specialised bank it is banned from
directly owning real estate property though it is allowed to
participate in real estate companies locally and abroad whose
objectives are to own and develop properties. KFH also acts as both
developer and financier at the same time. KREB will be facing unfair
competition unless certain changes in the relevant laws are affected
in order to maintain fair trading in the supply of real estate
finance.
Consumer Loans
There is a significant difference between an Islamic bank and the
conventional banks in Kuwait which merits some attention. 	 In
principle, KFH is not allowed by its charter or by Sharia code to
deal in straight loans. On the other hand, the commercial banks are
banned by the banking act and Kuwait commercial law to buy and sell
consumer products or engage in sale credit. Only the Kuwait Finance
House provides sale credit, whereas all commercial banks in Kuwait
It is worth mentioning that the setting up of industrial
buildings is usually financed by soft loans from the Industrial
Bank of Kuwait. Additionally, the Credit and Savings Bank
finances first time buyers or residentirl apartment buildings
for newly married couples through an interest free loan
repayable over 30-40 years period (see Chapter Four,
Spec ialised Banks).
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provide loan credit.1
The question is, are the Islamic banks the only source of non-
interest bearing loans? There are other sources in Kuwait. For
example, the Credit and Savings Bank grants, at present, interest-
free consumption loans to Kuwaitis especially for marriage and house
furniture. The Jordan Islamic Bank has opened an interest-free
account whereby customers who are willing to lend, interest-free,
deposit in this special account, and the bank in turn provides
eligible customers with interest-free funds.
Siddiqi has proposed using part of the Zakat Fund in providing
consumption loans "needed to alleviate suffering and deprivation".2
Actually Zakat is a non-refundable gift to the needy (among other
specified recipients) whose earnings are below the poverty line.
Thus Zakat could not be used for other purposes even if all
beneficiaries have received their share. In this case Islamic
scholars have suggested spending the surplus on beneficiaries from a
neighbouring Muslim country. Among the stated beneficiaries, only
insolvent debtors and not consumers are eligible for Zakat (or Zaka)
to settle their debts.
Recreational and luxury spending on services, eg, tourism and
entertainment, could not be financed by the current Islamic financing
instrument for two main reasons:
1.	 There is no tangible product that could be financed by sale
credit;
Sale credit is an agreement between a person (the debtor) and
any other person or entity (the creditor) by which the creditor
(eg, a bank) buys an item upon the customer's request and sells
it back at the cost price plus a margin. The amount owed is
repaid by one lump sum or by instalments. Both methods are
acceptable in Islamic law on the basis of Bai al-Ajal (deferred
sales). Loan credit is an agreement between a person (the
debtor) and any other person or entity by which the debtor
obtains cash and promises to repay at a specified time in the
future.
Thus in the Islamic system consumers will no longer be able to
get straightforward loans except, of course, benevolent loans.
Secondly, banks would have to deal with Bai al-Ajal unless the
ban on such activities remains after the abolition of interest.
2	 See Issues in Islamic Banking, Leicester: The Islamic
Foundation, 1983, pp 91-92.
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2. There would be no economic incentive nor a moral obligation for
the banks to grant non-interest loans to those, for example,
needing to take holidays.
However the absence of consumer credit facilities for recreational
expenses does not mean that the demand for such spending will be
diminished. The demand might decrease but it would not disappear,
unless the consumers are educated to rationalise their spending
habits. 1 One may also suggest co-operative banks as possible sources
for not only interest-free loans, but consumer loans on Islamic
principles. With the spread of co-operative supermarkets in Kuwait
small sub co-operatives could be opened at least in the major co-
operatives. The cost involved in running these quasi-banks could be
substantially reduced by using the existing office space in the co-
operative buildings and by assigning the bulk of clerical jobs among
existing employees.
Financing Ailing Companies on PLS
The PLS system, while driving at efficient allocation of resources,
must safeguard the interests of depositors including small savers.
It follows that an Islamic bank's management must assess the pros and
cons of every PLS proposal in terms of its profitability, liquidity,
safety and the character of the sponsor(s). An ailing company, by
definition, lacks one or more of these criteria. It would be
irrational, therefore, to finance an ailing company on a PLS basis
unless there are reasons to believe that a losing venture may turn
out to be promising. If, for example, certain changes in top
management were carried out or fresh capital were injected (see also
financing working capital below).
There would be no harm if some people borrowed from friends or
relatives on an interest-free, basis. General awareness of the
moral haz.irds associated with borrowing for recreational or
luxury purposes would prevent a black market for nba-lending
to flourish. Also the severe penalty on violators is another
deterrent.
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Financing Working Capital
Currently, Islamic banks are facing some difficulties in providing
working capital. There are various solutions to this problem. The
Islamic banking system is flexible and encompasses several financing
instruments other than PLS. A company, for instance, might need cash
to replenish its inventory or to finance working capital. This could
be done through murabaha, forward purchase and instalment sale. The
company may also sell some of its assets or premises for cash and
lease it back, though, in two separate deals (to be legitimate in
view of Sharia). Alternatively, the bank may extend short-term,
interest-free loans that might help temporarily, though it will not
help solve the basic problem. Another solution would be to decrease
capital by the amount of loans and the bank may invite new investors
to inject fresh money, provided that a market for the company's
product does exist. One thing that Islamic finance cannot do is to
finance salaries when a company is facing liquidity problems and has
obtained several interest-free loans.
The Cost of Processing the Loan and Service Charges
A service charge according to Islamic law should not be in proportion
to the amount of the loan or the value of the letter of guarantee
(see Chapter Two). In practice, the service charge is calculated 5n
two ways, (1) an outright percentage, eg, 2.5%, on the amount of the
loan (as applied by 1DB); (ii) a ratio calculated as a percentage of
net administrative expenses (gross income less provisions for bad
loans and taxes, actual taxes paid and write-offs, and interest on
borrowings in foreign currency) to average total assets.' In
fairness, neither of these methods include the cost of funds or the
time element in calculating the service charges. However, a standard
and unified method for calculating the service charge should be
sought. It does not seem that an outright percentage or a percentage
of net administrative expenses to total assets are in compliance with
Sharia.
1	 See BCD circular No 26, November 26, 1984.
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Fixing the service charge (according to the actual cost incurred) and
coniinission rates by the monetary authority and identifying the cases
when it is applicable preclude the chances of reverting to nba (ie,
disguised under another name).
Information and Running Costs
Islamic banks may have to incur higher information and running costs
than the conventional system. These costs involve hiring competent
staff and training of personnel in Islamic banking and in project
evaluation, close monitoring of projects, and additional auditing
work. More significantly, savers would have to spend, some time in
evaluating the performance of Islamic banks in order to choose the
one that meets their investment criteria. It has been argued that a
special agency could be commissioned to evaluate projects rather than
the banks' staff, and that the incremental cost is justified by the
social benefits that are expected to be realised from PLS financing)'
It is not clear, however, who would get the benefits, those who' pay
the cost or the society at large?
It is to be noted that the main benefits from financial
intermediaries stem from their ability to reduce the cost of
information and contractual arrangements. They are supposed to be
more experienced and informative than an ordinary saver or investor.
An agency would not solve the problem owing to the fees they charge,
and the need to scrutinise their work by the bank's staff. Besides,
a banker's job cannot be done by proxy. It should be realised that
there are costs that must be borne in order to install a new system.
Most of these costs could be capitalised and then charged to several
accounting periods.
1	 See Islamic Banks, ed M Au, Op CIt, p84.
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Provisions for Investment Risks
Arising from the above, the provi2ions for investment risk in the
Islamic banks are currently high by any standard. It is prudent to
have a high provision rate to ensure the efficient running of the
operation. Only by experience and practice could the level of
compensating balance be lowered.
Currently, the Jordan Islamic Bank's provision for investment risks
amounts to 4 percent of the total financing operations and 3.6
percent of the total financing and investment portfolio of the bank.
Provisions in the Islamic Investment House (1111) of Jordan were 4
percent in 1982, then dropped to 1.35 percent in 1983 solely for tax
purposes. The fact is that these provisions are not tax deductible
since only the actual write-offs are allowable expenses.
Liquidity ltanagement
The Islamic banks have experienced difficulties in short term and
overnight investments. - It was thought that trading in commodities
would secure liquidity when needed. This method, as it turned out,
was very risky as the prices of commodities had fallen when cash was
badly needed. Moreover, the absence of an Islamic central bank that
can act as a lender of last resort has compelled banks rather
reluctantly to maintain a self-imposed liquidity ratio which is, by
and large, higher than common norms and scales down from 50 percent
on savings accounts to ten percent on infinite mudaraba accounts.
The inaccessibility of short term money to alleviate chronic
liquidity shortages in the Islamic banks could be partially resolved
through (i) inter-banking operations within the existing Islamic
banking structure, (ii) emergency funds from the central bank, and
(iii) developing an Islamic money market.
A cash surplus bank would furnish the cash-deficit bank with fresh
money in the. form of sight or short-term deposits. Several deposits
or withdrawals might occur during the year. At the end of the year,
the donor bank could share in the profits of. the recipient bank on
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the basis of the daily points products method along with the banks'
saving or term deposits account)
The central bank in an interest-free banking system stands ready to
provide call money or emergency funds to illiquid banks through CDs
(see Islamic Central Bank). What the central bank cannot do,
however, is to buy debt obligations of the Islamic bank. It has been
suggested that the central bank could buy murabaha certificates from
the Islamic bank and make profit on the mark-up accrued on these
certificates. 2 In order for this recommendation to be accepted by
Sharia, the Islamic bank can open a special murabaha fund for the
central bank and use the fund to finance certain murabaha
transactions on behalf of the central bank on a commission basis.
Buying trade obligations, eg, murabaha is inconsistent with Sharia as
it is not possible to transfer the title of the murabaha goods from
the bank to the central bank in order to validate the transaction.
Moreover, property rights in niurabaha are usually passed on to the
trader as soon as the goods have been put in his custody. These
objections do not apply, though, to fixed obligations as leasing,
mudaraba or niusharaka certificates (eg, PTCs) which are negotiable
and their title is identifiable and transferable.
Liquidity Transfori.ation
The Islamic banks, at present, concentrate on short-term financing,
as do conventional commercial banks in Kuwait. In both systems, the
shareholders and depositors in particular expect quick returns. More
significantly commercial banks must stay liquid to meet customers'
demand for cash.
It would take time and effort to build up professionalism in
liquidity transformation, particularly in the case of abandoning the
1 The realisation of profits in this transaction depends on the
profitability of the debtor bank. The probability of losing
the principal anount is very remote as the bank can withdraw
the money at call or short-notice.
2 See Recommendations by the Committee of Central Banks (Monetary
Authorities of the Islamic Countries), Khartoum, April 30,
1984.
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"golden rule of banking" or the real bills doctrine that calls for
matching short-term deposits with short-term lending and long-term
deposits with long-term lending. According to Khatkhat and
Villaneuva (1980) the "sediment theory" has proved that in developing
economies "a certain core of funds always remain with banks over
longer periods of time".' Further research is needed to test this
hypothesis in Kuwait. A great deal could be expected if the results
of these researches were proved to be positive. For not only would
the specialised banks be more equipped to finance industry, but a
wide range of long-term finance could also be launched by commercial
banks (see liability management).
In order to increase the involvement of Islamic banks in long-range
financing, specified or unspecified investment funds could be
launched for this purpose. The banks' resources would not be
subjected to a volatile deposit base of relatively short maturities
if this proposal were carried out.2
Fixing the Rate of Return
In Chapter Six, we have argued against using the bank's rate of
profit (brp) and the depositors' rate of profit (drp) by the monetary
authorities as a monetary tool. The reasons given were that these
rates must be determined by the forces of supply and demand. In as
much as this argument remains valid, it must be noted that during
transition a market for Islamic loanable funds would be far from
being established.
Therefore, it would be plausible to have some sort of control by the
monetary authority to safeguard the interests of the depositors and
entrepreneurs against the possibility of the banks charging
exorbitant mark-ups. 3	The mechanics of such control vary with
1	 IMF staff paper, September 1980, Vol 23, p488.
2 However, the effective mobilisation of long-term resources
depends on the level of central bank's assistance and the
decline in the self-imposed liquidity ratios that are currently
invoked (see liquidity management).
3	 For more details see Effi.ciency - the price of funds.
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respect to the types of liabilities and assets structure of the
banking system.
Another issue that might face Islamic banks pertains to the profit
share on savings and investments deposits. Primarily, profit shares
should be declared in advance in compliance with the mudaraba
contract. This is practically difficult if (a) all investment
deposits were pooled together; (b) the allocation of profits were
prorata with the bank's equity; and (c) the balance of PLS deposits
at the beginning of the financial year were not the same as during,
or at the end of, the accounting period owing to new deposits,
drawdowns and different maturities of those deposits.
In Pakistani banks, the rates of profit on PLS deposits are declared
every six months on accrual basis. The net profit accruing to the
bank is allocated among various resources including deposits. Final
adjustment is made at year end.
The disadvantage of this method is that it assigns different
weightings for these resources and more weight is given to the bank's
equity. 1
 It does not seem fair to give more weighting to bank's
equity over other types of resources 2 for two reasons: (a) the
maturity of each liability is accounted for through the daily product
method; and (b) the net profit is calculated after all provisions are
made (including that on doubtful loans).
It must also be noted that the practice of not distributing profits
on less than 30 days or 90 days deposits is not also fair and may
encourage the holding of demand deposits as: (a) short-term
investment accounts, contrary to demand deposits, are not guaranteed,
and (b) they do not yield any profits to the depositors.
1	 See State Bank of Pakistan, BCD circular No 34, November 26,
1984.
2 The same sentiment has been expressed by Z Ahuied who considered
such "weightage" as contrary to Sharia and pointed out that the
weightage must be in favour of the enterprise in connection
with management and expertise provided, see UNIDO workshop,
paper No 16, Vienna, 1986, op cit, p33.
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The determination of profit share on PLS finances must also be
subjected to market forces. The availability of more than one
Islamic bank after the abolition of interest will allow fair
competition to take place among the banks. The borrower will be free
to negotiate the terms of the PLS contract including the profit
ratios and to conclude the deal with the bank that offers better
service and settles for a lower profit ratio than its competitors.
Bonus on Demand Deposits
Under current practice, demand deposits are not entitled to any
return. However, in a fractional reserve system, a Kuwaiti Islamic
bank may want to distribute cash bonuses to current account holders.
The managers may argue that since the bank has achieved a. high profit
margin on these accounts it would be fair to share part of it with
the depositors. Recalling that the Prophet once said "the best of
you are those who pay their debts generously" (literally 'in the best
possible manner') 1 ; and provided that the suggested bonus is neither
explicitly or implicitly stated in the contract, it appears that a
non-recurring and a variable bonus on demand deposits is permissible
(see Chapter Two, Bonus on Current Account). 2 In any event, the
monetary authority in Kuwait should be prepared to issue guidelines
and directives regarding the conditions for opening current accounts
and to set up priorities for utilisation of surplus funds in the
account. One such priority would be to determine the portions of
current account surplus that could be utilised for granting interest-
free loans as well as PLS loans.
The Criterion for Investment Decisions
The market rate of interest for various borrowing/lending
requirements is widely publicised and enables savers and investors to
1	 See Ibn Qudama, Al-Mughni, Riyadh, Maktabet al-Riyadh al-
Haditheh, nd, Vol IV, p236.
2 Prominent early Islamic jurists have seen no harm if a man pays
better or less than the initial loan, provided that no such
condition to this effect is mentioned in the contract. Among
those jurists: Said Ihn al-Musayab, Ibn Omar, Malek, al Shafii,
and Ishaq. For more details see Ibid, p356
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calculate the cost of capital without much effort. In the interest-
free system, the expected profit rate would be a criterion for
accepting or rejecting an investment. A few researches have been
conducted in order to calculate and formalise an Islamic rate of
return for use in discounting future income. No conclusive results
so far are available.' Unless a complete Islamic economic system is
applied it would be difficult to arrive at an Islamic average rate of
profit that could be used as an investment indicator.2
On the macro level, five major impediments are discussed. These are:
1. The balance of payments and the flow of capital.
2. Multipurpose banking.
3. Accessibility to money and capital market.
4. Deficit financing.
5. The effect on savers' and investors' behaviours.
The Balance of Payments and the Flow of Capital
Kuwait is a financial surplus economy and depends on oil as the main
source of current income. This means that the central bank is unable
to exercise control on the monetary base or high powered money as the
Ministry of Finance holds and administers the bulk of foreign
exchange reserves. The balance of payments is affected when the
Ministry decides to spend locally by calling in foreign reserves.3
This situation is likely to prevail after the abolition of interest
particularly if the authorities abandon the recent trend for
financing the deficit through government borrowing.
Based on the assumption that investors/savers will not reject the new
system, there is no danger of a massive outflow of private capital
1 See, for example, Anas Zarga, "Islamic Perspective on the
Economics of Discounting in Project Evaluation", in Z Ahraed,
1983, pp 203-31.
2 This does not mean that interest becomes legal or using
interest as an indicator means we are violating the code of
Sharia.
3	 See Crockett & Evans "Demand for Money in the Middle Eastern
Countries", IMF papers, Dec 1980, p 553 ff.
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after the abolition of interest. Nevertheless, the monetary
authority must be able to intervene when necessary to secure
liquidity of the banking system, and stability of the Kuwaiti
currency. What would be the tools in an interest-free economy for
controlling the transfer of capital?
In the current system, the transfer of capital is normally curtailed
though a changing interest rate mechanism and the exchange rate. At
present, the exchange rate mechanism seems to be the only method that
could be applied in an Islamic open economy. 1
 Other measures could
be adopted, of course, including a quota on the number of transfers
or amounts of each transfer. However, these measures are against the
free movement of capital and may not be effective.
The major issue in this context is to establish confidence in the
business community. A careful preparation and a nationwide campaign
for promoting the new system and explaining its advantages would
eliminate the chances of a massive out flight of capital after the
abolition of interest.
Multi-purpose Banking
Currently, the Islamic banks, with the exception of Iranian banks,
are permitted to conduct many commercial and rum-banking activities.
Central among these activities are the importation of goods for their
own account and on behalf of their clients, development of real
estate projects and the promotion of various types of investments
including among them commercial and industrial enterprises either
through acquisitions or equity participation.
In an interest-free banking system the regulators have to decide
whether to allow the banks to enter the market as buyers and sellers
of goods and services or to disallow such practices. The argument in
support of permitting Islamic commercial banks to be involved in
trade is based on the premise that Islamic banks are not lenders per
1	 1 have not seen any studies pertaining to the mechanism for
controlling capital outflow in an Islamic economy. 	 Further
research in this area is needed.
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se and they are multi-purpose in nature and as such they should be
deregularised. It could also be said that multi-purpose banks are
more cost efficient in terms of economies of scale and scope through
the concentration of many operations under one roof. On the other
hand, the augmentation of deposit taking activities, financing and
general trading leads to the concentration of power in a few hands.
This in turn leads to monopoly, conflict of interest and works
against specialisation of labour in the market. Effectively, banks'
personnel would have access to inside information about their
corporate customers which could be used to illicit illegal gains in
shares trading. The conflict of interest may arise when a bank's
representatives would sit on the boards of subsidiaries or customer's
companies. It is difficult to ascertain whether the director should
look after the interests of the bank or the company.
In Kuwait, the new activities cited above are in contrast with the
existing laws and regulations that restrict involvement of banks in
trading activities. The restriction is derived from the old banking
laws that segregate banking business and trading activities.
Accessibility to Money and Capital Market
The development of an Islamic money and capital market faces
technical and religious rescrvations. These reservations preclude
the Islamic banks from tapping the money and capital market in order
to alleviate their liquidity shortages. There are other objections
regarding the transferability of debt obligations, for example,
discounting of commercial bills and selling a bank's debts to a third
party (see Chapter Six, Discounting of Bills). Furthermore, the
development of a money and capital market or a secondary Islamic
market depends on the marketability, collectability, convertability
and changes in the market prices of these certificates.
It is difficult to predict at this stage whether an Islamic money
market would be efficient or not. Even with the assum ption that
corporate certificates will be marketable, callable and convertible
there remains the question of market prices and government
regulations.
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The market price of a PLS corporate certificate would be determined
by supply and demand in addition to the savers perception of the
expected income stream. The volatility of prices will not directly
affect yields as in the interest-based system. The yield
determinants are exogenous to the price of the certificate since it
is a function of the previous trends and future income of the
ent.erprise issuing the security. Actual or interim results whether
good or bad will tend to raise or depress the price of security
respectively, other things being equal.
The absence of government borrowing and open market operations will
tend to restrict the expansion of the Islamic money and capital
market. However, the market will be enhanced if the government of
Kuwait decides to finance public enterprises by selling PLS
denominated securities (see deficit finance).
The supervisory authorities with the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry must draft the required laws and amendments to the existing
ones regarding, for example, the issuance and trading of corporate
securities, the regulations pertaining to convertibility,
callability, prices and volumes of each issue and of each security
(eg, mudaraba, musharaka, leasing). The regulations must consider
whether commercial banks would be prohibited or permitted to deal and
underwrite corporate securities. Failure to organise and regularise
the market at an early stage will hinder its progress and adversely
affects the development of an efficient banking system.
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Deficit Financing
In the wake of a persistent budget deficit coupled with growth in the
private sector savings a proposal for internal borrowing is hereby
presented. Kuwait needs today more than any time before an efficient
allocation of resources and the mobilization of private savings. This
could be achieved through launching profit-linked securities (PLS) by
the government. PLS would be different from ordinary government
securities in the conventional system in substance and form.
Firstly, it will not be an interest-bearing bond. Secondly, it would
be for medium and long-term maturities with few short-term issues.
Thirdly, it must be linked with financing profit-generated projects
such as the construction of motorways (where a "toll" is paid by the
users), communication, education, health services and a host of other
similar projects that meet the following criteria: (a) the
cost/benefit relationship can be identified and quantified, (b) once
the cost/benefit relationship is known and by assuming that the
benefits outweigh the costs, a portion of the benefits would be
distributed annually as yields (to the bearer) until maturity.
Siddiqi has proposed the procurement of capital for industrial
enterprise from the public on a partnership or Mudaraba basis, and he
presented a good argument in favour of 'Government Mudaraba shares'
(GMS). In fact I see no reason why the government cannot promote
industrial projects by establishing a public shareholding company as
it is commonly practised in Kuwait and elsewhere.
Evidently, the Government of Kuwait is not in desperate need for
internal borrowing. However it would seem desirable to resort to
internal borrowing in the face of a growing budget deficit1 . The
advantages are summarised below:
1.	 M.N. Siddiqi, Banking without interest, 1983, p.133-7.
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1. Up until now the Kuwaiti citizens are dependent on the State
for everything ranging from security of employment to bailing
out speculators in the stock market. It is about time for the
public to share some of the burdens with the State. This
sharing creates a sense of responsibility, and has a
psychological influence on the individuals' behaviour and
spending habits.
2. It would partially halt the deterioration in the general
reserves, and in particular the reserves for future generations
which ought to remain intact.
3. It mobilises internal resources and directs them towards
productive investments.
On the other hand, the implementation of such programmes requires a
political will and an administrative infrastructure. Above all, the
proposed PLS should yield a positive return in order to generate the
required motivations or incentives for the public (institutions and
households) to participate in the scheme.
Presumably the application of PLS would not be applicable, for
example, to non-profit making projects such as the construction of a
military air base and so forth. There is a possibility though of
developing some sort of mechanism to finance such enterprises. For
instance, Annas al-Zarqa is convinced that such a mechanism is not
only possible but also feasible. He explains that one of the methods
for financing a non-profit enterprise, the air base in our example,
is to form a company with the sole purpose of setting up the base and
then renting it to the government1.
Alternatively, the base could then be sold on an instalment basis.
Though this type of financing might not be needed for Kuwait, at the
moment, it would nevertheless be a useful device in the poor
countries and a workable substitute for interest-bearing debts. This
solution, if adopted in any country, could improve the balance of
payments and may reduce foreign debts.
1. From an interview with Dr Zarqa, Jeddah April 17, 1986. It is
not intended, however, to present a complete programme of this
scheme as it is beyond the scope of this study.
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Does deficit financing lead to inflation? According to Friedman
(1974) this depends on the method of financing a deficit. In his
words
"If the deficits are financed by creating money they
unquestionably do produce inflationary pressures. If they are
financed by borrowing from the public, at whatever interest
rates are necessary, they may still exert some minor
inflationary pressures. Their major effect will be to make
interest rates higher than they would otherwise be"1.
Based on the above argument, it seems that a deficit financing on PLS
basis would produce inflationary pressures at times of tight money or
in poor economies 2 . Since the objective of tapping the market to
finance the budget deficit in Kuwait is basically to absorb the
excess liquidity, it may be safety assumed that internal borrowing in
Kuwait, if it is timed properly, would be anti-inflationary. Bearing
in mind the narrow absorptive capacity of the economy which led in
the past to stock market frenzy and a boom in real estate investment
causing unprecedented upsurge in prices.
Additionally the proposed scheme for borrowing from the public in
Kuwait would have the plausible effect of avoiding the crowding-out
effect. Government spending in Kuwait is currently causing crowding-
out of private spending since it is not accompanied by taxes or
borrowing from the public3.
1. See R.J. Gordon ed, Milton Friedman's "Monetary Framework",
(The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1974), p.140.
2. This does not mean that private wealth in these economies is
negligible or to imply that tapping the internal markets is
fruitless.
3. This effect is emphasised by Friedman and the economaticians of
the St Louis model. Helmut Frisch "Monetarist and Monetary
Economics, a Delayed Comment", in The Structure of Monetarism,
Thomas Mayer ed. (new York: W.W. Norton (Comp. 1978), p.120.
Also L.C. Anderson and K.M. Carlson, "A Monetarist Model for
Economic Stabilization", Federal Reserve Bank, St Louis Review,
1970.
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The Effects on Savers' and Investors' Behaviours
Much of the criticism regarding the effect of an interest-free system
on savings has taken the view that aggregate savings would decline.
Pryor, for example, has argued that:1
(a) Investing "passively" in an interest-yielding bond is not
possible in a PLS economy and direct investment increases risk
leading to a drop in saving.
(b) Assuming that income and substitution effects (between current
and future consumption) are the same in Muslim countries as
they are in the West, savers would choose current rather than
future consumption thus contributing to a decline in current
saving.
(c) The institution of zakat and the stress on charitable spending
reduces the incentive for saving particularly as zakat is paid
whether income is earned or not.2
It is true that investing in Islamic bonds is to-date not widely
available. However, it is possible, for example, to buy real estate
bonds that yield stable income in the Kuwait Finance House. Low risk
murabaha bonds are available from IDE though in large denominations
(see Chapter Two).
The third world debt crisis and the stock market crash have shown
that direct investment is safer than many investments. 3
 Recently,
Ul-Haque and Mirakhor have shown that, in the Islamic system and,
given the assumption that the rate of return on PLS increases with
the increase in risk, total saving will not be changed and perhaps
will increase. However, if the rate of return drops after the
abolition of interest then saving may decline, given the same level
I	 See Journal of Comparative Economics, June 1985, pp 208-9.
2	 Ibid.
3 This has prompted the Citi Bank Chairman to declare that direct
investments in Brazil are better than lending to the Central
Bank, see the author's article "The Final Chapter of the
Aftermath of Souk al-Manakh", Journal of Arab Banker, June-July
1987, pp 23-4.
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of risk in both systems. The mathematical analysis by Waqar has been
discussed (see Efficiency, infra), it suffices to recall that he has
shown that aggregate saving under certain assumptions would increase
in an Islamic system.
In studying the impact of uncertainty on saving, we shall examine the
behaviour of savers concerning the effect of uncertainty on both
income and wealth as perceived by some prominent economists. Irving
Fisher (1930)1 and Boulding2
 have asserted that uncertainty about
future income raises the propensity to save. In their view, the risk
of future income induces people to increase saving out of current
consumption in order to guarantee for themselves the same level of
income (or return). Sandino (1970) distinguished between capital and
non-capital income and argued that saving behaviour varies with
respect to the case under study. He found that the overall impact of
an increased capital risk is likely to be "indeterminate" as the
substitution effect reduces saving when its yield is uncertain
whereas the income effect tends to increase saving.3
More relevant to this analysis is Friedman's permanent income theory.
Consumers' spending and saving pattern according to Friedman are
directly affected by their permanent rather than by actual though
fluctuating money income. People weigh their saving, investment and
spending decisions according to their expected future income. Thus
they smooth their current spending/saving behaviour, saving in
prosperous years and "dipping into their savings in others".4
Regarding the point that has been raised by Pryor on zakat, we may
say that the effect of zakat on saving is positive given the fact
that zakat induces investment so that idle wealth would not be wiped
out by zakat (see Chapter Two, the Demand for Money). Kahf has also
1	 The Theory of Interest, New York, Macmillan, 1930.
2	 See Economic Analysis, Vol 1, "Macroeconomics", 4th ed, Harper
& Row, 1966, p535.
3	 Cited in TJ1-Haque & Mirakhor, 1986a, p4. The same result has
been confirmed by Block (1972) and Heinke (1975), see p5.
4 The permanent income hypothesis suggests that people adjust
their spending habits not in conformity with their fluctuating
or seasonal income. They treaL their income as a smooth flow
over the period. See Eamonn Butler, Milton Friedman. A Guide
o His Economic Thoug, Hants - UK, 1985, -pp 14-17.
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demonstrated that the institution of zakat increases the rate of
saving. He pointed out that if an individual wants to keep his
wealth constant after payment of zakat, the "wealth-owner-consumer"
must increase his saving at a higher rate than the zakat rate in
order to prevent his wealth from decreasing.l
Undeniably, the effect of zakat on recipients is positive as it
raises, their disposable income. Depending on the recipients' income
level, zakat leads to an increase in spending, but saving could also
be expected to increase. Even if we assume that the recipients of
zakat in the lower and higher income strata would raise their
spending on basics and conventional necessities respectively,
aggregate saving would increase. The wealth owners must increase
their saving/investments at a higher rate than the zakat rate as
mentioned above.
We cannot simply say that zakat is paid whether income is earned or
not! For example, investments in fixed assets and negative income
are exempted from zakat according to some jurists.2
The effect of zakat on aggregate saving and consumption was studied
by some Islamic economists who criticised the notion that zakat
raises aggregate consumption leading to a decline in aggregate
See "A Contribution to the Theory of Consumer Behaviour in an
Islamic Society" in Kurshici Ahmed, 1980, pp 9-30. Pryor (1985)
has simplified Kahf equations by showing that if z is the rate
of zakat on wealth (w) at the beginning of the same period,
plus any net saving at the end of the period, we have the
equation: w 1 (1 - z) (w + s 1 ), derived for s it can be
easily demonstrated that zakat levy increases savings at a rate
much higher than the zakat rate of 2.5 percent.
2	 See zakat 1st Conference, Kuwait, 30 April - 2 May 1984, p286.
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saving. Their views may be summarised as follows:1
1. Current economic researches have not reached a definite opinion
concerning the impact of the redistribution of income on
aggregate consumption and saving.
2. The contention that the average propensity to consume among
lower income earners is greater than among higher income
earners, is not always true.
3. Zakat (or zaka) is sometimes used to finance the purchase of
capital equipment rather than for consumption leading to more
investments. Even if we assume that these investments would
ultimately increase consumption, the ratio of investment to
consumption is unknown.2	 S
4. There are three categories of recipients (the zaka
administrators; those whose support to the Muslims is needed,
and the fighters for Cod) are not necessarily poorer than zaka
payers. Thus their average propensity to consume is not
necessarily higher than zaka payers.
5. Zaka increases the incentive to invest. This leads to an
increase in total income to employment levels which raises the
consumption of low income earners. However, it cannot be said
with certainty whether the new consumption/income ratio would
be higher or less than the old one (ie, before the zaka levy).
Hence, the effect of zaka on aggregate consumption and aggregate
income cannot be denied (due to the effect of zaka on investment
leading thus to an improvement in the income and productivity of the
poor). Additionally, it is difficult to predict whether the ratio of
1 See for example: Darweesh A Fuad and Mahmud S al-Zein, "The
Impact of Zakat on Aggregate Consumption Function in an Islamic
Economy", JRIE, No 1, Vol 2, Summer 1984, pp 52-9. See also:
Arias Zarqa, 1984, op cit, Zakat 1st Conference, Kuwait, pp 253-
97.
2	 See Zarqa, ibid, footnote 33, p294.
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aggregate consumption and aggregate saving to aggregate income would
increase or decrease after the imposition of zaka.l
In what follows four miscellaneous impediments are discussed. These
are:
1. Borrowers' behaviour and the moral hazard problem.
2. Interbank loans.
3. Debated instruments.
4. Risks attached to the traditional forms of Islamic finance.
Borrowers' Behaviour and the Moral Hazard Problem
Financing on a PLS basis involves the risk of understating profits
and resorting to devious accounting practices. A partial solution to
this problem would be to (a) standardise accounting practices and
procedures; (b) inspection of the clients' accounting records by the
bank's auditors; (c) comparison of the results of the client's
business with that of the industry. A wide and unjustified
dispersion will be a cause for concern and refusal of future finance.
Mismanagement and misappropriation of the accounts would result in
blacklisting violators. Since PLS is based on trust and honesty,
untrustworthy businessmen will soon be discovered, isolated and put
out of business.
A fundamental solution to the moral hazard problem is the adherence
to the Islamic code of conduct in business. Much could be done
through educating the masses in business ethics that call for prompt
payment of ones' debts on maturity, honesty, integrity, fairness and
brotherhood (see Chapter One, Ethics). The laxity in punishment
could lead to malpractices. Enforcement of the law is a deterrent in
any society.
Though mark-up on mark-up is forbidden, severe penalties must be
imposed on solvent borrowers to ensure prompt payment of their
obligations.	 In Pakistan, a judicial tribunal has been formed to
1	 Zarqa, ibid, p286.
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solve financial disputes in 90 days and appeals in 60 days. Similar
procedures could be applied in Kuwait.
There are other problems associated with the fact that Islamic
banking methods are not widely accepted or understood by business or
account holders in the community. However this is only temporary as
the widespread application of Islamic finance and the establishment
of an Islamic Advisory Board (see transformation process) would help
in broadening the knowledge of Islamic banking and financing.
Interbank Loans
Loans to domestic and foreign banks "are a convenient and efficient
short-term use of funds for banks with weak loan demand". 1 Inter-
bank loans in Kuwait are no exception, particularly in view of
limited investment opportunities in the local market. What would be
the implications on foreign loans if interest were abolished in
Kuwait?
Virtually all schools of thought do not differentiate between loans
to Muslims or non-Muslims and agree that the ban on nba includes
transactions with foreigners (unbelievers and non-Muslims). A
minority within the Hanafi School, however, has ruled that it is not
illegal to charge interest when dealing with an enemy (with whom the
Muslims are at war). They agree that if it is legal to kill Al-Harbi
(who is fighting the Muslims) and confiscate his land, property and
financial assets including money, it would be equally acceptable to
charge interest on loans.	 Based on this contention some Islamic
writers have tried to legitimise interest in all financial dealings
of Muslims on one hand with non-Muslims on the other. Nevertheless,
the basis for this generalisation breeds its fallacy. I requested
the opinion of Sheikh Mustafa Al-Zarqa2 on whether Islamic
institutions would be allowed to deal on an interest basis in their
foreign transactions. The following is, to the best of my ability, a
fair summary of his verbal answer. The Sheikh has concluded that:
1	 Wood & Porter, 1979, pu.
2	 A prominent Muslim scholar and currently Professor of Islamic
legislation in the Al-Yarmouk University, Jordan.
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"The Hanafi ruling only applies in certain exceptional cases
where a Muslim state is at war with a non-Muslim country.
Therefore, the category of Harbi does not encompass foreign
entities who are not at war with the Muslims. More so, who
have normal cultural and commercial ties with the Muslims".
There is no excuse, however, for not seeking non-interest bearing
instruments during transition. The question to be dealt with in a
capital exporting country like Kuwait concerns the possibility of
minimising its interest based transactions in foreign markets. It is
conceivable for Kuwaiti investors and institutions to tap the market
for corporate stocks as opposed to corporate securities that carry
fixed interest, provided that these companies are not engaged in
Islamically forbidden activities (eg, alcoholic beverage companies
and finance companies).
In order to evade restrictions on opening Islamic banking in foreign
countries, Kuwait banks and investment companies may form Islamic
leasing and hire purchase companies in many financial centres. There
are a variety of different types of closed- and open-end funds that
provide safety, liquidity and profitability to Islamic savers. 1 They
may be established to channel funds from lenders to borrowers on PLS
or other acceptable financing mediums.
Debated Instruments
The fact that some Islamic banks have applied some debatable
instruments does not legitimise these instruments. Their application
is, however, either for reason of (a) necessity, as in external
borrowing or correspondence banking; (b) wide or lenient
interpretation of Sharia, as in paying a bonus on current and savings
accounts; or (c) partial acceptance as in options. The majority of
jurists hold the view that currency options are not permitted on the
grounds that exchange of currencies should be made at the time of the
contract. This is not applicable under currency options. On the
other hand, it is believed that under currency options the promise is
1 Closed-end funds are investment companies with authorised
capital whereas open-end funds have no limited capital and has
the power to issue and redeem unlimited shares.
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not binding "as the two parties cannot agree in advance on the rate
to be applied in exchanging the currency at a. future date".1
As for dealing in commodities, Islamic law considers a promise to be
binding and enforceable if it were between two parties. For cases
when more than two parties are involved the question is still
unsettled. Selling or transferring an option to a third party hinges
upon whether the option itself could be regarded as a financial
obligation/right amenable for transferability or not. The
contemporary jurists have not decided upon this issue yet.2
The above issues are likely to be subjected to debate in any Islamic
country which is contemplating the abolition of interest. In any
event, there must be a distinction between speculation for the sake
of speculation (which is harmful) and the necessity of hedging for
banks and importers who must take positions in foreign currency.
Risks Attached to the Traditional Forms of Islamic Finance
The financing of industrial, commercial and other sectors in the
economy by Murabaha or Musharaka methods ties up the Islamic banks'
return on investment with the results of operations of these
businesses. In case of dwindling returns, the Islamic banks' profits
may be affected proportionally with the ratio of its equity
participation or profit and loss sharing schemes in the overall
financing operations. In addition, the degree of risk is normally
associated with the type of financing instrument employed by the
banks. In Mudaraba finance, the Islamic banks assume more risk than
in Musharaka, provided everything else remains the same. The high
degree of risk associated with the former type of finance stems from
the fact that the Islamic bank provides one hundred per cent of the
Mudaraba capital and is totally liable for losses incurred. Unless,
of course, in cases of fraud, mismanagement or negligence whereby the
managing partner becomes fully accountable for his conduct and the
1	 Jamal Attia, "Financial Instruments used by Islamic Banks",
London: 1985, plO.
2 Ibid, plO. There are also some other debatable instruments
which are discussed elsewhere (eg, interest on foreign assets,
discounting of bills and government borrowings).
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bank would be entitled to fair compensation. Other consideration of
risk is related to the inadmissibility of collaterals in Mudaraba
contracts, on the ground that the Mudaraba is based on trust and
confidence between the two partners.
For Islamic jurists have contended that the Mudaraba contract is a
fiduciary one and the capital entrusted to the Mudareb is 'trust
money' and any request for a collateral or guarantee renders the
contract void. However, the Hanbali school (a branch of Hanaf is),
ruled that the stipulation of a guarantee would only constitute a
breach of the terms of the contract which could be rectified without
the need to null the contract itself which remained valid.
Nevertheless, it is permissible to request a collateral to compensate
the bank for damages resulting solely from the negligence and
misconduct of the managing partner. This entails that in the absence
of fraud or negligence, the losses, if occurred, are an outcome of
adverse business conditions, uncontrollable circumstances which have
nothing to do with the managing partner nor the bank for that matter.
Thus it would be unjust if the entrepreneur would have to lose his
time and effort and at the same time has to protect the bank against
business losses.
Although by Musharaka the bank is offered the opportunity to share in
the equity ownership, there are certain risks inherent in this type
of financing. These involve potential losses of limited liability
that may include both the loss of the expected return and a loss of
part or the full amount of the capital invested in the joint venture.
To minimise the risks, the Islamic banks try to be cautious and
selective in their financing operations through Musharaka or
Mudaraba. This explains why these two forms of financing do not
account for more than 15 per cent of financing operations of these
Islam banks. Alternatively the degree of risk in a conventional bank
seems to be less than in an Islamic bank as far as Mudaraba or
Musharaka are concerned. This might be true in normal circumstances
where the payment of interest in a conventional bank is almost
guaranteed regardless of the results of operations of the customers.
As for an Islamic bank, the return or yield is directly linked with
the results of operations of the customers business. The yield could
be positive or negative depending on whether the partner's business
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has been profitable, or not. However if adverse business con4itions
prevail (e.g. bankruptcy of a customer financed by a conventional
bank and another financed by an Islamic bank) the picture would be
slightly different. In case of unsecured loans, both banks would not
be able to recover the loans or equity capital, whilst the
conventional bank would be able to recapture part, or a sizeable
portion, of the secured loan. Alternatively the Islamic bank would
not be able to recover the capital as Mudaraba or Musharaka loans
are, by their very nature, not secured.
The risk in Murabaha finance is considerably reduced since the
Islamic bank is permitted to secure the deal either through cash
deposits, mortgages or third party guarantee. However, as outlined
earlier, the customer is not bound to accept the goods purchased by
the bank. This overburdens the credit department who must exert all
efforts and must seek the advice of the trading department in the
bank before it decides to go ahead and order the goods. In other
words, the bank must ensure the marketability of the goods before
opening the letter of credit, simply because the goods might end up
in the bank's warehouse, if at a later stage, the client chooses not
to proceed with the transaction. This applies, however, in some
banks, such as the Kuwait Finance House, whereas in other banks like
DM1, for example, the promise to buy is not binding as long as the
bank has not purchased the goods. The deal becomes enforceble as
from the purchase date, thus reducing the exposure of risk. However
in both cases the liability for perished or damaged goods is borne by
the Islamic bank until such time when the title is passed on to the
client since the lB opens the LC in its capacity as importer.
Nevertheless the Murabaha contract creates an interesting situation
where the non-binding promise by the client to purchase the goods, is
legally binding in countries where civil law is different from
Islamic law.
Concurrently the restriction against surety overburdens the Islamic
bank staff who must be fine experts in project evaluation and
character assessment and in the type of businesses they finance in
order to safeguard the depositors funds, minimise the risk
undertaken, to enable them to supervise, advise and share in the
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management of the Musharaka joint venture. Finally, there is
uncertainty whether the profits, if any, of the joint venture would
be distributed or not at the end of the financial year owing to the
cash flow position. This might create difficulty in managing the
liquidity of the bank and might reduce its funding programmes at
least for a while.
Leasing is not immune from risk. The risk in leasing stems from the
fact that the rental payment is linked with the expected
profitability and cash flow of the rented assets which might be
volatile at times. The determination of the rental charges and the
restoration of asset in good working conditions require careful
planning and adequate supervision by the bank, for it might happen
that the lessee, in hire purchase finance, becomes insolvent or
unable to purchase the asset. In this case the bank may be compelled
to sell the asset at its market worth if it has no rental value any
more.
Liability for loss or equipment damages is borne by the client from
the possession date. Consequently, the client's obligations cover
the contract period, - although the rental charges are paid by
instalment. This type of lease is similar to a 'net lease' contract
in the conventional system.
Concluding Remarks
To minimise some of the above mentioned obstacles, Islamic values and
financial deals must be reviewed through the establishment of an
Islamic advisory board (see the Transformation section). One of the
major tasks of this board is to: (a) study on an ad hoc basis all the
issues pertaining to Islamic banking, (b) answer queries of the
public and financial institutions, and (c) issue pamphlets and
brochures explaining the types of Islamic instruments, the duties and
obligations of the investors and savers.
It has been taken for granted so far that Islamic investment banks
and nba-free investment companies in Kuwait are more suited to
provide long-term capital. The question to be dealt with is whether
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these institutions are prepared to replace a sizeable portion of
their current fixed or fluctuating interest bearing instruments with
PLS instruments, as there would be an immense impact on the banks'
income as a result of the above shift depending, of course, on the
outcome of the PLS projects.
A sudden switch from interest-bearing instruments to PLS on a wide
scale is not suitable or warranted. Financing sole proprietorships
and small firms on a musharaka or mudaraba basis without careful
preparation is counterproductive and may cause a setback to the new
system. This is why a gradual approach is advocated (see
transformation process). 1 A step by step approach does not mean,
however, that interest-bearing instruments should remain operative.
Probably one of the major advantages of the Islamic financial system
is the possibility of using trade related instruments which carry a
fixed return (eg, murabaha, instalment sale, forward buying and Ijara
waktina).	 These instruments could be applied without much
difficulty.	 The success of murabaha financing in virtually all
Islamic banks is a case in point.
In the following sections the efficiency and advantages of the
Islamic financial system are discussed. Both efficiency and
advantages should be read in conjunction with each other.
Efficiency of the Islamic Financial System
Efficiency is used here in a broad rather than in a narrow economic
sense. In a broad sense an efficient financial system is that which
is capable of achieving the objectives of intermediation. These
objectives range from facilitating the payment mechanism, providing a
wider range of financial and advisory services, and in meeting the
needs of both savers and investors.
Once the problems of musharaka and mudaraba are handled and
overcome, the actual financing by these types could be raised
gradually to a reasonable proportion in the total banks
lending.
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Potential efficiency in the narrow economic sense focuses on certain
issues in the Islamic system and compares its efficiency with the
conventional system. For example, a variable rate of return is
compared with fixed rate of return to establish which of these rates
leads to, for example, more savings than the other. Efficiency in
the narrow sense has been dealt with recently and rigourously by
Waqar M Khan (1985)1 and by N Ul-Haque and A Mirakhor (1986)2.
A prime objective of the financial system is to meet the needs of
both savers and investors. In order to examine whether the Islamic
financial system is able to achieve this objective, certain criteria
must be used. The criteria used in this chapter focus on
microeconomic as well as the macroeconomic efficiency of the proposed
Islamic financial system.3
The criteria for studying the microeconomic efficiency of Islamic
banking in Kuwait concern the availability of financial instruments,
the impact of risk on the mobilisation of savings and the supply of
funds, competition and choice.
Regarding macroeconomic efficiency, we discuss the effect of Islamic
finance on savings and investment, market and structural stability,
the price of funds and the contribution to economic activities.
However, the efficiency of the Islamic financial system must not be
judged according to the existing financial assets/claims in Kuwait
alone. In this respect it should be remembered that there is at
present only one Islamic financial institution in Kuwait and its
range of activities does not incorporate all the financial assets
that were envisaged in Chapter Six. Accordingly, the criteria for
1 See Towards an Interest-free Islamic Economic S ystem. A
Theoretical Analysis of Prohibiting Debt Financing, 1985, pp
36-51. More will be said in the Macroeconomic section.
2	 See also "Optimal Profit Sharing Contract and Investments in an
Interest-free Islamic Economy", IMF Paper, March 1986a.
3 I shall be using more or less the same approach used by A D
Bain in studying the efficiency of the British financial system
as I consider his approach is best suited for the purpose of
this section, see The Economics of the Financial Sytem,
Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981, pp 238-56.
412	 -
evaluating the economic efficiency of the system focuses on the
proposed working of the model rather than the current application.
413
14ICROECONOHIC EFFICIENCY
Range of Financial Instruments
The preceding chapter has shown the wide range of financial
instruments that do exist and those that might be introduced in
Kuwait and elsewhere to provide a wider range of Islamic financial
services. It has also been concluded that Islamic finance is able to
meet the needs of the borrowers (consumers and firms) for short-,
medium- and long-term finance, provided of course that all accepted
financial instruments are fully operational.
Savers also have a broad range of investment outlets such as savings
and term deposit accounts, shares and equity participation, and
finally a limited number of Islamic investment certificates (eg,
PTCs, leasing and hire purchase). They would have a combination of
instruments to choose from. These include trade related investments
in the form of specified deposits and low risk Islamic certificates
(eg, murabaha and real estate bonds).
As in interest-based systems, the range of financial instruments and
innovation of new ones is not limited. However, many Islamic
instruments at present are not fully developed or tested and have to
be subjected to the constraints imposed by Sharia.' This would
constitute a considerable barrier on the Islamic financial system if
interest were abolished before finalisirig the many technical and
legal questions surrounding certain instruments, or at least in
providing a substitute.
Risk and the Mobilisation of Savings
One of the main parameters for judging efficiency of a financial
system is the ability to mobi].ise savings. Undoubtedly, Islamic
banks have been generally very successful in this regard. The first
Islamic bank experiment in Mit Ghainr has shown how Islamic banking
1 It should be noted, however, that Sharia constraints are not
arbitrary and intended to serve higher social and economic
goals.
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can attract deposits from the rural population, and how it can make
them aware of the role of banks in a society. In 1983, for example,
KFH stopped taking deposits as their inflow was more than the bank's
capacity to process.
In what follows, the effect of risk on the mobilisation of savings,
and how risk could be minimised are discussed.
The first major weakness of Islamic finance, it has been alleged,
relates to the high exposure to risk for the savers. In fact the
risk varies with the type of duration of assets. Demand deposits are
the safest and are almost risk-free. The savers cannot only get
their deposits on demand, but the deposits themselves are secured by
the banks in compliance with Islamic law.' On the other hand, if
demand deposits are risk-free they, nonetheless, have an opportunity
cost representing foregone return that could otherwise be earned from
investments. Moreover, it would not be Islamically correct if most
savers were to keep idle balances to escape risk, as this constitutes
hoarding (see Chapter One, the demand for money). A rational saver
will not hold cash balances other than for transactional demand and
emergencies, otherwise his balance would be eroded by zakat and
1 This does not mean, however, that demand deposits would be
automatically protected after abolition of interest without
enacting the necessary laws.
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inflation (resulting in a decline in money purchasing power))
Investment deposits are not likely to be fully guaranteed, as the
current prevailing contention among the majority of Islamic writers
is that investment deposits are similar to Mudaraba capital and
therefore the recovery of deposits must not be guaranteed by the
banks (see Chapter Two, mudaraba). Noticeably the scale of risk to
savers includes the possibility of losing the income as well as a
portion of the deposited capital.
The absence of deposit insurance schemes may discourage small savers
as well as risk averters in the short-run. The success of the
Islamic financial system would eliminate the current reservations.
However some sort of insurance or guarantee of small savers funds by
a third party (the government) is not against the Sharia. The only
objection that could be raised is against using public funds for this
purpose. Although deposit insurance protects small savers, it does
not prevent bank panic caused by externalities, and would induce
banks' management to be involved in more risky ventures.
Investments in shares also offer reasonable returns commensurate with
risk. It has been proven mathematically and empirically that
diversification of investment tends to minimise risk. For instance,
the variance of stocks' average returns decline as the portfolio gets
very large until the variance approaches zero.2
The Islamic banks are usually cautious in their financing policy.
The fact that no Islamic bank has been bankrupt since the first
Islamic fully fledged private commercial bank was established is a
case in point. 3 There is no reason to believe that the Islamic banks
in Kuwait would not follow a conservative policy, provided that it
would not result in denying funds to those who needed them most (see
1 Indexation of benevolent loans is currently being discussed in
the Islamic circles. The subject has not been settled. Some
obstacles arise from the difficulty in selecting a workable
index and the unavailability of up-to-date statistical data.
Additionally, if the loan was adjusted upwards for the rate of
inflation does this mean that it should be adjusted downwards
in case of deflation? For more details see Siddiqi, Issues in
Islamic Banking, 1983, op cit, p87.
2	 See Douglas Fisher, 1971, p269.
3	 More will be said about the inherent stability of the Islamic
banking system later.
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Macroeconomic efficiency, infra). Though none of the depositors in
KFH have ever lost any of their capital, there is no guarantee that
losses are not likely to occur in the future. The same could be
said, to my knowledge, about Islamic banks everywhere.
The Impact of Risk on the Supply of Funds
In the preceding section the risks attached to the traditional forms
of Islamic finance were discussed. In this section the relation
between volume of finance and risk as well as the risk of equity
financing in the Kuwaiti market are analysed.
Another aspect of efficiency in the financial system is its ability
to provide capital irrespective of the volume of finance required and
without bias against risk as along as the investment is potentially
profitable. 1 Islamic banks are well prepared to finance risky
projects as they are under no obligation to pay a fixed return to
their depositors.
Financing risky projects requires careful evaluation of the venture
and risk. A proper appraisal of the risks involved in an enterprise
would	 take	 into	 consideration	 several	 factors	 including
profitability, management, ownership and markets. Choosing
profitable projects leads to securing the highest return to society.
For projects which are most socially desirable, government subsidies
and policy incentives would make sure that sufficient resources are
channelled to productive projects that need financing most.
Sometimes financiers would want to finance a project that is capable
of surviving on its own. This sounds reasonable in the case of
individual companies, but when an enterprise is part of a larger
group it does not really matter much if a reasonable amount of risk
is expected. Bain has even said that: "an efficient financial system
would therefore be characterised by the absence of any bias against
1	 Bain, op cit, pp 242-5.
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risky investment projects". 1
 The danger in equity finance, however,
could be real in times of recession, depression or sluggish demand
for the company's products (or for any other reason). In such
instances, the banks' return on their investment would decline and
hence so would the depositors' returns. There is nothing much the
banks can do about it, nor the companies, other than to hope for
better results in future. It is noticeable that some companies as a
rule, try when distributing dividends to reduce sharp fluctuation
from year to year. The same policy could not be adopted if banks
were to share in profits at a certain rate.
The banks can, however, minimise the potential risk of losses in
equity finance by limiting the volume of their equity participation
(or even PLS financing in general) in the same company or the same
group of companies (see Islamic Monetary Policy). Moreover, the
banks can reduce the risk of PLS financing by using murabaha and
Ijara contracts that "bring an element of stability" to banks'
earnings which reduces the risk to their depositors. However if
investors are risk averters in both systems, we notice that the PLS
system spreads the risks more equally than the interest-based
system. 2	Equity capital is growing as a conventional financing
method. It is noticeable, for instance, that Robin Pringle has
pointed out that equity capital has accounted for the rapid growth of
several of the newer merchant banks and is narrowing down the
differences between merchant banking and the work of industrial or
commercial holding companies.3
1 The only exception in Bain's view is very large projects, the
results of which would affect the welfare of the country as a
whole. He cites an example. The Channel Tunnel project, p243,
op cit.
2	 Waqar M Khan, o p cit, p59.
3	 1975, p 64.	 Also Albach has indicated the need for equity
financing in Europe in face of the decline in risky investment.
See "Risk Capital, Business Investment and Economic Co-
operation", in M Ali, ed, 1981.
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Competition and Choice
The existence of free competition is another indication of efficiency
of a financial system. A free market economy relies heavily on
competition to secure 'allocative efficiency' which occurs when the
investment yield to society is likely to be at its highest level.1
To what extent does this apply to Kuwait?2
Firstly competition among the commercial banks in Kuwait is expected
to be as keen after the abolition of interest as it is at present.
Secondly, savers would have almost the same financial outlets as at
present, that is banks, specialised institutions, investment
companies and the stock market. The Kuwaiti insurance companies do
not offer investment vehicles as their British or American
counterparts do. Even if they did, their investment operations would
have to be modified in compliance with the abolition of interest.3
Currently savers can switch from commercial banks to Islamic banks
(KFH) or to the specialised banks (with the exception of IBK as it is
not a deposit taker although may sell CDs to the public). If
interest were abolished savers would still use the same institutions.
Consumers' choice in the Islamic financial system would not be
limited. Social loans could still be obtained from CSB as is the
case currently. Moreover it is envisaged that the commercial banks
would start providing social loans as well, motivated by great
awareness of their social responsibility to the community.
The banks would be able to cater for interest-free deposits to be
geared directly for benevolent loans. It is further expected that
the bank with the highest social loans would gain a competitive edge
in the market in terms of deposits. The above sources would also
provide consumer loans.
I	 Bain, 1981, p242.
2 The analysis in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, is
concerned with the author's general perception of the situation
following the abolition of interest.
3	 Though their insurance activity may still be run as usual due
to the absence of a comprehensive Islamic insurance system.
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Small firms are likely to encounter difficulties in financing their
operations if the current attitude prevails after the abolition of
interest. At present small scale industries have limited access to
cheap industrial loans from IBK (despite management attempts to
create a workable formula and to establish lending criteria). Part
of the problem is to do with identifying small industries and the
administrative resources needed for evaluating potential projects.
These obstacles have only partially been overcome and more effort
still needs to be exerted in order to cater for small business
finance.
If the current practices and circumstances do not change, small
commercial firms would face difficulty after the abolition of
interest in obtaining seed capital from commercial banks. This is
due particularly to (a) the absence of a proven track record of sales
and profits owing to the lack of proper accounting data, (b) the
conservative traditional banking practices precluding the use of
mudaraba or musharaka financing, (c) collaterals or sureties not
being easily available,' and most of all Cd) the banks having to rely
heavily on the honesty and character of the entrepreneur.
Thus, it seems that small firms would be at a disadvantage. The
solution lies in changing the attitudes of the banks, coupled with
direct government measures. One possibility is, for instance, the
government establishment of a special fund for small businesses. The
purpose of this fund would be to finance small firms by providing,
for example, 50% of the financing, the rest financed from the banks
and private capital. This policy, if adopted, would enlarge the
distribution of resources. Many small firms and sole proprietorships
would have access to external finance which was inaccessible on
religious grounds.
THE MACROECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The criteria for examining the macroeconomic efficiency concern the
effect of Islamic financing on aggregate savings and investments
1 However, the need for collateral would be significantly reduced
as it would be requested in trade-related finance but not in
musharaka or mudaraba.
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including the stability of earnings, macroeconomic stability and
economic activities.
Aggregate Saving and Investments
The current nature of the Kuwait economy and government's attitudes
may influence to a great extent the prospects of interest-free
banking in the economy. It is assumed, therefore, that the current
policies concerning the positive role of the government in the
financial sphere will remain unchanged and might even be more
effective in creating the desirable atmosphere for the new system.
This assumption is very important to our analysis because if we try
to study the effect of PLS on the level of savings we are concerned
with the aggregate level of savings rather than individual savings.
It has not been proven that the elimination of risk-free assets would
decrease aggregate savings. In other words the existence of a rate
of interest does not change aggregate savings in the economy.
Individual savings, on the other hand, are more affected by the level
of income rather than by interest rates. It is true, however, that
given a choice individuals would prefer a fixed rate of return rather
than a variable one, provided that the mean rate of return is the
same. Additionally, given a certain degree of risk aversion and
assuming that the rate of return after investing in risk assets were
the same as before the introduction of risk then obviously, saving
will decline. This is the result of a recent theoretical study by
Nadim Ul-Haque and Abbas Morakhor) Their most crucial finding is
that by the elimination of all risk free assets and introducing risk
assets, wealth owners would try to restructure their portfolios in
order to decrease the level of risk. This could be done through
holding low-risk assets as opposed to risk free assets. This will
1	 See IMF Paper, 1986b, pp 5-8
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result in a rediversification of assets among the risk bearing
portfolio, rather than decreasing savings or investments.'
Wa.qar (1985) has shown the "superiority" of the variable rate system
over the fixed rate system (FRS) and that aggregate investment might
be higher given a certain set of assumptions. These are:
Moral hazard is absent, the Islamic scheme does not have any
collateral requirement, investors are risk averse. Both the
financier and entrepreneurs share the same views about the
probability distribution of the return on investment, and that
various investment projects are uncorrelated.2
In view of the above, it would not be realistic to assume that a
wholly equity based system will lead to instability in the banking
system and the entire economy. 3 A discussion is in order.
Stability of Earnings
Interest rates do fluctuate and follow a cyclical pattern, increasing
during business expansion and decreasing during recession. The exact
timing of each fluctuation is unpredictable. Thus volatility of
interest and the difficulty to predict its behaviour lead to
instability of the price of capital or yield. If kept within a
narrow range, volatility of interest does not necessarily lead to
instability in the whole system though it increases uncertainty and
makes investment decision more difficult. Likewise, the rate of
return in an equity based system exhibits a cyclical pattern
increasing during a boom and declining in a depression. The changes
in the level of return would not have an undesirable impact on
structural stability4
 if the changes were moving upwards. Only when
profits decline or losses may occur on a nation-wide basis, would
1	 Ibid, see also 1986a, pp 28-30.
2	 Op Cit, psi.
3 As argued by Naqvi, 1981, p127. He also pointed out that
instability is caused by the fact that the return on investment
in equity finance would be a function of business conditions,
ie eratic.
4	 Structural stability means the ability of the financial system
to protect itself against failure.
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stability be affected. Uncertainty in profits is very much a
function of business risk and the state of the economy rather than
the type of finance. For this reason equity finance or PLS does not
change the level of uncertainty, as the question to be dealt with in
equity finance is who takes the risks and how those risks are
distributed.	 Thus a PLS system allocates, more equitably, the
uncertainty among all depositors in a bank. This leads to more
stability as each party, according to Zarqa: "Can absorb its modest
share of a loss without significantly upsetting its normal activities
or defaulting on its obligation" thus eliminating any "panic reaction
among other business units" 1 .	 Hence may decrease the rate of
bankruptcies as well.
Macroeconomic Stability
Recalling that our Islamic finance model is not totally equity based
and taking into consideration the factors outlined in the preceding
section on microeconomic efficiency, it appears that the effect of an
interest-free economy on stability should be readdressed in order to
reflect the impact of the new financial system on macroeconomic
stability. The criteria used to assess this efficiency includes
market stability, stability in the price of funds, structural
stacility and the contribution of the new system to economic
activity. 2
Market stability implies a steady and continuous flow of long-term
funds through financial intermediaries to the users. In Kuwait such
a flow is maintained through the specialised institutions but not
from the commercial banks. 3 The capital needs of the industry
(excluding short-term loans) are currently secured from the
Industrial Bank of Kuwait. The resources ar made available by the
Ministry of Finance. A first soft loan of KD 100 million was made.
1 See "Stability in an Interest-Free Islamic Economy: a Note",
Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics, 1983, Vol 11, No 2, pp
181-88.
2 Rather than confine the analysis to instability of earnings
alone, or to depict the flows of interest-based system in order
to conclude that the interest-free economy is better.
3	 See Chapter 6, Caps in the Existing Financial System.
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available to IBK and when it was used up, another loan of the same
amount was also provided (see Specialised Banks). The CSB provide
mortgage finance (on interest-free) basis to eligible Kuwaiti
citizens. Other medium to long term loans are channelled though KREB
and the large investment companies to commercial real estate and
construction companies. There is no reason to believe that this flow
of funds would be distorted or minimised after the abolition of
interest, if everything else remains the same.
Price of Funds
Apart from interest-free loans to home buyers, Islamic long-term
finance in Kuwait has a price. This price to the user depends on the
type of financial instrument.' In trade related or fixed yield
instruments, the price, for example, is the margin in murabaha, the
rental charges in leasing, the profit rate in equity finance and PLS
schemes in general. It is difficult to predict the trend in the
above rates or the degree of fluctuations that they may be subjected
to. However, the determination of profit rates must follow certain
trends. First, these rates are not expected to be fixed or rigid.
Second, determination of the rates should not be left, in principle,
to the suppliers of funds nor the monetary authorities (see Islamic
monetary policy). Though this does not rule out the need for certain
guidelines to assist the institutions and borrowers in reaching a
fair contractual agreement. In the absence of such parameters, the
determination of the profit rate or rental charges by the lessor and
the lessee during the transition would be difficult. 	 Each party
would wonder what would be the fair rate. In the long run, the
factors of supply and demand would determine the rate. In addition
the monetary authorities can influence indirectly the supply of funds
by changing the volume of the central bank's deposits with member
banks.	 This would raise or decrease the bank's profit rates
depending on whether a contractionary or expansionary policy is
applied respectively (see Islamic monetary policy). 	 The rate of
1	 We are not concerned here with the mechanism of pricing the
instrument.	 For details see Impediments-fixing the rate of
return.
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profit on these deposits may be regarded as a prime rate in the
market.
Fluctuations in the price of stocks are likely to be reduced as
trading in options, or trading on margins are expected to be
curtailed in an Islamic system. In addition, the speculative demand
for money which is a destablising element according to the Kenyzian
system, would be drastically reduced in an Islamic economic system,
as there would be no speculation on interest bearing assets (see the
Islamic demand for money).1
On the other hand, there would be other factors that would continue
to cause instability in the Islamic system, as they do in the
conventional system. These may include changes in economic policies,
fluctuation in exchange rates, expectations of inflation or
deflation. All of these would alter investors/savers decisions and
expectations.
Economic Activities
The contribution to economic activities is considered to be one of
the key advantages of Islamic banking. The concentration by Islamic
banks on business activities rather than on home loans is one aspect
of this contribution. Studying the financial plan of the applicant
and stressing the profitability of the project helps efficient
enterprises to grow and prosper. Additionally, the elimination of
speculative activities leads to more efficient allocation of
resources than in the conventional system. The balance between the
demand for investment and the supply of finance could be achieved
more efficiently than in a system based on passive lending.
C L Bach has argued that: "if rising stock prices have been
heavily financed by borrowed money, a downturn in the market
may precipitate a major collapse in stock prices as lenders
calls for cash, and may place serious financial pressure on
banks and other lenders. A high market based on credit is thus
far more vulnerable than a 'cash' market, and is more likely to
be a cyclically destabilising force". Quoted in Chapra, 1985,
pp 98-9. See also A Zarqa, op cit, in Pakistan Journal of
Applied Economics, 1983, p183.
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Generally, the current financial system with some exceptions assumes
a 'permissive' rather than a 'promotional' role.'
In the Islamic system, the promotional efforts to attract deposits
should be matched with equal efforts to seek profitably
enterprises/investors. Failing that, the banking system cannot
survive particularly in the absence of fixed yield instruments. The
ability of the Islamic financial system to finance small business
which might be very active and innovative2 would further enhance its
contribution to economic activities.
Summary
Judging from the above mentioned criteria, one may conclude that the
financial institutions in Kuwait have been unable to date to
contribute to economic growth without government assistance. By the
same token an Islamic financial system in Kuwait would probably
depend, even more than the current system, on government aid in
supplying funds in the early phases.
With the exception of Islamic certificates there are at present
adequate types of financial claims that meet the needs of savers.
The Islamic financial assets that are currently in use are limited.
The availability of financial instruments in a wider range in the
future is an imperative prerequisite for securing an efficient
application of Islamic finance on a nation-wide basis.
The role of the Islamic financial system in the mobilisation of
savings irrespective of the risk involved is well noted. Likewise
the provision of equity finance on PLS basis shows the absence of
bias against risky investments (large or small), provided that risk
is properly assessed.
Currently, investors cannot freely switch from one financial
institution to another especially in the case of industrial or home
finance. This could be an added advantage as the cost of capital to
1	 Bain, o p cit, 1981, p252.
2	 Kartsen, 1983, p22.
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the borrower would be negligible especially after the abolition of
interest. In addition it minimises the social cost of intermediation
should there be a shortage of funds in the private sector. Currently
small commercial firms do not have the same privileges enjoyed by the
industry. This, however, has more to do with sectoral preferences
than shortage of funds. In the new system, it would be possible to
finance small businessmen who have the expertise, but lack
collateral, irrespective of their social status.
Upon studying the macroeconomic efficiency of the Islamic financial
system we have found that:
(a) A system of variable rate of return does not necessarily lead
to a reduction in the aggregate savings/investments in a
country. Savers/investors can split their portfolios among
risk-bearing and low-risk assets rather than decreasing savings
and investments.
(b) Equity financing on PLS basis does not change the level of
uncertainty in an enterprise as the outcome of a business is
independent of the method of financing.
(c) The uncertainties or risks are allocated more equitably than in
the conventional system. Banks, savers and investors can
absorb their 'modest' share of a loss, if any, without
disturbing the whole system through bankruptcies.
(d) Speculation in the stock market is expected to be curtailed as
trading in options, or on margins, is not allowed. This is an
indication of efficiency as, the flow of long-term funds can be
smoothly channelled through the financial institutions to the
production enterprises, leading thus to an increase in economic
activity.
(e) In a PLS or equity market savers would prefer the investment
which yields the highest return. Entrepreneurs would try to
market projects with the highest profits. 1 Probably for this
reason, Tobin has held the view that in an interest-free
In such a market enterprises may try to keep stock prices as
high as possible, see Pryor, Ibid. However, this may benefit
existing shareholders whereas new savers may shy away as a
rising stock would decrease the price earning ratio. This
would bring down the price of stock to the equilibrium level.
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economy, the rate of return on capital would be higher than in
the conventional system.1
Bearing the above mentioned points in mind we turn now to the
advantages of the Islamic financial system, followed by final remarks
and recommendations.
Advantages of Islamic Bankipg
Islamic banking is a cornerstone in the Islamic economic system. The
evolution of Islamic banking depends on the strict application of
Islamic economic principles. An Islamic financial system would not
be totally successful if an Islamic economic system were not fully
operational.
We will assume in the following analysis that an Islamic economic
system is functioning along with a PLS banking model. 2
 The
discussion will focus on the ethical and social benefits as well a
the economic benefits that the new banking system is likely to
achieve.
Categorically, Islamic economics aims at establishing a society based
on social justice, efficient allocation of resources and on providing
qual opportunities for all citizens (see Chapter One). To achieve
this in the banking sphere, Islamic economists have reinstated an
Islamic financing mechanism '5ased on profit and loss sharing
priple as opposed to a guaranteed return inherent in the interest
based system.
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that a PLS system provides a
workable and viable alternative to nba. The importance of this
finding stems from the fact that the PLS system is no longer an
abstract phenomenon. The broader justification of banning nba is to
establish a perfect measure for rewarding human effort and capital
1
	
	 See James TobirL, "Essays in Economics", Macroeconomics, Vol 1,
Markham, 1971, quoted in Pry'r, op cit, p207.
2 PLS banking model is the ultimate goal, meanwhile, certain
trade-related instruments (eg, murahaha, leasing) are allowable
in the new system, particularly in the early phases.
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through the mechanism of PLS. In a PLS system the net positive or
negative outcome of an enterprise would be shared between human
capital and money capital. A positive return adds to the wealth of a
society. Thus profit sharing (or the positive return) distributes
the creation of wealth in a society more equitably than the rate
interest. 1
In the interest based system, the borrower reaps the fruits of the
created wealth or must bear losses alone. It would be fairer,
therefore, if both the lender and borrower shared the additional
wealth, so created, according to an agreed profit sharing ratio. In
the event of a loss, it would be unfair for the lender to receive a
guaranteed sum while the entrepreneur suffers a loss of return and a
decline in his assets as well. Thus a financial system based on
sharing of profits along with risk or uncertainty lays the ground for
establishing social justice in the society.
A PLS system is more advantageous for the borrower in times of
recession as it relieves the debtor from paying fixed interest on
capital irrespective of the outcome of the business. Additionally,
the danger of bankruptcies would be largely reduced in the Islamic
system as losses would be borne in proportion to each party's
contribution rather than by the borrower alone. Since the Islamic
banks' investment would be at stake, they try to avoid bankruptcies.
Evidently, this would permit ailing or inefficient companies to
survive a recession which would not be possible under the interest
based system. 2
 On the other hand, well managed and profitable firms
would receive more funds than ailing ones. In the absence of
overdraft facilities, profitable firms would be encouraged to be more
efficient as this would be the only way for obtaining financial
resources.
1 The implicit assumption here is that other factors such as land
and labour are remunerated by rent and just wages respectively.
Notwithstanding that labour could share profits too, as
proposed by Wiezman (see wages vs profit sharing). For the
moment we assume that a just wage is as equitable as profit
sharing.
2	 Khan Rafi, 1983, p251.
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Nevertheless, by reducing the number of bankruptcies and alleviating
financial strain an equity based market would lead to stability in
the financial system)
Usually inflation is associated with frequent upward adjustment of
interest rates to keep pace with rising prices. Firms respond by
raising output prices in order to meet a soaring cost of borrowing.
The elimination of interest would reduce the effect of cost-push
inflain the level offlces, other things remaining equal.
Moreover, an increase in output prices may lead to an increase in the
nominal return on savings which means that the real return on savings
would be bid up. 2
 Consequently, the supply of PLS finance would be
enhanced. However, the increase in the level of prices may not
always result in a higher net operating margin than before inflation
due to price control accompanied by rising factor cost of other
inputs.
The demand for PLS capital would be enhanced as entrepreneurs will be
able to share the uncertainty of production with the banks. However,
if the prospect for profits were certain, entrepreneurs would rather
prefer to reduce the level of PLS contracts in favour of trade-
related instruments. By contrast, during recession the
entrepreneurs' demand for risk capital is likely to increase as
opposed to fixed yield instruments.
In the conventional system, a decrease in the nominal value of a
bank's asset may oblige depositors to transfer their deposits tc
other banks. The same could happen in an Islamic bank. 3
 However,
the capacity of an Islamic bank to absorb external shocks seems to be
1	 Many prominent economists have written favourably about equity
as opposed to credit to maintain stability, see for example H
Simon, 1948, p320; and CR Kindleberger, 	 fl.ias. Panics an
Crashes London: MacMillan, 1978, p16.
2	 Z Ahmed, 1985, p7. For this to occur the demand and supply for
loanable funds should be in equilibrium.
3	 An obvious example is the run on KFH when the price of its real
estate investments plummeted (see Chapter Four, KFH section).
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stronger than a conventional bank if liquidity were under control.1
A significant erosion in the nominal value of a conventional bank's
assets may lead to failure.2
An Islamic bank's investment deposits are used to purchase equity
participation and other financial instruments. The depositors'
expectations of profits are accompanied by their willingness to take
risk. A decline in the bank's assets leads to a devaluation in the
nominal value of investment deposits. The depositors can decide to
terminate their deposits at maturity and invest the residual
(adjusted for capital loss) in another Islamic bank. Or they may
retain their deposits in the expectation of a rebound in the asset
value of the bank which might cover their book losses and realise
some gain. We can say that a long-term depositor would prefer to	 *
retain rather than withdraw his deposit assuming that: (i) investment
deposits are long-term in nature, (ii) long-term savers/investors are
usually unaffected by cyclical fluctuations in earnings, (iii)
depositors are not allowed to terminate their deposits before
maturity (except in special cases), and (iv) a written notice of
withdrawal should be given in advance.
Thus it could be said that Islamic banks can withstand a crisis
caused by a decline in their assets more than interest based banks in
the medium term.
Miscellaneous Advantages
Undoubtedly, the development of leasing, hire purchase and
installment credit has permitted the commercial and merchant banks
(through their subsidiaries) "to provide more support to industry
than they could otherwise with prudence, and are often more
appropriate than conventional overdrafts for the financing of plant
However, a conventional bank is better equipped in facing
liquidity shortages than Islamic banks due to the availability
of paper money market and secondary market whereby the bank can
liquidate treasury bills and obtain money at call or short
notice.
2 Volker Nienhaus, "Islamic Banking: Microeconomic Instruments &
Macroecor1oniic Implications", Arab jpj, London: Nov/Dec 1986,
p29.
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and equipment". 1
 This is partly due to the fact that in the above
facilities the banks retain ownership of the asset and partly due to
the link between the banks' decision for financing and the future
cash flow to be generated by those assets.2
Final Remarks and Recommendations
This chapter has examined the pros and cons of interest-free banking
in Kuwait. It has concluded that a gradual evolution should protect
this experiment against failure and assist in anticipating possible
hurdles during the implementation process. Although prior
preparation is a cushion against failure, future success is not
guaranteed unless concerted efforts are augmented in building a solid
foundation. An objective outlook will nevertheless assist in
focusing our attention on possible weaknesses and will help in
formulating the type of policies that would minimise the risk that is
normally associated with ill-prepared revoluationary actions.
The main objectives and services that are currently provided by the
financial intermediaries in Kuwait would basically remain the same
after the abolition of interest. These services include: (a)
management of the payment mechanism; (b) reduction of risk through
portfolio diversification; (c) reduction in the cost of transactions;
(d) maturity transformation by accepting funds for various short-term
maturities (mainly saving accounts) and redeploying them for longer
periods; 3 Ce) promotion and investment in halal enterprises; and (f)
investment advisory services.
The elimination of interest will necessitate a drastic change in the
range of financial instruments that will be offered. In Chapter Six
a new range of financial services was introduced including Islamic
project financing which is best suited for large capital intensive
projects. This type of finance is appropriate for international
finance by Kuwaiti banks on Islamic principles. Further research is
I	 "Banks and Small. Firms", Banking Information Service, London:
May 1983, p9.
2	 Ibid, p9. See also Summary of Efficiency Section, Supra.
3	 This does not apply ; however, to specified mudaraba accounts
which are geared to specific periods and projects.
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needed to devise a legal framework for project finance in compliance
with Islamic law. Equity finance and subordinated capital are good
substitutes for medium and long-term lending in the conventional
system. Redeemable participation and murabaha could be used in the
main for working capital and trade finance.
Though mudaraba deposits are likely to encounter a loss of return in
one year, the expected stream of income in the subsequent years might
well offset the loss. However, one cannot deny the uncertainty
inherent in investment deposits if they were not managed properly.
Several investment and financing policies could be applied by an
Islamic bank to minimise uncertainties and generate a relatively
stable income stream. These policies would include:
1) diversification of mudaraba and investment portfolios among
various sectors and groups of investors/entrepreneurs.
2) splitting the investors' deposits (with their consent) into:
-	 demand deposits which are fully guaranteed by the banks.
-	 savings deposits which are not guaranteed but,
nevertheless, savers may withdraw their deposits upon
request or whenever they sense any difficulties facing
the bank.1
-	 investment type deposits.
There is a need for the creation of innovating approaches to cope
with the various needs of financing on the corporate and personal
levels. Failing that, corporate borrowers including Islamic banks
will find it difficult to obtain short term money to ease liquidity
shortages. Likewise, consumers will find it difficult to obtain
personal loans, for example, for recreational or unspecified
purposes. This has advantages and disadvantages. By eliminating
financial loans or overdrafts, speculation in the stock market will
be dwarfed leading to more stable prices. In the absence of lending
co-operatives and the limitations of interest free loans,
If a bank run occurs, an Islamic bank may become insolvent and
may not be ab1 to meet neither saving or demand deposits
withdrawals. A conventional bank is liable to face the same
position unless the central bank would step in both systems for
rescue.
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disintermediation would be encouraged causing a black market for
disguised nba to flourish.
The price of funds (to the users) in murabaha and other trade-related
instruments would have to be organised and co-. ordinated between the
authorities and financial institutions. It is expected that savers
and investors would be relating the margin (in murabaha or leasing)
to interest in the early phases of the abolition of nba. This could
be tolerated for a while but after some time the margin would have to
reflect criteria which could be laid down after studying the trend in
profit margin generally in the economy. One of the criterion would
be the cash flow generated from the leased asset. The rental charges
would be a ratio of the net cash flow during the rental period.
As for structural stability, it is expected that the central bank
would continue its role, as currently is the case, in providing tacit
support to the banking sector. If a 100 percent reserve system were
applied in Kuwait, there would be no need for the reserve ratio.
Although the system would be more stable than a fractional reserve
one, 1 monetary policy would be curtailed as the monetary authority
would not be able to use the reserve ratios to control credit
expansion and may have to control the monetary base instead.
The elimination of interest is one of the crucial steps for
instigating an Islamic economy. There are some controversial issues
that ought to be resolved, and some hurdles and contraints that
should be tackled in order to pave the way for a smooth
transformation. These may include studying the effects of an
interest-free system on the equilibrating mechanism in the market for
loanable funds, the effect of uncertainty on liquidity preference and
hoardings and on the supply of savings among small savers and low
income brackets, the effects of PLS on the supply of funds to small
For example, altering the reserve ratio by a small fraction
will cause a significant change in deposits as a result of the
multiplier, leading to instability due to the wide variation
between high-powered money and the level of banks' deposits.
Such variation would be eliminated in a 100 percent reserve
system since, high powered money and the money supply would be
equated when the multiplier would be equal to unity. See Iqhal
and Mirakhor, Occasional Papers, No 49, 1987, p 73, arid M
Rhan, 1985, p cit, pp 8-19.
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businesses and risk capital and the ways and means for fostering
entrepreneurial activities. It would be difficult to install the new
system and guarantee its viability without a solid legal framework
that regularises instruments and institutions, and prescribes the
rights and obligations of those concerned.
A shallow and underdeveloped money and capital market is yet another
limitation. Liquidity, liability and asset management are all
dependent on the availability of a. primary and secondary market to
provide liquidity and flexibility to the institutions and individuals
as well.	 Although many of the issues would not be resolved
overnight, it is equally undesirable to eliminate interest and leave
them unabated. For example, the elimination of interest without
formulating an Islamic monetary variable would weaken monetary
control. The authorities would have to decide whether to allow the
discount window during the transition or not and to study the impact
of either decision on the efficacy of the policy. Asset
concentration is another impediment. Further research is needed in
order to devlop a policy for fostering development finance in the
Kuwaiti commercial banks by reducing their concentration on short-
term lending, and for facilitating their adjustments to the new PLS
system.
Policy makers will face other difficulties concerning behavioural and
ethical issues and the necessity to reduce the moral hazard problem
(which will hinder the implementation of equity based lending).
Reducing information cost and adapting a PLS system precipitate
broadening the professional skills of banks' personnel and developing
their expertise in project evaluation and Islamic financing methods.
New techniques for government borrowing on a PLS basis could be
devised to finance development projects. Two methods have been
suggested, one through cost/benefit related securities, and the
second through tenders whereby a group of investors would set up the
project(s) and lease it back to the government (see deficit finance).
There is a need, however, to establish a legal and technical
framework to carry out government borrowing on a PLS basis, More
significantly policy makers have to study the implications of PLS
borrowing from the public as opposed to taxation in financing
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government spending vis-a-vis the impact on zakat collection.
Neither of these methods are used at present in Kuwait.
Islamic finance links capital with industry and commerce through
profit and loss sharing arrangements without interest. For the first
time in modern history an Islamic financing mechanism has become a
reality. This development is not just a matter of theory but a dream
come true.
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APPENDIX
Wage versus Share System
PLS as outlined in this thesis could be extended to labour/employer
contracts. Unlike PLS, wage vs share system has not been rigorously
tackled in the Islamic literature. Our aim at this stage is to
briefly eniphasise that the share system has had its roots in the
Islamic market and that this system could be a substitute for the
existing wage system in industry and for promoting small business in
Kuwait. Recalling that young Kuwaitis regard wage labour as
degrading and they usually refuse to work in the assembly line (see
Chapter Three, Manpower), we may realise the importance of the
sharing system in solving this problem as indicated in this quotation
from Udovitch:
"From the Ceniza documents it is apparent that employment as a
form of economic collaboration was eschewed since dependence
upon others for livelihood was considered degrading and
humiliating. Consequently many enterprises, no matter how
modest a scale, requiring the combined efforts of more than one
person would be organisd in the form of partnerships and
commenced as (mudaraba)".
For Kuwait the share system may encompass a combination of wages and
profit sharing in industry. This system has some merits. First, the
worker must earn a minimum wage to sustain a living and spend on his
family. 2
 Without this minimum, the Kuwaiti labour would not have the
required incentive to participate in the scheme. Second, the idea of
profit will create the necessary motivation and reduce enforcement
costs. Thirdly, during depression, profit distribution may be cut
back rather than laying off workers. More significantly, the scheme
provides the necessary inpetus for young Kuwaitis to work in
industry. This policy will reduce the dependence on foreign labour
and creates more jobs for newly graduates from technical colleges.
1	 Op cit, 1970, p184.
2	 Same views advocated by Islamic writers see Hakim Said "The
Employer and the Employee, the Islamic Concept", Karachi,
Motamar Al-Alam Al-Islami, 1964. For Western advocates see
Bert L Metzger, "Evolution of the Profit-Sharing/Share
Ownership Philosophy Worldwide", Evenston, Profit Sharing
Research Foundation, 1980, Quoted by Raffi, 1983, p255.
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